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THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
Foreword 
AQUESTION vital to the continuation of our federal system is whether states will or can take care of the demands made for governmental services in the 
areas where they are competent to act, or whether by failing 
to respond to this need, pressures will continue to be placed 
upon the federal government for increased intervention by 
way of financial assistance. It is hardly deniable that the 
states on the whole have access to economic resources and 
wealth which are adequate to support a tax structure yielding 
the revenues needed to finance their programs. The truth is, 
however, that, whatever the reason, the states in many in-
stances are facing financial crises in attempting to meet budg-
etary demands. In a number of areas the federal government 
is already lending assistance financed by means of federal 
taxes derived from the same sources that lie within the com-
petence of the states to reach. Perhaps one explanation is a 
more conservative political leadership in the states with re-
spect to taxation and spending. Perhaps also citizens share 
the illusion that money which comes from the federal gov-
ernment does not dip into their pockets as much as local 
taxes do. But certainly also an important part of the picture is 
that states by their constitutional provisions have imposed 
limitations upon their taxing problems which often create very 
real barriers to effective financing of state programs. These 
limitations have usually had a long history and go back to an 
earlier time when the property tax was relied upon almost 
exclusively as a source of state revenue. They reflect a dis-
trust and skepticism with respect to unlimited taxing power 
and the feeling that constitutional safeguards should be in-
serted to protect against abuse of the taxing authority. Prob-
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ably the foremost of these limitations imbedded in state con-
stitutions is that one which requires uniformity and equality 
of taxation. A common result of these provisions is to ham-
string the legislature in attempting to make the property tax 
system more flexible through exemptions, diversification of 
tax rates and classification of taxable property. Moreover, 
these provisions as judicially interpreted have often stood 
as barriers to the development of other kinds of taxes, notably 
the income tax, which are capable of yielding substantial 
revenues, which may temper the burden of the property tax 
and contribute to a more equitable and better balanced tax 
structure. 
Professor Newhouse's work is a very valuable contribution 
to the study and understanding of the uniformity and equal-
ity limitations. This is the most complete and thorough 
treatment of these constitutional provisions that has appeared 
to date. Professor Newhouse has examined these provisions, 
state by state, has set forth their history, and analyzed the 
judicial interpretation placed upon them. He has done all 
this with painstaking and methodical thoroughness in order 
to determine the conceptual and practical significance of 
these limitations as they relate to each of the states and also 
to assess the total results on a comparative basis. The sep-
arate treatment of each of the states in the various divisions 
included in the author's treatment furnishes a series of mon-
ographs which in themselves constitute highly valuable analy-
ses and commentaries. But the book also assumes a wider 
significance because of the conclusions drawn and the com-
parisons made on the basis of the separate state-by-state 
studies. The author's total treatment reveals an extraordi-
nary intimacy with the large body of constitutional provi-
sions and judicial decisions embraced in the study. 
In order to facilitate the comparative study and thereby 
make the entire project more meaningful, the author has 
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very carefully divided the uniformity provisions into nine 
different classes and has conducted the state studies by refer-
ence to the appropriate class in which a given state is found. 
Moreover, he has at the very outset, and the reader is well 
advised to note this carefully, defined his terms very accu-
rately in order to furnish more useful tools of analysis in 
dealing with the problems of judicial interpretation. The 
overall study makes clear another conclusion which of course 
is evident in other fields of constitutional interpretation, 
namely, that courts, starting with the same or approximately 
the same language, reach widely divergent results based on 
the approach they make to these provisions. As the author 
points out, the judicial conception of basic economic policy 
and the need for flexibility in the tax structure may readily 
induce one court to adopt an interpretation which makes 
words meaningful in a sense quite different from the result 
reached by another state court which may be more literally 
or conceptually minded and reaches decisions without regard 
to present fiscal policy considerations. 
The writer deals with the case materials in each state in 
a very critical way in order to see the underlying ideas that 
have been developed, the consistency and coherence in re-
sults reached, and the extent to which policy considerations 
have entered into these decisions. In turn, he draws upon the 
common fund of knowledge derived from a separate study 
of each of the states to make his illuminating comparative 
studies in a later chapter. As an illustration of the problems 
faced in regard to new types of taxes and the difficulties in-
volved in fitting them into constitutional limitations prem-
ised on historical considerations, Professor Newhouse has 
devoted a chapter to the history of state income tax laws and 
the problems faced by the courts in adapting them to uni-
formity limitations. As Professor Newhouse points out, the 
later trend has been to find a basis for justifying income 
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taxes notwithstanding an earlier view that an income tax 
was a tax on property and therefore had to meet the uniform-
ity requirement. The chapter on the income tax is a good 
commentary on the need of revision of constitutional pro-
visions in order to make them adequate to modern fiscal 
needs. 
The author concludes in the end that while much can be 
achieved by liberal interpretation of these provisions to pre-
vent their becoming unduly rigid as a limitation on legisla-
tive tax power, there is need for clarification of these con-
stitutional provisions through the amendment process so as 
to define more precisely the objectives of these limitations, 
the exceptions to them and the particular taxes that may be 
authorized notwithstanding these restrictions. Certainly it has 
placed an almost intolerable burden upon the courts to ac-
commodate these provisions to modern needs. They are faced 
with the choice either of adhering to judicially established 
conceptual interpretations that may severely circumscribe 
legislative discretion in devising a modern, equitable and 
adequate tax structure or of resorting to liberal interpreta-
tions founded on policy considerations which may have the 
effect of diluting the significance of these provisions to the 
point where they are no longer meaningful. There is much 
to be said for the idea of complete revision of these provi-
sions in the interest of clarity and greater precision. Perhaps, 
indeed, the time has come to eliminate the separate uniform-
ity provisions altogether and to rely instead upon the broad 
limitations of due process and equal protection to protect 
against arbitrary exercise of the tax power. Flexible and 
adequate taxation powers must be accorded state legislatures 
if the states are to preserve a substantial degree of self-re-
liance as opposed to looking for aid to the federal govern-
ment with its virtually unlimited tax powers. 
Professor Newhouse is to be congratulated on the thor-
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ough and patient research, careful and critical analysis, ex-
cellent organization and clarity of presentation which com-
bine to make this volume a very useful sourcebook and com-
mentary in dealing with the vital problems raised by these 
constitutional limitations. Here is a work that should prove 
to be of enduring value to lawyers, legislators and judges in 
dealing with the concrete problems arising under these limi-
tations at the present time. It should also prove invaluable to 
students of public finance and to those who are concerned 
with the problems of constitutional revision. 
PAuL G. KAuPER 
Preface 
T HE method of approach and arrangement of ma-terials are developed during the course of the monograph. Therefore, it is not necessary to repeat 
them here. The purpose of the study is twofold. First, it 
should provide background material for constitutional re-
vision. Second, it should aid counsel and court in deciding 
cases arising under existing constitutional limitations and 
state legislatures in drafting tax measures in such a way that 
pitfalls in existing limitations are avoided. 
The greater part of this monograph was prepared during 
a two year period from June 19 51 to 19 53, while I was a Re-
search Assistant with the Legislative Research Center, Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School. It was completed during 
succeeding summers, and I have attempted to reflect all 
cases decided through the summer of 1 9 56. It is a great 
pleasure for me to acknowledge my indebtedness to Profes-
sor William J. Pierce, Director of the Center, with whom I 
had day to day contact while writing the monograph, and to 
Professor Paul G. Kauper, who read the manuscript and gave 
helpful criticism. Of course, the views and conclusions ex-
pressed are those of the writer, who accepts full responsibility 
for any defects as may appear. 
School of Law 
University of Buffalo 
Buffalo, New York 
WADE J. NEWHOUSE, JR. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
ON February 8th, 1955, upon submitting to the Con-gress his recommendations concerning federal as-sistance to the states in the construction of school 
facilities, President Eisenhower stated: 
These are the facts of the classroom shortage: 
The latest information submitted by the States to the Of-
fice of Education indicates that there is a deficit of more than 
300,000 classrooms, a legacy-in part-of the years of war 
and defense mobilization when construction had to be cur-
tailed. In addition, to keep up with mounting enrollments, 
the Nation must build at least 50,000 new elementary and 
high school classrooms yearly. It must also replace the thou-
sands of classrooms which became unsafe or otherwise un-
usable each year. 
. . . [ M] illions of children still attend schools which are 
unsafe or which permit learning only part-time or under 
conditions of serious overcrowding. To build satisfactory 
classrooms for all our children, the current rate of school 
buildings must be multiplied sharply and this increase must 
be sustained. 
Fundamentally, the remedy lies with the State and their 
communities.1 
There is a profound difference of opinion concerning the ex-
tent to which the federal government should participate in 
the education of the nation's children, but it is generally 
agreed that the task is a basic function of state and local gov-
ernment. Moreover, partisans from both sides of the aisle 
deplore further concentration of functions in Washington: 
We talk about and we deplore incessantly the increasing cen-
tralization of power over our lives in Washington. But that 
1 101 Cong. Record 1047 (1955). Emphasis added. 
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tidal drift toward the Capital will go on and on unless those 
necessary functions of government which don't have to be 
performed in Washington are performed, and properly per-
formed, at the state and the local level. 
The people will demand the services, and if they don't get 
them at home they will turn to Uncle Sam. And every dollar 
you send to Washington to pay for them will shrink before 
it gets back home . 
. . . [T] he states are the dikes which we can build more 
strongly against the flood waters ever sweeping toward the 
District of Columbia.2 
The problem of the public schools is simply a single ex-
ample of the many general problems facing state and local 
government today. There is a crying demand for the states 
to solve the problem of highways, to create or maintain in-
stitutions for the aged and infirm, and to provide increased 
services for the mentally ill, to name only a few of the many 
and complex services expected of modern government. If the 
increasing demands for state services are to be met, state 
revenues obviously must increase,S which means an added 
strain on already creaking state tax structures. As a result, 
2 From a speech by Gov. Adlai E. Stevenson, Democratic Presidential 
nominee in 19 52, at the Illinois State Fair. The New York Times, August 
15, 1952, p. 5, col. 3. 
3 For example, a press release of Commerce Clearing House, dated Janu-
ary 24, 19 55, indicated that many state legislatures in 19 55 faced a prob-
lem of reducing state services or levying new and higher taxes. Most of 
the reporting states heard urgent demands from their governors or tax 
study groups for bolstering their hard-pressed state treasuries. New York 
was told "the day of reckoning has come," and that city tax authorizations 
must be made on a permanent, not temporary basis. A commission urged a 
2 cent increase in the gasoline tax and a 3 cent increase in the diesel fuel 
tax. California had a bill pending to cancel scheduled reductions in gasoline 
and diesel fuel taxes. Massachusetts was informed that substantial new 
revenues must be found on a long-term basis. Vermonters received word that 
the state needed more money if it were to pay for increased services. West 
Virginia needed $7 million, and its legislators were asked to produce that 
sum within the framework of present taxes. Idaho was asked for $8.5 
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there will be demands for new sources of revenue, but in 
creating new tax structures the state legislatures must always 
operate within state constitutional limitations. 
Probably the most important of the state constitutional 
limitations upon the taxing power is the requirement that 
taxation be "uniform and equal" to some degree. That limi-
tation, which is the subject of this monograph, may have a 
profound effect on the choices available to a state legislature 
when it attempts to increase revenue yields. Therefore a 
comparative study of state constitutional uniformity limita-
tions on taxation seems desirable for two reasons: ( 1) to de-
termine the exact meaning of existing uniformity limitations 
in order to avoid unconstitutional exercises of the taxing 
power; and ( 2) to ascertain what uniformity limitations are 
desirable if existing ones are so strict as to preclude judicious 
exercise of the taxing power in the light of modern economic 
conditions. 
The constitutions of forty-three (possibly forty-five) of 
the forty-eight states contain provisions which may be de-
scribed as "uniformity clauses." Generalizing further about 
the uniformity limitation is a treacherous, though necessary, 
undertaking. 
In the first place, there is a substantial and significant di-
versity in the phraseology of the several types of so-called 
"uniformity clauses." Moreover, much like the commerce 
clause and the equal protection clause in the federal Consti-
tution, the language of these provisions is so general as to be 
meaningless without an extensive study of court decisions. 
million. Maine proposed a 3 cent sales tax and/or a personal income tax. 
In New Hampshire the governor suggested new sources of revenue. These, 
he said, would not be a sales or income tax. A I% income tax was proposed 
in the legislature. Utah reported that an automatic property tax increase 
for schools seemed "unavoidable." Washington was told its growing popula-
tion forced tax raises. For the long pull, suggestions were for an income tax 
for which a constitutional amendment is required. 
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This is not to say that the phraseology of the basic uniformity 
clauses is unimportant. The courts always purport to start 
from the words of the governing clause. Therefore, the states 
will be classified in this study on the basis of the phraseology 
of the basic uniformity clauses found in their respective con-
stitutions. This approach will provide significant comparisons 
between the "literal" limitations and the court-made "effec-
tive" limitations. 
A second reason for avoiding generalizations concerning 
the state uniformity clauses is that a considerable number of 
states have extremely complex uniformity structures. The 
basic uniformity clause is often supplemented by other con-
stitutional provisions directed to some particular phase of the 
general limitation. Therefore, the entire "uniformity struc-
ture" of each state constitution, rather than the basic uni-
formity clause alone, must be analyzed. 
The uniformity limitation has taken a definite form in 
each of the forty-eight states. In order to evaluate the limi-
tation properly, one must remember that in comparing state 
constitutional limitations it can not be said that a "single" 
requirement of uniformity in taxation applies throughout 
all of the states, or throughout several of the states. Even if 
identical effective limitations were found in all states, there 
would still be forty-eight such limitations. Therefore when 
the constitutional provision is framed in the equivocal lan-
guage common to the so-called uniformity clauses, it should 
come as no surprise that there may be several different in-
terpretations of identically phrased provisions. The follow-
ing comment, though made in another context, is quite ap-
propriate here: 
Indeed, in view of our constantly growing body of cases 
and statute law, it is believed that an increasingly fruitful 
type of legal research is that which concentrates on the law 
of a single jurisdiction. Not only does it provide a more pre-
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cise statement of legal doctrines of one state than can be de-
rived from more general treatises, but it also furnishes a 
unique basis for generalizations as to rules which are applica-
ble in all jurisdictions. After all, general statements about 
the American common-law, when in one sense there are in 
fact some forty-eight or more American common-law sys-
tems, are not uniformly helpful.4 
Substitute "state constitutional law" for "common-law," and 
justification is had for the approach and method of this 
monograph, the main body of which will consist of individual 
studies of the law in each of the forty-eight jurisdictions. 
* * * * * 
Confusion will be kept at a minimum if certain basic defi-
nitions are set forth and used throughout the monograph. In 
this way it is hoped that some apparent conflicts may be re-
solved, conflicts which stem from the fact that words de-
scribing the general limitation of uniformity are not always 
used with the same meaning. The particular rules of the gen-
eral limitation may be classified and studied according to 
the following elements of a "tax." (I) The object of a tax, 
which is the thing taxed; for example, property, sales of 
goods, income, the privilege of engaging in a certain type of 
business. ( 2) The base of the tax, which is the unit of taxa-
tion; for example, the value of the property taxed, a unit of 
weight or measure, the income from a business taxed, the 
price of a thing sold. ( 3) The rate of taxation, which is the 
amount per unit. The rate is usually stated in percentages; 
for example, three per cent of net income, four mills per dol-
lar of the value of property taxed. However, the rate may 
be stated as a flat rate, a certain sum per unit of taxation 
(e.g., two cents per bushel of grain taxed, or so many dollars 
4 Simes, Lewis M., Foreword to Fratcher, Perpetuities and Other Re-
straints, viii-ix (1954). 
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for each additional store operated by a single management). 
If the rate is uniform for each unit taxed, it is proportional. 
If the rate increases as the tax base increases, it is progressive. 
( 4) The method of taxation, which depends upon the 
combined base-rate structure. Thus, ad valorem refers to a 
combined base-rate structure of value-percentage rate. The 
method of taxation is primarily identified by the base used. 
The application of particular rules of uniformity depends 
upon the nature of the tax. All taxes fall into a dichotomy of 
property taxes and nonproperty taxes. This study of the uni-
formity limitation demonstrates, without doubt, that a sharp 
distinction has been made between these two types of taxes, 
with a stricter uniformity limitation usually being applied to 
property taxes. The basis of this classification of taxes is the 
object of the tax. Property taxes have property as their ob-
ject. All other taxes are denoted nonproperty taxes. How-
ever, a very few states have not employed this distinction. 
One may fundamentally disagree with any effort to 
distinguish between property and nonproperty taxes, and it 
appears quite clear that the dichotomy is the source of con-
siderable confusion. Nevertheless, in order to understand 
the meaning of the uniformity limitation as it is applied in 
each of the several states, one must accept and work with the 
distinction. Defects in theory cannot obviate its existence. 
* * * * * 
For reasons which will be made clear by the state by state 
analysis, it will be helpful to break down the general uni-
formity limitation into particular rules of uniformity. The 
particular rules, which apply to property taxes, correspond 
to the elements of the tax. 
Uniformity required of the object of property taxes. This 
particular rule concerns the exclusion from or inclusion 
within the object of a property tax. The basic question is: 
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must all property within the territory of a taxing authority, 
except that expressly designated as exemptible by the con-
stitution, be selected for the object of any property tax 
imposed by that authority? Conversely, is the exemption of 
classes of property from the property tax prohibited? If all 
property must be selected, and no property may be ex-
empted, there is said to be a requirement of universality. The 
further question arises: is the universality requirement de-
rived from the basic uniformity clause, or is the requirement 
found in phrases apart from the basic clause? 
Uniformity required of the effective rate of a property 
tax. The effective rate of a property tax is the combined base-
rate structure. This combination is significant because prop-
erty selected for property taxation may be classified for the 
application of different effective rates in either of two ways. 
First, all property may be assessed for taxation at the same 
ratio of valuation and different percentage rates applied to 
different classes of property. The ratio of valuation is the 
per cent of "actual" value at which property is entered on the 
tax rolls. Second, all property may be subject to the same 
percentage rate, but classified for the application of different 
ratios of valuation. 5 Is an absolute uniformity required so 
that all property must be taxed at the same effective rate? 
Or, is there only a requirement of uniformity within classes, 
so that property may be classified for the application of either 
different ratios of valuation or different percentage rates? 
The uniformity limitation is a territorial requirement. 
That is, rates imposed by the state must be uniform through-
out the state, those by the county throughout the county, etc. 
There is no requirement that the rates of the different taxing 
authorities be correlated. 
Double taxation is one aspect of the problem of uniformity 
II Generally see Leland, The Classified Property Tax in the United Statea, 
Ch. II, especially at 52 ( 1928). 
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in effective rates. If an item of property is either subject to 
two taxes by the same taxing authority, or subject to the same 
tax twice, it is apparent that the effective rate for that class of 
property will vary from the effective rates applicable to other 
property. If absolute uniformity is required, double taxation 
would obviously violate the requirement. The issue of dou-
ble taxation becomes acute when representative intangible 
property is taxed. This raises the only really difficult ques-
tion: just when is the "same property" being taxed twice? 
This question necessitates a consideration of the relationship 
between representative intangible property and the tangible 
property which it represents. For example, X farm is encum-
bered with a mortgage. Are the farm land and the mortgage 
to be considered, for purposes of uniformity in taxation, the 
"same" property? If so, the taxation of both (the farm as 
realty and the mortgage as intangible property) results in 
double taxation. 
Uniformity required in the method of taxing property. 
Does the basic uniformity clause require that property be 
taxed only by the ad valorem method? Or, may specific 
property taxes be imposed? 
* * * * * 
An understanding of these definitions and particular rules 
of uniformity will assist immeasurably in comparing the state 
constitutional uniformity and equality limitations. 
CHAPTER II 
A Comparison, Solely 
According to Phraseology, of the State 
Constitutional Provisions 
A. THE NINE BASIC TYPES OF UNIFORMITY CLAUSES 
examination of the constitutional provisions which 
may be called basic uniformity clauses reveals nine 
typical clauses. The distinguishing characteristics of 
the several types relate to the manner in which the words 
"uniform" and "equal" are used. First it will be helpful 
simply to set forth the several typical clauses and indicate 
those states having such provisions. Any doubtful classifica-
tions of particular states will be justified later in this chapter. 
The first two types of uniformity clauses are identified 
by the use of the word "value" and obviously have a close 
kinship. 
TYPE I: Property shall be taxed according to its value. 
Three states have substantially such a clause which serves as 
the primary uniformity provision. They are Arkansas, 
Maine, and Tennessee. 
TYPE II: Property shall be taxed in proportion to its 
value. 
Four states have substantially such a constitutional provision. 
They are Alabama, California, Illinois, and Nebraska. The 
third typical clause is closely related to Types I and II. 
TYPE III: The legislature may impose proportional 
and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes upon all 
persons and estates within the state. 
9 
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Only two states, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, have 
such a basic uniformity clause. 
The next three typical clauses are closely related because 
of the manner in which they use the words "equal" and 
"uniform." 
TYPE IV: There shall be a uniform rule of taxation. 
Four states have substantially such a constitutional provision 
which serves as a basic provision. They are Michigan, New 
Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin. 
TYPE V: Taxation shall be equal and uniform. 
The four states having a Type V basic clause are Mississippi, 
Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
TYPE VI: The legislature shall provide by law for a 
uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation. 
Six states have substantially such a constitutional provision 
serving as the basic uniformity provision. They are Florida, 
Indiana, Kansas, Nevada, South Carolina, and Utah. 
There are two typical clauses, Types VII and VIII, which 
are framed in terms of "uniformity within classes." 
TYPE VII: Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class 
of subjects. 
Thirteen states have this type of provision as a basic uni-
formity clause. They are Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, 
Idaho, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New 
Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. 
TYPE VIII: Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class 
of property. 
Seven states have this type of basic uniformity clause. They 
are Arizona, Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington. 
Rhode Island and Vermont have no provision which 
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might be called a uniformity clause other than a provision 
similar to the following: 
TYPE IX: There shall be a fair distribution of the ex-
pense of government. 
Three states, Connecticut, Iowa, and New York, have no 
uniformity clause whatsoever. 
B. ANALYSIS OF EACH STATE'S UNIFORMITY STRUCTURE 
One purpose of this preliminary analysis is to justify the 
inclusion of each state within a particular group and to note 
any variations from the typical clauses. Another purpose is 
to describe the supplementary provisions which deal with 
particular problems of uniformity. In this way the uniform-
ity structure of each state can be seen as an integrated whole. 
Within each group of states, after a discussion of the basic 
uniformity clauses, the following supplementary provisions 
will be described: ( 1 ) provisions concerned with the degree 
of uniformity required of the object of a property tax; (2) 
provisions concerned with the method of property taxation; 
( 3) provisions concerned with the uniformity required of 
the effective rates of property taxes; ( 4) provisions expressly 
providing for different types of taxes. 
No attempt will be made in this preliminary analysis to 
comment on historical trends. Each of the state studies in 
Chapter III contains an historical note, and a comparative 
summary of the historical growth of the uniformity clauses 
is included in Chapter V. The entire uniformity structure of 
each state is reproduced in the Appendix. 
1. States with Type I Clauses 
Three states-Arkansas, Maine, and Tennessee-make 
up the group having a basic uniformity clause of Type I: 
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"Property shall be taxed according to its value." The Maine 
uniformity clause, found in Art. IX, §8, of the 1819 Con-
stitution, must be paraphrased somewhat in order to classify 
it as a Type I clause. The entire provision reads: 
All taxes up on real [and personal] estate, assessed by 
authority of this state, shall be apportioned and assessed 
equally, according to the just value thereof; [but the legis-
lature shall have power to levy a tax upon intangible per-
sonal property at such rate as it deems wise and equitable 
without regard to the rate applied to other classes of prop-
erty.] 
The phrase "and personal," modifying estate, was added by 
amendment in 18 7 5. The proviso concerning the taxation of 
intangibles was added by amendment in 1913. 
Arkansas and Tennessee fall more naturally into this 
group. In addition, their uniformity structures are much 
more elaborate than Maine's. The basic uniformity clause in 
each instance is similar to the following: 
All property [subject to taxation] shall be taxed according 
to its value, that value to be ascertained in such manner as 
the legislature shall direct. . . . 
The Arkansas Constitution of 1874, Art. XVI, §5, in-
cludes the phrase "subject to taxation" and adds this clause: 
"making the same equal and uniform throughout the state." 
This last clause seems to refer to "value," so that the Arkan-
sas Constitution does not contain a Type V uniformity clause: 
viz., "Taxation shall be equal and uniform." In the Arkansas 
provision the words "equal and uniform" are clearly sub-
ordinated to the "ad valorem" clause. 
The Tennessee Constitution of 1870, Art. II, §28, omits 
the phrase "subject to taxation," and adds a clause reading 
"so that taxes shall be equal and uniform throughout the 
state." This additional clause places Tennessee in a unique 
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posttwn. It is substantially identical to the Type V clause, 
which reads: "Taxation shall be equal and uniform." How-
ever, it is suggested that the words "so that" subordinate 
this clause, making it a supplementary provision, with the 
result that the "ad valorem" clause is the basic uniformity 
provision in the Tennessee Constitution.1 The words "so 
that" imply that equality and uniformity in taxation follow 
from taxing property "according to its value." 
Method of taxing property. None of the constitutions of 
these states have provisions other than the basic uniformity 
clause which are concerned with the method of taxing prop-
erty. This is to be expected since the basic uniformity clause 
itself is phrased in terms of ad valorem taxation of property. 
Object, property taxation. Both the Arkansas2 and Ten-
nessee3 constitutions require the exemption of specified prop-
erty. The phrase in the Arkansas uniformity clause which 
reads "All property subject to taxation" must be reconciled 
with Art. XVI, §6, which states that "All laws exempting 
property from taxation other than as provided in this Con-
stitution shall be void." Article II, §28 of the Tennessee 
Constitution provides that "All property, real, personal or 
mixed, shall be taxed but" that certain enumerated classes of 
property shall be exempted. This provision is in addition to 
the following words of the basic uniformity clause: "All 
property shall be taxed according to its value .... " Thus, 
both Arkansas and Tennessee have constitutional provisions 
which point to a likely requirement of universality. 
1 Compare the Ohio clause, infra, classified as Type IV. The basic clause 
in the Ohio Constitution reads: "Land and improvements thereon shall be 
taxed by a uniform rule according to value." The words emphasize "uniform 
rule" rather than "according to value." 
2 Ark. Canst. Art. XVI, § 5 ( 18 7 4) and Amendments Nos. 12 and 22. 
In addition, Amendment No. 27 contains a permissive exemption. 
8 Tenn. Canst. Art. I, §§28, 30 (1870). 
14 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
Effective rates, property taxation. As pointed out previ-
ously, the Maine "uniformity clause" has been amended so 
that the "rate"-note the singular-on intangible personal 
property need not be correlated with the "rate" applied to 
other classes of property. In both Arkansas and Tennessee 
the basic "uniformity clause" is supplemented by a special 
provision which concerns uniformity in the effective rates of 
property taxes. In the constitutions of both of these states4 
the basic uniformity clause is followed in the same provision 
by this clause: 
No one species of property from which a tax may be col-
lected, shall be taxed higher than any other species of prop-
erty of the same value. . . • 
Other taxes. In the constitutions of both Arkansas15 and 
Tennessee6 the supplementary clause as to effective rates is 
coupled with a proviso which states that certain enumerated 
occupations and "privileges" generally are to be taxed in 
"such manner" as the legislature might deem proper. In ad-
dition, Art. II, §28 of the Tennessee Constitution provides: 
The legislature shall have power to levy a tax upon incomes 
derived from stocks and bonds that are not taxed ad 
valorem. 
4 Ark. Const. Art. XVI, § 5 ( 1874); Tenn. Const. Art. II, §28 (I 870). 
In addition the Tennessee Constitution has a special provision concerning 
the uniformity required of the rate applicable to a particular class of prop-
erty. Article II, §28 provides: "The portion of a Merchant's Capital used 
in the purchase of Merchandise sold by him to non-residents and sent be-
yond the State, shall not be taxed at a higher rate than the ad valorem tax 
on property." 
11 Ark. Const. Art. XVI, §5 (1874): " ••• provided the General As-
sembly shall have power from time to time to tax hawkers, peddlers, ferries, 
exhibitions and privileges, in such manner as may be deemed proper." 
6 Tenn. Const. Art. II, §28 ( 1870): "But the Legislature shall have 
power to tax Merchants, Peddlers, and privileges, in such manner as they 
may from time to time direct." 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 15 
Miscellaneous. The Tennessee Constitution7 has a uni-
formity clause directed solely to local taxes. The Arkansas 
Constitution8 contains a unique provision, which is in effect 
a uniformity clause limiting local "special assessments." 
2. States with Type II Clauses 
Four states-Alabama, California, Illinois, and Nebraska 
-constitute the group having basic uniformity clauses 
phrased substantially like the Type II clause: "Property 
shall be taxed in proportion to its value." However, there 
is some diversity in phraseology. The clauses in Alabama and 
California most closely resemble each other and the typical 
clause. Article XI, §211 of the Alabama Constitution of 
1 90 1 provides that: 
All taxes levied on property in this state shall be assessed 
in exact proportion to the value of such property. . . . 
Article XIII, § 1 of the California Constitution of 18 79 pro-
vides that: 
All property in the State except as otherwise in this Con-
stitution provided, not exempt under the laws of the United 
States, shall be taxed in proportion to its value. . . . 
However, the effectiveness of this uniformity clause has been 
severely limited since 1933, when Art. XIII, § 14, ~4 was 
amended to increase the power of the legislature in respect 
to the taxation of personal property.9 
7 Tenn. Canst. Art. II, §29 (18i0), providing as to county and town 
taxes that: "all property shall be taxed according to its value, upon the 
principles established in regard to State taxation." 
8 Ark. Canst. Art. XIX, §2i (18i4): " ... such [special] assessments 
shall be ad valorem and uniform." 
9 Paragraph 4 of Art. XIII, § 14 reads: 
The Legislature shall have the power to provide for the assessment, 
levy and collection of taxes upon all forms of tangible personal property, 
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The Illinois and Nebraska basic uniformity clauses vary 
somewhat from the phraseology of the typical clause, yet 
they may reasonably be classified in this group. Article IX, 
§ 1 of the Illinois Constitution of 18 70 reads: 
The general assembly shall provide such revenue as may 
be needful by levying a tax, by valuation, so that every per-
son and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value 
of his, her or its property. . . . 
The Nebraska Constitution of 18 7 5 was amended in 1 92 0 so 
that Art. VII, §1 now reads: 
... taxes shall be levied by valuation uniformly and pro-
portionately upon all tangible property and franchises, and 
taxes uniform as to class may be levied by valuation upon 
all other property. 
Before 1920 the Nebraska uniformity clause was identical 
with the present Illinois provision except that the words 
"and franchises" appeared after the word "property." How-
ever, as in the California Constitution, the amendment 
limited the application of the basic uniformity clause to 
"tangible property and franchises," and provided a more 
liberal uniformity limitation for the taxation of "all other 
all notes, debentures, shares of capital stock, bonds, solvent credits, deeds 
of trust, mortgages, and any legal or equitable interest therein, not ex-
empt from taxation under the provisions of this Constitution, in such 
manner, and at such rates, as may be provided by law, and in pursuance 
of the exercise of such power the Legislature . . . may classify any and 
all kinds of personal property for the purposes of assessment and taxation 
in a manner and at a rate or rates in proportion to value different from 
any other property in this State subject to taxation and may exempt en-
tirely from taxation any or all forms, types or classes of personal property. 
Article XIII, §I contains, in addition to the basic uniformity clause set 
forth in the text, a definition of "property" by enumeration so that it 
definitely includes intangibles. This is, of course, superseded by the amend-
ment to Art. XIII, § 14 providing for separate treatment of personal prop-
erty. 
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property." The Nebraska uniformity clause obviously de-
viates substantially from the norm for this group. However, 
it falls more naturally under the Type II clause than any 
other, and its phraseology is not so different as to warrant a 
separate classification. 
Method of taxing property. There are no provisions in the 
constitutions of these states, other than the basic uniformity 
clauses, which deal with the method to be used in taxing 
property. As under Type I, this is not unexpected, since the 
uniformity clause is framed in terms of ad valorem taxation 
of property. 
Object, property taxation. Apart from the basic uniformity 
clauses, the following provisions are relevant in determining 
the uniformity required of the object of property taxes. The 
Alabama Constitution10 contains a provision requiring the 
exemption of specified property. The Illinois Constitution11 
contains a provision which permits the exemption of specified 
property. The California Constitution12 contains both per-
missive and mandatory exemption provisions. In addition, 
the provision13 concerning uniformity in the taxation of per-
sonal property expressly provides that the legislature may 
exempt classes of personal property from taxation. The 
Nebraska Constitution14 contains both permissive and manda-
tory exemption provisions. In addition, exemption of 
property other than that specified is expressly prohibited.15 
Effective rates, property taxation. Provisions other than 
the basic uniformity clauses which concern uniformity in 
10 Ala. Canst. Art. IV, §91 (1901). 
11 Ill. Canst. Art. IX, §3 (1870). 
12 Cal. Canst. Art. XIII, §I (1879), and numerous provisions providing 
for the exemption of certain classes of property. See the discussion of the 
California limitation in Chapter III, infra. 
13 Art. XIII, §14, ~4 supra note 9. 
14 Neb. Canst. Art. VIII, §2 (1875). 
15 /bid. 
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effective rates are found in both the Alabama and California 
constitutions. Art. XI, §217 of the Alabama Constitution re-
quires that the property of corporations and individuals 
"shall forever be taxed at the same rate." Article XIII, § 14 
of the California Constitution provides that personal property 
shall not be taxed at a greater rate than realty.16 In addition, 
both the Alabama17 and the California18 constitutions have 
provisions designed to prohibit the "double taxation" of cer-
tain representative property. 
Other taxes. The Illinois and Nebraska constitutions have 
general provisions providing for taxes other than property 
taxes. The Illinois basic uniformity clause is followed by a 
proviso stating that certain enumerated occupations and 
"privileges" may be taxed uniformly as to classes.19 The 
Nebraska Constitution simply provides in Art. VII, §1 that 
"Taxes, other than property taxes, may be authorized by 
law." In the Alabama20 and California21 constitutions there 
16 The provision reads: 
. . . no tax burden shall be imposed upon any personal property either 
tangible or intangible which shall exceed the tax burden on real property 
in the same taxing jurisdiction in proportion to the actual value of such 
property. 
17 Ala. Const. Art. XI, §211 ( 190 I). 
18 Cal. Const. Art. XIII, §I (1879). 
19 Ill. Const. Art. IX, §I ( 1870): 
••• but the general assembly shall have power to tax peddlers, auction-
eers, brokers, hawkers, merchants, commission merchants, showmen, jug-
glers, innkeepers, grocery keepers, liquor dealers, toll bridges, ferries, 
insurance, telegraph and express interests or business, vendors of patents, 
and persons or corporations owning or using franchises and privileges, in 
such manner as it shall from time to time direct by general law, uniform 
as to the class upon which it operates, 
20 Ala. Const. Art. XIII, §§229, 232 ( 190 I) (corporate franchise tax); 
Arndt. XXIII (inheritance tax); Art. XXII (net income tax). 
21 Cal. Const. Art. XIII, §II (1879) (income tax, "in such manner as 
shall be prescribed by law"); Art. XIII, §14 4/5 (insurance companies, 
gross premiums tax); Art. XIII, §16 (bank franchise tax measured by net 
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art> numerous provisions authorizing particular taxes, includ-
ing income taxes. 
l'v.,_,scellaneous. The Illinois22 and Nebraska23 constitutions 
have uniformity clauses designed especially for local taxes. 
3. States with Type III Clauses 
Two states-Massachusetts24 and New Hampshire25-
have as their basic uniformity clause a provision which reads 
substantially as follows: 
The legislature may impose proportional and reasonable 
assessments, rates and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and 
persons resident, and estates lying within the state. 
In addition, both of these state constitutions have provisions 
in their respective Bills of Rights which are pertinent to the 
uniformity limitations. Part I, Art. X of the Massachusetts 
Constitution reads: 
Each individual of the society has a right to be protected 
by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, ac-
income, in lieu of all other taxes except upon realty; corporate franchise 
taxes, generally, "by any method not prohibited by this Constitution."). 
22 Ill. Const.Art. IX, §§9, 10 (1870): 
[§9] .•. [municipal taxes] shall be uniform in respect to persons and 
property, within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same .••• 
[§I 0] The general assembly .•• shall require that all the taxable prop-
erty within the limits of municipal corporations shall be taxed for the 
payment of debts contracted under authority of law, such taxes to be 
uniform in respect to persons and property, within the jurisdiction of 
the body imposing the same. 
23 Neb. Const. Art. VIII, §6 ( 1875): 
••. such [municipal] taxes shall be uniform in respect to persons and 
property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same. 
24 Mass. Con st. Pt. II, Ch. I, Art. IV (I 7 8 0). 
25 N.H. Const. Pt. II, Art. 5 (1784). 
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cording to standing laws. He is obliged, consequently, to 
contribute his share to the expense of this protection. . . 26 
Part I, Art. 12 of the New Hampshire Constitution is sub-
stantially identical to the Massachusetts provision. 
The basic uniformity clause of the New Hampshire Con-
stitution must be reconciled with Art. 6 of Part II, which was 
amended in 190327 to read: 
The public charges of government, or any part thereof, 
may be raised by taxation upon polls, estates, and other 
classes of property, including franchises and property when 
passing by will or inheritance. . . . 
The provision is not too clear as to its purpose, but it will be 
shown in Chapter III that it has the effect of modifying the 
uniformity limitation as it theretofore had existed in New 
Hampshire. 
The constitutions of both of these states have been 
amended to provide that special treatment may be given to 
forest lands, 28 and to this extent a special class of property is 
established. 
Other taxes. The uniformity clause in the Massachusetts 
Constitution is followed immediately by a clause reading: 
[Power is given to the legislature J also to impose and levy, 
reasonable duties and excises, upon any produce, goods, 
wares, merchandise, and commodities, whatsoever, brought 
into, produced, manufactured, or being within the [state]. 
Also, the Massachusetts Constitution was amended in 1 9 51 
by the addition of Art. XLIV which provides for the taxation 
26 Note that in the constitutions of Rhode Island and Vermont a pro-
vision such as this stands as the basic uniformity clause. See the discussion of 
states with Type IX clauses, infra. 
27 Art. 6 was theretofore a provision relating to the periods required for 
the recurrent valuation of property. 
28 Mass. Const. Art. XLI, added in 1912; N.H. Const. Pt. II, Art. 5 as 
amended in 1942. 
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of income. It is further provided that property, the income 
of which is taxed, may be exempted from the "imposition of 
proportional and reasonable" taxes as presently authorized 
by the constitution. 
4. States with Type IV Clauses 
Four states-Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin 
-constitute the group having some form of a Type IV uni-
formity clause: "A uniform rule of taxation." There are 
marked differences in the scope and phraseology of their 
respective clauses. The more general clause is found in Art. 
VIII, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution of 1848, which reads: 
The rule of taxation shall be uniform. . . . 
The Michigan uniformity clause is quite similar to the Wis-
consin provision but is limited in its operation by a unique 
exception. Article X, §3 of the Michigan Constitution of 
1908 reads: 
The legislature shall provide by law a uniform rule of 
taxation, except on property paying specific taxes. . . . 
In addition, Art. X, §4 of the Michigan Constitution pro-
vides that: 
The legislature may impose by law specific taxes, which 
shall be uniform upon the classes upon which they operate. 
The New Jersey uniformity clause is expressly limited in its 
application to the taxation of property. Article VIII, § 1, 1f 1 
of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947 provides that: 
Property shall be assessed for taxation . . . by uniform 
rules. 
The uniformity clause in the Ohio Constitution is even more 
limited on its face than the other uniformity clauses in this 
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group. Article XII, §2, of the Ohio Constitution of 1851 
was amended in 192 929 to read as follows: 
Land and improvements thereon shall be taxed by uniform 
rules according to value. 
Object, property taxation. Both the Michigan and Wiscon-
sin basic uniformity clauses are combined with supplementary 
clauses which, in effect, state that taxes shall be levied on such 
property as the legislature shall prescribe-intimating a free-
dom of selection, and possibly a freedom of exemption of 
property. The New Jersey Constitution, Art. VIII, § 1, ~2, 
provides that "Exemptions from taxation may be granted 
only by general law." A rather ambiguous provision appears 
in the Ohio Constitution. Article XII, §2 contains the fol-
lowing clause: 
... and without limiting the general power, subject to the 
provisions of Art. I of this constitution, to determine the 
subjects and methods of taxation or exemptions therefrom, 
general laws may be passed to exempt [specified real 
property]. 
In addition, Art. II, §36 of the Ohio Constitution provides 
that forest lands may be exempted "in whole or in part." 
Effective rates, property taxation. Article VIII, § 1, ~ 1, 
of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, which contains the 
basic uniformity clause, also contains the following pertinent 
prOVISton: 
All real property assessed and taxed locally or by the state 
for allotment and payment to taxing districts shall be assessed 
according to the same standard of value; and such real 
property shall be taxed at the general tax rate of the taxing 
29 Prior to 1929 Art. XII, §2 read: 
Laws shall be passed, taxing by a uniform rule, all moneys, credits, in-
vestments in bonds, stocks, joint stock companies, or otherwise, and also 
all real and personal property, according to its true value in money. • . • 
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district in which the property is situated, for the use of such 
taxing district. 
There are two minor provisions in the Ohio Constitution 
which deal with effective rates. Article II, §36, provides for 
the exemption of forest lands "in whole or in part," and Art. 
XIII, §4, provides that corporate property "shall forever be 
subject to taxation, the same as the property of individuals." 
Article X, §7, of the Michigan Constitution governs the ratio 
of valuation. It reads: "All assessment hereafter authorized 
shall be on property at its cash value." 
Other taxes. Both the constitutions of Michigan and Wis-
consin have general provisions authorizing "other" taxes, 
with separate uniformity provisions therefor. Article X, §4 
of the Michigan Constitution provides that: 
The legislature may by law impose specific taxes, which 
shall be uniform upon the same classes upon which they 
L)perate. 
Article VIII, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution was amended 
in 1908 by the addition of the following sentence: 
Taxes may also be imposed on incomes, privileges and 
occupations, which taxes may be graduated and progressive, 
and reasonable exemptions may be provided. 
In the Ohio Constitution there are both general and 
specific provisions for "other" taxes. Article XII, sections 7 
and 8, provide for an inheritance tax and for the taxation of 
incomes. Article XII, § 10 is a general provision reading: 
Laws may be passed providing for excise and franchise taxes 
and for the imposition of taxes upon the production of coal, 
oil, gas and other minerals. 
All of these provisions were added to the Ohio Constitution 
in 1912. 
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5. States with Type V Clauses 
Four states-Mississippi, Texas, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming-have a Type V uniformity clause: "[All] taxa-
tion shall be equal and uniform." The Wyoming clause Art. 
I, §28, is in the Bill of Rights of the Wyoming Constitution 
of 1890, and includes the word "all." The uniformity clauses 
found in the other three state constitutions omit the word 
"all" (Miss. Const. 1890, Art. IV, §112; Tex. Const. I876, 
Art. VIII, §I; W. Va. Const. I872, Art. X, §I ).30 The 
Mississippi and West Virginia provisions have the additional 
phrase "throughout the state." 
Each of these four states has at least one additional pro-
vision which could serve as a basic uniformity clause. Missis-
sippi, Texas, and West Virginia have a "proportionality 
clause" substantially identical to the Type II provision, viz., 
" [All] property shall be taxed in proportion to its value." 
In each instance this clause appears in the same provision 
containing the basic uniformity clause. The Mississippi clause 
omits the word "all." 
The fourth state-Wyoming-has an additional provision 
which is somewhat similar to the Type IV clause, viz., "A 
uniform rule of taxation." Article XV, § 11 of that constitu-
tion reads: 
All property ... shall be uniformly assessed for taxation, 
and the legislature shall prescribe such regulations as shall 
secure a just valuation for taxation of all property.31 
30 The West Virginia basic uniformity clause remains in this form. How-
ever, fundamental changes have been made as to its effectiveness by amend-
ments in 1932 which state certain exceptions thereto. See the discussion 
under "effective rates." 
31 This final clause as to a "just valuation for taxation of all property" is 
substantially the same as that clause which supplements the basic uniformity 
clause of all states except one having a Type VI clause: "The legislature 
shall provide by law for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation." 
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The Mississippi Constitution has a third provision which 
could serve as a basic uniformity clause. In Art. IV, §liZ-
which contains the two provisions already referred to-the 
following clause is found: 
Property shall be assessed for taxes under general laws, and 
by uniform rules, according to (its true) value.32 
Object, property taxation. In both the Mississippi and 
West Virginia constitutions there are few significant pro-
visions, other than the uniformity clause along with the sup-
plementary clause already referred to, which concern the 
uniformity required of the object of property taxes. In the 
Mississippi Constitution the only provisions are sections 182 
and I 92, which permit industrial exemptions under certain 
conditions. The West Virginia Constitution provides for both 
mandatory and permissive exemptions of property in Art. X, 
§ 1. And in Art. VI, §53, it is provided that forest lands may 
be defined and classified, and may be "exempted from all 
taxation or be taxed in such manner . . . as the legislature 
may" provide. 
The Texas and Wyoming constitutions are more definite 
on this issue. In the Texas Constitution, Art. VIII, § 1 re-
quires certain exemptions,S3 and Art. VIII, §2 permits cer-
tain other exemptions. Article VIII, §2 concludes: 
. . . all laws exempting property from taxation other than 
the property above mentioned shall be null and void. 
In Wyoming a contrary approach is found. Art. XV, § 12, 
which requires the exemption of certain property, with this 
direction concludes: "and such other property as the legisla-
32 Note the similarity of this provision to the basic clause in the New 
Jersey Constitution, discussed with other Type IV states, supra. 
33 In addition there are numerous provisions in the Texas Constitution 
providing for the mandatory exemptions of specific property. See the dis-
cussion in Chapter III, section E, supra. 
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ture may by general law provide [shall be exempt from taxa-
tion]." 
Effective rates, property taxation. Only the Mississippi 
and West Virginia Constitutions have provisions other than 
the basic uniformity clauses which concern the uniformity 
required of effective rates. A minor provision in the Missis-
sippi Constitution, · § 181, provides that corporate property 
"shall be taxed in the same way and to the same extent as" 
individual property, with certain exemptions. The effect of 
the basic uniformity clause34 in the West Virginia Constitu-
tion was radically altered by an amendment in 1932. The 
basic clause remained the same. However, this proviso was 
added: "subject to the exceptions in this section contained." 
In effect, the exceptions which follow divide all property into 
five classes and set an aggregate maximum rate for all taxes 
assessed upon any class. The significant point is that different 
amounts were set up as the maximum rate for each of the 
classes. 
Other taxes. In the Wyoming Constitution the only pro-
vision concerning other taxes is Art. XV, §3 which provides 
for a gross products tax on mines, etc., in lieu of taxes on "the 
lands." The West Virginia and Texas Constitutions have both 
general and specific provisions referring to other taxes. Arti-
cle X, § 1 of the West Virginia Constitution contains the 
following clause: 
The legislature shall have authority to tax privileges, fran-
chises, and incomes of persons and corporations and to 
classify and graduate the tax on all incomes according to the 
84 The following clause also accompanies the basic uniformity clause in 
Art. X, §I of the West Virginia Constitution: 
No one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be 
taxed higher than any other species of property of equal value. • • • 
Of course, this sweeping limitation must be read in the light of the 1932 
amendments set forth in the text. 
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amount thereof and to exempt from taxation, incomes below 
a minimum to be fixed from time to time. 
Article VIII, § 1 of the Texas Constitution contains the fol-
lowing clause, which is placed immediately after the basic 
uniformity clause: 
The legislature may impose a poll tax. It may also impose 
occupation taxes, both upon natural persons and upon cor-
porations, other than municipal, doing any business in this 
State. It may also tax incomes of both natural persons and 
corporations other than municipal, except that persons en-
gaged in mechanical and agricultural pursuits shall never be 
required to pay an occupation tax .... 35 
Article VIII, §2 contains a second basic uniformity clause 
which is applicable to "occupation taxes." It provides that 
such taxes shall be "equal and uniform upon the same 
class of subjects within the limits of the authority levying 
the tax .... " 
Miscellaneous. West Virginia is the only state in this 
group which has a uniformity clause36 applicable solely to 
local taxes. 
6. States with Type VI Clauses 
Six states-Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Nevada, South 
Carolina, and Utah-have a Type VI basic uniformity 
clause. In each of these states, except Indiana, the effective-
ness of that clause has been substantially limited by subse-
quent amendments which leave the basic clause unchanged 
85 Art. VIII, §I 7 contains a provision similar to the Illinois provision 
discussed supra. It provides that "The specification of the objects and sub-
jects of taxation shall not deprive the Legislature of the power" to tax other 
objects and subjects "consistent with the principles of taxation fixed in this 
Constitution." 
36 Art. X, §9 " ... such [local) taxes shall be uniform, with respect to 
persons and property within the jurisdiction of the authority imposing the 
same." 
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while providing for special treatment of intangible property. 
Each state has a uniformity clause reading substantially as 
follows: 
The legislature shall provide [by law] for a uniform and 
equal rate of [assessment and] taxation, [and shall prescribe 
such regulations as shall secure a just valuation (for taxa-
tion) of all property]. . . . 
The basic clause is followed immediately by a provision ex-
cepting property of described characteristics which may be 
exempted by law. 
There are three significant variations on the basic clause. 
The uniformity clause in the Florida Constitution of 1885, 
Art. IX, § 1, omits the words "assessment and," thus reading 
"a uniform and equal rate of taxation."37 The uniformity 
clause in the Kansas Constitution of 1859, Art. XI, §1, does 
not have the "just valuation" clause.38 The third significant 
variation, one of addition rather than omission, is in the uni-
formity clause of the Utah Constitution of 1896, Art. XIII, 
§3. That clause reads as follows: 
The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal 
rate of assessment and taxation on all [tangible] property in 
the State, according to its value in money, and shall prescribe 
by law such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for 
taxation of such property, so that every person and corpora-
tion shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or 
its property . ... 
The italicized words are those found only in the Utah uni-
formity clause. The word "tangible," modifying "property," 
as well as a provision for special treatment of intangible 
property, was added by amendment in 1930. 
The uniformity clauses in the remaining three states of 
37 In addition, the Florida provision omits the words "by law" and "for 
taxation." 
38 In addition, the Kansas provision omits the words "by law." 
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this group are identical with the typical clause (Ind. Canst. 
185I, Art. X, §I; Nev. Canst. I864, Art. X, §I; S.C. Canst. 
I8 9 5, Art. X, §I). With the exception of the Utah provision, 
all of the uniformity clauses in this group are followed in the 
same provision by the "exceptions" clause which permits 
certain exemptions of property. 
South Carolina and Utah have additional provisions in 
their constitutions which could serve as basic uniformity 
clauses if they stood alone. Article I, §6 of the South Caro-
lina Constitution provides that: 
All property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion 
to its value. 
And Art. XIII, §2 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
All [tangible] property in the state, not exempt under the 
laws of the United States, or under this constitution, shall be 
taxed in proportion to its value. 
These provisions, of course, are Type II clauses. 
Intangible property, special treatment. In all of these 
states, except Indiana, the constitution has been amended by 
the addition of a provision removing the taxation of in-
tangible personal property from the scope of the uniformity 
clause. There is considerable variation among these amend-
ments. The Kansas and Utah provisions are similar. In Kan-
sas a 1 924 amendment takes the form of a proviso inserted 
in Art. XI, §I, immediately after the uniformity clause, so 
that the section now reads: 
The legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of 
assessment and taxation, except that mineral products, 
money, mortgages, notes and other evidence of debt may be 
classified and taxed uniformly as to class as the legislature 
shall provide. 
In the Utah Constitution a I930 amendment altered the 
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words of the basic uniformity clause itself-it refers now to 
"tangible" property, and a just valuation of "such" property. 
In addition, the following sentence was added to the same 
provision, Art. XIII, §3: 
Intangible property may be exempted from taxation as 
property or it may be taxed in such manner and to such 
extent as the Legislature may provide. 
However, a maximum rate of five mills is provided there-
for. 
In the South Carolina Constitution the uniformity pro-
vision, Art. X, § 1, was amended in 1932 by the addition of 
a new paragraph which states that the legislature may pro-
vide for the assessment of "intangible personal property" 
"at its true value in money" for purposes of state and local 
taxation. A low maximum "total" rate is provided and any 
tax on such property other than pursuant to this amendment 
is prohibited. 
Florida provides for a more limited separate treatment of 
intangible property. By an amendment in 1924, an "excep-
tion" was made to the uniformity clause, Art. IX, § 1, so that 
the legislature may now provide for "special rate or rates on 
intangible property," with a maximum rate of two mills. 
The rate was raised to five mills by an amendment in 1 944. 
Such special rate or rates are exclusive of all other state and 
local taxes. The 1944 amendment also added a proviso to the 
effect that a recordation tax of two mills might be imposed 
in lieu of all other intangible assessment on certain secured 
obligations. 39 
39 In 1940 Art. IX, §2 of the Florida Constitution was amended to pro-
vide that no levy of ad valorem taxes on property other than intangible 
property is to be made by the state. Thus, the overall structure presents this 
picture: intangible property is to be taxed only by the state, and such taxa-
tion is governed as to uniformity by the proviso to Art. IX, § 1. Tangible 
property, real and personal, is to be taxed only at the local level. 
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The most limited special treatment for intangible property 
is found in Nevada. In 1942 the exemption clause in Art. X, 
§ 1, which also contains the uniformity clause, was amended 
to require the exemption of intangible property.40 
Object, property taxation. The Indiana and Kansas Con-
stitutions have no provisions other than the uniformity clauses 
which deal with uniformity of the object in property taxes. 
In Florida Art. IX, sections 1 and 2 provide that the state 
shall tax intangible property and the local units shall tax 
tangible property. Article IX, § 13 provides for a motor 
vehicle license tax "in lieu" of taxation of motor vehicles for 
personal property taxation. Article XVI, § 16, provides that 
corporate property shall be subject to tax unless used for 
certain enumerated purposes. There are provisions for both 
mandatory41 and permissible42 exemption of property. In 
Nevada the only supplementary provision dealing with uni-
formity in the object of property taxes is Art. VIII, §2, 
which provides that corporate property shall be subject to 
taxation the same as property of individuals. In South Caro-
lina, Art. X, §4 of the constitution requires certain exemp-
tions, and Art. VIII, §8 permits industrial exemptions. 
Article XIII, §2 of the Utah Constitution contains both 
mandatory and permissive exemptions. 
Effective rates, property taxation. In addition to the 
numerous provisions already discussed, in Nevada and South 
Carolina there are certain other clauses concerning uni-
40 The provisions read: 
• • . shares of stock (except shares of stock in banking corporations), 
bonds, mortgages, notes, bank deposits, book accounts and credits, and 
securities and choses in action of like character are deemed to represent 
interest in property already assessed and taxed, either in Nevada or else-
where, and shall be exempt. 
4 1 Art. IX, §§9, 11; Art. X, §7. 
42 Art. IX, § 1. 
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formity in effective rates. Article VIII, §2 of the Nevada 
Constitution provides that corporate property "shall be sub-
ject to taxation the same as property of individuals." Article 
III, §29 of the South Carolina Constitution provides that 
"all taxes upon property, real and personal, shall be laid 
upon the actual value of the property taxed. . . ." 
"Other'' taxes. With the exception of Nevada, all of the 
states in this group have provisions concerning "other" taxes. 
In Florida, Indiana, and Kansas there are only special pro-
visions. The Florida Constitution expressly prohibits the 
taxation of inheritances and income in Art. IX, § 11. This 
is a unique provision. Indiana, in Art. X, §8, provides that a 
tax upon incomes may be imposed, "from whatever sources 
derived, at such rates, in such manner, and with such exemp-
tions as may be prescribed by law." The Kansas Constitu-
tion, Art. XI, §2, also provides for a tax on incomes, which 
may be graduated and progressive. Article XI, § 1 0 grants 
the power to levy "special taxes, for road and highway 
purposes, on motor vehicle and on motor fuels." South Caro-
lina has a general provision in its section containing the 
uniformity clause, Art. IX, § 1, which provides that a 
"graduated tax on incomes" and "a graduated licence on 
occupations and business" may be imposed. The Utah Consti-
tution, Art. XIII, §3, provides for the taxation of incomes, 
which tax ''shall be" graduated. A general provision in Art. 
XIII, §12 reads: 
Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to prevent 
the Legislature from providing for a stamp tax, or a tax 
based on income, occupation, licenses or franchises. 
Miscellaneous. Both the Florida43 and the South Caro-
43 Article IX, § 5 provides that the legislature may authorize local taxes, 
"and all property shall be taxed upon the principles established for State 
taxation." 
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lina44 constitutions contain uniformity clauses applicable only 
to local taxes. 
7. States with Type VII Clauses 
Thirteen states-Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, 
Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia-constitute 
the group having a Type VII basic uniformity clause. 
There are variations in the precise phraseology, on the basis 
of which five subgroups may be established. 
Three states (Minn. Const. 18 57, Art. IX, § 1, as 
amended 1906; N.M. Const. 1911, Art. VIII, §1, as 
amended 1914; Okla. Const. 1907, Art. X, §5) have a 
clause which simply provides as follows: 
Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects. 
There is a variation in the New Mexico provision, which 
reads:"· .. taxes shall be equal and uniform upon the sub-
jects of taxation of the same class." This is the only provision 
in this group which varies from the basic words identifying 
this type clause, viz., "uniform upon the same class of sub-
jects." The variations described below concern additional 
phrases attached to the basic words. 
Two states (Mo. Const. 1945, Art. X, §3; Mont. Const. 
1889, Art. XII, § 11) have a basic clause which contains a 
"territorial" phrase and reads as follows: 
Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within 
the territorial limits of the authority of levying the tax. 
Four states (Del. Const. 1897, Art. 8, §1; La. Const. 
1 921, Art. X, § 1 ; Pa. Const. 18 7 4, Art. 9, § 1 ; Va. Const. 
44 Art. VIII, §6; Art. X, §5. Local taxes shall be "uniform with respect 
to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the 
same." 
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1902, Art. 13, §168) have clauses identical with the second 
variation above, except that the clauses read "All taxes . 
. . . "Two states (Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VII, §1, ~3; Ore. 
Const. 1859, Art. I, §32) have clauses identical with the sec-
ond variation above, except that the clauses read "All 
taxation. . . ." Two states (Colo. Const. 18 7 6, Art. X, §3; 
Idaho Const. 1890, Art. VII, §5) not only have the word 
"All" modifying "taxes," but also add a clause as to "just 
valuation" which is similar to the clause which commonly 
modifies the Type VI basic clause. Thus, the uniformity 
clause found in those two states reads: 
All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects 
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, 
and shall be levied and collected under general laws, which 
shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valua-
tion for taxation of all property, real and personal. 
Additional uniformity clauses. Similar to the development 
found in practically every other group, there are several 
states in Group VII which have clauses in addition to the 
basic uniformity clause capable of serving as a basic clause if 
they stood alone. Four states in this group-Montana, Ore-
gon, Idaho, and New Mexico-have such a supplementary 
uniformity clause. The Montana Constitution contains a 
Type VI clause combined with the "just valuation" clause, 
such as is found attached to the basic clause in Colorado and 
Idaho. Article XII, § 1 of the Montana Constitution of 
1889 reads: 
. . . [T] he legislative assembly . . . shall levy a uniform 
rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe such reg-
ulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all 
property, except that specially provided for in this article. 
This provision is substantially identical to the basic Type 
III clause. 
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The constitution of Oregon also contains a prov1s1on 
similar to the Type VI clause, but it varies by substituting 
the word "rules" for "rate," so that Art. IX, § 1, reads: 
The Legislative Assembly shall . . . provide by law uni-
form rules of assessment and taxation. All taxes shall be 
levied and collected under general laws operating uniformly 
throughout the State. 
However, the provision is of general nature and could serve 
as a basic clause in the absence of other provisions. As a 
matter of fact, the clause resembles the Type IV provision 
in the use of the word "rules." 
Idaho has a separate provision which is practically identical 
to the provision of the Illinois Constitution, classified as 
Type II. Article VII, §2 of the Idaho Constitution reads: 
The legislature shall provide such revenue as may be need-
ful, by levying a tax by valuation, so that every person or 
corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, 
her, or its property, except as in this article hereinafter other-
wise provided. 
New Mexico also has a provision which might be classified as 
Type II, although it is limited in application, and-as 
contrasted to the other "supplementary" clauses found in 
this group of states-the New Mexico provision is coupled 
with and precedes the basic clause. Article VIII, §1 reads: 
Taxes levied upon tangible property shall be in proportion to 
the value thereof, and taxes shall be equal and uniform upon 
the subjects of taxation of the same class. 
Elaboration of the basic clauses as to classes of property. 
Five of these thirteen states-Georgia, Idaho, Missouri, 
Oklahoma, and Virginia-have provisions which permit the 
classification of property or "subjects." The Georgia and 
Missouri provisions are similar in this respect, both establish-
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ing in the constitution the permissible degree of classification 
of property. The Georgia Constitution of 1945, Art. VII, 
§ 1, ~ 3, which also contains the basic uniformity clause, pro-
vides as follows: 
Classes of subjects for taxation of property shall consist of 
tangible property and one or more classes of intangible per-
sonal property including money. The General Assembly 
shall have power to classify property including money for 
taxation, and to adopt different rates and different methods 
for different classes of such property. 
In the Missouri Constitution of 1945, Art. X, §4(A) pro-
vides for classification of property in the following manner: 
All taxable property shall be classified for tax purposes as 
follows: class 1, real property; class 2, tangible personal 
property; class 3, intangible personal property. The general 
assembly, by general law, may provide for further classifi-
cation within classes 2 and 3, based solely on the nature and 
characteristics of the property, and not on the nature, resi-
dence or business of the owner, or the amount owned .... 
The Idaho, Oklahoma, and Virginia provisions are more 
general. The Idaho Constitution, Art. VII, §3, provides: 
The word "property" as herein used shall be defined and 
classified by law. 
The Oklahoma Constitution, Art. X, §22, takes a negative 
approach, providing: 
Nothing in this Constitution shall be held or construed, to 
prevent the classification of property for purposes of taxa-
tion; and the valuation of different classes by different means 
or methods. 
The Virginia provision which contains the basic clause, § 168, 
simply adds the following: 
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The general assembly may define and classify taxable sub-
jects .... 
The sentence concludes with a reference to the power to 
classify property for purposes of subjecting it to either state 
or local taxes, but not both. It should also be pointed out that 
the Montana Constitution, Art. XII, § 1 7 ,-in contrast to 
the permissive provision of the Idaho Constitution-defines 
property by providing: 
The word property as used in this article is hereby declared 
to include moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, franchises and all 
matters and things (real, personal and mixed) capable of 
private ownership. . . . 
Structure of each state. Of course the above provisions take 
on additional meaning against a background of the entire 
uniformity structure of the state constitutions. The Colorado 
uniformity clause, in Art. X, §3, is accompanied by a proviso 
requiring a minimum personal property exemption. Also, 
Art. X, sections 4 and 5 require the exemption of described 
classes of property. Article X, §6 provides: "All laws ex-
empting from taxation, property other than that hereinbefore 
mentioned, shall be void. . . ." A proviso in section 6 per-
mits motor vehicles to be classified, and the levying of a 
"graduated annual specific ownership tax thereon," with the 
tax being "in lieu of all ad valorem taxes upon such prop-
erty." Article X, § 17 of the Colorado Constitution provides 
that "The general assembly may levy income taxes, either 
graduated or proportional . . . , and may, in the administra-
tion of an income tax law, provide for special classified or 
limited taxation or the exemption of tangible and intangible 
personal property." 
There are few provisions in the Delaware Constitution 
other than the basic uniformity clause. The basic uniformity 
clause in Art. VIII,§ 1 is followed by this exemption proviso: 
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"but the General Assembly may by general laws exempt 
from taxation such property as in the opinion of the General 
Assembly will best promote the public welfare." Article X, 
§4 provides for a special mandatory exemption of certain 
school property. 
In Georgia the basic uniformity clause is accompanied by 
the provision which establishes certain limits within which 
property may be classified. The same section, Art. VII, § 1, 
~3, deals further with the particular problems of method of 
property taxation and effective rates. It is provided that the 
general assembly may "adopt different rates and different 
methods for different classes of such property." In Art. VII, 
§ 1, ~ 4, a very long provision sets forth permissive exemp-
tions, and concludes: "All laws exempting property from 
taxation, other than the property herein enumerated, shall 
be void." A minor point is dealt with in Art. VII, §2, ~4, 
wherein it is provided that property of public utilities might 
be valued by different methods "but not at a greater basis 
of value or at a higher rate of taxation than other properties." 
In Idaho the basic uniformity clause, as described above, is 
accompanied by the "just valuation" clause. The section, Art. 
VII, §5, concludes: "Provided, that the legislature may 
allow such exemptions from taxation from time to time as 
shall seem necessary and just .... "Article VII, §4 contains 
a mandatory exemption. The "supplementary" clause in the 
Idaho Constitution, which concerns "proportional" taxation 
of all property, in Art. VII, §2, is joined by a clause covering 
nonproperty taxes. The latter reads: "The legislature may 
also impose a license tax (both upon natural persons and 
upon corporations, other than municipal, doing business in 
this state). . . ." This section concludes with a permissive 
exemption of improvements on land. Furthermore, Art. VII, 
§3, as already described, provides that "The word 'property' 
... shall be defined and classified by law." Idaho is the 
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only state having a provision relating to double taxation 
generally, as contrasted to some particular problem thereof. 
A proviso in Art. VII, §5 reads: " ... duplicate taxation of 
property for the same purpose during the same year, is 
hereby prohibited." 
The Louisiana Constitution is the most detailed of the 
forty-eight states. This is the result of the numerous pro-
visions dealing with particular taxes45-at times, in what 
amounts to a complete statutory form which is amended as 
frequently as statutes are amended. For each of the taxes, 
the degree of uniformity required is spelled out in the special 
provision. Article X, §4 of the Louisiana Constitution is a 
general property exemption provision, listing a great many 
classes of property to be exempted. The section begins with 
the following words: "The following property, and no other, 
shall be exempt from taxation .... " There are several 
other property exemption provisions.46 A provision in Art. 
X, § 1 governs the ratio of valuation to be used in taxing 
property/7 but the provision must be read along with Art. 
X, § 12, providing that "all real estate . . . shall be valued 
at actual cash value." Article X, sections 1 and 21 provide 
for special treatment of forest lands and natural resources. 
The Minnesota Constitutional uniformity structure con-
sists primarily of the basic uniformity clause, to which there 
is attached a proviso reading: "but" certain enumerated 
classes of property "shall" be exempted. By subsequent 
45 Art. X, § 1 (income tax); Art. X, §7 (inheritance tax); Art. X, §8 
(license taxes generally); Art. X, §9 (taxation of banks); Art. VI, §22 and 
Art. VI-A (statutory scheme for motor fuel and motor vehicle taxes). 
46 Art. X, §§4, 9, 2 2; Art. VI, § 16.2. 
H The provision reads: 
The valuations and classification fixed for State purposes shall be the 
valuation and classification for local purposes; but the taxing authorities 
of the local subdivision may adopt a different percentage of such valuation 
for purposes of local taxation. 
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amendment a "permissive" exemption of certain personal 
property was added. All the other Minnesota provisions rela-
tive to uniformity are provisions for particular taxes: Art. 
IX, §IA, spells out the requirements for an occupation tax 
as to mining; Art. XVI, §3 provides that motor vehicles may 
be taxed on a more onerous basis than "other personal prop-
erty," but that a tax pursuant thereto is to be in lieu of all 
others except local wheelage taxes; Art. XVIII, §1 provides 
for special treatment of forest lands; Art. XVIII, §3 pro-
vides for a fuel tax; Art. XIX, §4 establishes an in lieu air-
craft tax. 
As stated above, the Missouri Constitution supplements 
the basic uniformity clause in Art. X, §3 with Art. X, §4, 
which spells out the particular requirements of uniformity to 
some degree. It reads: 
(A) All taxable property shall be classified for tax purposes 
as follows: class 1, real property; class 2, tangible personal 
property; class 3, intangible personal property. The general 
assembly, by general law, may provide for further classifica-
tion within classes 2 and 3, based solely on the nature and 
characteristics of the property, and not on the nature, resi-
dence or business of the owner, or the amount owned .... 
(B) Property in classes 1 and 2 and subclasses of class 2, 
shall be assessed for tax purposes at its value or such per-
centage of its value as may be fixed by law for each class and 
for each subclass of class 2. Property in class 3 and its sub-
classes shall be taxed only to the extent authorized and at the 
rate fixed by law for each class and subclass, and the tax shall 
be based on the annual yield and shall not exceed eight per 
cent thereof. 
Moreover, in Art. X, §6, both mandatory and permissive ex-
emption of named classes of property are provided for, the 
section concluding: "All laws exempting from taxation 
property other than the property enumerated in this article, 
shall be void." Article X, §7 provides for special treatment 
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of forest lands, and Art. X, §5 for the method of taxing 
railroads. A sentence of Art. X, §4(A), provides for other 
taxes in a negative way: 
Nothing in this section shall prevent the taxing of franchises, 
privileges or incomes, or the levying of excise or motor ve-
hicles license taxes, or any other taxes of the same or different 
types. 
As stated above, the basic clause in Art. XII, § 11, of the 
Montana Constitution is supplemented by a clause of the 
"uniform rate" Type. Section 1 also contains a general pro-
vision as to license taxes: "The legislative assembly may also 
impose a license tax. . . ." Article XII, § 1 a permits the 
graduated and progressive taxation of income. Article XII, 
§3 provides for special treatment of mines and mining claims, 
and Art. XII, §2 contains both mandatory and permissive 
exemptions. Montana has a provision relating to a particular 
problem of double taxation. Art. XII, § 1 7, which defines 
"property," concludes: 
. . . but this shall not be construed so as to authorize the 
taxations of the stocks of any company or corporation when 
the property of such company or corporation represented by 
such stocks is within the state and has been taxed. 
The uniformity structure of the New Mexico Constitution 
is quite limited. It consists simply of the uniformity clause in 
Art. VIII, §1, mandatory exemptions in Art. VIII, §3, and 
a permissive exemption in Art. VIII, §5. 
Oklahoma has a rather lengthy constitution, but the uni-
formity structure is not particularly complicated. Article X, 
§S contains the uniformity clause, and Art. X, §22, as de-
scribed above, refers to the classification for methods of valu-
ation. Article X, §6 and Art XII-A provide for the exemp-
tion of described property, and Art. V, §50 states: "The 
Legislature shall pass no law exempting any property within 
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this State from taxation, except as otherwise provided in this 
Constitution." Concerning the problem of effective rate, 
Art. X, §8 reads: "All property which may be taxed ad 
valorem shall be assessed for taxation at its fair cash value . 
. . . " Article X, § 12 is a general provision referring to 
"other" taxes than property taxation by way of a lengthy 
enumeration of types of taxes. 
Oregon has as its uniformity structure only the uniformity 
clause and the supplementary clause, described above, in Art. 
IX, §1, and Art. I, §32, respectively. 
The uniformity structure is also fairly simple in Pennsyl-
vania. Article IX, § 1 contains the uniformity clause, and a 
proviso reading: "but" the legislature may by general laws 
exempt from taxation certain named classes of property. 
Article IX, §2 reads: "All laws exempting property from 
taxation, other than the property above enumerated shall be 
void." 
Virginia has one of the more lengthy uniformity struc-
tures. Section 18 9 provides for the permissive exemption of 
industries, and Section 183 reads: "Unless otherwise pro-
vided in this Constitution, the following property and no 
other shall be exempt from taxation, State and local, includ-
ing inheritance taxes .... " Section 171 provides that "No 
State property tax for State purposes shall be levied on real 
estate or tangible personal property, except the rolling stock 
of public service corporations .... " This provision is, of 
course, pertinent to the classification referred to above con-
cerning classes for either state or local property taxes. Deal-
ing with effective rates, section 169 provides that all 
assessments of tangible property shall be at "fair market 
value." A proviso to that section reads: "The general assem-
bly may allow a lower rate of taxation to be imposed for a 
period of years by a city or town upon land added to its 
corporate limits, than is imposed on similar property within 
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its limits at the time such land is added." Section 170 pro-
vides for a tax on incomes, a license tax upon business which 
cannot be reached by the ad valorem system, and state 
franchise taxes. 
8. States with Type VIII Clauses 
Seven states-Arizona, Kentucky, Maryland, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington-con-
stitute the group having a basic uniformity clause of Type 
VIII: "Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of prop-
erty." There are variations in the precise phraseology of the 
basic clause, on the basis of which the seven states may be 
divided into sub-groups. 
Five states (Ariz. Const. 1912, Art. IX, § 1 ; Wash. Const. 
1889, Art. XI, §176, as amended 1911; Ky. Const. 1891, 
§171, as amended 1915; N.D. Const. 1829, Art. XI, §176, 
as amended 1919; S.D. Canst. 1889, Art. XI, §2, as 
amended 1 918) have a clause providing as follows: 
[All] taxes shall be uniform upon [the same class of prop-
erty] [all property of the same class] [within the territorial 
limits of the authority levying the tax]. 
The Arizona, Washington, and North Dakota provisions use 
the phrase "the same class of property," but only Arizona 
and Washington include the word "all." The Kentucky and 
South Dakota provisions use the phrase "all property of the 
same class," and both omit the word "all" which modifies 
taxes. Except for South Dakota, all of the above states have 
the phrase concerning territorial limits. Other minor differ-
ences are: in Kentucky the phrase "all property of the same 
class" is modified by the phrase "subject to taxation"; and in 
North Dakota the word "property" is modified by the 
phrase "including franchises." The provision in the North 
Carolina Constitution of 1868, Art. V, §3, as amended in 
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1935 may be differentiated from the above group, although 
there is little real substantial difference. It reads: 
Taxes on property shall be uniform as to each class of prop-
erty taxed. 
The provision in the Maryland Constitution of 18 67, Art. 
XV, Bill of Rights, as amended in 1915, may be legitimately 
included in this group despite considerable difference in 
phraseology. It reads: 
[A]ll taxes [state and county] ... shall be uniform as to 
land within the taxing district, and uniform within the class 
or subclass of improvements on land and personal property 
which the respective taxing powers may have directed to 
be subject to the tax levy. 
Additional uniformity clauses. Two states have supple-
mentary clauses of some other basic type. Section 174 of the 
Kentucky Constitution provides that: 
All property . . . shall be taxed in proportion to its value, 
unless exempted by this Constitution. . . . 
This corresponds, of course, to the Type II clause. In the 
South Dakota Constitution, Art. VI, § 17 reads as follows: 
. . . all taxation shall be equal and uniform. 
However, it should be pointed out that in each of the above 
instances, these "supplementary" clauses are found in the 
constitutions as originally drafted, while the basic clauses 
have reached their present status by way of subsequent 
amendments. This explains any apparent conflict. 
Elaboration of the basic clauses as to classes of property 
permitted. In both Maryland and Washington there are 
provisions which establish certain minimum classes of prop-
erty. In each of these two states, the effect of such provisions 
is to establish real property as a minimum class, with personal 
property being subject to further classification. In Maryland 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 45 
the basic uniformity clause itself, Art. XV of the Bill of 
Rights, is framed in terms of minimum classes of property. 
"Land" is established as a single class, with "improvements" 
and "personal property" subject to being "sub-classified." 
Article VII, § 1 of the Washington Constitution, which con-
tains the basic uniformity clause, also states that "All real 
estate shall constitute one class." A proviso adds that "the 
legislature may tax mines and mineral resources and lands 
devoted to reforestation by either a yield tax or an ad 
valorem tax at such rate as it may fix, or by both." In addition, 
the Washington Constitution defines "property." Article 
VII, § 1 states: "The word 'property' as used herein shall 
mean and include everything, whether tangible or in-
tangible, subject to ownership." 
Structure of each state. Of course, the above provisions of 
each state take on additional meaning against a background of 
the entire uniformity structure. In Arizona, in addition to the 
basic uniformity clause in Art. IX, § 1, there is a provision 
(Art. IX, §2) setting forth both mandatory and permissive 
exemptions of property. That section concludes: "All prop-
erty in the state not exempt . . . under this constitution, or 
not exempt by law under the provisions of this section shall 
be subject to taxation .... " Article IX, § 11, 1f2, which was 
added in 1940, imposes a motor vehicle license tax "in lieu of 
all ad valorem property taxes on any vehicle subject to such 
license tax." 
Kentucky has a number of provisions in addition to the 
basic uniformity clause, as amended, which is in § 1 71. The 
same section authorizes the classification of property to be 
subject to local taxation, the provision reading: "The Gen-
eral Assembly shall have power to divide property into 
classes and to determine what class or classes of property 
shall be subject to local taxation." This provision was added 
at the time of the amendment of the basic uniformity clause. 
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Section 174 remains in its original form, and contains the 
second "uniformity clause." In addition, it has a provision 
dealing expressly with a particular problem of rates, provid-
ing that "all corporate property shall pay the same rate of 
taxation paid by individual property." Section 170 remains 
in its original form and contains mandatory exemptions. It 
concludes: "and all laws exempting ... property from 
taxation other than the property above mentioned shall be 
void." Section 3, still in its original form, provides that "no 
property shall be exempt from taxation except as provided in 
this Constitution." Section 172 provides that "All property, 
not exempted from taxation by this Constitution, shall be 
assessed for taxation at its fair cash value, established at the 
price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale." 
There are no relevant provisions in the Maryland Con-
stitution, other than the uniformity clause which defines to 
some degree the minimum classes of property, as described 
above. 
In North Carolina the uniformity clause, Art. V, §3, is 
accompanied by a provision, Art. V, §5, which sets forth both 
mandatory and permissive exemptions. 
In North Dakota the only relevant provisions are in the 
same section which contains the basic uniformity clause, Art. 
XI, § 1 7 6. There are certain mandatory exemptions. Since 
the amendment of 1911 adding the present basic uniformity 
clause, the section has been further amended in 1 91 9 to add 
a provision which states that "the legislature may by law 
exempt any or all classes of personal property from taxa-
tion." "Improvements" are to be considered personal prop-
erty. 
In South Dakota the section containing the basic uni-
formity clause, Art. XI, §2, also contains a clause which 
affirms a freedom of selection for the legislature. It reads: 
"The legislature is empowered to divide all property includ-
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ing moneys and credits as well as physical property into 
classes and to determine what class or classes of property 
shall be subject to taxation and what property, if any, shall 
not be subject to taxation." However, there remain some 
provisions which appeared in the constitution as originally 
drafted. Article VI, § 17 contains the second uniformity 
clause, and Art. XI, §4 provides that "The legislature shall 
provide for taxing all moneys, etc.," and also for the taxing 
of property employed in banking, "so that all property em-
ployed in banking shall always be subject to a taxation equal 
to that imposed on the property of individuals." Article XI, 
sections 5 and 6, contain mandatory exemptions, and Art. 
XI, §7, still in the original form, provides that "All laws 
exempting property from taxation other than that enumer-
ated in sections 5 and 6 of this article, shall be void." 
In Washington the section which contains the basic uni-
formity clause and establishes certain classes of property, Art. 
VII, § 1, also sets forth both mandatory and permissive ex-
emptions. 
9. States with Type IX Clauses 
Rhode Island and Vermont constitute the group of states 
having a Type IX basic uniformity clause: "There shall be 
a fair distribution of the expense of government." These two 
states are often listed with those states categorized as hav-
ing no uniformity provisions at all. However, in each of these 
states there is a single provision which serves the purpose of 
a basic uniformity clause. The Rhode Island Constitution of 
1843, Art. I, §2, reads: 
All laws . . . should be made for the good of the whole; 
and the burdens of the state ought to be fairly distributed 
among its citizens. 
The Vermont Constitution of 1793, Ch. I, Art. 9 reads: 
. . . every member of society hath a right to be protected 
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in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property, and therefore 
is bound to contribute his proportion toward the expense of 
that protection. . . . 
There are no other provisions in either of these two states 
which deal with particular problems of uniformity. 
10. States Without Uniformity Clauses 
Three states-Connecticut, Iowa, and New York-have 
no constitutional provisions which might be called basic uni-
formity clauses. Any general limitation upon taxes of some 
degree of uniformity is found in the "equal protection" 
clauses-or the equivalent of such clauses-of those states 
(Conn. Const. 1818, Art. I, § 1 ; Iowa Const. 18 57, Art. I, 
§6;N.Y.Const.1938 [1894],Art.I,§11). 
In addition, in Iowa and New York there are provisions 
dealing with particular uniformity problems. Both states 
have clauses preventing discrimination in certain cases. In the 
Iowa constitution, Art. VIII, §2, provides that "The prop-
erty of all corporations for pecuniary profit, shall be sub-
ject to taxation, the same as that of individuals." In New 
York, Art. XVI, §4 prohibits discrimination as to rates and 
method of taxation as between corporations established under 
United States laws and corporations under New York laws 
engaged in similar businesses. In addition, New York also 
has a provision relating the taxation of intangibles, Art. XVI, 
§3, which reads: 
... Intangible personal property shall not be taxed ad 
valorem nor shall any excise tax be levied solely because of 
the ownership or possession thereof, except that the income 
therefrom may be taken into consideration in computing any 
excise tax measured by income generally .... 
New York also has a provision concerning exemptions. 
Article XVI, § 1 provides that "exemptions from taxation 
may be granted only by general laws." 
CHAPTER III 
The Operative Effect of Each State's 
Uniformity Structure 
A. ANALYSES OF STATES WITH TYPE I CLAUSES 
1. Arkansas 
a. The provisions; historical note 
T HE present constitution of Arkansas came into force in 1 8 7 4, and the uniformity clause is found in Art. XVI, §5, which reads: 
All property subject to taxation shall be taxed according 
to its value, that value to be ascertained in such manner as 
the General Assembly shall direct, making the same equal 
and uniform throughout the State. No one species of prop-
erty from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher 
than another species of property of equal value, provided the 
General Assembly shall have power from time to time to tax 
hawkers, peddlers, ferries, exhibitions and privileges in such 
manner as may be deemed proper .... 
The basic uniformity clause is italicized. The omitted part of 
Art. XVI, §5, requires the exemption from taxation of prop-
erty used for public, religious, educational, and charitable 
purposes.1 Several amendments to the constitution have pro-
1 Arkansas was admitted into the Union in 1836. In its original constitu-
tion the uniformity clause was in §2 of the Revenue Article [unnumbered]. 
Section 2 was substantially identical to Art. XVI, § 5 of the present con-
stitution of 1874, with only minor differences of punctuation. In the 
clause concerning "other" taxes, the occupation of "merchants" was in-
cluded, but "ferries" and "exhibitions" were not. In the succeeding con-
stitution of 1861 the only change of substance was the insertion of the 
word "true" to modify "value," so that the provision read "All property 
49 
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vided for additional property exemptions.2 Article XVI, §6, 
stipulates that 
All laws exempting property from taxation other than as 
provided in this Constitution shall be void. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
There has been relatively little controversy concerning the 
meaning of the uniformity limitation embodied in the Arkan-
sas constitution. For purposes of uniformity in taxation, 
taxes are either property taxes or excise taxes. The term 
excise taxes is used to designate all taxes which are not 
property taxes. It is clear that both the uniformity clause 
in Art. XVI, §5 and the supplementary provision refer-
subject to taxation shall be taxed according to its true value." In the next 
constitution of 1864- the word "true" was omitted. 
The fourth constitution was dated 1868 and the uniformity clause was 
substantially changed. The revenue article was Art. X, and §2 thereof pro-
vided: 
Laws shall be passed taxing by a uniform rule all money credit, in-
vestments in bonds, joint-stock companies, or otherwise; and also all real 
and personal property according to its true value in money; but [certain 
enumerated classes of property, public, religious, etc.] shall never be 
taxed. . . . Personal property shall be appraised in such manner as may 
be provided by law at its true value in money, but the general assembly 
may exempt from taxation personal property to the value of live hundred 
dollars to each taxpayer. 
In addition, Section 3 of that article provided: 
The general assembly shall provide by law, for taxing the notes and 
bills discounted or purchased, moneys loaned, and all other property, 
effects or dues of every description, without deduction, of all banks now 
existing, or hereafter created, and of all bankers, so that all property 
employed in banking, shall always bear a burden of taxation equal to that 
imposed on other property of individuals. 
The present constitution was adopted in 1874-, and the uniformity pro-
vision reverted to its prior phraseology. 
2 Amendment No. 12 (added in 1926) and Amendment No. 27 (added 
in 1938) provide for industrial exemptions; Amendment No. 22 (added in 
19 3 6) provides for a homestead exemption. 
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ring to "species of property" apply only to property 
taxes. 3 N onproperty taxes, on the other hand, must be uni-
form within classes. This requirement is alternately de-
rived either from Art. II, §34 and §18 5 of the Arkansas 
Constitution, or the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the federal Constitution.6 The ob-
jects selected for excise taxes and the exemptions there-
from need only be reasonable classes/ and classifications may 
3 See, for example, Sims v. Ahrens, 167 Ark. 55 7, 271 S.W. 720 ( 1925) 
and Stanley v. Gates, 179 Ark. 886, 19 S.W.2d 1000 (1929), discussed 
under "Income Tax," infra. Nor does Art. XVI, §6, concerning the ex-
emption of property, limit nonproperty taxes. See Ward v. Bailey, 198 
Ark. 27, 127 S.W.2d 272 ( 1939) upholding a statutory provision which 
was construed to exempt income from certain refunding bonds from the 
state income tax. Fulkerson v. Refunding Board, 201 Ark. 957, 147 
S.W.2d 980 (1941) followed the Ward case. 
4 Section 3 reads: "The equality of all persons before the law is recog-
nized, and shall ever remain inviolate .... " 
5 Section 18 reads: 
The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens 
privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally 
belong to all citizens. 
6 Sec, for example, Stanley v. Gates, supra note 3 at 900. 
7 Sec, for example, Fort Smith v. Scruggs, 70 Ark. 549, 69 S.W. 679 
( 1902) in which an act authorizing cities to require residents thereof to 
pay a tax for the privilege of keeping and using a vehicle within the city 
was held not to be an unreasonable discrimination in favor of those who 
dwelled outside of the city and used a vehicle therein. In Ex Parte Byles, 
93 Ark. 612, 126 S.W. 94 (1910) a license tax on peddlers of enumerated 
articles was upheld, the court stating, at p. 618: "Treating this statute as 
one imposing a tax on privileges or occupations, it is valid, as the Legislature 
has the power to select certain occupations and tax them, without taxing 
others, and to classify the peddling of certain articles as an occupation and 
tax it." In Standard Oil Co. v. Brodie, 153 Ark. 114, 123-124,239 S.W. 
7 53 ( 1922) a fuel tax, construed as a tax upon the privilege of using the 
highways, was upheld, even though it did not reach vehicles propelled by 
steam, electricity, or gasoline purchased out of the state. In State v. Handlin, 
100 Ark. 17 5, 139 S.W. 1112 ( 1911) an amendment to the inheritance 
tax, providing in effect that the excess of $5 0,000 of estates subject to the 
tax was to be exempt, was upheld. See also, Wiseman v. Phillips, 191 Ark. 
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be made for the application of different rates.8 The court has 
held that a progressively graduated rate is a reasonable 
classification.9 Because of the stricter uniformity limitation 
applicable to property taxes, it is always crucial to determine 
the nature of a particular tax. The Arkansas court has held 
that a net income tax/0 an inheritance tax,11 a tax on the 
privilege of severing timber from the soil, 12 and a corporate 
franchise tax with a base of capital stock13 are not property 
taxes.14 
63, 84- S.W.2d 91 (1935) and Hardin v. Vestal, 204- Ark. 4-92, 162 
S.W.2d 923 ( 194-2), upholding certain exemptions under the sales tax. 
8 See, for example, Stanley v. Gates, supra note 3, in which separate rate 
schedules for corporations and individuals under the income tax were held 
to be valid. However, in Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Hot Springs, 85 Ark. 
509, 109 S.W. 293 (1908), the Arkansas court held that a local ordinance 
which imposed an annual tax upon coal oil wagons of $50, while imposing 
an annual tax of $10 on other vehicles, was void because it arbitrarily dis-
criminated against all owners of vehicles used for delivering coal oil. The 
court relied upon Art. II, § 18 of the Arkansas Constitution as the pertinent 
constitutional limitation. 
9 See Stanley v. Gates, supra note 3, discussed in the text under 
"Income tax." 
10 See the discussion in the text at notes 21-29, infra. 
11 State v. Handlin, supra note 7 at 179: " .. , it may now be regarded 
as settled law that inheritance taxes are not laid upon property, but upon the 
privilege or right of succession to it; or, in other words, it is in the nature 
of excise tax, and not subject to the same tests with respect to equality and 
uniformity as taxes levied upon property." 
12 Fioydv.MillerLbr.Co., 160Ark.17,254-S.W.4-50 (1923). 
13 St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. State, 106 Ark. 321, 152 S.W. 110 
( 191 3). The base of the tax was the proportion of the outstanding capital 
stock of the corporation, represented by property owned and used in busi-
ness transacted within the state. 
14 But see the dissenting opinion in Wiseman v. Phillips, supra note 7 at 
76-78, in which the sales tax was held by the majority to be an excise tax 
and valid. The dissent not only vigorously disagreed with the view con-
cerning the nature of the income, inheritance, and severance taxes, but 
would as well have held the sales tax to be a tax upon property. The dissent, 
therefore, would have held the tax to be invalid as not conforming to the 
uniformity clause in Art. XVI, §5 which limits property taxation. In the 
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The uniformity limitation in taxation has not been the 
most serious obstacle to the validity of nonproperty taxes in 
Arkansas. The court has given a very restrictive interpreta-
tion to that part of Art. XVI, §5, which reads: 
.•. provided the General Assembly shall have power from 
time to time to tax hawkers, peddlers, ferries, exhibitions and 
privileges in such manner as may be deemed proper .... 
Contrary to the interpretation given similar provisions in 
other state constitutions, the Arkansas coure5 has consistently 
relied upon the maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius to 
rule that the state16 can not tax those "occupations" or 
"privileges" of "common right." The occupations and 
privileges enumerated in Art. XVI, §5 are characterized as 
not being of "common right," and by their enumeration the 
state is prevented from taxing those which are of "common 
right." 
A unique situation exists in Arkansas concerning uni-
formity and "special assessments." In all other states it is 
held that the basic uniformity clause is not applicable to 
special assessments. However, Art. XIX, §27 of the Arkan-
sas Constitution imposes a special limitation upon special 
assessments, requiring that "such assessments shall be ad 
valorem and uniform." In addition, there are cases suggest-
ing that the court has ruled that the uniformity clause in Art. 
XVI, §5 is applicable to special assessments.17 For the pur-
poses of this monograph it is sufficient merely to refer to this 
view of Chief Justice Johnson the former opinions as to the nature of the 
named taxes were "novations." 
l5 See, for example, the discussion of this problem in the several opinions 
in Floyd v. Miller Lbr. Co., supra note 12. 
16 This limitation is not imposed upon the local taxing authorities. Sims v. 
Ahrens, supra note 3 at 563-564-. 
17 See, for example, Monticeiio v. Banks, 48 Ark. 251, 2 S.W. 852 
(1886); Davis v. Gaines, 48 Ark. 370, 3 S.W. 184 (1886); Martin v. 
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unusual situation which is primarily based on the unique uni-
formity provision for special assessments. 
( 1) Property taxation 
The few cases which have ruled on uniformity and prop-
erty taxation definitely establish a limitation of the strictest 
degree, as might be expected in light of the manner in which 
the property tax uniformity rules are spelled out in Art. 
XVI, §5. A requirement of universality governs both the 
selection of property for taxation and the exemption of 
property other than that specified in the constitution as ex-
emptible. This requirement is said to be derived from the 
uniformity clause as well as from the clause in Art. XVI, §6, 
which expressly prohibits exemptions.18 
Reynolds, 125 Ark. 163, 188 S.W. 4 {1916). Contra: Caton v. Western 
ClayDrainageDist., 87 Ark. 8,112 S.W. 145 {1908}; Bensbergv. Parker, 
95 S.W.2d 892 (1936}. 
18 See Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co. v. Worthen, 46 Ark. 312 ( 188 5). In 
that case the issue involved the validity of a statute which provided that the 
schedules furnished by railroad companies, upon which the value of their 
property for taxation purposes was figured, were not to include "embank-
ments, tunnels, cuts, ties, trestles or bridges." The court stated that if the 
legislature meant to relieve any portion of the property belonging to rail-
road corporations from the duty of contributing to the property tax, then it 
had undertaken to do something which was quite beyond its power. It was 
said {at p. 327) that: 
The theory of our constitution is that the common burden shall be 
borne by common contributions. All property is to be taxed according to 
its value. "All" does not mean all the legislature may designate, or all ex-
cept such as the legislature may exempt. If this were so the whole burden 
of taxation might be thrown upon land, or upon any one species of prop-
erty .... The legislature cannot discriminate between different classes 
of property in the imposition of taxes. The only discretion with which 
it is invested, is in the ascertainment of values, so as to make the same 
equal and uniform throughout the state. (Emphasis added.] 
The italicized sentence makes it clear that the Arkansas court finds the 
words of the basic uniformity clause sufficient to require universality in 
taxation of property, quite apart from the specific provision in Art. XVI, §6 
prohibiting the exemption of property. 
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Absolute uniformity is required in the effective rate 
applied to that property actually taxed.19 Note, however, that 
the requirement of absolute uniformity in both percentage 
rate and ratio of valuation is spelled out in Art. XVI, §5 in 
phrases which supplement the uniformity clause. The per-
centage rate requirement is spelled out in the clause referring 
to "species of property." The ratio of valuation requirement 
is spelled out in the following words, found in the uniformity 
clause itself: "making the same [i.e., value] equal and uni-
form throughout the state." There is no judicial precedent 
concerning the effect of these additional words on the mean-
ing of the basic uniformity clause itself. That is, there is no 
indication that the words "according to value," standing 
alone, would necessarily require absolute uniformity in 
effective rates. 
Property may be classified for the purpose of using differ-
ent methods in determining the value of the several classes.20 
19 See Ex parte Fort Smith & Van Buren Bridge Co., 62 Ark. 4-61, 36 
S.W. 1060 (1896), holding that all property subject to a property tax must 
be taxed on the same percentage of its actual value. The court emphasized 
both the clause directed to making value "equal and uniform" and the 
second sentence of Art. XVI, § 5. However, the ratio of valuation does not 
have to be lOOo/o of the actual value. Any per cent may be used, so long as 
absolute uniformity prevails. State ex rel. Nelson v. Meek, 127 Ark. 349, 
353-354, 192 S.W. 202 (1917), and cases there cited. 
It is usually held that the requirement of uniformity in effective rates is 
"territorial"-that a comparison between ratios of valuation used by sep-
arate taxing authorities imposing separate tax burdens, such as the state and 
County X, is irrelevant. While this applies as to the final effective rate in 
Arkansas, the peculiar wording of Art. XVI, § 5 is the basis for a rule that 
the ratio of valuation must be the same for the several taxing authorities in 
Arkansas. Hays v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 159 Ark. 101, 250 S.W. 879 
( 1923). The basis of this rule is the following clause in Art. XVI, §5: "mak-
ing the same [that is, value] equal and uniform throughout the State." Of 
course, the percentage rate may vary from district to district so that the 
effective rate of any taxing authority is not limited by this rule. 
20 See, for example, St. Louis, l.M. & S.R. Co. v. Worthen, 52 Ark. 
529, 135 s.w. 254- (1889). 
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It is important for comparative purposes to emphasize this 
because any indication found in the annotations or digests of 
cases to the effect that "property may be classified for pur-
poses of taxation" stems from the language found in the cases 
ruling on this particular point. Taken out of context, the 
language quoted in the annotations is misleading. But there 
is no confusion in the actual decisions of the Arkansas court. 
Any statements concerning the classification of property were 
made solely in relation to classification for the method of 
determining the value of property. 
There is no question, of course, that the ad valorem 
method must be used in taxing property, because the basic 
uniformity clause is phrased in terms of this particular rule of 
uniformity. There have been no judicial decisions on this 
point. 
(2) Income tax 
Two leading cases, Sims v. Ahren21 and Stanley v. Gates/2 
establish the validity of an income tax under the Arkansas 
Constitution. The first Arkansas income tax was passed in 
1923. It purported to be a gross income tax, reaching income 
from all sources.23 The tax was held invalid by a five judge 
court in the Sims case. The opinion is long and somewhat 
confusing. However, the basis of the opinion on rehearing, 
agreed to by three of the judges, was ( 1) that the tax was not 
a property tax but an excise tax, and ( 2) that the tax, as an 
excise tax, was invalid for two reasons. First, the tax was a 
violation of the commerce clause of the federal Constitu-
21 Supra note 3. 
22 Supra note 3. 
23 General Acts 1923, No. 345, p. 282; the statute is set forth, in part, in 
Sims v. Ahrens, supra note 3, at 560-5 61. The tax had a flat rate of 
I/10 of I%. The CCH Arkansas Tax Reporter, ~10-026, has described 
the tax as substantially a net income tax. 
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tion.24 Second, the tax was a violation of the requirement that 
excise taxes be uniform within classes. It was said that a gross 
income tax operating upon all persons and all corporations 
alike was discriminatory.25 However, the three judge 
majority agreed upon this statement: "[I]t is within the dis-
cretion of the Legislature to pass a properly classified net 
income tax law."26 
Taking a hint from the dictum in the Sims case, the legis-
lature passed the Income Tax Act of 1929/7 which imposed 
a net income tax. The rates for individual income were pro-
gressively graduated, but a flat rate was applicable to 
corporate income. The tax was upheld in the Stanley case, 
the court ruling that the tax was a nonproperty tax, and that 
the distinction made between individual and corporate rates, 
the progressive individual rates, and the minimum personal 
exemptions were all reasonable classifications. Three justices 
dissented, the court now being composed of seven members. 
However, there was no disagreement concerning the nature 
of an income tax, the dissenting justices disagreeing only as 
24 Supra note 3 at 573-574. 
25 ld. at 584. The majority view was: "It is absolutely essential to uni-
formity that the income only should be taxed .•.. For the reason that the 
relation between the amount of capital and of profits varies widely, a tax 
on gross profits would necessarily operate in a discriminatory manner and 
be arbitrary." 
26 ld. at 580, 599. Emphasis added. 
27 General Acts 1929, No. 118, p. 5 73. Section 3 of the Act imposed the 
tax, section 3 (a) reading: 
A tax is hereby imposed upon and with respect to the entire income 
of every resident, individual, trust or estate, which tax shall be levied 
•.. annually upon such entire net income as herein computed, at the 
following rates .••• 
Section 3 (b) read: 
Every corporation organized under the laws of this State shall pay 
annually an income tax with respect to carrying on or doing business 
equivalent to two (2%) per cent of the entire net income of such cor-
poration as defined herein ••.. 
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to the reasonableness of certain classifications found in the 
Act.28 The Sims and Stanley cases resolved any doubts con-
cerning the validity of an income tax under both the uni-
formity limitation29 and the restrictive interpretation given 
the provision in Art. XVI, §5 concerning the permissible 
coverage of nonproperty taxes. 
2. Maine 
a. The provisions; historical note 
Maine has had but one constitution, dated 1819. The only 
provision pertinent to uniformity in taxation is Art. IX, §8, 
as amended, which provides: 
All taxes upon real [and personal] estate, assessed by 
authority of this state, shall be apportioned and assessed 
equally, according to the just value thereof [but the legisla-
ture shall have power to levy a tax upon intangible personal 
property at such rate as it deems wise and equitable without 
regard to the rate applied to other classes of property] .1 
28 Supra note 3 at 906-907. Am·ong other classifications objected to 
was the fact that a partnership was taxed at the higher schedule of rates for 
individual, while a corporation doing the same business was taxed at the 
lower flat 2% rate. 
29 See Ward v. Bailey, supra note 3, and Fulkerson v. Refunding Board, 
supra note 3. Also see Baker v. Hill, 180 Ark. 387, 21 S.W. 2d 867 ( 1929) 
holding the income tax to be a nonproperty tax insofar as the "maximum 
rate limitation" upon property taxation was concerned. The cases discussed 
in the text and the rationale therein on the nature of an income tax were 
relied upon. 
1 The word "apportioned" in Art. IX, §8 refers to the apportionment of 
the state property tax in a lump sum in quotas among the towns in proportion 
to the valuation of property within the towns. Contrary to the usual prac-
tice, the state of Maine levies a certain sum of money upon each town, to 
be collected by the town at will and paid over, rather than levying a rate 
per $100 upon all property in the jurisdiction. For problems raised under 
the requirement of uniformity in "apportionment," see, for example, Sandy 
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The phrase "and personal" was added in 18 7 5 by amend-
ment. The clause in brackets concerning the taxation of in-
tangible personal property was added in 1913 by amendment. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
It is clear, as expected under this type of basic uniformity 
clause, that Art. IX, §8 applies only to property taxes.2 Non-
property taxes are required to be uniform within classes. The 
source of this limitation has never been clearly stated. The 
cases simply make the assertion that a tax, if a nonproperty 
tax, is not limited by Art. IX, §8 and that the tax is constitu-
tional if all in a class are treated alike. There are only a small 
number of cases concerning the uniformity required of non-
property taxes. 3 In State v. Hamlin4 the court ruled that a 
collateral inheritance tax which had a flat rate was upon the 
privilege of receiving property, not upon the property itself. 
River Plantation v. Lewis, 109 Me. 472,84 Atl. 995 (1912); Hamilton v. 
Portland State Pier Site District, 120 Me. I 5, 21-22, 112 Atl. 8 36 ( 1921). 
2 For example, State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 49 5, 30 Atl. 76 ( 1894); In re 
Opinion of the Justices, 13 3 Me. 525, 178 Atl. 621 ( 193 5); State v. West-
ern Union Telegraph Co., 73 Me. 518 ( 1882); State v. Maine Cent. R. 
Co., 74 Me. 376 (1883); In re Opinion of the Justices, 123 Me. 573, 121 
Atl. 902 (1923). 
3 In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see: State v. Western 
Union Tel. Co., supra note 2, holding selective corporation franchise taxes 
(with bases computed by reference to all property owned by the corporation 
except realty) to be excise taxes, and therefore not subject to the uniformity 
clause, Art. IX, §8; In re Opinion of the Justices, 123 Me. 573, 121 Atl. 
902 (1923), ruling that a "reasonable tax or charge per gallon upon" mo-
tor fuels would be an excise tax. 
In a more recent case, State v. F. H. Vahlsing, Inc., 147 Me. 417, 88 
Atl. 2d 144 (1952), the court upheld the Maine Potato Tax Law, R.S. 
1944, c. 14, §§206-217, against the contention that it violated the property 
tax uniformity limitation because it was not levied ad valorem. The court 
ruled that the tax, which imposes a rate of I¢ a barrel on all potatoes 
raised in the state, except such as are retained by the grower to be used for 
home consumption and for seed purposes, was an excise tax. The revenue 
is used to publicize Maine potatoes. 
4 Supra note 2. 
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The present Maine Inheritance Tax5 has a classified object 
with different graduated rate schedules applicable to each 
class. The validity of the graduated rates has not been 
litigated before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. 
Although there is no income tax in Maine, in 19 3 5 the 
court rendered an advisory opinion6 in which it ruled that 
a net income tax would not be a direct tax upon property, and 
therefore would not be subject to the uniformity clause in 
Art. IX, §8. The court stated that the proposed tax was a 
"proposal ... to tax the privilege of receiving income."7 
Several particular issues were passed on. The court stated 
that to tax income from intangible personal property at a 
higher rate than the rate upon income derived from other 
sources would be an invalid discrimination. However, income 
from real property might be exempted. Of most significance 
was the statement that the tax might be enacted with either a 
graduated rate or a single fixed rate. 
( 1) Property taxation 
The uniformity clause in the Maine Constitution has been 
interpreted to require a strict degree of uniformity. 8 Absolute 
uniformity is required of the effective rate applicable to all 
5 Maine Rev. Stat. 194-4-, c. 14-2, as amended. 
6 Opinion of the Justices, 13 3 Me. 525, 178 Atl. 621 ( 1935). 
7 ld. at 528. 
8 On its face the scope of the uniformity provision was broadened by the 
18 7 5 amendment adding the phrase "and personal" to make the clause now 
read: "All taxes upon real and pers01zal estate .... " However, there is some 
doubt whether before 18 7 5 uniformity was required only as to taxation of 
real property. The court in an 1873 opinion stated: 
Though this section applies specially to real estate, yet the very idea of 
taxation implied an equal apportionment and assessment upon all prop-
erty, real and personal, "according to its just value." It cannot for a mo-
ment be admitted that the constitution authorizes an unequal apportion-
ment and assessment upon real and personal estate, without any reference 
to its "just value." 
Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer, 62 Me. 62, 73, 16 Am. Rep. 395 (1873). 
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property taxed by any taxing jurisdiction; 9 thus, "double 
taxation" is prohibited.10 The 1913 Amendment to Art. IX, 
Sec. 8 apparently makes an exception to this requirement. 
That amendment provides that intangible personal property 
may be taxed at a "rate" without regard to the "rate" appli-
9 In In re Opinion of the Justices, 97 Me. 595, 55 At!. 827 (1903) it 
was said that, in levying a state tax, the legislature would be prohibited by 
Art. IX, §8 of the constitution from fixing a higher rate of taxation upon 
rural lands than the rate upon urban lands. Quoting Art. IX, §8, the court 
said (p. 597): "This command of the Constitution is absolute and compre-
hensive .... The only permissible variation of the amount of the tax is 
that resulting from the difference in value. The rate must be the same 
everywhere. Locality can be considered only so far as it affects value." And 
ininreOpinionoftheJusticcs, 123 Me. 573,121 Atl.902 (1923),when 
asked whether the legislature had the right to levy a reasonable tax per 
gallon upon all motor fuel, the court stated (p. 5 77): "The answer to this 
question depends upon the nature of the contemplated tax. If a property 
tax, it obviously offends the Constitution of Maine, Art. IX, §8 .... To 
single out any particular species of property •.. and impose a property 
tax upon it unequal in comparison with the tax upon other commodities as 
to value would be void." 
Other than advisory opinions the cases have concerned the proposition 
that absolute uniformity is required of the ratio of valuation used within any 
one taxing district, but that this ratio need not be I OO% of the "actual" 
value. Spear v. Bath, 125 Me. 27, 130 Atl. 507 (1925); Cumberland 
County Power & Light Co. v. Hiram, 12 5 Me. 13 8, 131 Atl. 594- ( 1926). 
Also see the recent case, Scars, Roebuck & Co. v. Inhabitants of City of 
Presque Isle, ISO Me. 181,107 Atl.2d4-75 (1954-). 
10 It is clear that the court holds the view that to tax a part of the prop-
erty located in a taxing district twice, while the remainder is taxed only 
once, would be a violation of the uniformity clause, Art. IX, §8. Dyar v. 
Farmington Village Corp., 70 Me. 515, 522-523 (1878). In Wheeler v. 
County Commissioners, 8 8 Me. 174-, 180 ( 189 5) it was said that for a 
taxing authority to tax the real estate of a corporation to the corporation and 
to tax the shares of the corporation to the holder thereof when the real estate 
already taxed was taken into account, to some extent, in fixing the value of 
the shares "resulted in double taxation ... contrary to the spirit and policy 
of the law." Art. IX, §8 was quoted, but it was noted that the statutory 
scheme provided for a deduction of the value of the real estate. In Stevens v. 
Dixfield & Peru Bridge Co., 115 Me. 4-02, 99 Atl. 94- ( 1916) such a case 
of "double taxation" was held to violate the uniformity clause. 
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cable to "other classes of property." In fact, practically no 
use has been made of this exception and intangible personal 
property is, purportedly, still subject to the General Prop-
erty Tax. 11 Thus, the court has had no occasion to interpret 
the scope of this exception. On its face the amendment ap-
pears to authorize only a separate rate applicable to all in-
tangible personal property. 
In addition to the requirement of absolute uniformity in 
effective rates, property may be taxed only by the ad valorem 
method.12 In contrast, there is no rule of universality either 
for the selection or exemption of property.13 The court has 
said: 
This provision [Art. IX, §8, before the 1913 amendment] 
simply requires that any tax which shall be lawfully imposed 
upon any kind or class of real or personal property shall be 
11 The only exception is that shares of stock in domestic trust companies 
and national banking institutions are taxed separately at a fixed rate. Maine 
Rev. Stat. 1944, c. 14, §§t56-158A. 
12 There is no case directed specifically to this problem. However, note 
the implication in the statement in In re Opinion of the Justices, 123 Me. 
57 3, 5 77, 121 At!. 90 2 ( 192 3) to the effect that "To single out any par-
ticular species of property . . . and impose a property tax upon it unequal 
in comparison with the tax upon other commodities as to value would be 
void." [Emphasis added.] 
13 There are very few cases on this point. In In re Opinion of Justices, 
I 02 Me. 527, 66 At!. 726 ( 1907) the court stated that an excise (gross 
receipts) tax on railroads which was to be in lieu of state and local taxes 
upon their property was not forbidden by any constitutional provision. In 
Portland v. Portland Water Co., 67 Me. 135 (1877) the court held that 
the city's exemption of the property of the water company for a term of 
years was not a violation of the uniformity provision, Art. IX, §8. How-
ever, in that case the court relied to a considerable degree on a contract 
between the city and the company under which water was to be furnished 
without charge to the city. While stating the general principle concerning 
the power to exempt, the court distinguished former cases by stating that 
this situation "partakes the character of a contract." 
In Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer, supra note 8, the court affirmed the 
general power of exemption, but held an exemption by the city of certain 
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apportioned and assessed upon all such property equally . 
. . . It does not require the legislature to impose taxes upon 
all the real and personal property within the State of what-
ever kind and to whatever use applied. The legislature may, 
nevertheless, determine what kinds and classes of property 
shall be taxed and what kinds and classes shall be exempt 
from taxation. It has exercised this power of exemption fre-
quently and continually, without question, since the adoption 
of the Constitution. It is now too late to question the 
power.14 
classes of manufacturing institutions within the city to be invalid. One 
alternative reason given was that the exemption violated Art. IX, §8 in that 
the exemption was not "statewide." See the discussion on that limitation in 
the text. 
And in Dyar v. Farmington Village Corp., supra note 10, the court held 
that the attempt to create a territorial corporation made up of a part of a 
town and to impose a tax upon the realty therein, when the "territorial cor-
poration" remained a part of the town for all other tax purposes, was in-
valid. One reason given was that this was an invalid exemption contrary to 
Art. IX, §8 (pp. 522-523). 
The court asserted: 
. . . [I] n this state . . . a tax cannot be constitutionally imposed upon 
a portion only of the real estate of a town, leaving the remainder exempt. 
So held in Brewer Brick Company v. Brewer .... In that case the 
portion to be exempted was specified, while in this the portion to be 
taxed is specified. But this difference is unimportant .... The result is 
the same. One portion is taxed and the other is exempt. Or, to speak 
with entire exactness, one portion has an additional tax placed upon it 
from which the remainder is exempt. And it is this result-this inequality 
of taxation-that renders the proceeding unconstitutional. 
It is questionable whether the Brewer case supports the statement made. 
However, the Dyar case clearly rules upon the point, so that we may con-
clude that realty may not be exempted solely on the basis of location. The 
statement that no realty may be exempted is broader than the holding and 
does not necessarily represent the law in light of the opinion (Opinion of 
the Justices, supra) ruling upon the validity of the exemption of railroad 
property. Of course, in that case there was an "in lieu" excise tax. How-
ever, realty classified as public property and property of benevolent institu-
tions, for example, are in fact exempted. See Maine Rev. Stat. 194+, c. 81, 
§6. 
14 In re Opinion of the Justices, 102 Me. 527, 66 Atl. 726 {1907). 
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This is not a surprising result in view of the fact that there 
are no provisions in the Maine Constitution for either the 
mandatory or permissive exemption of certain classes of 
property which are almost universally exempted to some 
degree in the forty-eight states-for example, public prop-
erty, educational property, and the like.15 
However, the court has ruled that the exemption of 
property must be on a statewide basis.10 A species of property 
cannot be exempted in one jurisdiction and taxed in another. 
The rationale of the court for this proposition was as follows: 
The legislature may determine the amount of taxation 
and select the objects. They may exempt by general and uni-
form laws certain descriptions of property from taxation. 
To have uniformity of taxation, the impos1t10n of, and 
the exemption from taxation, must be by one and the same 
authority-that of the legislature. It is for the legislature 
to determine upon what subject matter taxation shall be im-
posed; upon land, upon loans, upon stock, etc.; but the 
subject matter once fixed, the rule is general, and applied 
to all property within its provisions .... It cannot be pre-
tended that it would be constitutional to impose a tax on a 
church in A., and to exempt one of the same character in B. 
. . . But if it be conceded that each town has the right to tax 
part and exempt part of the property located therein, what-
ever its character, uniformity in relation to the subject mat-
ter, as well as to the ratio of taxation, is at an end. 
15 See Maine Rev. Stat. 194-4, c. 81, §6. 
16 Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer, 62 Me. 62, 16 Am. Rep. 395 (1873). 
The issue concerned the validity of a state statute providing that manufactur-
ing establishments were to be exempt for a term of years from property taxa-
tion, provided the towns and cities in which the same were located gave their 
consent to such exemption. Besides finding an improper delegation of 
power, the court ruled that such an exemption would violate the uniformity 
provision, Art. IX, § 8, in that the nature of the exemption could vary from 
town to town. 
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If, of the innumerable varieties of manufacture, different 
towns exempt different, or the same species of manufacture, 
the utter want of uniformity is obvious.17 
This position is in contrast to the rule of uniformity required 
of effective rates. There need be no correlation of the effec-
tive rates imposed by the state and the several local taxing 
jurisdictions, because absolute uniformity is required only of 
the rate applied to all property taxed by any single taxing 
jurisdiction, state or locaP8 
3. Tennessee 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The principal provision concerning uniformity of taxation 
in the present Tennessee Constitution of 1870 is Art. II, §28. 
Section 28 contains the basic uniformity clause and other 
pertinent limitations. The section reads (with indentation and 
emphasis supplied) : 
All property, real, personal or mixed, shall be taxed, but 
the Legislature may except such as may be held by the State, 
by counties, cities or towns, and used exclusively for public or 
corporation purposes, and such as may be held and used for 
purposes purely religious, charitable, scientific, literary or 
educational, and shall except one thousand dollars' worth of 
personal property in the hands of each taxpayer, and the 
direct product of the soil in the hands of the producer and his 
immediate vendee. 
All property shall be taxed according to its value, that 
value to be ascertained in such manner as the Legislature 
shall direct, so that taxes shall be equal and uniform through-
out the State. No one species of property from which a tax 
may be collected shall be taxed higher than any other species 
of property of the same value. 
17 /d. at 74. 
18 See the cases cited in note 9, supra. 
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But the legislature shall have power to tax Merchants, 
Peddlers, and privileges, in such manner as they may from 
time to time direct. The portion of a Merchant's Capital used 
in the purchase of Merchandise sold by him to nonresidents 
and sent beyond the State, shall not be taxed at a rate higher 
than the ad valorem tax on property. 
The Legislature shall have power to levy a tax upon in-
comes derived from stocks and bonds that are not taxed ad 
valorem . ... 1 
Two other provisions should be considered. Article II, §292 
makes the principles of uniformity found in Art. II, §28 
expressly applicable to local taxes. Article II, §303 provides 
for the exemption of domestic produce and manufactured 
articles. Tennessee has had substantially this same uniformity 
structure for the greatest part of its history. However, a 
novel uniformity clause based on quantity rather than 
quality, and sometimes referred to as the first "real" uni-
formity clause,4 was introduced in the original Tennessee 
Constitution, dated 1796.5 
1 The omitted part of Art. II, §28 concerns a poll tax. 
2 The provision reads: 
The General Assembly shall have power to authorize the several 
counties and incorporated towns of this State, to impose taxes for county 
and corporation purposes respectively, in such manner as shall be pre-
scribed by law; and all property shall be taxed according to its value, upon 
the principles established in regard to State taxation .... 
3 The provision reads: 
No article manufactured of the produce of this State shall be taxed 
otherwise than to pay inspection fees. 
4 Matthews, "The Function of Constitutional Provisions Requiring Uni-
formity in Taxation," 3 8 Ky. L. J. 31, 41 ( 1949). Cf. Chapter V, Part A, 
infra. 
5 The original Tennessee Constitution, Art. I, §26, contained the follow-
ing provision: 
All lands liable to taxation in this state, held by deed, grant, or entry, 
shall be taxed equal and uniform, in such manner that no one hundred 
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In Tennessee taxes may be classified for the purpose of 
applying Art. II, §28 as property, nonproperty, and income 
taxes. The uniformity limitations in Art. II, §28 apply only 
to the taxation of property. Nonproperty taxes and taxes upon 
income are limited only to that degree of uniformity required 
by either Art. XI, §8 of the Tennessee Constitution-the 
equivalent of an "equal protection" clause-or the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 7 The court at one time ruled that "special 
assessments" as well as "taxes" upon property were limited 
acres shall be taxed higher than another, except town-lots, which shall 
not be taxed higher than two hundred acres of land each; no freeman 
shall be taxed higher than one hundred acres, and no slave higher than 
two hundred acres on each poll. 
Article I, §27 of the constitution of 1796 was identical to the present Art. 
II, §30, supra note 3, providing for a special exemption. 
In the Tennessee Constitution of 18 34 the uniformity provision was 
found in Art. II, §28 and the rule of uniformity was changed to one of 
value. The basic uniformity clause and supplementary clause as to "rates" 
were identical with those appearing in present Art. II, §28. However, the 
first sentence varied significantly from the first sentence of the present Art. 
II, §28. That section provided: 
All lands liable to taxation, held by deed, grant, or entry, town-lots, 
bank-stock, slaves between the ages of twelve and fifty years, and such 
other property as the legislature may from time to time deem expedient, 
shall be taxable. 
Article II, §30 of the 1834 constitution carried over Art. I, §27 of the 
1796 constitution, and was therefore identical with the present Art. II, 
§30. Article II, §29 of the 1834 constitution was new, and substantially 
the same as the present Art. II, §29, supra note 2, which applies the 
principles of uniformity to local taxes. 
6 One of the very few articles dealing with the uniformity problem 
generally is Parker, "Tax Problems Presented by the Tennessee Constitu-
tion," 4 Vand. L. Rev. 116 (1950), in which the writer analyzes the 
uniformity limitation under the Tennessee Constitution. 
7 See, for example, Shields v. Williams, !59 Tenn. 349, 366-367, 19 
S.W. 2d 261 {1929) and the cases discussed in notes 60-62, infra. 
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by the uniformity provision in Art. II, §28.8 This interpreta-
tion has since been overruled.9 
( 1) Property taxation 
Uniformity in selection and exemption. The Tennessee 
Supreme Court has consistently interpreted Art. II, §28, to 
require the strictest degree of universality in the taxation of 
property. Therefore, except for property designated as 
exemptible in Art. II, §§28 and 30 of the constitution, it is 
said that no property may be exempted from taxation, and a 
taxing authority may not select for taxation less than all 
property within its territorial jurisdiction.10 However, the 
apparent strictness of this rule was notably limited in the 
1929 Shields case, discussed below, in which the court, in 
fact, sanctioned the "exemption" of representative intangible 
personal property, although in theory the strict rule was not 
even partially abandoned. 
With certain exceptions of no consequence to the present 
discussion, the cases concerning universality, which were 
decided before the 1929 Shields case, fall into five groups. 
First, in several cases the court held that Art. II, §28 was 
violated by certain statutes purporting to exempt a part or all 
of the property in newly incorporated territory from city 
taxation for a period of years.11 The only cases decided since 
8 The leading case was Taylor McBean & Co. v. Chandler, 56 Tenn. 
34-9 (1872). 
9 Arnold v. Knoxville, 115 Tenn. 195, 90 S.W. 4-69 (1905). See 
Parker, supra note 6 at 120-121. 
10 See the cases cited in notes 11-13, 19, and 23, infra. 
11 See Jones v. Memphis, 101 Tenn. 188, 4-7 S.W. 138 (1898). Also 
see Allen v. Board of Mayor and Aldermen of Smithville, 14-0 Tenn. 4-18, 
20 5 S.W. 124- ( 1917), in which the court held an entire act void because 
of the proviso reading: "that not more than one acre of any lands included 
in said boundary and used for farming purposes shall be taxable under this 
act .... "The purpose of the act was to grant a charter to the municipality. 
A clear statement of the limitation is found in the dictum of Railway 
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1929 which concern either the "exemption" or "selection" 
of property from taxation are affirmations of this principle.12 
Second, there are those cases in which the court has held 
that the uniformity provision, Art. II, §28, was violated by 
certain statutes which "selected" only real estate for taxation, 
with the result that all personalty within the taxing jurisdic-
tions was not subject to the taxes. Such omissions were held 
to be unconstitutional "exemptions."13 
The third group of cases embodies correlative propositions. 
Company v. Wilson County, 89 Tenn. 597, 609 (1891), in which the 
court, after first finding that there was no statutory power in the county to 
exempt railroad property from taxation, said, after quoting Art. II, §28: 
This constitutional mandate that all property (except that mentioned 
therein for exemption) shall be taxed, prohibits even ~the Legislature 
from granting any other exemption whatever, no matter what the con-
sideration; and if it attempts to do so, the effort is unavailing and void 
for want of legislative power. [The constitution declares what property] 
shall be taxed, and what may and what shall be exempt from taxation. 
12 American Bemberg Corp. v. City of Elizabethton, 180 Tenn. 373, 
175 S.W. 2d 535 (194-3); Bell v. Town of Pulaski, 182 Tenn. 136,184 
S.W. 2d 384 (194-4); Corp. of Sevierville v. King, 182 Tenn. 14-3, 184 
S.W. 2d 3 81 ( 194-4). In the latter two cases, as in the Allen case, supra 
note 11, the land to be exempt was farm land. 
13 A leading case is Reelfoot Lake Levee Dist. v. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 1 51, 
36 S.W. 1041 ( 1896), in which the court clearly explained the proposi-
tion. The court stated that Section 28 is mandatory in at least two points, 
one of which is that all property, of whatever kind, except for exemptions 
in the constitution, shall be taxed. And it held that the act in question 
"utterly" ignored this requirement in that "it expressly limits taxes therein 
provided for to land alone, and thereby exempts all personalty, and without 
as well as that within the exceptions mentioned in the fundamental law . 
. • . " (pp. 161-162). Also see Taylor McBean & Co. v. Chandler, 56 Tenn. 
349, 24- Am. Rep. 308 (1872). Both of these cases arose over the validity 
of what were held to be "special assessments," not "taxes." In those early 
cases such "special assessments" were held to be limited by Art. II, §28, and 
therefore invalid for the reasons mentioned. As stated above, at note 9, this 
interpretation of the application of the uniformity provision was later re-
versed. However, the cases are still valid as to the meaning of the uniformity 
limitation. 
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On the one hand, the court has held that the same taxing 
authority, without violating Art. II, §28, may tax both the 
"capital stock" of a corporation as property of that corpora-
tion and the shares of the same corporation as personal prop-
erty of the shareholder.14 The court reasoned that the two 
items were separate and distinct items of taxable property, 
and that to tax both was not such "double taxation" as is 
prohibited by the uniformity limitation. In addition, the 
court has stated, as dictum, that the same proposition held 
true for the taxation of both land and the mortgages 
thereon.15 A similar statement has been made concerning the 
taxation of property bought on credit as property of the 
buyer and the debt on the same as property of the seller.16 
It should be pointed out, however, that in the "capital stock" 
cases the court was referring to the taxation of the "capital 
stock" as invested in the corporate tangible property. Thus, 
the court was not in fact approving the taxation at the same 
time of both corporate intangible assets and the corporate 
shares.17 
14 Memphis v. Ensley, 65 Tenn. 553, 32 Am. Rep. 532 (1873); Street 
Railroad v. Morrow, 87 Tenn. 406, II S.W. 348 ( 1889); and see 
Memphis v. Memphis City Bank, 91 Tenn. 574, 195 S.W. 1045 (1892); 
Memphis v. Home Insurance Company, 91 Tenn. 55 8, 19 S.W. I 042 
(1892). 
15 Dunn v. Dunn, 99 Tenn, 598, 607, 4-2 S.W. 259 (1897), in which 
the issue was the priority of a tax lien. The court stated that land and the 
mortgagee's interest therein are separate and distinct things, for while the 
land is taxed in the hands of the mortgagor, and to its full value, the mort-
gagee is taxed upon his notes and the mortgage which he holds to secure 
them. Thus, for tax purposes, they were treated as separate and distinct 
properties. Also see Street Railroad v. Morrow, supra note 14- at 4-19-4-20. 
16 Street Railroad v. Morrow, supra note 14- at 4-19-20. 
17 See, for example, Memphis v. Ensley, supra note 14. The Court said 
(at p. 554-) that the Company had "all their capital stock invested in Gas 
Works Manufactory and other appurtenances necessary to the production 
and supply of gas. This property has been regularly assessed for taxes, and 
the same was paid. A tax, however, has been assessed on the shares of stock 
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On the other hand, in subsequent cases the court held that, 
while both corporate shares and "capital stock" may be taxed 
without violating Art. II, §28, the provision does not require 
the taxation of both.18 The court characterized the taxation 
owned by the shareholders at their market value as part of the personal 
property of said shareholders .... " (Emphasis added.) It was claimed 
that this was an unconstitutional "double taxation" (but with no constitu-
tional citation) on the ground that the tax on the capital stock "as invested 
is a tax on the shares .... " (Emphasis added.) In concluding that the tax 
on the shares was valid, the court stated at p. 5 62: "The shareholders are 
liable to be taxed for their stock as owners of other property [than the 
capital stock], regardless of the fact that the capital stock invested in the 
property of the company has been taxed .... " (Emphasis added.) Also 
see Street Railroad v. Morrow, supra note 14, in which it was stated (at 
p. 419): "The tax in the case now being considered is laid upon the property 
of the corporation, and the capital stock in the hands of the corporation 
is, by express direction of the lawmaker, omitted from assessment." See 
Tenn. Public Acts of 1887, Ch. 2, §8. 
18 Union & Planters' Bank v. Memphis, 101 Tenn. 154, 46 S.W. 55 7 
( 1898), in which the court pointed to the provision in Art. II, §28 stating 
that the valuation of property is to be determined in such manner as the 
legislature might direct, and stated (pp. I 5 9-160): 
The Legislature in its wisdom has provided for the assessment of 
stock to the shareholder, and has determined that no tax shall be assessed 
upon the capital of the corporation. It was clearly within the power of 
the Legislature to prescribe this method of taxing bank stock, and, until 
the system is changed, no ad valorem tax can be collected from the cor-
poration on the capital stock. (Emphasis added.) 
Also in Tennessee Fertilizer Co. v. McFall, 128 Tenn. 645, 163 S.W. 806 
( 1913), the court stated (at p. 660): 
It is within the power of the legislature to assess corporations upon 
their corporate property and capital stock excluding the shares of stock, or 
it is within the power of the legislature to assess shares of stock in lieu 
of corporate property and capital stock . ... Either mode of assessment 
is valid, and neither can be regarded as unlawfully exempting corporate 
property from taxation. The two plans are merely different methods of 
assessment of corporate property. [Emphasis added.] 
Also see Carroll v. Alsup, 107 Tenn. 257,64 S.W. 193 (1901); Sloan v. 
Columbia, 144 Tenn. 197, 232 S.W. 663 (1920). But see the earlier case 
of Chattanooga v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co., 75 Tenn. 561 (1881). 
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of only one item (e.g., "capital stock") at its full value as 
simply a "method of assessing" such property. It is signifi-
cant to note that in these later cases the court was referring 
to the intangible assets of the corporations when it referred 
to "capital stock." A change had been made in the General 
Property Tax by this time so that most corporations were 
taxed on their intangible assets (that is, their "capital stock"), 
the value of which was stated to be the value of corporate 
shares minus the value of tangible property taxed as other 
property. The shares of such corporations were not taxed to 
the holders thereof. On the contrary, when the first proposi-
tion above was stated-that it was permissible to tax both 
"capital stock" and shares-it appears that shares were taxed, 
but that no provision was made for taxing the total intangible 
assets (that is, the "capital stock") of corporations. 
The fourth group of cases concerns the "exemption" of 
both governmental and private bonds from the general 
property tax. These cases are of particular importance be-
cause they concern positive efforts to "exempt" a class of 
intangible property from taxation. The court first held that 
two statutes, interpreted as providing for the exemption of 
state bonds from both state and local property taxation, 
violated the uniformity provision, Art. II, §28, because they 
were, in fact, "exemptions" of property not designated as 
exemptible by the constitution.19 However, a few years later, 
19 In State Nat. Bank v. Memphis, 116 Tenn. 641, 94 S.W. 606 ( 1906) 
a statute (Gen. Rev. Act. 1903, c. 258, §25) which provided that the as-
sessable value of shares of stock in banks was to be the actual cash value of 
such stock less the value of realty and tangible personalty belonging to the 
bank, and less the value of state bonds owned for not less than six months, 
was construed to create, in effect, an exemption of state bonds. The court 
held the clause void, because (p. 65 3) "It violates the clause of the constitu-
tion that 'all property ... shall be taxed,' and the clause that 'taxation 
shall be equal and uniform throughout the State.' " In Keith v. Funding 
Board of Tennessee, 127 Tenn. 441, 155 S.W. 142 (1912) a statute ex-
pressly providing that the "principal and interest" of state bonds were not to 
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in Foster v. Roberts, the court overruled those prior cases20 
and held that the "exemption" of the principal and interest 
from state bonds from state and local taxation was not an 
"exemption" of property as contemplated by Art. II, §28, 
but was an "act of sovereignty" by which the state simply 
provided for its credit.21 It was agreed that if the statutory 
provision was construed to be an "exemption" of property, 
the decisions of the overruled cases would have been cor-
rect.22 The precise nature of the Foster case rationale was 
emphasized by a 1924 decision, Cumberland University v. 
Golladay,23 in which the court ruled that the "Foster case 
be taxed by either the state or local governmental units was held to violate 
Art. II, §28 of the constitution because it was an "exemption" of property 
not designated as exemptible in the constitution. 
20 142 Tenn. 3 50, 219 S.W. 729 ( 1919). As stated by the court (p. 
3 51), the power of the legislature to authorize the issuance of "nontaxable 
bonds of the state" was "again brought in question" by the challenge of the 
validity of Tenn. Laws I 919, c. 114, which provided that "neither the 
principal nor interest of said [state] bonds shall be taxed" by state or local 
units of government. It was recognized that a similar statute was held un-
constitutional in the Keith case, supra note 19. The court expressly over-
ruled that case, and it mentioned (at p. 356) State Nat. Bank v. Memphis 
as only "correctly" holding that there was no implied exemption of state 
bonds from taxation. However, in fact the court found an implied statutory 
"exemption," so that this case must be taken as overruling both the Keith 
case and the State Nat. Bank case. 
2l The court (p. 354) relied on the dissenting opinions in the Keith 
case, which had concluded that the constitutional inhibition against exemp-
tions from taxation was not intended to control the state with reference to 
its own credits as a means of floating its obligations at lower rates of interest. 
Thus, the legislature might, in the exercise of its "inherent sovereign 
power," contract that bonds issued by the state should be free from the 
burden of taxation. 
22 Foster v. Roberts, supra note 20 at 353, saying that an examination of 
the Keith case "clearly discloses that the correctness of the positions taken 
therein depends entirely upon whether the consideration of the question 
is undertaken as one of taxation exemption of property forbidden by the 
Constitution, or whether it is to be viewed as an act of sovereignty." 
23 152 Tenn. 82, 274 S.W. 536 (1924). Tenn. Laws 1925, c. 77, §! 
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rule" did not extend to the exemption of the principal and 
interest from private bonds from taxation. The rationale of 
the earlier cases was relied on in this opinion to support a 
decision that Art. II, §28 was violated by a statute providing 
for the exemption of bonds of educational institutions from 
state and local taxation. 
Fifth, in State ex rel. Hauk v. American Trust Co.,24 the 
court held that the "in lieu" provision of a "mortgage 
registry" tax was unconstitutional. The tax had been imposed 
"in lieu of all other taxes."25 The tax itself was considered a 
nonproperty tax and therefore valid, but the "in lieu" pro-
vision violated Art. II, §28, because it amounted to an 
exemption. "[T] he legislature is without power to exempt 
from taxation any property except as specified in [the Con-
stitution] ."26 Thus, the court established the following gen-
eral rule. A privilege tax imposed indirectly upon a class of 
property not designated by the constitution as exemptible, 
could not constitutionally be imposed "in lieu" of the general 
was substantially identical to the provisions which had been contested in 
the cases discussed in the text, and provided that such bonds "should not 
be taxed." The court clearly treated the provision as an "exemption" (p. 
8 5) and relied upon Art. II, §28, to hold the statute invalid, stating that 
Section 28 provides that "all property" shall be taxed, and (at p. 86) that 
"The legislature is without power to grant tax exemptions to individuals or 
institutions contrary to the express mandate of the constitution. . . . 
Bonds, when issued and sold by a literary institution, after passing into 
hands of an individual, are beyond the tax-exempt class of property enu-
merated" in Section 28. 
24 141 Tenn. 243, 208 S.W. 611 (1918). 
25 Tenn. Laws 1917, c. 70: " ... prior to the recording by the Regis-
trars of the several counties of the State of any mortgage, or deed of trust 
... there shall be levied and paid, in lieu of all other taxes, a state tax of 
I 5¢ on each $100 or portion thereof, of the amount of the indebtedness so 
secured ... provided that this tax shall not apply to loans under $1 ,000." 
26 Supra note 24 at 246. The court stated that it "must conclude that it 
was the intention to exempt registered mortgages and deeds of trust from 
ad valorem taxation." 
UNIFORMITY STRUCTURES 75 
property tax upon that class of property because such an "in 
lieu" provision would, in fact, be an "exemption" of such 
property. 
To 1929, then, the meaning of the rule of universality had 
developed rather clearly. It prohibited both the positive ex-
emption of classes of property, and the "negative" exemption 
of classes of property by way of a failure to select such classes 
for taxation. Neither could an "in lieu" nonproperty tax be 
substituted for the general property tax on a class of property 
not designated as exemptible by the constitution. However, 
the effect of the strict rule had been modified in two instances. 
First, the court had held that, while the constitution did not 
forbid the simultaneous taxation of both corporate stock in 
the hands of the individual and the capital stock of the corpo-
ration, nevertheless there was no requirement that both must 
be taxed. Second, the exemption of state bonds had been con-
strued not to be an "exemption," and consequently not gov-
erned by the strict rule of universality. 27 Of course, this 
second "exemption" really proved the rule of universality, 
because, if Art. II, §28, was not to be violated, it was neces-
sary to construe the statutory relief of state bonds from 
property taxation as not being an "exemption" of property. 
The evasive nature of this rationale was emphasized when 
the court subsequently held that private bonds could not be 
"relieved" of taxation as that would be an unconstitutional 
"exemption." 
27 In Foster v. Roberts, supra note 20, the court took a possible alterna-
tive position when it stated (at p. 357): "Further, we are of the opinion 
that the bonds of the State do not constitute property within the meaning 
of that term, as used in the taxation clause of the Constitution," but that 
such are instrumentalities of the government which it could not be contended 
that the legislature is mandatorily required to tax, or which because of con-
stitutional language cannot be exempted. However, this position was not 
pursued at length, and does not appear in the later cases concerning the 
"exemption" of representative intangible property. 
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At this point it will be helpful to describe the pertinent 
parts of the general property tax act as it appeared before 
being changed by the legislature in 1 92 9. This will be of 
considerable aid in determining the implication of those 
changes which were upheld by the court in the 1929 Shields 
case, discussed below. In 1929 the general property tax act 
was located in Chapter 602 of the Public Acts of 1907. Sec-
tion 1 of that Act, the general provision, read: 
. . . all property-real, personal, and mixed-shall be 
assessed for taxation for state . . . [and local] purposes, ex-
cept such as is declared exempt in the next section. 
The next section was obviously a paraphrase of the first 
sentence of Art. II, §28 of the constitution. Section 2 of 
Chapter 602 set forth certain exemptions, stating "· .. all 
property herein enumerated and none other shall be exempt 
from taxation." The enumerated property coincided with 
that property designated as exemptible by the constitution. 
Section 8 of Chapter 602 implemented the general section by 
providing for the classifications under which "all personal 
property of every kind" was to be assessed. The section 
clearly covered all intangible property, except certain stocks 
in corporations the capital stock of which was taxed by 
Tennessee.28 
Section 24 of Chapter 602 provided that shares of stock in 
banking institutions and certain miscellaneous corporations 
were to be assessed as personal property to the holders 
thereof, the tax to be in lieu of any taxation of the corporate 
capital stock. The value of such shares was to be the actual 
cash value minus the value of realty and tangible personalty 
owned by such corporations which was taxed as other prop-
erty. Sections 21, 22, and 26 of Chapter 602 provided for the 
28 See note 30, infra, for the original and amended versions of this 
section. 
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taxation of intangible property in the hands of corporations 
other than the banking institutions and miscellaneous cor-
porations mentioned in Section 24. Thus, the capital stock of 
substantially all domestic and foreign corporations doing 
business in Tennessee was taxed, with its value being the 
actual cash value of the shares in such corporations less the 
value of realty and tangible personalty owned by such cor-
porations, which was to be taxed as other property. 
In 1929 the Tennessee legislature passed Chapter 86 of 
the Public Acts of 1929. The obvious purpose was to imple-
ment the unique provision in Art. II, §28, which reads: "The 
legislature shall have power to levy a tax upon incomes de-
rived from stocks and bonds that are not taxed ad valorem." 
(Emphasis added.) The Act did two things. First, sections 1 
through 6 imposed a tax of 5% on the "incomes derived by 
way of dividends from stocks or by way of interest on bonds . 
• • • "
29 There were certain exclusions and exemptions, and 
the term "bonds" was defined very broadly, in Section 4 of 
the Act, so that it included all "obligations . . . evidenced 
by an instrument whereby the obligor is bound to pay interest 
to the obligee. . . ." 
Second, section 7 of the Act amended the General Prop-
erty Tax Act of 1907, so that the ad valorem tax would, in 
fact, fail to tax all intangible personal property in the hands 
of individuals, other than money on hand or on deposit and 
bank shares. This was done in the following manner. The 
general section of the General Property Tax Act, purporting 
to subject "all property" to taxation, was left unchanged. 
However, Section 8 of Chapter 602 of the Acts of 1907, 
which provided the classification under which all personal 
property was to be assessed, was amended to provide only 
for the assessment of tangible personal property and money 
29 The income tax and its particular provisions are discussed infra. 
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on hand or on deposit.80 Section 24 of Chapter 602, provid-
ing for the taxation of bank shares to the holders thereof, 
was left unchanged. 
The validity of Chapter 8631 of the Public Acts of 1929-
known as the "Hall Income Tax Act"-was immediately 
30 Section 8 of the Act, as amended, read as follows, with the italicized 
words being those deleted by the 1929 amendment, and the words in CAP-
ITALS being those added by the 1929 amendment. 
• , , all personal property of every kind shall be assessed under the fol-
lowing classification: 
Class 1. [Household goods and similar property.] 
Class 2. [Farming tools and similar property.] 
Class 3. [Livestock.] 
Class 4. [Watercraft.] 
Class 5. The amount of income derived from United States bonds and 
all other stocks and bonds not taxed ad valorem. 
Class 6. All bonds except United States bonds and all shares of stock 
as herein after provided in section 22 [and section 21 by interpretation, 
see Sloan v. City of Columbia, 144 Tenn. 197 ( 1920)] of this Act. 
Class [ 5] 7. Notes, duebills, chases in action, accounts, mortgages, or 
any other evidence of i?zdebtedness, and money on hand or on deposit, 
or invested in any manner in this State or elsewhere not otherwise as-
sessed IN THIS STATE. 
Class (6] 8. All other TANGIBLE personal property not hereinbe-
fore designated. • • • 
The deletion of the phrase "of every kind," modifying "personal property" 
in the first sentence, and the addition of the word "tangible" to modify 
"personal property" in the catch-all clause, now class 6, emphasize the effect 
of this amendment. 
31 Chapter 86 was amended three days after its enactment by Chapter 
116 of the Public Acts of 1929. The changes made were irrelevant for the 
present discussion. An exemption from the income tax was amended and 
Section 3 of chapter 116 read in part: "the General Assessment Act of 1907 
is amended so as to provide that stocks and bonds upon whose income an 
income tax is imposed shall not be assessed for State, county or municipal 
taxation." Of course the General Assessment Act had already been amended 
so as to "fail to tax" most intangible property, and it was not conditioned 
on the imposition of the income tax. It appears that this rather questionable 
provision, constitutionally, was intended to relate to certain back ad valorem 
taxes for the years immediately preceding 1929. See Trotter, "The Tennes-
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challenged, and both features of the Act-the Income Tax 
and the amendment of the General Property Tax Act-were 
upheld in Shields v. Williams. 32 The uppermost issue facing 
the court, as the opinion makes clear, was the validity of the 
income tax. The validity of the "release" of certain intangi-
ble property from taxation was subordinate to and a part of 
that issue. Consequently, this was the crucial constitutional is-
sue which the framers of the constitution had in mind when, 
in Art. II, §28, they "authorized" the legislature to levy a 
tax "upon incomes derived from stocks and bonds that are 
not taxed ad valorem. " 33 
The court rejected the contention of the complainants that 
the income tax provision in Art. II, §28 referred to the in-
come from "stocks and bonds which could not be taxed ad 
valorem," namely, the income from federal obligations and 
stocks in certain railroad corporations, the shares of which 
were exempted by charter provisions from taxation.34 In the 
court's opinion: 
The clause . . . was not designed to authorize an attempt 
to tax incomes from stocks and bonds not taxable but to au-
see Income Tax Law of 1929," 8 Tenn. L. Rev. 106, 118-123 (1930). 
The provision was not referred to at all in a case contesting the constitu-
tionality of the Income Tax Law. 
32 159 Tenn. 349, 19 S.W. 2d 261 (1929). There were four distinct 
issues dealt with by the court, only the first of which is of interest to the 
immediate discussion: first, the validity of the amendment to the general 
assessment law and the consequent "repeal" of the general property tax in 
respect to a substantial part of in tangible property; second, the general 
validity of the income tax, which raised the issue of its nature; third, the 
validity under uniformity restrictions applicable to the income tax of the 
exemptions therefrom; and, fourth, certain issues concerning the constitu-
tional limitation on legislative procedure. The validity of the income tax, as 
such, will be dealt with infra. 
33 Supra note 32 at 356. 
3 4 Supra note 32 at 3 57. 
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thorize a tax upon incomes derived from stocks and bonds 
that were (lawfully) not taxed ad valorem. 35 
Therefore the basic problem was one of identifying the 
"stocks and bonds" which might be "lawfully not taxed ad 
valorem." The importance of the word "lawfully" was em-
phasized by the complainants' contention that the 192 9 Act's 
"omission" of intangible property classified as "stocks and 
bonds" from the ad valorem General Property Tax was a 
transgression of "the constitutional mandate that all prop-
erty should be taxed and that authority for the income tax 
[could not] be drawn from such legislative dereliction."36 
The court agreed that "a contumacious failure or refusal 
to levy a tax on property, taxation of which the Constitution 
required," could not create a class of property lawfully "not 
taxed ad valorem.na7 Therefore, it was necessary for the 
court to determine the validity of that part of the 192 9 Act 
which removed from the scope of the general property tax 
that property producing income which was taxed by the in-
come tax imposed by the same 1929 act. Upon the validity 
of this amendment of the General Property Tax Act rested 
the ultimate validity of the income tax itself. 
The court's decision upholding this "repeal [by the 1929 
Act] of the ad valorem tax on property described as" stocks 
and bonds was supported by a rationale encompassed by the 
following brief statement: 
Section 28 ordains that all property be taxed and enjoins 
uniformity and equality in taxation but it does not exact dou-
ble taxation.38 
After reviewing the cases in which it had faced the issue of 
3 5 Supra note 32 at 359, emphasis supplied. 
36 Supra note 32 at 357. 
37 Supra note 32 at 360. 
38Jbid., emphasis supplied. 
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"double taxation" in relation to the taxation of both corpo-
rate shares and corporate capital stock, the court asserted: 
Notwithstanding our Constitution requires that "all prop-
erty, real, personal or mixed, shall be taxed" and notwith-
standing it has been held for years that the capital stock of a 
corporation and the shares of stock of a corporation were dis-
tinct items of property, it has likewise been held for years 
that the Constitution did not require the assessment of both 
capital stock and shares of stock. 39 
The court then extended this rationale to justify a ruling 
that the constitution did not require the taxation of both 
"bonds," as defined in the 1 92 9 Act, and the property which 
they represented. Remember that the term "bonds" was 
broadly defined as including all interest bearing obligations. 
The court's statement warrants quoting at length. 
The principle of these cases [concerning the "double taxa-
tion" of corporate shares and capital stock] seems ample war-
rant for the legislative repeal of taxes hitherto levied on the 
instruments described as bonds in chapter 86 of the Acts of 
1929. Such instruments merely call for money. They have no 
intrinsic value. The money upon which such bonds are based 
is assessed under other provisions of chapter 602 of the Acts 
of 1907. The substance does not escape, only the symbol is 
freed. 
The owner of a bond is entitled, besides interest, to re-
ceive the money called for when his bond matures. Mean-
while, the money coming to him is being taxed. 
The owner of a share of stock in a corporation whose cor-
39 Supra note 32 at 362, emphasis supplied. The court reviewed the 
cases discussed supra, notes I 5 through 18. It should be pointed out that the 
court did not recognize the distinction that in the cases holding taxation of 
both "capital stock" and shares valid, the term "capital stock" was not used 
to refer to the intangible assets of a corporation but was used to refer to the 
capital stock as invested in tangible property, while in the later cases the 
term "capital stock" was used to refer to the taxation of the intangible assets 
of a corporation. 
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porate property is assessed is entitled, besides dividends, to 
his part of the corporate property when the corporation is 
wound up. Meanwhile, the corporate property coming to him 
is being taxed. 
The essence of the corporation tax cases cited is that taxa-
tion of the basic property justifies release from taxation of 
the ultimate right to receive such property. The repeal of the 
ad valorem tax on property described as bonds by chapter 8 6 
of the Acts of 1929 may be securely rested on the doctrine 
implicit in these cases, as well as the release from ad valorem 
taxation of stock in corporations located and taxed else-
where.40 
In making its decision the court found it necessary to dis-
tinguish the H auk case in which the court had held that the 
in lieu provision of a nonproperty tax on the privilege of re-
cording mortgages was invalid. As the distinguishing factor 
the court suggested that the prior opinion "involved the as-
sumption that mortgages must be assessed as other property. 
• • ."
41 Thus, the only thing in the Shields case contrary to 
the rationale of the Hauk case was the rejection of that as-
sumption. However, the rationale of the H auk case was ren-
dered ineffectual in so far as representative intangible prop-
erty is concerned.42 
The court did, in fact, overrule the Cumberland U niver-
sity case, in which it was held that the "exemption" of the 
40 Supra note 32 at 363-364-, emphasis added. It is interesting to note 
that the court relied upon a Washington case (State ex rel. Wolfe v. Par-
menter, 50 Wash. 164, 96 Pac. 1047 (1908)) as supporting authority for 
this analysis. See the discussion of Washington's uniformity limitation m 
Chapter III, Part H, infra. 
41 Supra note 32 at 365. The Hauk case is discussed supra at note 24. 
42 Therefore it is not correct to say that "No attempt was made either to 
distinguish the holding [in the Hauk case] or to overrule it. Nevertheless 
the 'double taxation' approach does reject the Hauk holding entirely, for the 
court permits the legislature to exempt all intangibles which may be fitted 
into that concept. Nothing in the opinion indicates that they have to be 
taxed in some other manner; in fact, stocks and bonds which pay no income 
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principal and interest of bonds of educational institutions 
was a violation of Art. II, §28. That case and its antecedents 
concerning the exemption of state bonds from taxation were 
not mentioned in the opinion.43 Nevertheless, it must be 
recognized that the Shields case can not be entirely recon-
ciled with all prior decisions. In extending by analogy the 
rationale found in the "double taxation" cases the court of 
necessity reversed another line of cases which did not just as-
sume, as did the H auk case, that a class of representative in-
tangibles had to be taxed, but actually held that private 
bonds, strictly speaking, could not be "released" from taxa-
tion. 
In summary, one may conclude that a rule of universality 
is clearly found in Art. II, §28 of the Tennessee Constitu-
tion, but that the strictness of the rule has been avoided in 
the case of representative intangible personal property by use 
of a rationale which considers all property taxed when the 
"basic property" is taxed.44 The court has followed this ra-
are not taxed at all [under the Income Tax]." Parker, supra note 6 at 13 3. 
To the contrary, the "double taxation" approach as described in the text 
avoids the Hauk holding. The court still accepts the rule of the Hauk case 
to the effect that an indirect non-property tax may not be substituted for a 
direct ad valorem property tax. However, with the "double taxation" ra-
tionale this rule becomes irrelevant for limiting the exemption of repre-
sentative intangible property. 
43 Nor is the Cumberland University case mentioned in the article by 
Parker, supra note 5, in his rather thorough analysis of the Shields case. The 
Cumberland University case is discussed supra at note 23. 
44 It is interesting to note that the court never used the word "exemp-
tion" in Shields v. Williams, supra note 32. It always spoke in terms of 
a failure to select, e.g.: the 1929 act amended the General Assessment Act 
so as "to omit from taxation" certain items (p. 3 53) ; the taxpayer, states 
the court, contends that "in omitting such securities from ad valorem taxa-
tion" etc. (p. 357); "The principle of these [double taxation] cases seems 
ample warrant for the legislative repeal of taxes hitherto levied on the instru-
ments described as bond~ ..•• " (p. 363); the essence of the corporate 
double taxation cases cited "is that taxation of the basic property justifies 
release from taxation of the ultimate right to receive such property. The 
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tionale even though it has also actually held that both the 
representative property and the property represented thereby 
may be taxed by the same taxing authority without running 
afoul of the uniformity requirement of Art. II, §28. 
This summary demonstrates one difficulty in the Shields 
case rationale. In its conclusion in that case the court pointed 
out that the money upon which "bonds" are based is "as-
sessed under other provisions" of the general property tax 
(i.e., as personal property to the holder), that corporate 
property of domestic corporations is also taxed under the 
general property tax, and that the doctrine of the cases sup-
ports the "release from ad valorem taxation of stock in cor-
porations located and taxed elsewhere." An important ques-
tion to be asked is this: does the court mean that representative 
property may be "released" from taxation only when the 
basic property is actually taxed somewhere? Certainly there 
was no proof offered that the property of all foreign corpo-
rations concerned was "taxed elsewhere." In addition, the 
"double taxation" cases were equating the taxation of cor-
porate shares to the holder and corporate capital stock to the 
corporation. In very few states are corporations taxed upon 
their "capital stock," i.e. the value of their assets above the 
value of their tangible assets. In addition, what of "bonds," 
i.e. obligations calling for interest, which "call for money" 
beyond the taxable jurisdiction of Tennessee? Certainly, in 
many states money on hand or deposit may well be exempt 
from taxation. 
These questions are not raised in an effort to find some 
way by which the exemption of representative intangible 
property in Tennessee may be challenged, because it does 
not seem likely that such an attack would be successful. But 
repeal of the ad valorem tax on properties described as bonds • • . as well 
as the release from ad valorem taxation of stock in corporations located and 
taxed elsewhere. . • ." (p. 364). 
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the questions do point out the obstacles to a flexible tax 
structure which are raised by a strict uniformity provision, 
and they also demonstrate the doctrinal difficulty a court 
runs into when it seems determined to approve an attempt 
to avoid the alleged harshness of a strict rule of uniformity 
which forbids both the total exemption of intangible prop-
erty and the imposition of a lower rate upon such property.45 
At times the court has relied solely upon the words of the 
first sentence of Art. II, §28 ("All property shall be taxed") 
to reach its conclusion that Section 28 declares what prop-
erty "shall be taxed, and what may and what shall be ex-
empt from taxation."46 However, in other opinions47 it is 
45 Compare the following comment: 
It can readily be seen that with enactment of the Hall income tax in 
1929, and its subsequent approval by the State Supreme Court in Shields 
v. Williams, the critics of the uniformity rule obtained most of the re-
forms they had sought by means of constitutional amendment .... 
• . • (W] ith respect to intangibles, Tennessee is accomplishing un-
der the income tax practically everything that is accomplished in other 
states by means of low rate property taxes. However, there are two ex-
ceptions, which may be rather important. 
The first exception is in connection with securities that temporarily 
yield no income. . . . There is no tax on income, because there is no 
income; neither is there any property tax since stocks and bonds have 
been exempted outright from ad valorem taxes •... 
The second exception refers to the treatment of money and bank de-
posits .... (T] hese items are still technically subject to taxation under 
the general property tax rates. 
White, "Revision of the Taxation Uniformity Clause in the (Tennessee] 
Constitution," I Papers on Const. Revision 79, 84-86 (Univ. of Tenn., 
1947). 
46 For example, Memphis v. Memphis City Bank, supra note 14 at 588, 
in which it was pointed out that the contrary was true under the constitution 
of 1834 (see note 5, supra); Railway Co. v. Wilson County, supra note II 
at 608; Cumberland Univ. v. Golladay, supra note 23 at 86. 
47 For example, Bell v. Town of Pulaski, supra note 12; Allen v. Board 
of Mayor & Aldermen of Smithville, supra note II; Jones v. Memphis, 
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also clear that the court has ignored this express requirement 
of universality and found that exemption of property not 
designated as exemptible in the constitution would violate 
that part of Section 28 which "provides for uniformity in 
taxation." 
Other rules. There is little, if any, controversy concerning 
the other particular rules of uniformity governing the taxa-
tion of property in Tennessee. Property may be taxed only 
by the ad valorem method; thus, specific property taxation 
is forbidden. 48 This is, of course, expected in view of the ex-
press words of the basic uniformity clause of this type. The 
Tennessee uniformity provision is unique in this respect in 
that it seems to spell out "equality and uniformity" as a con-
dition resulting from taxation of property according to its 
value: "All property shall be taxed according to its value, 
• . . so that taxes shall be equal and uniform throughout 
the state." 
Absolute uniformity is required in effective rates, both of 
the percentage rate49 and the ratio of valuation.50 This re-
1upra note II. In State Nat. Bank v. Memphis, supra note 19 at 65 3 the 
court relied on both the express requirement of universality and a general 
requirement of "uniformity" when it held an exemption violated "the 
clause of the constitution that 'all property . . . shall be taxed,' and the 
clause that 'taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State.' " 
48 Reelfoot Lake Levee Dist. v. Dawson, supra note 13; Phillips v. Lewis, 
3 Tenn. Cas. 230 (1877); Taylor McBean & Co. v. Chandler, supra 
note 13. 
49 See Jones v. Memphis, 1upra note II at 191, in which it was concluded 
that to "exempt" newly incorporated territory from taxation for certain 
current purposes for a period of years would be to impose "a different rate 
of taxation upon the old and new territory within the same" taxing jurisdic-
tion. Also see American Bcmberg Corp. v. City of Elizabethton, supra 
note 12. 
6° Carroll v. Alsup, supra note 18; McCord v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 
187 Tenn. 277, 213 S.W. 2d 196 (1948). However, absolute uniformity 
is not required in the "method" of assessment. That is, as long as the same 
standard is achieved in each case-"actual cash value"-different classes of 
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quirement is spelled out in the supplementary clause of Sec-
tion 28 which provides that "No one species of property from 
which a tax may be collected, shall be taxed higher than any 
other species of property of the same value." However, as 
with the other particular rules of uniformity, the court has 
tended to refer to Art. II, §28's requirement "of uniformity 
and equality" as the source of the limitation, so that the 
spelling out of this particular rule does not stand for the 
proposition that the basic clause would not require it. 
The requirement in Tennessee concerning the ratio of 
valuation differs from the usual position. The Tennessee Su-
preme Court has held51 that "actual cash value"-that is, a 
ratio of 100 %-is the only ratio of valuation which satisfies 
property may be valued by different methods. For example, see City of 
Knoxville v. Ft. Sanders Hospital, 1+8 Tenn. 699, 257 S.W. +08 (1923), 
pointing to the provision in Art. II, §28 stating that the value of property 
is to be ascertained in such manner as the legislature shall direct. 
51 Carroll v. Alsup, mpra note 18, is the leading case. It was there stated 
(atp.283): 
There are ... two fundamental principles to be taken as guides in 
assessing property under our Constitution and laws: (I) That all prop-
erty shall be assessed at its actual cash value; and (2) that taxes shall be 
equal and uniform. The latter proposition flows naturally and inevitably 
as a corollary to the former, for, when all property is assessed at its ac-
tual cash value, then all taxes become equal and uniform. However diffi-
cult it may be to arrive at the first result, it is imperatively demanded 
by the Constitution and laws, and the second unavoidably and from ne-
cessity follows it ..•. 
And, at 292 the court said: 
The actual caslz value is tlze only practicable basis upon which taxes can 
be made equal and uniform, and this is clearly the constitutional require-
ment. . . . [Emphasis by the court. J 
The latest case is McCord v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., supra note 50. This 
doctrine is severely criticized in Parker, supra note 6 at 121-125, in which 
the author points out that the federal courts have held to the contrary un-
der the federal equal protection clause, and, indeed, an early federal deci-
sion construed the Tennessee constitutional provision to the contrary: Taylor 
v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 88 F. 350 (6th Cir., 1898). 
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the constitutional requirement of "equal and uniform" taxes. 
It is interesting to note, however, that in the pertinent 
cases52 it was alleged that the other property in the taxing 
jurisdiction was valued at varying ratios for different classes 
of property. It was the position of the court that such a pat-
tern demonstrated the "impracticability of adopting any 
other than the actual cash value as" the ratio of valuation to 
be used. It was suggested that the only practical remedy in 
such cases was to seek to have the ratio of valuation for all 
property raised to 100%.53 The court rejected any suggestion 
that it declare the entire tax void because of an illegal use of 
varying ratios of valuation. However, one writer suggests 
that in later opinions, the court has in effect, stymied any ef-
fort to seek the remedy suggested.54 Thus, the court has con-
demned a de facto classification of property for effective rates 
as being illegal, but leaves the situation in fact unchanged. 
As a final point, the court has ruled that the requirement of 
uniformity in taxation of property is "territorial."55 
( 2) N onproperty taxes 
The first important issue in determining the validity of 
any given tax is to determine its nature. In contrast to the 
strict uniformity limitation applicable to property taxes, non-
property taxes56 need only be uniform within classes. The 
52 Carroll v. Alsup, supra note 18 at 291; McCord v. Nashviiie, C. & St. 
L. Ry., supra note 50 at 291-292. 
53 Carroll v. Alsup, supra note 18 at 292. 
54 Parker, supra note 5 at 124-125. 
55 Nashviile, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Marshall County, 161 Tenn. 236, 246-
247, 30 s.w. 2d 268 (1929). 
56 The terms alternately used to designate nonproperty taxes are "excise" 
and "privilege," the same being synonymous for purpose of uniformity. 
Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Senter, 149 Tenn. 569, 260 S.W. 144 
(1923); Foster & Creighton Co. v. Graham, 154 Tenn. 412, 421, 285 
s.w. 570 {1925). 
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limitation is alternately derived from the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitu-
tion and the equivalent of an equal protection clause in the 
Tennessee Constitution.57 The state limitation has been 
equated to that derived from the federal equal protection 
clause.58 The object selected for a nonproperty tax and ex-
emptions therefrom need only be reasonable classes.59 The 
57 Both Art. I, §8 and Art. XI, §8 are generally cited. 
58 See, for example, Marion County River Transp. Co. v. Stokes, 173 
Tenn. 347,350, 117 S.W. 2d 740 (1938). 
59 See, for example, Shields v. Williams, supra note 32 (in respect to a 
tax on income from intangibles, the court held the following classifications 
were valid: the exemption of (I) income from commercial paper maturing 
in six months or less (2) income of eleemosynary and similar institutions); 
State v. Alston, 94 Tenn. 67 4, 30 S.W. 7 50 ( 189 5) (collateral inheritance 
tax; the court held that the distinction made between collateral and direct 
kindred was a reasonable classification, and that the minimum exemption 
was a reasonable classification on the basis of "ability to pay.") ; 
Sterchi Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Wallace, 168 Tenn. 299, 77 S.W. 2d 807 
( 1934) (miscellaneous license tax imposed on sellers of electrical appliances 
and exempting merchants whose stock was not more than $5,000, of which 
electrical appliances constituted not more than 10%, held not to be an 
arbitrary classification). Also see Ogilvie v. Hailey, 141 Tenn. 392, 210 
S.W. 645 ( 1918) (local vehicle tax which selected only autos used for 
pleasure, to the exclusion of autos used for business purposes, was held a 
valid classification); Foster & Creighton Co. v. Graham, supra note 56 (fuel 
use tax which selected the privilege of using gasoline as the object of the 
tax, to the exclusion of the use of all other petroleum products, held not to 
be an arbitrary classification). In Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Senter, 
supra note 56 (corporate Excise Tax, with a base of net income) and 
Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Haston, 153 Tenn. 675, 284 S.W. 905 (1925) 
(annual corporate report tax with a base of capital stock) the court held that 
it was not arbitrary to select corporations as the object of a tax, even though 
partnerships and individuals engaging in business were not included. Com-
pare Corn v. Fort, 170 Tenn. 377,95 S.W. 2d 620 (1935), in which the 
court held that it was arbitrary to select partnerships as the object of a 
privilege tax with a base of invested capital, when individuals engaging in 
similar business were excluded. The tax was upheld as to corporations, but 
that part of the statute reaching partnerships was held invalid, the court 
saying it could find no reasonable distinction between the partnership and 
the individual engaging in competing businesses. 
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object of a nonproperty tax may be further classified for the 
purpose of applying different rates to the different classes.60 
The Tennessee court has not had an occasion to pass upon the 
validity of a progressively graduated rate. It has ruled that 
the following taxes of comparative interest were not property 
taxes: an inheritance tax; 61 a mortgage recording tax; 62 a 
realty transfer tax; 63 a fuel use tax; 64 and both a corporate 
60 See, for example, Marion County River Transp. Co. v. Stokes, supra 
note 58, upholding a miscellaneous license tax classifying ferries so that a 
higher rate was applied to those competing with state toll bridges. Also see 
Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Haston, supra note 59, in which the court upheld 
as reasonable the use of a flat rate increasing according to brackets based on 
increasing amounts of capital stock of corporations subject to the annual 
corporate report tax. But in Royal Crown Bottling Co. of Knoxville v. 
Stokes, 177 Tenn. 117, 146 S.W. 2d 838 (1941) the court held that the 
distinction made under a miscellaneous license tax between distributors of 
liquid carbonic acid gas and distributors of solid carbonic acid gas was an 
arbitrary classification and therefore a violation of Art. I, § 8 and Art. XI, 
§8 of the Tennessee Constitution and the federal equal protection clause. 
Distributors of the liquid gas were taxed at the rate of five cents a pound, 
while distributors of the solid gas were taxed at the rate of two cents a 
pound. 
61 State v. Alston, supra note 59, in which it was held that the tax was 
upon the right or privilege of acquiring property by succession. 
62 State ex rei. Hauk v. American Trust Co., supra note 24. The tax was 
held invalid for other reasons, sec notes 26 and 2 7 supra. It was said that the 
act might have been held valid as a tax upon the privilege of registration. 
63 State ex rei. Stewart v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 139 Tenn. 406, 20 I 
S.W. 738 (1918). 
64 Foster & Creighton Co. v. Graham, supra note 56. It was contended 
that a tax on the use of a particular commodity is a tax on the property itself, 
which would have subjected the tax in question to the property tax uni-
formity limitation. The court rejected this contention, using a classification 
of "direct" and "indirect" taxes, direct taxes being "imposed directly on 
property according to its value," while indirect taxes are "upon some right or 
privilege." The court refused to follow the rule suggested by the taxpayer, 
distinguishing Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 25 5 U.S. 
288, 41 S. Ct. 272 (1920), and rejecting the reasoning in Thompson 
v. McLeod, 112 Miss. 383,73 So. 193 (1916). Those cases are discussed 
respectively in Chapter III, Parts H and E, infra. Also see Humphries v. 
Carter, 172 Tenn. 392, 112 S.W. 2d 833 (1937). 
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franchise tax with a base of capital stock65 and a corporate 
franchise tax with a base of net income. 66 In an early case it 
was held that a tax could not be levied solely on the "privi-
lege of ownership," but that such a tax was upon the prop-
erty itself. 67 
The Tennessee court has not restrictively interpreted the 
"other taxes" clause68 in Art. II, §28. Briefly, the court has 
held that a "privilege is whatever the legislature chooses to 
declare to be a privilege, and to tax as such."69 Furthermore, 
the court has stated that the "other taxes" clause is not a 
grant of power but simply an attempt to emphasize the non-
applicability of the uniformity provision in Art. II, §28 to 
non property taxes. 70 This view is to be contrasted to the re-
sult under a similar provision found in the Arkansas Con-
stitution. 71 
(3) Income tax 
The court has held72 that a general net income tax73 is pro-
hibited by the Tennessee constitution. It should be emphasized 
65 Corn v. Fort, supra note 59. 
66 Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Senter, supra note 56, and see the 
discussion under "Income Tax," infra. . 
67 Phillips v. Lewis, supra note 48. 
68 " ••• but the legislature shall have power to tax. Merchants, Peddlers 
and privileges, in such manner as they may from time to time direct." 
69 Hooten v. Carson, 186 Tenn. 282, 286, 209 S.W. 2d 273 ( 1948). 
See the thorough discussion of this problem by Parker, supra note 6 at 125-
130. 
7° Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Haston, supra note 59, in which the court 
stated (at p. 688): 
This language [note 68, supra] would seem ... to confer upon the 
legislature the power to tax merchants, peddlers, and privileges. Its true 
object, however, was to indicate with distinctness that the power to tax 
merchants, peddlers, and privileges was not to be understood as inhibited 
by the restriction as to the taxation of property. 
7l Supra, Chapter III, Part A, text at notes 15-16. 
72 Evans v. McCabe, 164 Tenn. 672,52 S.W. 2d 159 (1932). 
73 In 1923 the court held that a corporate "excise" tax with a base of 
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that this is the result of a unique provision in Art. II, §28 of 
that constitution. There has been no determination by the 
court concerning the effect of the uniformity limitation on an 
income tax in Tennessee. In 1929 the legislature acted to 
implement that part of Art. II, §28, which reads: 
The legislature shall have power to levy a tax upon incomes 
derived from stocks and bonds that are not taxed ad valorem. 
As previously described,74 in 1929 the legislature amended 
the general property tax to exempt therefrom substantially 
all intangible property, except money on hand or deposit, 
and at the same time imposed a tax of 5% on the "income 
derived by way of dividends from stocks or by way of interest 
on bonds. . . ." The term "bonds" was defined very 
broadly, so as to include all "obligations ... evidenced by 
an instrument whereby the obligor is bound to pay interest 
to the obligee. . . ." There were several "exclusions" and 
"exemptions" from this limited income tax. The act pro-
vided that the following income should be "excluded" from 
the income tax: (I) income from governmental obligations; 
( 2) income from stocks if, in effect, the "capital stock" of the 
issuing corporations was taxed or if such stocks were taxed 
to the holder thereof as personal property; 75 and ( 3) income 
in the hands of "educational, religious or other like institu-
tions." In addition, the act provided for an exemption of 
"income derived from stocks and/ or bonds having a value of 
$1 ,000." The term "bond" was defined to exclude commer-
cial paper maturing in six months or less. In other words, the 
net income was not an income tax. It had been contended that the tax was 
in fact a tax upon the net income and that a tax upon income was a property 
tax limited by Art. II, §28. The court held the tax to be a nonproperty tax 
upon the privilege of exercising the corporate franchise. Bank of Commerce 
& Trust Co. v. Senter, supra note 58. 
74 Supra note 30. 
75 See the description of the general property tax in this respect, supra, 
text at notes 28-30. 
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income from substantially all "notes, duebills, chases in ac-
tion, (and) accounts"70 was subject to the tax. 
As described above,77 in Shields v. Williams/8 the court 
held that the unique income tax provision in Art. II, §28, re-
ferred to the taxation of the incomes derived from stocks and 
bonds "lawfully" not taxed ad valorem. After an extended 
analysis in which it reached the conclusion that the removal 
of substantially all intangible property from the scope of the 
general property tax was "lawful," the court passed on to 
consider the validity of the income tax itself. 
The court ruled that it was not necessary to determine the 
nature of an income tax, i.e., whether property or excise tax, 
because Art. II, §28, "ex vi termini, excludes the income 
tax from the scope of the equality and uniformity clause."79 
Thus, the court concluded: 
If the income tax sanctioned by section 28 of Article II be 
a property tax, it only reaches property not within the pur-
view of the equality and uniformity clause, that is property 
not taxed according to value. The only equality and uniform-
ity therefore required in this limited income taxation is such 
equality and uniformity as it demanded in all legislation by 
section 8 of Article I and section 8 of Article XI of the 
Tennessee Constitution and 14th Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution. That is to say, a reasonable classification of in-
comes to be taxed is permissible.80 
Having determined that the more liberal uniformity re-
quirement was applicable, rather than the strict limitation 
applicable to property taxation, the court readily held that 
the exemptions of the "income from so many stocks" and the 
76 Cf. White, supra note 45 at 85. See the section of the general property 
tax providing for the classifications under which personal property was to be 
taxed prior to 1929, supra note 3 0, particularly class seven thereunder. 
77 Supra, text at notes 31-40. 
78 159 Tenn. 349, 19 S.W. 2d 261 (1929). 
79 !d. at 366. 
80 !d. at 366-367. 
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income of religious, educational and similar institutions were 
reasonable classifications.81 The court also held that the "only 
debatable classification," the "exclusion" of commercial pa-
pers maturing in six months or less, was valid. In doing so it 
repeated the shibboleth usually used by courts once it is de-
termined that a classification is valid, namely, "that in reve-
nue measures the Legislature has a wide range of discretion 
and . . . the courts will not interfere if any good reason 
can be conceived to justify a classification."82 
In 1931 the legislature enacted a General Net Income Tax 
Act,83 which reached income from all sources. In Evans v. 
McCabe,S4 the court held that the tax was prohibited by Art. 
II, §28, of the constitution. The provision in Art. II, §28, 
concerning the taxation of income from stocks and bonds was 
interpreted to deny the legislature the power to tax income 
of other classes. 85 Thus, the nature of an income tax is irrele-
vant under the Tennessee uniformity limitation, and Ten-
nessee is limited to a tax on the income from intangibles be-
cause of its unique constitutional provision. 
B. ANALYSES OF STATES WITH TYPE II CLAUSES 
1. Alabama 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The original Alabama Constitution, dated 1819, contained 
only one provision concerning uniformity in taxation. Article 
VI, §8 provided that: 
81 /d. at 367. 
82 !d. at 367-368. 
83 Public Acts 1931, c. 21. 
84 Supra note 72. 
85 !d. at 680-682. This analysis is severely criticized by Parker, supra 
note 6 at 136-138. 
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All lands liable to taxation in this State, shall be taxed m 
proportion to their value. 
The next two constitutions of Alabama, dated 18681 and 
18 7 52 respectively, contained a uniformity clause enlarged in 
scope over the original clause, and joined by a new supple-
mentary provision. The uniformity provisions in those two 
constitutions were substantially identical with the basic uni-
formity clause (Art. XI, §211) and supplementary provision 
(Art. XI, §217) found in the present Alabama Constitution 
of 1901.3 Section 211 provides that: 
All taxes levied on property in this State shall be assessed 
in exact proportion to the value of such property. 4 
The supplementary clause, section 217, reads: 
The property of private corporations, associations and in-
dividuals of this State shall forever be taxed at the same 
rate; provided, this section shall not apply to institutions 
1 Article IX, § 1 was identical with section 211 of the present 1901 con-
stitution, and Art. XIII, §4- was substantially identical with section 217. 
2 Article X, § 1 was identical with section 211 of the present 190 I con-
stitution, and Art. X, §6 was identical with section 217 except that in the 
proviso the words "or enterprises" appeared after the word "institutions." 
3 In view of the substantially identical phraseology of the uniformity 
provisions of the constitutions of 1868, 1875, and 1901, it is permissible 
to use indiscriminately cases decided under the prior constitutions in de-
scribing the meaning of the present Alabama uniformity limitation. In citing 
the cases under the prior constitutions only the present section numbers will 
be used in order to avoid interpolations. 
4 The omitted part of §211 concerns "double taxation," and reads: 
••• but no tax shall be assessed upon any debt for rent or hire of real or 
personal property, while owned by the landlord or hirer during the cur-
rent year of such rental or hire, if such real or personal property be as-
sessed at its full value. 
This proviso did not appear in the prior constitutions, and its purpose and 
history are referred to in note 20, infra. 
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devoted exclusively to religious, educational or charitable 
purposes. 
The present 1901 constitution also contains other uniformity 
provisions which did not appear in the prior constitutions. 
Article IV, §91, requires the exemption of governmental and 
certain other limited classes of property from taxation. A cor-
porate franchise tax is required by Art. XII, §§229 and 232. 
Amendment 23, added in 1931, spells out the extent to 
which an inheritance tax is permissible in Alabama.5 Amend-
ment 25, added in 1932, provides that the legislature shall 
have the power to impose a net income tax, and adds that 
"Income shall not be deemed property for purposes of ad 
valorem taxes."6 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
Although it should hardly need be stated that Art. XI, 
§§211 and 217 apply only to property taxes, the rule con-
tinues to be restated in judicial opinions/ and necessarily so 
because most Alabama taxes are challenged as violations of 
the basic uniformity provisions. The challenge continues to 
be made, although with a noticeable lack of success. The only 
uniformity required of nonproperty taxes is a uniformity 
5 An inheritance or estate tax is allowed only to the extent that such a 
tax absorbs any deduction or credit allowed under a federal inheritance or 
estate tax. This amendment supersedes former section 219 of the Alabama 
Constitution which provided expressly that the legislature might impose an 
inheritance tax with a rate of not more than 2. 5%. 
6 The necessity of this amendment authorizing an income tax and except-
ing it from the property tax uniformity and maximum rate limitations is 
discussed in the text at notes 27-3 3, infra. 
7 For example, Western Union Tel. Co. v. State Board of Assessment, 80 
Ala. 273, 60 Am. Rep. 99 ( 1885), Lee v. State Tax Comm., 219 Ala. 513, 
123 So. 6 (1929), Nachman v. State Tax Comm., 233 Ala. 628, 173 So. 
25 (1937), and National Linen Service Corp. v. State Tax Comm., 237 
Ala. 360, 186 So. 478 (1939). But see the early case of Clark & Murrell v. 
Port of Mobile, 67 Ala. 217 ( 1880). 
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within classes.8 Thus, the object selected for a nonproperty 
tax and exemptions therefrom need only be reasonable 
classes,9 and an object may be further classified for the ap-
plication of different rates.10 The Alabama court has not had 
an occasion to rule upon the validity of a clearly progres-
sively graduated rate. 
8 The source of this limitation in the Alabama Constitutions is not always 
clearly stated. However, it appears that the requirement alternately stems 
from Art. I, §I and §2 of the Alabama Constitution, as well as from the 
federal equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The language 
of the court in this respect is interesting to note. For example, a typical 
statement is found in Nachman v. State Tax Comm., supra note 7 at 635, 
in which a selective gross receipts tax was held not to be within the operation 
of sections 211 and 21 7: "The only limitation imposed upon the Legisla-
ture is that when it proceeds to impose a tax on occupations or privileges, it 
must be equal and uniform. The equality and uniformity consist in the 
imposition of the like tax upon all who engage in the vocation, or who may 
exercise the privilege taxed." Of course, when the court uses the term 
"equal and uniform" in respect to property taxation, it is not limited to 
"classes." 
9 See, for example, Frazier v. State Tax Comm., 234 Ala. 353, 175 So. 
402 (1937) (sales tax; holding that the exemption of gross receipts re-
ceived by manufacturers, compounders, processors, producers, miners, and 
quarries from sales to consumers in carload lots or in larger quantities, except 
as otherwise provided was not an arbitrary classification); Nachman v. State 
Tax Comm., supra note 7 at 635 (selective gross receipts tax, with a rate 
of 1.5% as an additional license tax on retailers and places of amusement; 
held, the object was a reasonable class: "The state may tax all [privileges 
and occupations], or it may select for taxation certain classes and leave the 
other untaxed."); Phoenix Carpet Co. v. State, 118 Ala. 143, 22 So. 627 
(1897) (corporate franchise tax with a base of paid-up capital; held, cor-
porations may be classified and less than all corporations selected for the tax). 
10 See, for example, American Bakeries Co. v. City of Huntsville, 232 
Ala. 612, 168 So. 880 (1936) (miscellaneous local license tax with a flat 
rate for named occupations and business; held, the distinction made be-
tween itinerant sellers of bakery products ( $3 0 0) and bakeries ( $1 00) was 
not an arbitrary classification contrary to the federal equal protection clause 
and Art. I, §I of the Alabama Constitution, nor was a flat rate as opposed 
to a proportional rate applied to amount of business done arbitrary); Lee v. 
State Tax Comm ., supra note 7 (securities recordation tax) ; Warrior Water 
Co. v. Long, 218 Ala. 125, 117 So. 656 (1928) (utilities gross receipts 
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Since the uniformity required of property taxes is a strict 
limitation, an important issue in all cases is the determination 
of the nature of the tax. The court has held the following 
taxes of comparative interest to be nonproperty taxes: gross 
receipts taxes on selected businesses; 11 a corporate franchise 
tax with a base of paid-up capital stock; 12 recording taxes/3 
a general use tax; 14 and a selective severance tax.15 The court 
has held that a net income tax is a property tax, but a later 
decision casts considerable doubt on the reasoning of that 
case.16 
( 1 ) Property taxation 
The Alabama court has held that the uniformity structure 
tax; a classification between new public utilities being constructed for first 
year business, and one taking over an old and going public utility, where 
the first class paid a minimum tax of $100 and the latter paid 2% of the 
gross receipts as did all other utilities, held valid); Goldsmith v. Huntsville, 
120 Ala. 182, 24 So. 509 (1897) (local merchants gross receipts tax, with 
the rate being a fiat rate graduated according to the value of gross amount of 
stock of merchandise on hand; held, a privilege tax and the classification 
for rates valid); Saks v. Birmingham, 120 Ala. 190, 24 So. 728 (1897) 
(similar tax to that in the Goldsmith case, supra; held, reasonable classifica-
tion). 
11 Western Union Tel. Co. v. State Board of Assessment, supra note 7; 
Capital City Water Co. v. Board of Revenue, 117 Ala. 303, 23 So. 970 
( 1897). Also see Goldsmith v. Huntsville, supra note I 0. 
12 Phoenix Carpet Co. v. State, supra note 9. 
13 The leading case is State v. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co., 188 Ala. 487, 
66 So. 169 (1914) concerning a mortgage recording tax. Also see Lee v. 
State Tax Comm., supra note 7 concerning a foreign securities recording tax. 
14 National Linen Service Corp. v. State Tax Comm., supra note 7, in 
which the court distinguished such a tax from a tax on the "mere use of 
property for purpose of ownership" of property. 
111 Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. State, 204 Ala. 469, 86 So. 65 (1920), 
coal and iron ore mining taxes, holding that the fact the taxes were fixed 
at so much per ton on the mineral mined does not render the tax a direct 
tax on the mineral, rather the tax was held to be on the privilege of the 
business of mining. 
16 The income tax cases in Alabama are discussed in the text at notes 
27-33, infra. 
UNIFORMITY STRUCTURES 99 
of the Alabama Constitution, Art. XI, §211 and §217, does 
not contain a rule of universality.17 Classes of property may 
be exempted from the general property tax, the only limi-
tation being that such exemptions constitute reasonable 
classes.18 "In lieu" provisions of nonproperty taxes, which 
17 Moog v. Randolph, 77 Ala. 597 (1884) in which it was ruled that 
the allowance of deductions of indebtedness from solvent credits in valuing 
the same for assessment was not a violation of the uniformity provisions. The 
court stated that those provisions do not prohibit exemptions from taxation. 
The ruling was necessary in order to determine the issue of a material vari-
ance in the General Revenue Act. In State v. Birmingham Southern R. Co., 
182 Ala. 475, 62 So. 77 (1913), it was held that a statutory provision 
providing that taxable property was to be assessed at 60% of its fair cash 
value was not a violation of the uniformity provisions; the court supported 
its decision by use of a rationale which characterized this reduced ratio as 
being the equivalent of an exemption of property. In Pullman Car & Mfg. 
Corp. of Alabama v. Hamilton, 229 Ala. 184, !55 So. 616 (1934), it was 
necessary to restate the general rule as to the exemption of property; the 
court (at pp. 186-187) reviewed the cases to that time. Also see the cases 
in notes 18 and 19, infra, and In re Opinion of the Justices, 234 Ala. 358, 
175 So. 690 (1937); Opinion of the Justices, 249 Ala. 572, 32 S. 2d 297 
(1947). 
18 In State v. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co., supra note 13, the court held 
that the exemption of mortgages, or debts secured thereby upon which a 
recording privilege tax had been paid from the ad valorem tax, while leaving 
subject to such tax other intangibles, listed in the statute as "all money lent, 
solvent credits, or credits of value" with certain exceptions, was a reasonable 
classification. Thus, Barnes v. Moragne, 145 Ala. 313,41 So. 947 (1906) 
was overruled to the extent that dictum therein asserted that this class of 
"money, etc." could not be further classified. 
In Board of Revenue v. Montgomery Gas-Light Co., 64 Ala. 269 ( 1879) 
the court indicated that if only "annual gains, profits or incomes" of indi-
viduals were subject to the general property tax, Art. XI, §217 would be 
violated. Thus, the supplementary uniformity provision, providing for equal 
rates as between property owned by corporations and individuals, places a 
potential restriction upon classifications which may be made. But see State v. 
Board of Revenue & Road Com'rs, 73 Ala. 65 ( 1882) concerning the 
same fact situation, but in which the court asserted that, although it would 
violate Art. XI, §217, nevertheless "when the legislature, through a failure 
to levy, leaves a species of property free of taxation, by providing no ma-
chinery which can be adapted to the assessment, the courts of the country 
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relieve property indirectly affected by such nonproperty 
taxes from property taxation, have been held to be nothing 
more than a valid exercise of the power to exempt property 
from taxation.19 
Apart from the absence of a rule of universality, the 
strictest degree of uniformity is required. Absolute uniform-
ity is required of the effective rate applicable to all property 
selected for the general property tax by a taxing jurisdic-
tion.20 However, the ratio of valuation may be less than 
are powerless to remedy the evil." Also see Pullman Car & Mfg. Corp. of 
Alabama v. Hamilton, supra note 17, in which the court considered the 
"inducement" exemption of industrial plants to be reasonable. 
19 State v. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co., supra note 13 (mortgage recording 
tax) and Lee v. State Tax Comm., supra note 7 (foreign corporate securi-
ties tax). 
20 See, as to the percentage rate: Mobile v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 53 Ala. 
570 (1876) in which the court held that a statute violated the uniformity 
clause because it required the taxation of corporate capital stock under the 
local general property tax at a lesser per cent than the general rate imposed. 
Also see Proctor v. State, 215 Ala. 6, I 09 So. I 0 5 ( 1926). See, as to ratio 
of valuation: State v. Birmingham Southern R. Co., supra note 17; State v. 
Alabama Power Co., 254 Ala. 327, 48 S. 2d 445 (1950). The Alabama 
Power Co. case is the leading case on the uniformity required of effective 
rates. See note 25, infra, for further discussion. Also see the dissent in Lee v. 
State Tax Comm., supra note 7, which would have held the securities re-
cording tax, supra notes 13 and 19, a tax upon property and therefore a 
violation of the uniformity clause because the 2.5 mill rate was lower than 
the general property tax rate. 
In some early cases the Alabama court ruled that it was not "double taxa-
tion" to tax both property and the mortgage thereon (Alabama Gold Life 
Ins. Co. v. Lott, 54 Ala. 499 (I 8 7 6)), and both corporate shares and the 
tangible property of the issuing corporations (Jefferson County Sav. Bank v. 
Hewitt, 112 Ala. 5 46, 20 So. 926 ( 1896)). It may be pointed out that the 
basic uniformity clause in the 190 I constitution, Art. XI, §211, was ex-
panded to prohibit the taxation of one particular class of representative 
property and the property represented thereby. See note 4, supra. The pur-
pose of this proviso is commented upon in a concurring opinion in Eliasberg 
Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Grimes, 204 Ala. 492, 500, 86 So. 56 (1920), the 
first income tax case. The concurring justice stated that the proviso was 
added to the uniformity clause in the 190 I constitution to counteract an 
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100% so long as an absolute uniformity purportedly pre-
vails. 21 The court has compared the use of a reduced ratio of 
valuation to a "partial exemption," which would be valid. 22 
The opinions have contained much loose language, how-
ever, so that-at least until 1950-there may have been 
some doubt as to the necessity of absolute uniformity in ef-
fective rates. The opinions23 have referred in a general way 
to the power of the legislature to classify property for pur-
poses of taxation, and at times-for example, as in Moog v. 
Randolph24-seemed to relate the power of classification to 
effective rates. However, if there was any doubt raised by 
the dictum in these cases, it was settled by unequivocal Ian-
unreported opinion, in which it was held that notes for the rent of land 
were taxable even though the land itself was already taxed. 
21 State v. Birmingham Southern R. Co., supra note 17. The issue in that 
case concerned the validity of a statute providing that taxable property was 
to be assessed at 60% of its fair and reasonable cash value. The court held 
that Art. XI, §211, the basic uniformity clause, was complied with as long 
as all property was assessed at the same ratio. It was said (at p. 481): "There 
is nothing expressed or implied in the language of this limitation which 
prohibits the Legislature from fixing as a basis for taxation any percentage 
of the actual value of property whether greater or less than I 00 per cent 
thereof, provided only that such rule is applied without discrimination to 
all property of the same nature." 
22 fd. at 480-481,490. 
23 Sec the cases cited in notes 17 and 18, supra. 
24 Supra note 17. In commenting upon the validity of exemptions of 
property from taxation, the court stated (at p. 602): 
These clauses have never been construed to exact the taxation of all 
property, of every description, in the State, at precisely the same rate 
of taxation, without regard to its peculiar nature, uses, or other char-
acteristics. 
This statement is contrary to the facts; see, for example, Mobile v. Stone-
wall Ins. Co., supra note 20. Also see State Bank v. Board of Revenue, 91 
Ala. 217, 223, 8 So. 852 (1890) in which the court stated: "Nor is it 
necessary that we should express any opinion at this time, whether every 
species of property, if taxed at all, must necessarily be taxed at the same 
rate per centum." 
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guage in State v. Alabama Power Co./5 to the effect that 
absolute uniformity is required of effective rates. Thus, the 
dictum is limited to the particular rule which was stated in 
those cases, namely, that the legislature may classify prop-
erty for purposes of exemption-"total" exemption or "par-
tial" exemption-if all taxable property is exempted to the 
same degree. 
As expected under this type of basic uniformity provision, 
property must be taxed by the ad valorem method. The same 
"standard" of "value" must be used for all property taxed; 
the legislature may not fix an "arbitrary" value for any class 
of property.26 It is interesting to note that there are no words 
of "uniformity and equality" in the Alabama Constitution. 
25 Supra note 20. The issue in the case concerned the power of the 
Department of Revenue to assess the property of plaintiff, a public utility, 
at a ratio of 60% while all other property in the state was systematically 
and intentionally assessed at a rate not in excess of 40%. It was contended 
by the state that the plaintiff was not treated differently from other public 
utilities, thus all of a class were treated alike. It was insisted by the state 
that sections 211 and 217 must be tested by the rules applicable to the 
federal equal protection clause. The court rejected this argument, flatly 
stating (at p. 335): "This is not correct." The court rejected the argument 
that the cases dealing with exemption from property taxation in effect ad-
mitted the principle of classification. The court ruled that the legislature 
has the power to select certain species or classes of property for taxation, 
but that (at p. 338): 
... once a species or class of property is selected by the legislature for 
taxation then the constitutional provisions come into play and all property 
of such species or class that is taxed must be taxed uniformly or equally 
at the same rate regardless of its ownership. • . . Once property is made 
taxable there is but one classification and that classification is property 
under the oery language of the constitution. [Emphasis added.] 
Of course, the discrimination in this respect must be an intentional and 
systematic discrimination. Hamilton v. Adkins, 2 50 Ala. 55 7, 3 5 S. 2d 18 3 
(1948). 
26 Board for Assessment of Property of R. Cos. v. Alabama Cent. Ry., 
59 Ala. 551 (1877). Also see State v. West Point Mfg. Co., 236 Ala. 467, 
183 So. 449 ( 1938). 
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However, the court quite often refers to the strict rules of 
property-tax uniformity as being required by the constitu-
tional limitation of "uniformity and equality." The failure 
of the court to find a rule of universality in this limitation is 
not surprising since there are no provisions in the constitution 
expressly providing for the exemption of certain classes of 
property which are almost universally exempted. 
(2) Income tax 
In 1919 the Alabama legislature enacted a General Net 
Income Tax Act.27 The rate of the tax was graduated from 
2% to 4%. In Eliasberg Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Grimes28 
the tax was challenged as a violation of Art. XI, §214 of the 
Alabama Constitution which limits the maximum rate on 
property to an annual .65%. The court held that the tax 
was a violation of section 214. Income was said to be em-
braced within the meaning of the word "property" as used 
in that particular constitutional limitation. There was no dis-
cussion of the validity of the tax under the uniformity pro-
visions, Art. XI, §§211 and 217. However, the opinion was 
largely devoted to an evaluation of prior Alabama decisions 
that income was "property" within the meaning of that word 
as it was used in the uniformity provisions, sections 211 and 
21 7, of the present constitution and their historical ante-
cedents.29 
In 1933 the 25th amendment to the Alabama Constitution 
was adopted. That amendment removed the income tax from 
the scope of the uniformity and maximum rate limitations 
which apply to property taxes, and specifically provided for 
27 Ala. Gen. Acts 1919, pp. 374-395. 
28 204 Ala. 492, 86 So. 56 ( 1920 ). 
29 !d. at 494-499. The court also concluded that the weight of authority 
from other jurisdictions was in concurrence with its decision. But cf. 
Chapter V, Part C, infra. 
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the imposition of a progressively graduated net income tax 
with a classified object.30 Such a tax was thereafter imposed 
by the legislature, and in State v. W eil31 the court dealt with 
the issue of the power of the state to tax residents on income 
from out of state. In the course of its decision, it was neces-
sary that the court comment upon the purpose of the 25th 
amendment to the Alabama Constitution. 32 In doing so, the 
court, although disclaiming any intent to "discredit" the 
Eliasberg opinion, in fact, tends to question the validity of 
the reasoning therein. 33 While this is now immaterial insofar 
as the validity of an income tax in Alabama is concerned, it 
is nevertheless of some significance for comparative purposes. 
80 The amendment reads, in part: 
The legislature shall have the power to levy and collect taxes for state 
purposes on net incomes from whatever source derived within this state 
. . . and to designate and define the incomes to be taxed and to fix the 
rates of taxes provided that the rate shall not exceed 5 per cent nor 3 
per cent on corporations. Income shall not be deemed property for pur-
poses of ad valorem taxes. 
Certain minimum personal exemptions and exemptions for dependents are 
required. 
31 232 Ala. 5 78, 168 So. 679 ( 1936 ). 
32 /d. at 58 3: 
... it is reasonably clear that its dominating purpose is to remove net 
incomes, as a subject of taxation, from the influence of the decision of 
this court in Eliasberg Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Grimes ... and sections 
.•. 211, 214 . . . of the Constitution, by taking this subject of taxa-
tion, by constitutional mandate, out of the property class, placing it in 
the class of privileges that are subject to excise taxation. 
83 /d. at 582-583. But see State v. Ala. Power Co., supra note 20 at 340, 
discussed supra note 25, in which the court drew upon the income tax 
amendment to support its view of the restrictiveness of the basic uniformity 
clause applicable to property taxation, saying: "The authors of the constitu-
tional amendment recognized that an income tax was a direct tax the same 
as an ad valorem tax on property generally ..•. " 
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2. California 
a. The provisions; historical note 
105 
The present California Constitution, dated 1879, has a 
complex structure of provisions requiring uniformity in taxa-
tion, and that structure reached its present status after nu-
merous revisions. The basic uniformity clause is found in the 
first paragraph of Art. XIII, § 1, which reads (with indenta-
tion supplied) : 
All property in the State [except as otherwise in this Con-
stitution provided], not exempt under the laws of the United 
States, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascer-
tained as provided by law, or as hereinafter provided. 
The word "property," as used in this article and section, is 
hereby declared to include moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, 
dues, franchises, and all other matters and things, real, per-
sonal, and mixed, capable of private ownership; [provided, 
that a mortgage, deed of trust, contract, or other obligation 
by which a debt is secured when land is pledged as security 
for the payment thereof, together with the money repre-
sented by such debt, shall not be considered property subject 
to taxation] .1 
The section contains a further proviso which requires the ex-
emption of described classes of property (public property, 
growing crops, and certain educational property). An addi-
tional provision permits the deduction of certain debts from 
credits in some instances.2 
There is a second uniformity provision in the California 
Constitution which vitally affects the scope of the uniformity 
1 The phrase in the first brackets was added by amendment in 1914-. 
The proviso in the second brackets was added by amendment in 191 0. 
These amendments did not represent a change in the general operation of 
the uniformity provision, and they are explained in notes 5 and 6, infra. 
2 The sentence reads: "The Legislature may provide, except in the case 
of credits secured by mortgage or trust deed, for a deduction from credits 
of debts due to bona fide residents of this State." 
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clause in Art. XIII, § 1. The following paragraphs were 
added to Art. XIII, §14, in 1933: 
The Legislature shall have the power to provide for the 
assessment, levy and collection of taxes upon all forms of 
tangible personal property, all notes, debentures, shares of 
capital stock, bonds, solvent credits, deeds of trust, mort-
gages, and any legal or equitable interest therein, not exempt 
from taxation under the provisions of this Constitution, in 
such manner, and at such rates, as may be provided by law, 
and in pursuance of the exercise of such power the Legisla-
ture ... may classify any and all kinds of personal prop-
erty for the purposes of assessment and taxation in a manner 
and at a rate or rates in proportion to value different from 
any other property in this State subject to taxation and may 
exempt entirely from taxation any or all forms, types or 
classes of personal property. [Emphasis added.] 
In addition, the following provisions are relevant. There 
are a substantial number of sections in the constitution, 3 added 
since 1900, which provide for either mandatory or permissive 
exemptions of special classes of property. There are several 
provisions concerning particular taxes. Article XIII, § 11 pro-
vides that an income tax may be imposed. That section ap-
peared in the constitution of 18 79 in its original form. Since 
that time other sections have been added, and frequently 
amended, providing for other particular taxes.4 
3 Art. XIII, § 1 a (added 1914; college property, etc. generally) ; Art. 
XIII, § 1 b ( 1926; cemeteries) ; Art. XIII, § 1 c ( 1944; property used for 
religious, hospital, charitable purposes); Art. XIII, §I% ( 1911, several 
subsequent amendments; veterans' exemption); Art. Xlii, §10 (1900; 
church property); Art. Xlii, §10a (1920; property of orphanages); Art. 
XIII, §1% (1902; state, municipal and district bonds); Art. Xlii, §100 
(1904; personal property, $100 to each householder); Art. XIII, §12% 
(certain trees and vines) ; and Art. IX, §§ 1 0-13 and 1 5 (property of 
named educational institutions). 
4 Article Xlii, § 14, paragraphs 1-3 provide for the taxation of utilities 
and their property. Article Xlii, §14 4/5 contains a detailed provision for 
a gross premiums insurance companies tax, setting forth the base, rates, and 
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The apparently overlapping uniformity clauses can be 
better understood after a brief historical survey of the uni-
formity provisions in past and present California constitu-
tions. In the first constitution, dated 1849, there was a single 
provision concerning uniformity of taxation. Article XI, § 13 
provided, in part: 
Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state. 
All property in this State shall be taxed in proportion to its 
value, to be ascertained as directed by law .... 
The kinship of that provision to the present Art. XIII, § 1 is 
obvious. The "equal and uniform" clause has been deleted, 
and the "proportion to value" clause retained. 
The next California Constitution was the present constitu-
tion of 18 79. In its original form, the uniformity structure 
was only slightly expanded over that found in the constitu-
tion of 1849. There were three relevant provisions. Article 
XIII, § 1 contained the basic uniformity clause and was 
phrased in substantially the same words used today.5 Article 
XIII, §4 provided for the manner in which enumerated rep-
resentative intangible property (property security) was to be 
taxed, the clause being framed to avoid "double taxation."6 
deductions. The tax is "in lieu" of all other taxes except upon realty. 
Article XIII, § 16 provides for a bank tax "according to or measured by their 
net income," to be "in lieu" of all other taxes except upon realty. Section 
16 also contains the following general provision: 
The Legislature may provide by law for the taxation of corporations, 
their franchises, or any other franchises, by any method not prohibited 
by this Constitution or the Constitution or laws of the United States. 
5 The addition of the phrase in the first sentence-"except as otherwise 
in this Constitution provided"-coincides with the practice of adding pro-
visions to the constitution which provide for the exemption of special 
limited classes of property. It was not the basis of any change in the meaning 
of the uniformity clause. The addition of the provision concerning the 
"double taxation" of land securities is explained in note 6, infra. 
fl The pertinent part of section 4 read: 
A mortgage, deed of trust, contract, or other obligation by which a 
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The third provision was Art. XIII, §11, which provided that 
income taxes might be imposed "in such cases and amounts, 
and in such manner, as shall be prescribed by law." 
This remained the basic uniformity structure until the 
transition period of 1924-1933. In 1924 a section was added, 
Art. XIII, § 12;/z, which provided for the taxation of enu-
merated intangibles unrestricted by the limitations of the 
strict unformity requirement applicable to the taxation of all 
other property.7 The implementation of this provision 
failed,8 and 1933 marked the transition to a new effective 
debt is secured, shall, for the purposes of assessment and taxation, be 
deemed and treated as an interest in the property affected thereby. Ex-
cept as to railroad and other quasipublic corporations, in case of debt so 
secured, the value of the property affected by such mortgage, deed of 
trust, contract, or obligation, less the value of such security, shall be as-
sessed and taxed to the owner of the property, and the value of such 
security shall be assessed and taxed to the owner thereof, in the county, 
city, or district, in which the property affected thereby is situated .••• 
In 191 0 this section was repealed, and the problem was dealt with by the 
addition of the proviso to Art. XIII, §I, by which the security was there-
after not to be "considered property subject to taxation." For a discussion 
of the problem of "double taxation" prior to these provisions, see infra 
note 24. 
7 The pertinent part of Art. XIII, § 12 _0 read: 
The Legislature . . . shall have power to provide for the assessment, 
levy and collection of taxes upon all notes, debentures, shares of capital 
stock, bonds, solvent credits or mortgages, not exempt from taxation under 
the provisions of this Constitution, in a manner, at a rate or rates or in 
proportion to value different from any other property in this State subject 
to taxation; taxes imposed by any act of the Legislature adopted pursuant 
to the powers hereby conferred shall be in lieu of all other property taxes, 
State, county, municipal or district, upon such property .•. provided, 
that the rate or rates of taxation of such securities . . . shall not exceed 
those assessed or imposed upon other property in this State not exempt 
from taxation. • • • 
8 The implementing statute was held invalid in Arnold v. Hopkins, 20 3 
Cal. 553, 265 Pac. 223 (1928) because it did not conform to certain re-
quirements of the constitutional provision, Art. XIII, § 12 _0. However, no 
issue of uniformity in taxation was raised. 
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uniformity limitation. In 1933 the paragraphs quoted above 
were added to Art. XIII, §14. The amendment withdrew 
the taxation of personal property from the scope of the uni-
formity clause in Art. XIII, § 1 which would otherwise apply 
to the taxation of "all" property.9 Thus, the basic uniformity 
clause in California has been subjected to a substantial modi-
fication although its words remain unchanged. 
In summary, the history of the California uniformity 
structure falls into two periods. From 1849 to 1933, under 
two constitutions, there was a single basic provision govern-
ing the taxation of "all" property, and, as will be shown, re-
quiring the strictest degree of uniformity. From 1933 to the 
present time, there have been two basic provisions, one of 
which has relieved the taxation of personal property from 
the strict uniformity limitation. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
Nonproperty taxes are not limited by the uniformity pro-
vision in Art. XIII, § 1.10 Such taxes are required only to be 
9 However, a "maximum rate" equality is ensured between personal 
property and realty. Article XIII, §14 was amended in 1933 to include 
the following: 
The total tax imposed on notes, debentures, shares of capital stock, 
bonds, solvent credits, deeds of trust, mortgages and any legal or equitable 
interest therein in pursuance of the provisions of this section shall not be 
at a rate in excess of four-tenths of I per cent of the actual value of such 
property and no tax burden shall be imposed upon any personal property 
either tangible or intangible which shall exceed the tax burden on real 
property in the same taxing jurisdiction in proportion to the actual value 
of such property. 
This limitation emphasizes the dominating purpose of the amendment 
which was to permit "low-rate" taxation of intangible property. 
10 Under Art. XI, § 13 of the 1849 constitution there was a tendency to 
apply the first sentence of that section-"Taxation shall be equal and uni-
form throughout the State"-to nonproperty taxes. However, all that was 
required of such taxes was uniformity within classes. For example, in 
Sacramento v. Crocker, 16 Cal. 119, 123 (1860) it was said that a rate 
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uniform within classes.11 The source of the limitation is both 
Art. I, § 11 12 of the California Constitution and the federal 
equal protection clause. Thus, the objects selected for non-
property taxes and exemptions therefrom need only be rea-
sonable classes/3 and the objects may be further classified for 
schedule (increasing flat rates for additional amounts of gross receipts) of 
a "business" tax was "uniform and equal, applying to all persons in the 
same category." [Emphasis added.] See note 20, infra. 
11 See, for example In re Wilmerding's Estate, 117 Cal. 281, 49 Pac. 
181 (1897) (inheritance tax); Kaiser Land & Fruit Co. v. Curry, 155 
Cal. 638, 103 Pac. 341 (1909) (corporate franchise tax with a base of 
capital stock); Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Johnson, 13 Cal. 2d 545, 90 P. 2d 
572 ( 1939) (general use tax). Also see the summary of this problem in the 
recent case, Fox Bakersfield Theatre Corp. v. City of Bakersfield, 36 Cal. 
2d 136,222 P. 2d 879 (1950). While this is established beyond argument, 
it is still an important proposition since almost invariably a tax is challenged 
as a violation of the uniformity clause, Art. XIII, § 1. The usual reason for 
this approach is to enable the taxpayer to challenge the tax as not being 
imposed "ad valorem," or as resulting in "double taxation." Of course, if 
the court establishes that the tax in question is not a property tax, then 
the "method" used is immaterial; see, for example, the Douglas case, supra. 
There is no "double taxation" as between different nonproperty taxes or as 
between a property tax and a nonproperty tax; see, for example, the Fox 
Bakersfield Theatre Corp. case, supra. The "double taxation" issue has been 
continually raised in California-invariably without success, which has not 
seemed to bother later complaining taxpayers. 
12 The section reads: "All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform 
operation." The same provision, with the same number, was found in the 
1849 constitution. Article I, §21 is also cited at times as the source of this 
limitation. That section provides: " ... nor shall any citizen, or class of 
citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, 
shall not be granted to all citizens." 
13 See, for example: In re Wilmerding's Estate, supra note 11 (inherit-
ance tax; holding that the selection of only collateral heirs was not an 
arbitrary classification, and that a minimum exemption of $500 was a reason-
able classification); Fox Bakersfield Theatre Corp. v. City of Bakersfield, 
supra note 11 (local license tax of 1 ¢ per 1 0¢ admission fee, applicable to 
places of amusement if admission fee charged, with certain exemptions of 
places where no fee charged and of charitable organization and the like 
where fee was charged; upholding tax against contention that the classifica-
tion was improper because not all amusement businesses in city were in-
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application of different rates.14 The court has not ruled upon 
the validity of graduated rates. However, the present inher-
itance tax does have a graduated rate schedule. 
Since the uniformity required of property taxes is a stricter 
limitation, the nature of a tax is always a crucial issue. The 
court has ruled upon the following taxes of comparative 
interest. It has held that an inheritance tax was a nonproperty 
tax, 15 but that a so-called "probate fee" was a tax upon 
property and a violation of the uniformity clause in Art. 
eluded); Roth Drugs v. Johnson, 13 Cal. App. 2d 720, 57 P. 2d 1022 
(1936) (retail sales tax; holding the following to be reasonable classifica-
tions: the selection of retail sales as opposed to wholesale sales, and the ex-
emption of sales of certain classes of things, such as food, as well as the ex-
emption of certain sales which were subject to other privilege taxes). In 
Bacon Service Corp. v. Huss, 199 Cal. 2I, 248 Pac. 235 (I926), followed 
in Ex parte Schmolke, I 99 Cal. 42, 248 Pac. 244 ( 1926), the court held 
that the exemption from the state motor vehicle transportation license tax 
of those transporting their own property or employees, and those transport-
ing no persons or property for hire, as well as those operating commercial 
vehicles within incorporated cities were not arbitrary classifications. How-
ever, in the Bacon Service Corp. case it was held that the exemption of 
sightseeing motor-buses carrying passengers for hire and operating outside 
of municipalities was an arbitrary classification and therefore invalid. See 
the following cases for further examples of arbitrary classifications: Buene-
man v. City of Santa Barbara, 8 Cal. 2d 405,65 P. 2d 884 (I937); Town 
of St. Helena v. Butterworth, 198 Cal. 230, 244 Pac. 357 (1926); Ex 
parte Richardson, I 70 Cal. 68, 148 Pac. 2 I 3 (I 915). 
14 See, for example, Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Independent Gas Co., 
I 52 Cal. 765, 93 Pac. I 006 (I 908) (local utilities license tax; holding the 
flat rate of $I 00 per period was not an unreasonable discrimination, as 
against the contention that to use a flat rate and disregard the amount of 
business done was discriminatory); Town of St. Helena v. Butterworth, 
supra note I 3 (local license tax; upholding different rate schedules for those 
having and those not having fixed places of business in the city). Also see 
McAdams Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. App. 2d 3 59, 89 P. 2d 
729 (I939). 
Hi In re Wilmerding's Estate, supra note 11, collateral inheritance tax, 
the court said (at p. 287): "This tax is not upon property, but upon the 
right of succession, [therefore] the constitutional provision that all property 
shall be taxed according to its value is inapplicable." 
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XIII, § e 6 A local motor vehicle license tax was held to be a 
tax on the "mere ownership" of property, and therefore on 
the property itself and a violation of Art. XIII, § 1 / 7 but a 
state vehicle license tax was held to be a nonproperty tax.18 
The following taxes were held to be non property taxes: a 
general use tax; 19 a local selective severance tax; 20 and a cor-
porate franchise tax with a base of capital stock. 21 
16 Fatjo v. Pfister, 117 Cal. 83, 48 Pac. 1012 ( 1897); a fee, at the time 
of filing in proceedings for administration of estates of deceased persons, and 
in guardianship proceedings, amounting to $1 per $1,000 of appraised valu-
ation in excess of $3,000, was held to be a tax on the estates of decedents, 
infants, and incompetents, and not analogous to an inheritance tax. 
17 Flynn v. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 2d 210, 115 P. 2d 3 ( 1941). The 
court placed considerable reliance on the exact words of the ordinance. It 
said that the tax "depend [ s] entirely on the factor of ownership; no 
mention is made [in the ordinance] of use or operation of the vehicles" 
with the exception as to motorcycles. "A tax levied by reason of ownership 
of property is a tax on property rather than an occupation tax," relying on 
Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 255 U.S. 288, 41 S. Ct. 
272 (1920), and the discredited Thompson v. Kreutzer, 112 Miss. 165, 
72 So. 891 (1916), infra Chapter III, Part E. 
18 Ingels v. ~iley, 5 Cal. 2d 154, 53 P. 2d 939 (1936). Here the words 
of the statute explicitly provided for a tax on a particular "use," rather than 
"mere ownership." However, the amount of the tax was a per cent of the 
actual market value. The tax was held to be on the privilege of operating 
vehicles on the highways. 
19 Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Johnson, supra note 11. 
20 McAdams Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles, supra note 14. 
21 Kaiser Land & Fruit Co. v. Curry, supra note 11, holding (at p. 6 53): 
"The charge is in no sense a tax upon the thing granted, as is the tax im-
posed under section 1 of article XIII. It is a mere license fee charged for the 
privilege, and is not a tax upon property at all, and the requirements of 
section 1 of article XIII of the constitution do not apply thereto." The 
court had earlier held that a corporate "franchise to be" was taxable property 
subject to the general property tax, but that such franchise might be taxed 
by either a property tax or an excise tax. See, for example, Bank of Cali-
fornia v. San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276, 75 Pac, 832 (1904) and Spring 
Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 62 Cal. 69 (1882). Those cases con-
cerned the property tax, and the issue was primarily raised by the listing of 
"franchises" in the definition of property found in Art. XIII, § 1, supra. 
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( 1 ) Property taxation: prior to 19 3 3 
It was clear that under both Art. XI, § 13 of the 1849 
constitution and Art. XIII, § 122 of the present 18 79 constitu-
tion the strictest degree of uniformity in the taxation of 
property was required. There was a rule of universality, 
exemption of any property other than that specifically 
designated as exemptible in the constitution being pro-
hibited.23 Absolute uniformity was required of the effective 
rate applicable to all property taxed by any taxing authority.24 
22 There seems to have been no significance in the deletion of the 
sentence "Taxation shall be equal and uniform" from the uniformity pro-
vision as it was carried over from Art. XI, §I 3 of the 184-9 constitution to 
Art. XIII,§ I of the 1879 constitution. The result as to property taxation-
strict uniformity-was the same under both constitutions. In the application 
of the "equal and uniform" clause to nonproperty taxes under the 184-9 
constitution it was simply interpreted to mean uniformity within classes. 
Note I 0, supra. 
23 See Crosby v. Lyon, 37 Cal. 24-2 (1869) (184-9 constitution; relying 
on the sentence "taxation shall be equal and uniform" to prohibit ex-
emptions of property); People v. Latham, 52 Cal. 598 (1878) (184-9 con-
stitution; the court clearly relied alternately upon the "equal and uniform" 
clause and the words "all property shall be taxed," emphasizing the word 
"all"); McKay v. San Francisco, 113 Cal. 392, 397, 4-5 Pac. 696 ( 1896); 
Chesebrough v. San Francisco, 153 Cal. 559, 96 Pac. 288 (1908). 
24 See for example, Fatjo v. Pfister, supra note 16, in which the court 
held that a "fee" amounting to $1 per $1,000 of appraised valuation over 
$3,000 of estates of deceased persons, infants, and incompetents, to be paid 
at the time of filing in a proceeding for the administration of such estates, 
was in fact a property tax upon such estates. The tax violated Art. XIII, § 1 
because it imposed "an extraordinary tax upon the property to which it 
applies, in addition to the equal and uniform tax to which alone all prop-
erty in the state is liable." In other words, this was a clear example of 
"double taxation"-the taxing of the same property twice in the same 
taxing period by the same taxing authority, resulting in effective rates not 
being absolutely uniform. 
There has been considerable controversy in California as to just what 
constitutes "double taxation" in the taxation of representative intangible 
property. In a line of cases the court has ruled that the taxation of shares to 
the shareholder and corporate property to the corporation constituted the 
taxation of the "same" property twice, resulting in unequal effective rates. 
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Of course, only the ad valorem method might be used m 
taxing property.211 
It appears that under the present constitution the rule of 
universality has been derived from the words "All property 
shall be taxed," rather than from a principle based upon the 
phrase "in proportion to its value." However, under the 1849 
provision a rule of universality was alternately attributed to 
the "equal and uniform" clause.26 It should be pointed out 
that the court has equated "uniformity and equality" to the 
requirement of "proportionality," as, for example, in the 
following statement: "Manifestly, under the prevailing 
circumstances, the exaction of the assessments in question was 
violative of the indispensable principle of equality and uni-
formity commensurate with taxation of property 'in propor-
tion to its value'."27 
(2) Property taxation: 1933 to present 
The uniformity provision in Art. XIII, §14, which was 
However, this is said to be so only when the corporate property is within 
the taxing jurisdiction attempting to reach the stock and subject to the tax. 
Thus, it was held that the taxation of shares in corporations having no 
property in the state was not "double taxation." See the following cases 
which developed this doctrine: People ex rei. Burke v. Badlam, 57 Cal. 
594 ( 1881); San Francisco v. Fry, 63 Cal. 470 ( 1883); Germania Trust 
Co. v. San Francisco, 128 Cal. 5 89, 61 Pac. 178 ( 1900); Crocker v. 
Scott, 149 Cal. 575, 87 Pac. 102 (1906); Chesebrough v. San Francisco, 
supra note 23; Canfield v. Los Angeles, 157 Cal. 617, 108 Pac. 705 
( 191 0) ; Bank of California, Nat. Ass'n v. Roberts, I 7 3 Cal. 3 9 8, 160 Pac. 
225 (1916). Also see San Francisco v. Anderson, 103 Cal. 69, 36 Pac. 1034 
(1894) and McKay v. San Francisco, supra note 23. 
On the absolute uniformity required in the ratio of valuation, see the 
statement in McClelland v. Board of Sup'rs, 30 Cal. 2d 124, 128-129, 
180 P. 2d 676 (1947). 
25 See, for example, the dictum in Roth Drugs v. Johnson, supra note 13 
at 739. 
26 See the cases in note 2 3. 
27 Flynn v. San Francisco, supra note 17 at 216, emphasis added. 
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added in 1933 and governs the taxation of personal property, 
limits to a substantial degree the effective operation of the 
uniformity provision in Art. XIII, § 1, which remains un-
changed in form. Because of Art. XIII, §14, the strict degree 
of uniformity required by Art. XIII, § 1 is now limited to 
the taxation of real property. There has been no clear-cut line 
of decisions developing the meaning of the uniformity limita-
tion which is derived from Art. XIII, § 14 and applicable to 
personal property taxation.28 However, on its face, it seems 
quite clear that Section 14 permits the taxation of all personal 
property-tangible as well as intangible-by specific as well 
as ad valorem taxes. There is no rule of universality for the 
taxation of personal property. And less than all taxable per-
sonal property may be selected for taxation, with that selected 
being subject to varying rates for different classes.29 
In fact, under the existing California tax structure the 
following use has been made of the liberal Art. XIII, § 14. 
Intangible property, except solvent credits, is entirely ex-
28 But see Dawson v. County of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. 2d 77, 98 P. 2d 
49 5 ( 1940), concerning the maximum rate limitation applicable to the 
taxation of intangibles which requires equality as between such rate or rates 
and the rate imposed on real property. See note 9, supra. 
29 But see Flynn v. San Francisco, supra note 17, in which the court held 
that a local tax (as construed by the court) upon the "mere ownership" of 
vehicles was in fact upon the property (i.e., vehicles, personal property) 
and therefore a violation of Art. XIII, § 1 because it imposed "double taxa-
tion." The cases relied upon by the court were decided under the present 
constitution before the 1933 amendment which clearly removes the re-
quirement of an absolute uniformity of rates as to all property-real and 
personal-in a taxing jurisdiction. Therefore, the limitation as to "double 
taxation" in Art. XIII, § 1 should no longer be relevant to taxes imposed 
upon personal property. However, the court might well have struck down 
the tax as a violation of the proviso in the amendment of Art. XIII, § 14 
which insures a "maximum rate" equality between real and personal prop-
erty (see note 9, supra). If the vehicle was subject to the general property 
tax, then the additional "property" tax would impose a greater rate than 
that imposed on real property in that taxing jurisdiction. 
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empt.80 However, tangible personal property remains subject 
to the general property tax at the real property ad valorem 
rate,31 and apparently no tangible property not expressly de-
scribed as exemptible by a special constitutional provision has 
been exempted under the new limitation applicable to per-
sonal property taxation. There has been one unusual result 
under the new uniformity provision found in Art. XIII, § 14. 
The court has held that the enumeration of classes of in-
tangible property in that provision limits the legislature to 
the taxation of only such classes. 32 Thus, intangible property 
not enumerated may not be taxed. For example, a liquor 
license was considered intangible property, but not taxable 
since not enumerated in the new Art. XIII, §14. 
3. Illinois 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The basic uniformity clause of the present Illinois Consti-
tution, dated 18 7 0, is found in the first clause of Art. IX, § 1, 
which reads: 
The general assembly shall provide [such revenue as may 
be needful by] levying a tax, by valuation, so that every per-
son and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value 
of his, her [or its] property . . . ; but the general assembly 
shall have power to tax peddlers, auctioneers, brokers, 
hawkers, merchants, commission merchants, showmen, 
jugglers, innkeepers, grocery keepers [liquor dealers,] toll 
bridges, ferries, [insurance, telegraph and express interests or 
business, vendors of patents,] and persons [or corporations 
owning or] using franchises and privileges, in such manner 
8° Cal. Revenue and Taxation Code §§212, 215 3. Solvent credits are 
subject to an "in lieu" tax of 1/10 of 1 'Jo. 
3l Cal. Revenue and Taxation Code §§I 06, 201. 
82 Roehm v. County of Orange, 32 Cal. 2d 280, 196 P. 2d 550 (1948). 
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as it shall from time to time direct [by general law, uniform 
as to the class upon which it operates] .1 
This provision 1s accompanied by Art. IX, §2, which pro-
vides: 
The specification of the objects and subjects of taxation 
shall not deprive the general assembly of the power to re-
quire other subjects or objects to be taxed in such manner as 
may be consistent with the principles of taxation fixed in this 
constitution. 
A third provision, Art. IX, §3, states that enumerated classes 
of property "may be exempted from taxation."2 In addition, 
Art. IX, §93 and § 1 04 provide expressly for uniformity m 
local taxes. 
1 The two prior constitutions of Illinois (dated 1818 and 1848) had 
basic uniformity clauses substantially identical to the uniformity clause of 
the present constitution. In the first constitution of 1818 there was a single 
provision relative to uniformity of taxation. Article VIII, §20 read: 
The mode of levying a tax shall be by valuation, so that every person 
shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of the property he or she has 
in his or her possession. 
In the second constitution, dated 1848, Art. IX, §2 read as does the present 
Art. IX, § 1 quoted in the text, but with the words in brackets not present. 
Article IX, §6 was identical with the present Art. IX, §2. Article IX, §3 was 
similar to the present exemption section, Article IX, §3, but provided for 
the "permissible" exemption only of governmental, education, religious, and 
charitable property. Article IX, §5 of the 1848 constitution combined, m 
substantially the same terms, the present sections 9 and 1 0 of Art. IX. 
2 Article IX, § 3 reads: 
The property of the state, counties, and other municipal corporations, 
both real and personal, and such other property as may be used ex-
clusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, for school, religious, 
cemetery and charitable purposes, may be exempted from taxation; but 
such exemption shall be only by general law ..•. 
3 The section reads: 
••. but such [municipal] taxes shall be uniform in respect to per-
sons and property, within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same. 
4 The section reads: 
The general assembly . . . shall require that all the taxable property 
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b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation5 
The court has ruled that the "proportionality clause" in 
Art. IX, §1 applies only to property taxes. 6 Nonproperty 
taxes are required only to be uniform within classes. 7 The ob-
jects selected for non property taxes and exemptions therefrom 
within the limits of municipal corporations shall be taxed for the pay-
ment of debts contracted under authority of law, such taxes to be uniform 
in respect to persons and property, within the jurisdiction of the body 
imposing the same .••• 
5 One of the few articles dealing with the general uniformity problem of 
a state constitution is a Comment, "The Illinois Constitutional Requirement 
of Uniformity in Taxation," 3 3 Ill. L. Rev. 57 ( I9 3 8). Also Cushman, 
"The Proposed Revision of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution," I9 52 
Univ. of III. Law Forum 226, is largely concerned with the requirement of 
uniformity under the Illinois Constitution. It is a more cursory treatment, 
but is a thorough presentation of the proposed amendment to Art. IX, §I 
which would considerably alter the meaning of that provision. The proposal 
was rejected in the I952 elections, but will again be voted on in the I956 
general elections. Senate Joint Resolution No. I6, Adopted June 24, I955 
[Ed.: Rejected, I956]. Also see Report of the Illinois Re'{)enue Laws Com-
mission (Springfield, I949), especially at 73-80, 20 I-220. 
6 See, for example, Kochersperger v. Drake, I67 Ill. I22, 47 N.E. 32I 
( I897) and the cases in notes 8 and 9, infra. This is particularly clear under 
the Illinois type of provision which contains a separate uniformity limitation 
applicable to nonproperty taxes. Of course, it remains necessary to state the 
proposition since the property tax limitation is more restrictive with the 
result that complaining taxpayers attempt to bring every tax within the 
operation of the proportionality clause in Art. IX, §I. 
7 The source of the limitation is alternately the second clause of Art. IX, 
§I and the "equal protection clause" of the fourteenth amendment to the 
United States Constitution. But see note II, infra, pointing out that the 
limitations cannot be equated, and that the state provision tends to be more 
restrictive. 
The provision in Art. IX, §9, supra note 3, could conceivably be con-
strued to apply a strict limitation upon municipal nonproperty taxes. How-
ever, local nonproperty taxes are subject only to the uniformity within 
classes limitation derived from Art. IX, §I. Article IX, §9 has been con-
strued to limit municipal property taxes only. See, for example, Harder's 
Fireproof Storage & Van Co. v. Chicago, 235 III. 58, 85 N.E. 245 (I908). 
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need only be reasonable classes,8 and the objects may be 
s For example: 
Retailers' Occupational (Sales) Tax. Because of the interpretation given 
Art. IX, § 1 concerning the types of non property taxes permissible [see note 
13, infra] the Illinois retail sales tax is framed as a tax upon the occupation 
of making retail sales. The first such tax was imposed in 1933 and held 
invalid in Winter v. Barrett, 352 Ill. 441, 186 N.E. 113 (1933). Under 
that tax farmers selling their own produce at retail and retailers of motor 
fuel were exempted. The court ruled that the act purported to be on "one 
class," those engaged in making sales at retail, and it was therefore held 
that the exemptions were arbitrary classifications. Thus, the court gave a 
very strict interpretation as to what might constitute a minimum class. A 
second such tax was imposed in the same year, and the above exemptions 
were eliminated. That tax was upheld in Rei£ v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 104, 188 
N.E. 889 (1934), and it was also held that the exemption of "isolated sales" 
was not an arbitrary classification. 
Cigarette taxation. For the same reason mentioned under the Retailers' 
Occupational Tax [and see note 13, infra] the legislature in 1941 enacted 
a Cigarette Tax Act which imposed a tax upon the occupation of distribut-
ing cigarettes. By a 1943 amendment the word "distributors" was defined 
so as to, in fact, include "users" of cigarettes bought in other states. The 
amendment was held to violate Art. IX, §1, ~2 in Johnson v. Daley, 403 
Ill. 338, 86 N.E. 2d 350 (1949) as being an arbitrary classification-the 
inclusion of those within a class which are not in fact within that class. So, 
in 1951 the legislature passed the Cigarette Use Tax Act which purported 
to impose a tax on the privilege of using cigarettes in Illinois, taxing all 
users irrespective of where the cigarettes were purchased. However, dis-
tributors who were required to collect the "use" tax and who were subject 
to the "distributors" tax [the rate is the same under both taxes], were 
allowed to offset this amount by an amount required to be paid under the 
"distributors" tax. Thus, we have the complementary use tax structure, but 
drafted as it was because of the interpretation concerning permissible types 
of taxes. In Johnson v. Halpin, 413 Ill. 257, 108 N.E. 2d 429 (1952), 
the court held that the tax was a privilege tax and not a violation of the 
uniformity limitation. It was said that "all users" were taxed, thus all in 
the same class were treated alike, since "The statute does not tax only those 
users who buy their cigarettes out of the State." 
Also see the following cases for examples of classifications found to be 
reasonable: In re Speed's Estate, 216 Ill. 23, 74 N.E. 809 (1905), aff'd 
203 U.S. 553 (inheritance tax; holding that the exemption of devises to 
domestic charitable corporations was reasonable) and similarly see People 
v. O'Donnell, 327 Ill. 474-, 158 N.E. 727 (1927); People v. Tatge, 267 
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further classified for the purpose of applying different rates.9 
The Illinois court has not ruled upon the validity of gradu-
Ill. 634, 108 N.E. 748 (1915) (inheritance tax; a proviso excluding de-
vises to step-children from any exemptions under the tax held to be reasona-
ble); People v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 343 Ill. 3 88, 17 5 N.E. 5 72 ( 1931) 
(motor fuel tax; holding the tax to be upon the privilege of operating motor 
vehicles on the highways, and finding the classification under the act not 
arbitrary even though kerosene and electricity were excluded as motor 
"fuel"; the case is often cited as a leading case on these issues) ; Routt v. 
Barrett, 396 Ill. 322, 7I N.E. 2d 660 (I947) (privilege tax levied under 
Horse Racing Act; holding the tax valid, and rejecting the contention that 
there was no just distinction between horse racing and harness racing, the 
latter not being included within the tax); City of Metropolis v. Gibbons, 
3 34 Ill. 43I, I66 N.E. IIS ( I929) (local ordinance licensing moving 
picture theaters; held, moving picture theaters may be taxed as a class). 
In the following cases the court held certain classifications to be arbitrary: 
Ohio Oil Co. v. Wright, 386 Ill. 206, 53 N.E. 2d 966 (I944-) (oil pro-
duction tax; where producers were limited to those owning the product 
when taken from the ground, thus excluding nonowning producers, an 
arbitrary exclusion; and see the discussion in the text, infra) ; City of Chi-
cago v. Ames, 365 Ill. 529, 7 N.E. 2d 294- (I937) (public utility tax im-
posed on the gross receipts from sales of water, gas, or electricity supplied 
for domestic or commercial consumption and not for resale, thus excluding 
in fact receipts from such services supplied for industrial use; held, the ex-
clusion constituted an unreasonable distinction in the class of those furnish-
ing such services). 
9 See, for example: Kochersperger v. Drake, supra note 6 (inheritance 
tax; held, the classification of beneficiaries into six classes according to rela-
tion to the deceased for purpose of applying a different proportional rate 
to the property devised to each was reasonable); Metropolis Theater Co. v. 
Chicago, 24-6 Ill. 20, 92 N.E. 597 (I9IO), aff'd, 228 U.S. 6I (local 
ordinance, classifying theaters into five classes according to the price of ad-
missions, and imposing an annual license tax increasing for each class; held, 
a reasonable classification); Braun v. Chicago, II 0 Ill. 186 ( I884-) (local 
license tax, brokers, classified according to nature of business done, e.g., 
bankers, with different flat rates for each sub-class; held, uniform as to all 
within the same classes). In the following cases local vehicle taxes were held 
valid, the court finding classification of vehicles according to passenger ca-
pacity, number of horses drawing, horsepower, etc. for purposes of different 
rates to be reasonable: Melton v. City of Paris, 3 3 3 Ill. I90, I64- N.E. 2I8 
(1928); McGrath v. Chicago, 309 Ill. SIS, 14I N.E. 299 (I924); 
Ayres v. Chicago, 239 Ill. 237, 87 N.E. I 07 3 ( I909); Harder's Fireproof 
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ated rates under the uniformity within classes limitation 
found in the second clause of Art. IX, § 1.10 In general the 
Illinois court has followed the usual approach of liberally 
interpreting the classification limitation; however, some 
fairly recent decisions11 indicate that the second clause of Art. 
IX, § 1 of the Illinois Constitution may be given a more re-
strictive interpretation than is given to the federal equal pro-
tection clause. 
A potentially serious limitation upon the power of the 
Illinois legislature to impose nonproperty taxes stems from 
the enumeration of taxable objects in the second clause of 
Art. IX, § 1.12 The court has held that only three types of 
taxes may be imposed in Illinois, 1) ad valorem property 
taxes, 2) occupation taxes, and 3) franchise or privilege 
taxes.13 Thus, nonproperty taxes are limited to "occupation" 
and "franchise or privilege" taxes. However, this "limita-
tion" can mean much or nothing depending on meaning given 
the terms "occupation," "franchise," and "privilege." There 
is every indication that "this limitation to three types of non-
Storage & Van Co. v. Chicago, supra note 7. In Mutual Tobacco Co. v. 
Halpin, 4I4 Ill. 226, 1 I 1 N.E. 2d ISS (19S3), the court held that the 
flat rate per cigarette (or pack) under the cigarette distributor's tax was 
reasonable in answer to the contention that to tax without regard to the 
differing value of cigarettes resulted in a tax not uniform in burden. 
10 However, in Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 
18 S. Ct. S94- ( 1897) the United States Supreme Court, in a leading case, 
held that the progressive graduated rates then in effect under the Illinois 
inheritance tax did not violate the equal protection clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution. See Chapter IV, infra. 
11 See Winter v. Barrett (retailers occupation tax), and Chicago v. Ames 
(Public Utilities Gross Receipts Tax), note 8, supra. 
12 Cf. the same problem under the Arkansas and Tennessee Constitutions, 
supra Chapter III, Part A. 
13 Bachrach v. Nelson, 349 Ill. S79, S88-S89, I82 N.E. 909 (1932) is 
usually cited for this proposition. See Comment, "The Illinois Constitu-
tional Requirement of Uniformity in Taxation," 3 3 Ill. L. Rev. S 7 at 
60-61, 80-8I (I938); Cushman, supra noteS at 237-238. 
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property taxes is not so restrictive as might first appear be-
cause of the broad scope which [the Illinois] Supreme Court 
has given to privilege taxes."14 
Of course, it is of crucial importance in most instances that 
a tax be removed from the operation of the "proportionality 
clause" in Art. IX, § 1 if the tax is to be upheld. Thus, the 
nature of any given tax is of considerable importance. For 
purposes of uniformity of taxation the court has held that an 
inheritance tax was not upon property but on the privilege 
of succession.15 However, it has also held that a statute fixing 
a graduated "fee" to be paid in making application for letters 
of administration of estates was in fact a tax upon the prop-
erty involved and a violation of the proportionality clause 
which limits property taxes.16 
Income tax.17 In 1932 the Illinois legislature passed an act 
which imposed a personal net income tax with a graduated 
rate.18 The tax was immediately challenged, and in Bachrach 
14 Cushman, supra note 5 at 237-238. Nevertheless, as that same writer 
points out, "In spite of these holdings, much uncertainty still exists as to 
the power of the General Assembly to make a given transaction rather than 
an occupation or employment a privilege for the purpose of taxation." Ibid. 
In addition, he states that such doubts had prevented the imposition of a 
general complementary use tax. But see the action taken as to the cigarette 
use tax, supra note 8. In that case, Johnson v. Halpin, the court clearly 
takes a dim view of a restrictive interpretation of the type of provision 
found in Art. IX, § 1 and refers to the Arkansas restrictive interpretation as 
"a vague doctrine of tax immunity of natural or common rights." 
15 Kochersperger v. Drake, supra note 6, a leading state case on this issue. 
16 Cook County v. Fairbank, 222 Ill. 578, 78 N.E. 895 (1906), dis-
cussed under "property taxation," infra. Also see the taxes considered in 
the cases found in notes 8 and 9, supra. 
17 See Comment, "Is Any Desirable Type of General Income Tax Con-
stitutional in Illinois?" 3 5 Ill. L. Rev. 7 3 0 ( 194-1) ; Note, "The Constitu-
tionality of the Illinois Income Tax Law of 1932," 1 Univ. of Chi. L. Rev. 
124- (1933); Barnett, "An Income Tax Law in Illinois," 27 Ill. L. Rev. 
119 (1932). 
18 Ill. Laws 1931-32, First Spec. Sess., p. 91. 
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v. N elson19 the Illinois Supreme Court held that it violated 
the proportionality clause in Art. IX, § 1. Income was ruled 
to be property within the meaning of that clause, and the tax 
under consideration was said to be upon income, therefore 
upon property.20 Having brought the tax within the opera-
tion of the property tax uniformity clause, the court held that 
the graduated rate feature violated "the constitutional pro-
vision that all taxes must be levied on property according to 
valuation."21 
Since it was decided that income itself was property, the 
court did not have to determine whether a tax upon income 
from property is a tax upon that property from which it was 
derived. However, the court did make a statement approving 
that doctrine/2 and in a subsequent case concerning the oil 
production tax, the court relied upon that proposition as be-
ing "decided" in the Bachrach case. It was in fact so held in 
the later case.23 Therefore, it would appear that taxation of 
income derived from property, even at a flat rate equal to 
that imposed on all other property, is subject to some con-
stitutional doubt in Illinois.24 
Oil Production Tax {Severance tax). In 1941 the Illinois 
legislature enacted the Oil Production Tax Act.25 Section 2 
t9 349 Ill. 579, 182 N.E. 909 (1932). 
20 !d. at 591-595. 
21 /d. at 595-596. 
2 2 Jd. at 595. In an earlier case, Young v. Illinois Athletic Club, 310 
Ill. 75, 141 N.E. 369 (1923) the court had ruled that an income tax was 
not a tax upon the property from which that income was derived. However, 
the case concerned the liability for payment of the income tax upon rentals 
when by the terms of the lease the lessee covenanted to pay as additional rent 
all taxes levied upon the real estate, any interest of the lessor under the 
lease, or any tax the lessor was required to pay by reason of interest in the 
real estate. 
23 See discussion below. 
24 But see Comment, 35 Ill. L. Rev., supra note 18 at 736. 
25 Ill. Laws 1941, p. I 068. 
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of that act purported to impose a tax "upon each person en-
gaged in the business of producing oil in" Illinois. The tax 
was to be computed at a rate of 3% of the value of the oil 
produced. Among the definitions, found in section 1, was the 
following: " 'Producer' or 'person engaged in the business of 
producing oil' means any person owning oil or having a 
royalty interest therein at the time it is taken in this State, 
whether taken by him or some other person in his behalf." 
The entire tax was held unconstitutional in Ohio Oil Co. v. 
Wright. 20 In brief, the court found that the tax was in part a 
property tax and in part an occupation tax. This classification 
was made because 
a different situation [was] presented as to an oil company 
owning an interest in lands on which it [had] a right to drill 
wells and produce oil, and does by its operations produce oil, 
and that of an owner of land who [had] executed a lease or 
deed authorizing an oil company to go upon his land and 
explore for and procure oil. ... 27 
As for the "mere" royalty owner-brought by statutory 
definition within the meaning of the term "producer"-the 
court held that the tax was in reality upon the royalties, that 
mineral royalties were rent, and as such, income.28 The court 
ruled that a tax upon the income derived from property was 
in reality a tax upon the property itself. Therefore, the tax 
under consideration was upon the property producing the 
26 386 Ill. 206, 53 N.E. 2d 966 ( 194-4-). See note 28, infra, as to rele-
vancy of Friedrich v. Wright, 3 86 Ill. 22 9, 53 N .E. 2d 97 4 ( 194-4-). 
27 /d. at 211. 
28 In the Ohio Oil Co. case there were no royalty owners parties to the 
case; however, the court dealt with every aspect of the tax, and in the com-
panion case, Friedrich v. Wright, supra note 26, the taxpayers were royalty 
owners. The court simply referred to the Ohio Oil Co. case as decisive. It 
was also held that to define arbitrarily as producers those who were not "in 
fact" producers, would be an unreasonable classification and violative of the 
second paragraph of Art. IX, § 1. See note 8, supra. 
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royalty (the mineral rights as real estate). 29 Therefore, the 
tax as to royalty owners was held to be a violation of the 
proportionality clause in Art. IX, § 1, which governs the 
taxation of property.30 
However, as to the company operating the lease and doing 
the actual production work, it was said that an occupation, or 
nonproperty tax might be properly levied. But the tax in 
question was held to violate the second clause in Art. IX, § 1, 
which requires nonproperty taxes to be uniform within 
classes.31 This was so because "many persons properly in the 
business of producing oil were excluded." A producer who 
did not own or have a royalty interest in the oil at the time 
it was taken from the ground was "excluded from" the 
operation of the tax. 
( 1) Property taxation 
Property taxes must conform to that degree of uniformity 
required by the proportionality clause in Art. IX, § 1. Gen-
erally speaking, Illinois is known as having a constitutional 
limitation which requires the strictest degree of uniformity in 
the taxation of property. The reservation in section 2 of Art. 
IX ("The specification of the objects and subjects of taxation 
shall not deprive the general assembly" etc.) does not create 
exceptions to the proportionality clause, but refers only to 
nonproperty taxes.32 To the contrary, the court has ruled 
29 Ohio Oil Co. v. Wright, supra note 26 at 212-214. 
30 The court was not clear concerning the precise manner in which the 
tax violated the property uniformity clause. Probably the basis of this con-
clusion was that "double taxation" would have resulted. See the discussion 
under "property taxation," infra. Cf. People ex rei. Smith v. Coen, 415 
Ill. 73, 112 N.E. 2d 119 (1953). However, some statements indicated the 
basis of the tax's invalidity was the ad valorem method requirement. There 
was no "valuation" by state officers. 
31 Ohio Oil Co. v. Wright, supra note 26 at 218-222. 
32 See, for example, Bachrach v. Nelson, supra note 13 at 587-588 
(holding an income tax a property tax, and subject to the proportionality 
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that the degree of uniformity required of property taxes is 
affected by the second clause of Art. IX, § 1 : 
... but the general assembly shall have power to tax 
peddlers, auctioneers, brokers, hawkers, merchants, commis-
sion merchants, showmen, jugglers, innkeepers, grocery 
keepers, liquor dealers, toll bridges, ferries, insurance, tele-
graph and express interests or business, vendors of patents, 
and persons or corporations owning or using franchises and 
privileges, in such manner as it shall from time to time direct 
by general law, uniform as to the class upon which it 
operates. 
This rather unusual interpretation given the second clause of 
Art. IX, § 1 has been the basis in recent years for making an 
exception to the strict property tax uniformity requirement. 
This development is discussed in detail under the subject of 
"effective rates." 
Of course, under this type of basic uniformity clause prop-
erty must be taxed by the ad valorem method. Specific 
property taxes violate Art. IX, § 1. 33 There is a strict rule of 
universality which forbids both the omission of taxable prop-
erty from the general property tax34 and the positive exemp-
clause); People's Loan & Homestead Ass'n v. Keith, 153 Ill. 609, 623-624, 
39 N.E. 1072 (1894-) (Section 2 not intended to permit exemptions of 
property not enumerated in section 3 of Art. IX). See note 3 5, infra. 
33 People v. Cook County, 221 Ill. 4-93, 77 N.E. 914 (1906), holding 
that a statute was unconstitutional which provided for a specific amount per 
acre of land to be paid on land from which certain obnoxious weeds were 
removed by the county. The court held that the statute imposed a "tax," 
not at "special assessment," and was therefore a violation of Art. IX, § 1 
because it was not levied with regard to the value of such property. But see 
the early case, Rhinehart v. Schuyler, 7 Ill. 4-73 (2 Gilman) (184-5), dis-
cussed in note 39, infra. 
34 A statutory failure to select all taxable property in the taxing j urisdic-
tion invalidates the entire tax, Primm v. Belleville, 59 Ill. 14-2 ( 1871); 
Crane v. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 153 Ill. 34-8, 38 N.E. 943 (1894). 
In both of those cases a purported "special assessment" was held to be, in 
fact, a "tax." Therefore the selection of realty to the exclusion of person-
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tion of such property.3~ The universality limitation has been 
derived both from the proportionality clause in Art. IX, § 1, 
and the enumeration of exemptible classes of property in Art. 
IX, §3. Section 3 creates an exception to the rule of uni-
alty violated the rule of uniformity in Art. IX, § 1. In the Primm case the 
provision in question was Art. IX, §§2, 5 of the 1848 constitution. See note 
1, supra. However, the court has also held that the failure of a ministerial 
officer to carry out the statutory mandate to list all taxable property will not 
invalidate a tax. Dunham v. Chicago, 55 Ill. 357 (1870) (under the 1848 
constitution, see note 1, supra); Spencer and Gardner v. People, 68 Ill. 510 
(1873); Peoplev. Lots In Ashley, 122 Ill. 297,13 N.E. 556 (1887); 
People v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 301 Ill. 541, 134 N.E. 314 (1922), dis-
tinguishing People v. Noyes, 295 Ill. 35 5, 129 N.E. 151 ( 1920); and see 
the cases in note 49, infra; but see People ex rel. Wangelin v. Wiggins 
Ferry Co., 3 57 Ill. 173, 191 N.E. 296 ( 1934), note 48, infra. 
35 See the leading case of People's Loan & Homestead Ass'n v. Keith, 
supra note 32, in which the court held a statute unconstitutional which 
provided that the stock and notes of building and loan associations should 
not be subject to taxation. The statute was construed to be an exemption 
statute, and the court said (at p. 618): "Under section 1 of article 9 of the 
constitution ... it is plain that the burdens of taxation were intended to 
be cast equally upon all the property of the State, of every description." Had 
it not been for Art. IX, §3, listing exemptible property, the legislature 
would have no power in any case to enact laws exempting property from 
taxation. It was said that the enumeration of exemptible property in Art. 
IX, §3 is also "a clear limitation upon the power of the legislature to exempt 
any other property." Thus, the statute violated both sections of Art. IX. 
Relied on in In re St. Louis Loan & Investment Co., 194 Ill. 609, 62 N.E. 
810 (1902), holding invalid a statute providing that capital stock and 
shares on which loans had been procured were not to be taxed. 
Also see People v. National Box Co., 248 Ill. 141, 93 N.E. 778 (1910), 
in which the court had to construe a statute providing for the assessment of 
the capital stock of certain corporations by state officers. The court ruled 
that, if the statute were construed to imply that the capital stock of all other 
corporations was exempt, it would violate the proportionality clause, Art. 
IX, § 1. Therefore, it was held that local assessors had to assess the capital 
stock of corporations not listed for state valuation. The same result was 
reached in Consolidated Coal Co. v. Miller, 236 Ill. 149, 86 N.E. 205 
( 1908); and see Oak Ridge Cemetery Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 299 Ill. 
4-30, 132 N.E. 55 3 ( 1921). In People v. First Congregational Church, 232 
Ill. 158, 83 N.E. 536 (1907) held that a statute exempting parsonages 
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formity established by section 1. And the enumeration of 
exemptible property in section 3 is said to preclude the 
exemption of any other property.36 The rule of universality 
may not be avoided by use of an "in lieu" nonproperty tax.37 
violated Art. IX, §§ 1 and 3 because parsonages was a broader class of prop-
erty than the class described as "exclusively religious" in section 3. Also see 
People ex rei. Lloyd v. University of Illinois, 357 Ill. 369, 192 N.E. 24-3 
(1934-), based on: People ex rei. Olmstead v. University of Illinois, 328 
Ill. 377,159 N.E. 811 (1928); People v. Deutsche Gemeinde, 249 Ill. 
132, 94 N.E. 162 ( 1911); Supreme Lodge M.A.F.O. v. Board of Review, 
223 Ill. 54, 79 N.E. 23 (1906). 
36 See the cases in note 3 5, supra. 
37 See Report of the [Illinois] Revenue Laws Commission 201-219 
(Springfield, 1949) and the cases there analyzed in discussing the question: 
"Would it be constitutional to repeal the provisions of the Revenue Act 
relating to the assessment and taxation of the capital stock of domestic cor-
porations and substitute in lieu thereof a supplemental franchise tax on both 
domestic and foreign corporations measured by net income from business 
carried on in this State?" 
In the other states having a rule of universality the courts have agreed 
with the proposition stated in the text. (But see Oklahoma, infra text at 
notes 9-21, Chapter III, Part G.) Any apparent exception to the rule in 
Illinois has its roots in a decision sustaining the Illinois Central gross re-
ceipts tax imposed in lieu of all state and local taxes. See Illinois Central 
R. Co. v. McLean, 1 7 Ill. 29 I (I 8 55). This arrangement was a part of the 
original charter of the railroad. Priv. Laws, 1 8 5 1, p. 61, § § 1 8, 20 ; Ill. Ann. 
Stat., c. 120, §§373-374. The court has consistently viewed this arrange-
ment as a contract, subject to all the protection of the state and federal con-
stitutional limitations concerning the impairment of the obligations of 
contract. See, for example, Illinois Central R. Co. v. Emmerson, 299 Ill. 
328, I32 N.E. 4-71 (1921). At the time this arrangement was originally 
entered into, there was no provision in the governing constitution of 184-8 
which prohibited the commutation of taxes. The present constitution of 
1870 (Art. X, §6) does prohibit the commutation of state taxes. However, 
in a special section (Ill. Canst. 1870, Separate Sections: § 1) the constitu-
tion also sanctions the continuance of the special Illinois Central gross 
receipts tax with its in lieu features. 
Apart from the contract aspect of this anomalous arrangement, the Mc-
Lean case, supra, and other later cases, in upholding the tax relied to some 
extent on the second clause of Art. IX, § 1, finding authority therein for the 
legislature to impose an in lieu tax for taxes on property owned by those 
enumerated. The loose language of the McLean case was picked up and 
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The Illinois legislature has made no attempt to impose a 
systematic classified property tax. The Illinois general prop-
erty tax38 has remained basically unchanged since shortly 
after the admission of Illinois to the Union.39 All property is 
elaborated on in the Porter case, infra note 87, discussed in relation to 
effective rates. See the text at notes 86-115, infra. As suggested in the text, 
the only issue in the Porter case concerned the power of the legislature to 
classify property for the purpose of using different methods of valuation. 
See text to note 92, infra. Nevertheless, the unwarranted dictum has been 
the source for controversy concerning exemptions as well as the more im-
portant controversy concerning classification of property for effective rates, 
as discussed in the text. See, e.g., note I 00, infra. However, other than the 
Illinois Central Railroad gross receipts tax cases, only one case has actually 
had an in lieu tax issue involved for decision. In Raymond v. Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co., 196 Ill. 329, 63 N.E. 745 (1902), the court was faced with 
determining the validity of a 29"o tax on the gross premiums of foreign 
insurance companies (other than life), the tax to be in lieu of all other taxes 
other than taxes on the real estate of such companies. The court, on the 
basis of the McLean decision, supra, and the dictum in the cases cited in 
notes 8 7-91, i1~fra, did indicate that the in lieu provision would have been 
valid insofar as it was in lieu of state taxes. Authority for this proposition 
was found in the second clause of Art. IX, §I. Because of this authorization 
the commutation clause (Art. IX, §6) was said to be no obstacle. However, 
the tax was declared to be unconstitutional as a violation of the uniformity 
clauses limiting local taxes, Art. IX, §§9, I 0. See notes 3 and 4, supra. 
Those local uniformity clauses were said to prohibit taxes in lieu of local 
property taxes because they were not coupled with the second clause of Art. 
IX,§ I. 
On the basis of an extensive analysis of the above and other opinions the 
writer in the Report, supra, concludes that such an in lieu tax would not 
now be constitutional. No distinction was made as to state taxes on property 
because there was, in fact, no state rate at the time. Thus, practically, the 
problem concerned only relief from local property tax rates. However, the 
author calls attention to the controversy caused by broad unwarranted dic-
tum found in the cases concerning the method used to value property, notes 
87-91, infra. The controversy stems from the peculiar construction given 
the second clause of Art. IX, §I. 
88 At present this is the Revenue Act of 1939 as amended, Ill. Ann. Stat. 
c. 120, §§482-811. 
89 However, until 1839 the Illinois property tax was both a selective tax 
and a specific tax. Land was the principal item taxed, but a few items of 
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subject to the tax, unless specifically exempted, and is to be 
extended on the tax rolls at its "fair cash value." The same 
percentage rate is applied to all property taxed by any taxing 
district. This is the statutory scheme-the facade. The factual 
picture has long been quite different from that set forth in 
the statutes. At times a single ratio of valuation of less than 
1 0 0% is applied in a roughly uniform manner throughout 
a taxing district. However, especially since the early part of 
this century, the assessors of several local units (counties in 
personal property were also subject to taxation. See Report, supra note 3 7 at 
1 (1949), and the preface to the Revenue Act of 1939 by the Illinois Tax 
Commission, reprinted, Ill. Stat. Ann., c. 120, p. 186. Also see Jensen, 
Property Taxation in the U1zited States 4-5-4-7 ( 1931) for a historical ac-
count of early taxation in Illinois. 
By the Act of Feb. 18, 1823 all lands were to be divided into three 
classes: "first quality," "second quality" and "third quality" respectively. 
Property was to be declared by the owner as to which class it belonged. The 
classes were arbitrarily valued at four, three, and two dollars per acre re-
spectively. A tax of .0 of 1 per cent was imposed and town lots were 
exempt. In Rhinehart v. Schuyler, supra note 3 3, that tax was upheld 
against the contention it violated the proportionality clause in the first 
constitution of 1818. See note I, supra. Two judges dissented, believing 
that property was exempted and that the tax was specific. The case was an 
action of ejectment brought in 1845 to recover possession of a plot of land 
bought at a tax sale for taxes due under the prior tax act. One defense was 
that the revenue act, under which the land in question was assessed and 
subsequently sold for taxes, was unconstitutional and void because the tax 
was specific and not ad valorem. The majority anticipated its conclusion 
when it stated the very practical situation which it faced (at p. 496-497): 
"The most solemn acts of the legislature, long acquiesced in, have been 
denounced as unconstitutional. Titles to valuable estates, acquired under 
them, are questioned; and the whole tax laws of the State, from the very 
commencement of its government down to the year 1829, are declared to 
have been passed without authority, and against the express provisions of 
the constitution." Stressing the practical difficulties which would have been 
faced in those earlier years in attempting to value all property in the state, 
the majority concluded that the system used was the "best system, and the 
only mode by which uniformity of taxation can be secured." The Rhinehart 
decision has been since ignored. The decision is not hard to understand 
when seen against its factual background. In addition, at the time it was 
made, the present general property-tax system had been introduced. 
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particular) have enforced a de facto classified general property 
tax. Property has been classified by the local assessor, and the 
several classes extended on the tax rolls at varying ratios of 
valuation. The result is a de facto classified effective rate.40 
Since there has been no statutory scheme for a classified 
property tax, the court has had few occasions to pass upon the 
requirement of uniformity in percentage rates. However, it 
is quite clear that the Illinois court interprets the proportion-
ality clause of Art. IX, § 1 as requiring absolute uniformity 
in the percentage rate41 applied to all property taxed by any 
single taxing authority.42 
40 See, for example, Cushman, supra note 5 at 23 5-236; Report, supra 
note 37 at 30 ff. ( 194-9). 
41 Bachrach v. Nelson, supra note 20 (holding an income tax to be on 
the income as property, and the graduated rate feature to be a violation of 
the proportionality clause); Cook County v. Fairbank, supra note 16 (gradu-
ated probate fee held to be in fact upon the property of the estate, thus the 
graduated rate would violate the proportionality clause). In addition, 
"double taxation" would violate the requirement of absolute uniformity in 
rates. Thus, in the Cook County case the additional fee would have been 
an invalid "double taxation" of the property involved which was also taxed 
under the general property tax. See Friedrich v. Wright, supra note 26, 
following Ohio Oil Co. v. Wright, supra note 26, and holding that an at-
tempt to tax royalty owners under the oil production tax (see notes 25-30, 
supra) was in fact upon the royalty received, It was further held that to tax 
the income from land (royalty is rent, rent is income, so reasoned the 
court) was to tax the land itself in violation of the proportionality clause. 
The opinion was not too clear, but apparently the court conceived of this 
as an example of the prohibited "double taxation." At the time there was 
no state property tax, and the oil production tax was a state tax. Therefore 
it would have been irrelevant to add this burden on land taxed to the 
burden imposed by local units because to have "double taxation" the two 
taxes must be by the same taxing authorities. Board of Highway Com'rs v. 
Bloomington, 253 Ill. 164-, 97 N.E. 280 (1912). The court has held that 
the taxation by the same taxing authority of corporate tangible property to 
the corporation and taxation of shares in the corporation to the holders 
thereof was not "double taxation." Danville Banking & Trust Co. v. Parks, 
88 Ill. 170 (1878); Illinois Nat. Bank v. Kinsella, 201 Ill. 31, 66 N.E. 
338 (1903). 
42 Since the limitation is "territorial," a comparison of rates between 
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(b) Effective rates: ratio of valuation 
The de facto classification system introduced by local 
assessors is conceded by some writers to be a realistic adjust-
ment to the facts of economic life.43 Indeed, there are those 
who feel that the system is not likely to be upset by the court 
even though found to be illegal.44 Nevertheless, such a 
system is not above constitutional standards. Since the Illinois 
Supreme Court has ruled that universality and absolute uni-
formity in percentage rates are required, one would expect 
the rationale supporting such rules to support a further rule 
requiring absolute uniformity in the effective rate applicable 
to all property taxed by any single taxing authority, thus re-
quiring absolute uniformity in ratio of valuation as well as 
percentage rate. If either the percentage rate or the ratio of 
valuation may vary for classes of property, it becomes ob-
vious that there is little sense in requiring the other factor of 
the effective rate to be the same for all property taxed. 45 
property taxes imposed by different taxing authorities is irrelevant. Anderson 
v. City of Park Ridge, 396 Ill. 235, 72 N.E. 2d 210 (1947). Also see 
People ex rei. O'Connell v. Chicago & W.I.R. Co., 256 Ill. 388, 100 N.E. 
35 (1912). 
43 For example, Cushman, supra note 5 at 236: "Using this de facto 
classified property tax, Mr. Clark [the County Assessor of Cook County], 
has ... done as good a job as any assessor in the state with an unworkable 
personal property tax system." See the Report, supra note 3 7 at 3 7-3 8 
(1949), pointing out that the equitable result depends upon the assessor: 
". • . [T] he state does have an extra-legal system of administrative classi-
fication. This system . . . operates in a most discriminatory and inequitable 
manner. In Downstate counties, especially, it is haphazard, arbitrary, and 
grossly lacking in uniformity. A few years ago the Assessor of Cook County 
attempted to improve personal property assessment in that county by setting 
up an administrative system of classification of certain types of personal 
property." After describing that system, the writer concludes: "Although 
the system of classification med in Cook County is without legal authority, it 
represents a sincere effort to improve personal property tax assessments." 
44 Cushman, supra note 5 at 236. 
45 See the general discussion on this problem in Chapter I, supra. 
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It will be helpful to make a summary statement of the de-
tailed analysis to follow. Until approximately 1935 one 
could conclude that a rule of absolute uniformity applied to 
effective rates and that the rule was derived from the propor-
tionality clause in Art. IX, § 1. Broad language is found in 
some opinions which, when taken out of context of actual 
decision and attendant facts, might support a conclusion that 
only uniformity within classes is required of the ratio of 
valuation-at least, for certain classes of property.46 How-
ever, this was never actually decided by the court. Indeed, 
the court was never really faced with any contention that 
classification for such purposes was permissible. In those cases 
the opinions of which contain language susceptible of being 
interpreted as approval of classification for such purpose 
appears, the court was in reality faced only with this question: 
could property be classified for the purpose of using different 
methods of valuation, the aim purportedly being to ascertain 
the full value of all classes of property? In other cases the 
court consistently paid lip service to the rule of strict uni-
formity. However, it is not unusual to find in those cases in 
which the court pronounced most vigorously the rule of 
absolute uniformity in ratio of valuation, that the court also 
placed an obstacle in the way of the rule's enforcement. That 
obstacle took the form of procedural requirements and avail-
able remedies. Thus, until about 1 9 3 5, the court held firm to 
the rule of absolute uniformity with no announced exceptions. 
In fact, it was long obvious that the rule was an ineffective 
constitutional limitation, being honored more in the breach 
than in the observance.47 
During the period from 1935 to 1946 the court decided 
certain cases of considerable significance which appear to 
reverse, to some extent, the prior interpretation of Art. IX, 
46 See the cases discussed in notes 87-92, infra. 
47 See note 40, supra. 
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§ 1 as it limits property taxation. It appears now that at least 
some property may be classified for the purpose of applying 
different ratios of valuation, thereby achieving a classified 
effective rate. In part this results from the unusual interpre-
tation given to the second clause of Art. IX, § 1. 
The cases which bear upon this problem may be placed 
into three significant groups. First, there are those cases 
which concern the taxation of property, in general, by the 
general property tax, with such property being valued by 
local authorities for application of the local rates. Second, 
there are those cases concerning the taxation of railroad prop-
erty by the general property tax, with such property being 
valued by state officers and apportioned to the counties 
through which the railroads run for application of the local 
property tax rate. Third, there are those cases concerning the 
taxation of the capital stock of corporations at the general 
property tax rate by the "Capital Stock Tax," with such 
capital stock being valued by state officers and entered on the 
tax rolls at that value for the county tax rate. A different ap-
proach has been taken by the Illinois court in each of these 
three groups of cases in approving-tacitly or expressly-
classification of property for the purpose of applying different 
ratios of valuation. 
(i) General Property Tax: Valuation of property by 
county officers for application of county rates. In the cases 
concerning this situation it could safely be said, until 1935, 
that the Illinois Supreme Court in its decisions (pur-
portedly), as well as in its words, adhered to the view that 
the proportionality clause of Art. IX, § 1 required absolute 
uniformity in the ratio of valuation used by any taxing juris-
diction. Thus, if a ratio of valuation other than "fair cash 
value" ( 100% ratio, as required by statute) was actually 
used by county assessors in valuing property for entry upon 
the tax rolls, then that ratio had to be applied to all property 
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alike.48 The opinions of the court, although at times not too 
precisely formulated, never deviated from this view. 
48 See, for example, the following cases in which the taxpayer alleged 
that a ratio of valuation was applied generally to all property in the county, 
and that the ratio was lower than that used for taxpayer's property. In 
People ex rel. Wangelin v. Gillespie, 358 Ill. 4-0, 192 N.E. 664- (1934-), 
the court stated as the rule: if an assessor intentionally rejects a statutory 
provision and generally assesses property for taxation at substantially less 
than true or market value, then all property in the same district must be 
assessed on the same ratio. However, this "rule" was reduced to dictum 
because the decision actually turned on the proposition that there had been 
a "fraudulent" overvaluation of taxpayer's property above its "actual" value. 
In People ex rel. Wangclin v. St. Louis Bridge Co., 357 Ill. 24-5, 191 N.E. 
300 ( 1934-), the court found that, notwithstanding the statutory require-
ment of actual value, evidence showed that the taxing authorities in the 
county, in disregard of the statute, assessed property generally, both real and 
personal, at from 3 7 o/o to 4-0% of actual value. Relying on Art. IX, § 1, the 
court held that a ratio of not to exceed 4-0 o/o of fair cash market value, as 
adopted by the county, must be applied to the property of the taxpayer. 
People ex rel. Wangelin v. Wiggins Ferry Co., supra note 34-, is a leading 
case, in which the evidence showed that the customary ratio of valuation used 
by the board of the county was about 4-0%. In one of the clearest statements 
of the meaning of Art. IX, § 1, the court said (at p. 18 0) : 
[It is the intent of Art. IX, § 1] that one class of property within the 
municipality should not be assessed at one value while the same class of 
property similarly situated, in the same community, should be assessed 
at a grossly higher value. Uniformity in taxation by this method is 
thwarted. The command of the constitution is equality and uniformity 
of taxation. . .• The assessment of all property, regardless of whether 
it is owned by an individual or corporation, must, therefore, be made at 
its proportional value. This rule applies not only to the fair cash market 
value of the property, but where a factor has been adopted by a taxing body 
or taxing officials by which property is listed for taxation purposes below 
its market value, the same factor must be applied equally to other property 
in order to secure uniformity of taxation. [Emphasis added.] 
The very significant statement was then made (at p. 181), that "The duty 
to assess the full valuation cannot be supreme unless applied to all tax-payers 
alike, and where it is impossible to secure both the standard of full value 
and the uniformity and equality required by section I . . . the command 
of the constitution must be adopted as fundammtallaw [Emphasis added]." 
Cited for this proposition were the Stuckart and Bureau County cases, infra 
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However, it is clear that the enunciation of this rule in a 
number of cases was so hedged by remedial limitations that 
the result was a "rule" having no real relationship to the 
facts supposedly governed by that "rule." This was par-
ticularly clear in a series of cases decided from 1932 to 1934 
which resulted from the so-called "tax strike" which occurred 
in Cook County and elsewhere in 1932. In these cases the 
taxpayers alleged that substantially different ratios of valua-
tion were applied to different classes of property as estab-
lished by the county assessors, and that some personal prop-
erty was entirely omitted from the tax rolls, with the result 
that property extended on the rolls at the higher ratios of 
valuation bore a disproportionate part of the tax burden.49 
notes 93 and 72, respectively. It was held that the court below erred in not 
sustaining an objection of the taxpayer in an action for delinquent taxes, 
because the taxpayer had paid a tax computed on the basis of 40% of the 
actual cash value of its property and a collection of a greater amount was 
not justified by the record. It may be noted that the court found that there 
was no failure to exhaust statutory remedies. Thus, we have a case in which 
the court actually extended relief where the "illegal" action was wholly that 
of ministerial officers. Cf. notes 34, supra, and 52, infra. Also see the follow-
ing cases: People v. Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co., 287 Ill. 246, 122 N.E. 
467 {1919); People ex rel. Miller v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 300 Ill. 
399, 133 N.E. 325 {1921); and People ex rel. Carr v. Stewart, 315 
Ill. 25, 145 N.E. 600 {1924). However, in the two early cases, Spencer 
and Gardner v. People, supra note 34, and People v. Lots in Ashley, supra 
note 34, the court stated as a rule that the mere omission by ministerial 
officers of taxable property from the roles, or the assessment at less than the 
statutory requirement of I OOo/o ratio, would not affect the validity of the 
tax imposed on other property in the county, and that the court had no 
power to "revise" an assessment in the absence of "fraud," that "mere 
error" was not sufficient. Also see, for example, the cases in note 49, infra, 
in which the taxpayer alleged that a ratio of valuation was systematically 
applied to another class of property, and that the ratio used was lower than 
that applied to a class of property to which taxpayer's belonged. 
49 A leading case is Bistor v. McDonough, 348 Ill. 624, 181 N.E. 417 
(1932), in which it was sought to enjoin the collector of Cook County 
from seeking recovery of a judgment for general taxes levied on plaintiffs' 
property for 1929. It was alleged (I) that the officers had intentionally and 
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The taxpayers either requested injunctions against collection 
of the alleged excessive amount of taxes due, or described 
the situation as a defense against the alleged excessive 
amount due in an action for delinquent taxes. 
The court continued its verbal adherence to the rule of 
absolute uniformity, stating that such factual situations as 
alleged were violations of both the proportionality clause and 
the statutory requirement of "fair cash value." However, the 
court, after stating its position concerning the "illegality" of 
such de facto classification systems, proceeded to dismiss the 
fraudulently failed to assess some personal property and had under-assessed 
other personal property, all in violation of Art. IX, § 1, because realty was 
compelled to bear a disproportionate burden of taxation, and (2) that plain-
tiffs were willing to pay a tax on a uniform ratio of valuation for all prop-
erty. After characterizing plaintiffs' position as being a claim of discrimina-
tion in favor of personal property with the result that the levy was void to 
that extent, the court (p. 629) gave lip service to the rule of absolute 
uniformity. It said that Art. IX, § 1 requires one person not to be compelled 
to pay a greater proportion of taxes according to the value of his property 
than another, that uniformity of taxation implies uniformity of burden, and 
that this equality cannot exist without uniformity in the basis of assessment 
as well as the rate of taxation. It was further said (p. 632) that when it is 
impossible to secure both the standard of "true value" and the uniformity 
and equality required by Art. IX, § 1, the latter is preferred as achieving the 
ultimate purpose of the law, and therefore plaintiffs had a right to have the 
assessments of their realty be equal and uniform "with all other property." 
However, the court asserted, one must exhaust remedies at law before a 
court of equity will interfere, and in this case plaintiffs had failed to avail 
themselves of legal remedies. It was said (p. 634-) that plaintiffs had not 
asked the Board of Review to revise the assessments upon realty. The rule of 
Spencer and Gardner v. People, supra notes 34, 48 was repeated, namely, 
that neither omission to assess nor undervaluation of one kind or class of 
property will invalidate assessments upon other property in the same juris-
diction. Other cases were: Koester v. McDonough, 3 51 Ill. 492, 184- N .E. 
826 (1933); People ex rei. Koester v. Board of Review of Cook County, 
351 Ill. 301, 184- N.E. 325 (1933); and People ex rei. McDonough v. 
Cesar, 34-9 Ill. 3 72, 18 2 N .E. 4-48 ( 19 3 2). For a similar result see the 
earlier case of First Nat. Bank v. Holmes, 246 III. 362, 92 N.E. 893 
(1910). 
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contentions of the taxpayers. The basis for this result was the 
rule that neither the ministerial omission of taxable property 
from the tax rolls nor the ministerial undervaluation of one 
kind or class of property will invalidate the assessments upon 
other property in the same jurisdiction.50 The only remedy 
the taxpayer has is mandamus, requiring the taxing officers 
to perform their duty properly. 
In 1935 the court, although using language which might 
be construed as following the orthodox rule, in fact enforced a 
de facto classification system. In People ex rel. McDonough v. 
Schmuhl51 the action was for judgment against and sale of 
certain realty for the delinquent general property tax due in 
1928 to Cook County. The taxpayer paid part of the tax and 
objected to the balance on two grounds. First, it was alleged 
that the Board of Review of Cook County had valued the 
premises in question at more than two and one-half times the 
"fair cash value." Second, it was alleged that the Board of 
Review of Cook County intentionally applied a ratio of 
valuation of 3 7% to realty in the county at large and a ratio 
of 20% to realty in the "loop" district of Chicago in viola-
tion of Art. IX, § 1. 
Interestingly, the court used language which seems to sup-
port the orthodox rule and cited other cases which do support 
that rule.52 However, at the same time, the court stated that 
the pleadings admitted that the allegations showed such a 
disparity and discrimination "between the fair cash value of 
appellant's property and the valuation for taxation placed on 
50 But see the results in People ex rel. Wangelin v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 
supra notes 34, 48. 
51359 Ill. 446, 194 N.E. 731 (1935). 
52 !d. at 449: "No tax-payer can be required to pay a greater proportion 
of the taxes, according to the value of his property, than any other tax-
payer," citing the Bureau County case, infra note 72. The assessments of 
taxing authorities "must be at the same proportionate value." 
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other property of the same class as to entitle him [the tax-
payer] to relief."53 The court concluded: 
Appellant was entitled to have property assessed upon the 
same basis of valuation as other property. It is admitted that 
other property was assessed at 37% of its actual value. 
Appellant's property should have been assessed on that 
basis. 54 
Therefore, it was held that the judgment below for the 
county collector was reversed, and the cause was remanded 
with directions to enter a judgment for such amount as 
resulted from the application of the 3 7% factor to the value 
placed upon appellant's real estate for the year 1928. 
Since the court stated that the allegations were admitted 
by the pleadings, the "facts" were as follows: realty in the 
"loop" was debased to 20%; realty in the county at large 
was debased to 37%; the property of the taxpayer was in the 
county at large, and overvalued to two and one-half times 
its actual value. The court ordered its final valuation reduced 
to 3 7 %-the ratio used for the "class" of property 
to which taxpayer's property belonged, the "class" being 
characterized by location. The actual result of the decision 
makes meaningful the statement of the court first quoted 
above, in which the phrase "other property of the same class" 
is used. This language implicitly changes the phrase in the 
second quote to read "other property of the same class was 
assessed at 37%." Thus we find the enforcement of a de facto 
classification system. 55 
In two cases decided since 1935, People ex rel. Toman v. 
Olympia Fields Country Club56 and People v. Southwestern 
53fd. at 450. Emphasis added. 
54 /bid. Emphasis added. 
55 Cf. the result in People ex rel. Schlaeger v. Allyn, 393 Ill. 154, 65 
N.E. 2d 392 ( 1946), infra note 68, in which the court by its inaction 
actually enforced a de facto classification system. 
56 374 Ill. 101,28 N.E. 2d 109 (1940). 
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Bell Tel. Co.,51 the court has used language which clearly 
implies that property may be classified for the purpose of ap-
plying different ratios of valuation without violating Art. IX, 
§1.68 However, the facts in those cases were such that no such 
variation was proved. Consequently, the actual decision of 
the court in either case was not contrary to a rule of absolute 
uniformity, and the language in question was reduced to 
dictum. It is significant that in the Southwestern Bell case, 
in which the strongest language concerning permissible classi-
fication was used, there was a dissent59 which pointed to the 
implication of the language used by the majority and re-
57 377 Ill. 303, 36 N.E. 2d 362 (1941). 
58 For example, in the Olympia Fields Country Club case, supra note 56, 
the issue was whether taxpayer's property was "fraudulently" overvalued, 
and whether it was proper to compare the value placed on property of a 
similar kind, similarly situated. However, the court made the broad state-
ment (at p. 103): 
Section I of article 9 . . . requires that taxation shall be by general law 
uniform as to the class upon which it shall operate. The court adheres 
to the doctrine that this provision of the constitution means uniformity 
as applied to a class. No prohibition against classification of property and 
taxpayers into different classes can be read into the constitution. 
In the Southwestern Bell case, supra note 57, it was alleged that varying 
ratios were used as between realty and personalty. However, the court 
found that the percentage alleged was actually used only to lower or raise 
the value of some particular items of property in order to achieve an accu-
rate valuation. Nevertheless, the court said (at p. 306): 
This court has always recognized that all laws relating to taxation and 
the enforcement thereof by taxing bodies are subject to the requirements 
of equality and uniformity of taxation. We have construed the command 
for uniformity to mean that taxation must be uniform as to the class upon 
which it operates and that the uniformity demanded applies to property 
of like kind and character and similarly situated. 
59 Two judges dissented in the Southwestern Bell case on the ground 
that they agreed with the taxpayer's interpretation of the facts. Murphy 
dissented for that reason and for the reason that the language seemed to 
imply that Art. IX, §I does not require uniformity in debasing valuations 
as between various classes of property. 
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jected such words if they were taken to mean that property 
could be classified for effective rates. 
However, at substantially the same time that the two 
above decisions were made, the court decided two other cases, 
Tuttle v. Bell60 and People ex rel. Toman v. Pickard,61 
which clearly condemn any classification system for effective 
rates.62 In both of these cases taxpayers alleged the existence 
of a de facto classification system for applying different ratios 
of valuation. In the Tuttle case the court condemned the 
system as illegal but gave no injunctive relief as requested, 
falling back upon the rule that improper action by ministerial 
officers was not a ground for reduction of the value of tax-
payer's property.03 But, as in the earlier cases, the court used 
some of its strongest and most unequivocal language in de-
claring such a factual situation "illegal," while at the same 
time doing nothing about it. 04 In the Pickard case the court 
also squarely restated the rule of absolute uniformity, saying: 
This court has held many times that [where assessors extend 
taxes on a percentage of fair cash value] such factor should be 
uniformly applied as to all property within the same juris-
diction.65 
60 377 Ill. 5IO, 37 N.E. 2d 180 (194I). 
6l 377 Ill. 6IO, 37 N.E. 2d 330 (1941). 
62 Also see People ex rei. Tedrick v. Allied Oil Corp. of Illinois, 388 
Ill. 219, 67 N.E. 2d 859 (I944); People ex rei. Tennyson v. Texas Co., 
406 Ill. I20, 92 N.E. 2d I42 (I950). 
63 Tuttle v. Bell, supra note 60 at 5 I 4. 
64 /d. at 5 I 3, saying: 
The constitutional provision [Art. IX, §I] precludes the taxing officials 
from adopting a method of valuing property whereby there is a discrimi-
nation in favor of or against any class of property. • . . This rule ap-
plies not only to the fair cash value of the property, but where an equal-
ing factor has been adopted by a taxing body or taxing officials by which 
property is listed for taxation purposes below its fair cash value, the same 
equaling factor must be applied equally to other property in order to 
secure uniformity of taxes. 
65 People ex rei. Toman v. Pickard, supra note 61 at 614. 
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However, there was no necessity to pass upon the legality of 
the alleged classification system because the court found that 
no disparity in ratio of valuation was proved. 
(ii) General Property Tax: Valuation by officers of one 
taxing authority with application of rate of another taxing 
authority with noncoterminous boundaries. For some years 
prior to 1945 the statutory scheme for determining the final 
value of property to which the percentage rates of the several 
taxing authorities might be applied was as follows :66 The 
state tax rate was to be applied by the county clerks to the 
property in their respective counties upon the valuation 
produced by the equalization and assessment of property by 
the State Tax Commission (at one time designated the Board 
of Equalization). All other tax rates (counties and other local 
units) were to be applied to the valuation produced by the 
equalization and assessment of property by the county 
officers, except for that property originally assessed by the 
State Tax Commission for which the valuation of the state 
officers was to be used. This latter property consisted of rail-
road property and the capital stock of some corporations. 67 
This system presented the following problems as to uni-
formity of taxation. Suppose special tax district X overlapped 
counties A and B. In county A an assessment ratio of 40% 
was used for all property taxed. In county B an assessment 
ratio of 8 0% was used for all property taxed. Therefore, 
when the percentage rate of district X is applied to two items 
66 Ill. Laws 1939, p. 886, § 163; Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 120, §644. 
67 Under the revenue act the capital stock of all domestic corporations, 
"except companies and associations organized for purely manufacturing and 
mercantile purposes, or for either of such purposes, or for the mining and 
sale of coal, or for printing, or for the publishing of newspapers, or for the 
improving and breeding of stock, or for banking, or for building and loan 
purposes," is assessed by the State Department of Revenue. The "excep-
tions" are assessed by local officers. III. Laws 1939, p. 886, §21; III. Ann. 
Stat. c. 120, §502. 
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of property of equal value but located in different counties, 
the property in B county will pay twice the amount to district 
X that the property in A county pays. Obviously a disparity 
based upon geographical location exists in the effective rate 
and tax burden of district X. When the court was faced with 
just such a situation in People ex rel. Schlaeger v. Allyn68 it 
figuratively threw up its hands, condemned the situation as a 
violation of uniformity in taxation, but felt that it was a 
situation beyond its power to correct,69 and, in fact, by failure 
to grant any remedy actually enforced a classified property 
tax. 
A second problem raised by the above system was as 
follows: The State Board has determined the average de-
basement figure used by the several counties of the state. This 
figure is either greater or smaller than the assessment ratio 
used in county A. Thus, an item of property valued centrally 
by the State Board and having a situs in county A will pay a 
68 393 Ill. 154, 65 N.E. 2d 392 ( 1946). In that case the taxpayer ob-
jected to the taxes of three special taxing districts (village, park, and 
school) having coterminous boundaries. These districts overlapped Lake and 
Cook Counties. The rates of the special districts were certified to the re-
spective county clerks, to be extended upon the value of property as valued 
by the respective county officers. Taxpayer aiieged that property in Cook 
County, in which taxpayer's property was located, was valued at an assess-
ment ratio of 75%, while property in the adjoining Lake County was 
valued at a ratio of only 21 %. Since the special district rates were extended 
on the county valuations it was obvious that taxpayer's property located in 
Cook County was carrying a greater proportionate tax burden of the special 
taxing districts than property of equal value in Lake County. 
69 I d. at 161. The court said that the taxpayer made no suggestion as to 
how uniformity might be maintained in such a situation, and that if tax-
payer was correct, it would necessitate ali property in the state being valued 
alike before absolute uniformity in such situations could exist. 
In such situations, as long as the assessment and levy of taxes is based 
upon the judgment of the assessing officers in each separate county, ab-
solute uniformity cannot be achieved. This matter is one exclusively for 
the legislature, and the relief, if any, in the several counties must come 
from the legislature and not from the courts. 
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larger or smaller amount of tax than an item of property of 
identical value in county A but valued locally. A disparity in 
the effective rate and tax burden of county A would seem to 
exist, with classification now being based on the identity of 
the assessor. 70 In Illinois, railroad property and the capital 
stock of some corporations are valued by the State Board in 
the manner described above. The uniformity problem result-
ing from this arrangement has been dealt with by the court 
in distinctly different ways depending upon whether the 
property involved was railroad property or capital stock. 
(ii) (a) General Property Tax: Railroad property valued 
by state officers and apportioned to the counties for taxation. 
In 1867, in two of the earlier uniformity cases/1 Bureau 
County v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co.72 and Chicago & N. W. 
Ry. Co. v. Boone County,73 the court held that absolute uni-
formity should prevail in the assessment ratio used by any 
one taxing district, and that railroad property should be 
assessed for a county tax rate at no greater ratio of its "true" 
value than the assessment ratio used for other property in the 
county. This view was adhered to some years later, in the 
70 The situation becomes more complicated when it is not assumed-as 
it is in the text-that there is a single ratio used in a county. That is, when 
there exists a de facto classification system within a county. 
In 1945 the legislature attempted to deal with the inequities arising from 
this use of two equalized values. It provided that all taxes are to be ex-
tended by the respective county clerks upon the property in their counties 
upon the valuation produced by the equalization and assessment of property 
by the State officers. Ill. Laws 1945, p. 1212, § 1; Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 120, 
§644. Generally, see Report, supra note at 37 at 54 ff.; Allen, "Full-Value 
Assessment Program in Illinois," 31 Bull. Nat. Tax Assn. 116 ( 1946); 
Weil, "Property Tax Equalization in Illinois," 6 Nat. Tax J. I 57 ( 19 53). 
71 These decisions were made under the uniformity provision of the 
prior 1848 constitution, but are relevant in view of the similarity of those 
uniformity provisions to the present constitutional provisions. See note 1, 
supra. 
72 44 Ill. 229 ( 1867). 
73 44 Ill. 240 (1867). 
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1870's, in two cases74 decided shortly after the present con-
stitution of 18 7 0 came into force. 
However, in 1887, in Illinois & St. L. Railroad & Coal 
Co. v. Stookey/5 the court refused to give relief although the 
taxpayer alleged that the township tax rate was applied to 
railroad property located therein on the basis of a 100% 
assessment ratio (as made by the state officers), while the 
same rate was applied to all other property in the township 
on the basis of a 3 3% assessment ratio (as made by local 
officers). The court did not view the result as constitutional. 
However, it took the position noted above/6 namely, that 
illegal action by local ministerial officers (the statutory re-
quirement was full value) would not invalidate a tax. Im-
plicitly the opinion suggested that the proper remedy of the 
taxpayer was to correct the valuations made locally. As for 
the Bureau County and Boone County cases, the court simply 
brushed them aside with the statement that it would not con-
sider the question whether the constitutional uniformity pro-
vision was properly applied in those cases because that pro-
vision had no application in the case at hand. 
So the matter stood until 1934-. Then in People ex rel. 
McDonough v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co.77 the court 
stated that the rule governing the ratio of valuation for any 
taxing district was one of absolute uniformity, and that the 
taxation of the taxpayer-railroad's property had to be on 
that basis. The taxpayer was defending in an action for de-
linquent taxes. Its defense was that a part of the taxes alleged 
to be due had been paid, and that its property had been 
74 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Livingston County, 68 Ill. 458 (1873) and 
Lawv. People, 87 Ill. 385 (1877). 
75 122 Ill. 358, 13 N.E. 516 (1887). 
76 See note 49, supra. 
77 357 Ill. 493, 192 N.E. 645 (1934). See People ex rel. McDonough 
v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 355 Ill. 605, 190 N.E. 82 (1934) for similar facts 
and similar conclusion. 
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placed on the tax rolls at 60% of its actual value, while 
other property throughout the taxing district (Cook county) 
was assessed at only 37% of actual value. The court held 
that this was a good defense, based on Art. IX, § 1, and said: 
The record conclusively shows that the taxing authorities of 
Cook county adopted an arbitrary factor of [ 3 7%] of the fair 
cash or true value on which property was assessed for taxation 
purposes for the year 1930. The same factor of 37% must be 
applied impartially and equally to all property in Cook 
County in order to observe the constitutional guaranty of 
equality and uniformity of taxation.78 
This ruling was, in fact, clearly reversed in the leading 
case of Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. State Tax Comm./9 al-
though the opinion of that case did not refer to Grand Trunk 
at all. In an effort to achieve an equality within local taxing 
districts as between railroad property and all other property 
in such districts, the State Tax Commission in 1938 certified 
the property of railroads, apportioned on a mileage basis, to 
counties at the different assessment ratios which were found 
to be representative of the respective counties.80 In the Mobile 
78 !d. at 498. Emphasis added. 
79 374 Ill. 75, 28 N.E. 2d 100 (1940). In the Union Electric case, 
infra note 99, the court expressly overruled the Grand Trunk Western 
case, supra note 77, insofar as inconsistent with the doctrine expressed in 
the Mobile & Ohio Railroad case. 
80 Prior to 193 8 the Commission had certified the value of railroad prop-
erty at an average debasement ratio, computed on a statewide basis. Thus, 
one ratio was used for all railroad property throughout the state. On in-
vestigation the Commission concluded that the tax of such property by 
local rates would result in inequality of tax burden as between that railroad 
property and property valued locally in counties in which the ratio used 
varied (greater or smaller) from the average figure. Of course, the method 
proposed in 1938 did not solve the problem completely, for the Commission 
had found that there generally existed within the counties a disparity be-
tween the assessment ratios used for rural and urban property, so that the 
local ratio used by the Commission was an average of the several ratios ap-
pearing in the respective counties. 
UNIFORMITY STRUCTURES 147 
& Ohio case, the court held that this method violated the 
uniformity provisions of the constitution.81 It was conceded by 
all, stated the court, that Art. IX, §§ 1, 9 and 10 "require that 
taxation on all persons and property shall be uniform within 
the taxing district levying the same."82 However, it was also 
asserted that the only constitutional issue concerned whether 
or not the state itself was a taxing district. The Attorney 
General, in attempting to avoid a decision that the method 
used by the Commission was illegal, had argued83 that the 
state was no longer a taxing district because there had been no 
statewide general property tax levy since 1932. The court 
rejected this argument, pointing out that the statute provided 
for an annual determination, by designated officials, of the 
rate for the state tax, and that the determination by the offi-
cials that "no rate" was needed was no less a decision regard-
ing a state tax than a determination that a "positive" rate 
would be needed. Thus, the court concluded that the only 
way of attaining the principle of uniformity for a statewide 
tax was by the application of a single uniform assessment 
ratio to all railroad property in the state. 
By this line of argument the court completely avoided the 
real issue. The tax involved was not a state tax, and the state 
was not "the taxing district levying" the tax. Thus, since uni-
formity is required "within the taxing district levying the 
[tax]," it was irrelevant whether uniformity would have 
been maintained within any other taxing district, e.g., the 
state. The fact that the property was valued by state officers 
cannot obscure the fact that this valuation was to serve two 
tax rates, one state and one local. The same consideration 
81 The method was held to violate the Railroad Assessment Act of 19 39, 
as well, which stated that railroad property was to be debased to the state-
wide average. 
82 Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. State Tax Comm., supra note 79 at 82. 
Emphasis added. 
83 /d. at 86. 
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which led the court to conclude that a single ratio figure was 
necessary to attain uniformity throughout the state would 
demand the conclusion that a single ratio figure should 
have been used throughout the county in question. 84 
In the final analysis, the Mobile & Ohio case is a clear 
84 After this analysis of the Illinois uniformity limitation was written the 
Illinois Supreme Court decided Department of Revenue v. Warren Petro-
leum Corp., 2 III. 2d 483, 119 N.E. 2d 215 (1954). The Private Car 
Line Companies Tax Act (III. Ann. Stat. c. 120, §§372.1 et Jeq.) provides 
for the assessment and taxation of the "operating personal property" of all 
private car line companies operating in Illinois. The rolling stock of do-
mestic corporations is assessed by state officers and certified to the county 
wherein the company has its principal place of business. This part of the 
act presents the same problem faced in the Mobile & Ohio R. case, dis-
cussed in the text. However, the rolling stock of foreign corporations is not 
only assessed at an average debased ratio, but in addition it is then taxed at 
an "average rate of taxation" computed by the state officers and based on the 
rates used by all the counties in the state. In the Warren Petroleum case, 
the taxpayer contended (p. 21 8) that the tax discriminated against it as a 
foreign corporation in favor of domestic corporations of like character, "and 
therefore violate [ d] the State and Federal constitutions." This contention 
was based upon the use of the "average rate of taxation" for the taxpayer's 
property, and the appropriate local rate for the property of domestic car 
line companies. The only issue discussed by the court was the validity of the 
act under the federal equal protection clause. It was held that there was no 
arbitrary discrimination, and, consequently, the equal protection clause was 
not violated. No one will quarrel with that conclusion. However, the court 
completely ignored any problems raised by Art. IX, § 1 of the Illinois Con-
stitution. A "case note" in 1954 Ill. L. F. 525, 526 n. 10 indicates that the 
state constitutional issue was raised in the briefs, but that the treatment by 
the Supreme Court might have resulted from the rule that the constitutional 
issue must be timely raised or it will be waived. 
In any case, if the tax on the rolling stock of foreign private car companies 
is considered a local property tax, the problem of Mobile & Ohio R. is com-
pounded-not only is a different assessment ratio used, but a different 
percentage rate is also used. On the other hand, if the tax is considered es-
sentially a state tax rate, possibly no problem of uniformity in effective rates 
is raised. The same ratio of valuation and percentage rate is applied to all 
property taxed by the state-namely, the rolling stock of foreign car com-
panies. But this runs head on into the universality requirement, which will 
not permit a taxing jurisdiction to select less than all taxable property for 
UNIFORMITY STRUCTURES 149 
example of the court's talking in terms of absolute uniform-
ity but in fact enforcing a limited classification system which 
will impose a different effective tax rate upon railroad prop-
erty from the effective rate imposed upon other property 
within the same taxing jurisdiction. Mobile & Ohio was fol-
lowed in a number of cases decided shortly thereafter.85 
(ii)(b) General Property Tax: Valuation of capital stock 
of certain corporations by state officers used for local tax 
rates. Numerous cases have concerned the validity of the 
general property tax as it is applied to the capital stock of 
corporations.86 It is these cases which have quite often con-
tained "classification language," and are often cited as au-
thority for propositions beyond their actual scope. There are 
five early cases, decided between 1875 and 1904, which may 
be considered and disposed of as one. They are: Porter v. 
taxation. See notes 3 4-3 7, supra. Indeed, if the tax is considered a state 
rate, what of the rationale suggested by the court in Mobile & Ohio R., 
namely, that there is a state rate of "zero"? That would mean not only that 
the universality rule would be violated, but there would no longer be an 
absolute uniformity in effective rates because a different percentage rate 
would be applied to rolling stock of foreign corporations from that applied 
to all other property subject to the state rate. One may surmise that the 
court was not unhappy that the state constitutional issue did not have to be 
considered in Warren Petroleum. 
85 People ex rei. Hempen v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 379 Ill. 543, 42 
N.E. 2d 69 (1941); People ex rei. Ross v. Chicago M. St. P. & P.R. Co., 
381 Ill. 58, 44 N.E. 2d 566 (1942); People ex rei. Toman v. Chicago 
Union Station Co., 383 Ill. 153,48 N.E. 2d 524 (1943). In the last case 
the court spelled out the rule that Art. IX, §I does not permit the valuation 
of one piece of property at certain ratios and other property in the same 
taxing district at substantially different ratios. It thereupon proceeded to 
ignore the fact that the state was not really the taxing district concerned. 
86 The nature of this tax is aptly described in the following statement, 
Report, supra note 3 7 at I 7 3 (I 949) : 
Because of the frequent misunderstanding of the nature of the capital 
stock tax in Illinois an explanation of its meaning and operation is needed. 
Although the statutes and courts employ the term "capital stock," the tax 
is not a levy on capital stock as that phrase is generally employed. The tax 
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Rockford, R.I. & St. L. R. Co.,81 Coal Run Coal Co. v. Fin-
len,88 Ottawa Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Downey,89 Sterling 
Gas Co. v. Higby,0° and Hub v. Hanberg. 91 In all of these 
cases there is much talk about "classification" of corporate 
property for purposes of taxation and of the power so to 
classify pursuant to the second clause of Art. IX, § 1, which 
reads: 
. . . but the general assembly shall have power to tax ped-
dlers, auctioneers, brokers, hawkers, merchants, commission 
merchants, showmen, jugglers, innkeepers, grocery keepers, 
liquor dealers, toll bridges, ferries, insurance, telegraph and 
express interests or business, vendors of patents, and persons 
or corporations owning or using franchises and privileges, in 
such manner as it shall from time to time direct by general 
law, uniform as to the class upon which it operates. 
Indeed, in the important Union Electric Power Co. case, 
discussed below, these cases are relied on as establishing this 
proposition. However, it is submitted that the only issue in 
these cases, and really the only thing discussed despite some 
rather equivocal language, concerned the power of the legis-
lature to classify property for the purpose of using different 
is a property tax on those corporations chartered by the State of Illinois 
which is intended to tax, as property, the intangible values of corporations 
in the form of goodwill, franchise, or capitalized excess earning power 
and the like. The capital stock tax also needs to be distinguished from the 
annual franchise tax which is sometimes called a capital stock tax ..•• 
The capital stock tax is frequently defined as a tax on the corporate 
excess. In this sense it means that the full economic value of the corpora-
tion is taxable as property and that the excess of the entire economic value 
over the tangible property assessments is the amount that is to be assessed 
and taxed as capital stock. 
87 76 Ill. 561 (1875). 
88 124 Ill. 666, 1 7 N .E. 11 ( 1 8 8 8). 
89 127 Ill. 201,20 N.E. 20 (1889). 
90 134 Ill. 557,25 N.E. 660 (1890). 
91211 Ill. 43,71 N.E. 826 (1904). 
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methods of valuation,02 but with the same end always in 
mind-the determination of the "actual" value of property. 
The next case of interest is People's Gaslight & Coke Co. 
v. Stuckart,03 in which the court avowedly followed a rule 
of absolute uniformity "within a taxing district." The opinion 
is not too clear, but the case may be reduced for present pur-
poses to the following: Plaintiff's "home office" was in Cook 
County. The county assessor entered the value of plaintiff's 
capital stock (as centrally determined) upon the tax rolls and 
extended upon this centrally made valuation the total 
amount of rates which had been certified (state, Cook 
County, and any special taxing districts having jurisdiction 
over plaintiff). Plaintiff filed a bill against the Treasurer of 
Cook County to enjoin the collection of all of the tax in ex-
cess of a stated amount "upon the ground that the assessment 
was fraudulent, excessive and not uniform with the assess-
ment of other property throughout the State."94 It was fur-
ther charged "that personal property in the State was as-
sessed by the local assessors at not exceeding fifty per cent 
and real estate at not exceeding sixty per cent of its fair cash 
value.m5 Plaintiff also contended that the state board had 
not followed its own rules in assessing capital stock but had 
arbitrarily used several different methods. 
The court apparently found that the particular assessment 
of plaintiff's capital stock was made in an arbitrary manner. 
It noted that the assessment of real property throughout 
the state "did not exceed" 55% of actual value, "and the ev-
idence in regard to personal property tends to show an as-
sessment no higher."96 The court concluded that, if assess-
92 Admittedly, the court did seem to rely on the second clause of Art. IX, 
§I in reaching this conclusion. 
93 286 Ill. 164-, 121 N.E. 629 (1919). 
94 /d. at 16 5. Emphasis added. 
95 /d. at 167-168. 
96 /d. at 178-179. 
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ment of plaintiff's capital stock had been made on a similar 
ratio, the amount of tax would have been less than the 
amount above which plaintiff sought to enjoin collection. 
Therefore, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to the 
decree. In explaining the applicability of Art. IX, § 1, the 
court said that, while the mandate of the proportionality 
clause is directed to the legislature and concerns the laws 
which may be passed imposing taxes, nevertheless 
. . . no power exists or should exist in any corporate author-
ity to go counter to this command of the fundamental law. 
. . . [A] nd where assessors have disregarded the injunction 
of the law and made an assessment of property far below its 
real cash value, their misconduct must also follow the prin-
ciple of uniformity and their assessments of all persons must 
be at the same proportional value.97 
The court also said, in the course of determining that a 
court of equity could exercise jurisdiction: 
An assessment is . . . at too high a rate, even though less 
than the actual value, when the property is assessed at a 
greater proportion of its actual value than is used at the same 
time in the assessment of all other property.98 
This opinion is more notable for what it did not, rather 
than for what it did establish. Somewhat like the later rail-
road property cases, the court was concerned with the state-
97 /d. at 173. But see the cases in which the court has held that action 
of ministerial officers may not alone invalidate the tax on property assessed 
at a higher ratio of valuation, note 49, supra. 
98 /d. at 176. Emphasis added. The court had said that a court of equity 
will exercise its jurisdiction to enjoin the collection of a tax where the prop-
erty has been fraudulently assessed at too high a rate. The county officials 
argued that this would not apply here since taxpayer's property was not 
assessed at too high a rate since it was assessed at less than full value. The 
court replied that this involves the assumption that an assessment can be too 
high only when the assessed value exceeds full value, and then made the 
statement quoted in the text. 
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wide assessment ratio, but in this case with the maximum 
rather than the average ratio. The plaintiff based its conten-
tion on the ratio applied to other property "throughout the 
state." No statement was made concerning the ratio used in 
Cook County. Was it the same as the statewide maximum 
ratio, or was it a lower percentage? Nor was any distinction 
made concerning the fact that the total tax extended against 
plaintiff's capital stock was an aggregate tax rate. Thus, for 
that portion of the tax representing a state rate extended by 
the county officer some statewide equality was relevant. But 
for that portion of the tax representing only the Cook County 
rate a countywide equality was all that was relevant. Thus, 
the opinion leaves much to be desired insofar as the prob-
lems of uniformity are concerned. Yet, it is clear that the 
court was thinking in terms of an absolute uniformity of ef-
fective tax rate used by any single taxing jurisdiction, re-
gardless of the difficult questions which were left unan-
swered. The really important question one might raise about 
the case is whether it lends support to the railroad property 
cases which were concerned with achieving a uniformity 
throughout the state as to the ratio of valuation applied, dis-
regarding the fact that the statewide uniformity is of no con-
sequence in comparing tax burdens within a taxing jurisdic-
tion on the local level. 
In any event, in 1946 the Illinois Supreme Court made a 
deliberate and substantial inroad in the uniformity limitation 
applicable to the ratio of valuation used in taxing property. 
In People ex rel. Prindable v. Union Electric Power Co.99 
the court ruled that, in determining the value of property for 
the application of the percentage tax rate of a single taxing 
authority, at least some property may be classified for the 
purpose of applying different ratios of valuation. This de-
viation from a rule of absolute uniformity in effective rates is 
99 392 Ill. 271,64 N.E. 2d 534- (1946). 
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based on an interpretation of Art. IX, § 1, which modifies 
the import of the proportionality clause by placing emphasis 
on the second clause of that section. 
Action in the Union Electric Power case was initiated by 
the collector of St. Clair County to recover unpaid taxes ex-
tended against the capital stock of the company. In its an-
swer the company contended that Art. IX, § 1 had been 
violated because the county tax was extended on 54% of the 
value of its capital stock as valued by the state board, while 
the tax was extended on 35% of the value of property in the 
county, assessed by local assessors. That is, the state board 
used an assessment ratio of 54%, and the local assessors in 
St. Clair County used an assessment ratio of 35 %· The com-
pany contended that the proportionality clause required a 
comparison of the ultimate tax burden borne by its capital 
stock with that burden borne by the realty, personalty, and 
the capital stock located in the county and assessed locally. 
First, the court reviewed the five early cases, referred to 
above/00 which were concerned with the meaning of the uni-
formity clause and its relation to the capital stock tax. The 
court concluded that those opinions established the power of 
the legislature to classify property belonging to the enu-
merated subjects in the second clause of Art. IX, § 1 and, by 
general law, provide for their assessment in a different man-
ner and at a different ratio of valuation from that applicable 
to other property located in the same taxing jurisdiction. 
This power to classify was said to be derived from the second 
clause of Art. IX, § 1. It is submitted that this is not an ac-
curate statement of the purpose of those early cases.101 It is 
100 See notes 87-91, supra. The court placed particular emphasis on the 
opinion in Porter v. Rockford, R.I. & St. L. R. Co., supra note 87, as first 
establishing this proposition which it was asserted was consistently followed 
in the cases following. Cf. note 3 7, mpra. 
101 See text to notes 90-99, supra. Indeed, in People ex rei. Prindable v. 
Union Electric Power Co., supra note 99 at 277-278, the court quoted from 
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true that in the opinions of those cases the court relied on the 
second clause of Art. IX, § 1, and that in each opinion the 
court spoke at great length of the power of the legislature 
to classify certain property. Nevertheless, the fact remains 
that the issue in each of those cases concerned only the power 
to provide for different methods of valuing different classes 
of property (capital stock). The only decision in any of the 
cases was simply that classification of property was permissi-
ble for such a purpose.102 
Nevertheless, in the Union Electric case, the court con-
cluded that the reviewed cases supported the validity of such 
a classification as the facts showed in Union Electric. The 
court also concluded that the Mobile & Ohio R. Co. case103 
supported this view. Then the court expressly overruled the 
Grand Trunk Western R. Co. case104 insofar as it held to the 
contrary of the Mobile & Ohio R. Co. case. The court sig-
nificantly stated that the parties in the Grand Trunk Western 
Coal Run Coal Co. v. Finlcn, supra note 88, at some length. The quotation 
clearly indicates the precise nature of the issue in those early cases: 
We see nothing in the constitution which prohibits the legislature from 
providing one metlzod for determining the value of the capital stock, 
including the franchise, of a railroad company, another method for a 
mining corporation, and still another for manufacturing corporations. We 
see no clause in the constitution which prohibits the legislature from 
placing certain specified corporations in one class, and providing a uni-
form method of assessment for that class, and placing certain other 
specified corporations in another class, and providing a uniform manner of 
assessment for that class. [Emphasis added.] 
102 In People ex rel. Prindable v. Union Elec. Power Co., supra note 99, 
the court at 284--28 5 dismisses the Stuckart case, supra notes 93-98, with 
the statement that nothing in the case "holds that property valued under 
the first clause of section I of article IX must be assessed in the same way as 
property coming within a class fixed by law under the second clause of 
section I, or that the same debasing factor should be used in each of them." 
[Emphasis added.] This is hardly a fair description of the Stuckart opinion. 
103 Supra note 79. 
104 Supra note 77. 
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R. Co. case failed to discuss the relation of the second clause 
of Art. IX, § 1 to this problem.105 
Following this review of what it considered to be the per-
tinent cases, the court reached several conclusions which are 
worth quoting at some length. As to the issue at hand, the 
court stated: 
It is our conclusion that section 1 of article IX of the con-
stitution permits the General Assembly to establish classes 
among certain enumerated types of property mentioned in 
said section; that among such classes is the property of cor-
porations who own or use franchises and privileges; that such 
a general law has been enacted authorizing the taxing of the 
105 People ex rei. Prindable v. Union Elec. Power Co., supra note 102. 
The court said at 285-286: 
We have examined the record and briefs in that case, from which it ap-
pears the point was not raised that railroads, under the law then existing, 
could be classified under a general law uniform in effect, and assessed in 
a different manner and by different officers than those referred to in the 
first clause of section 1 of article IX, and not a single case establishing 
this well settled principle was cited by either party. Consequently the 
opinion does not point out that there is a distinction between property 
assessed and valued under the first clause of section I, and that valued 
in accordance with general laws enacted in pursuance of the second 
clause .••• 
If the statement in the Grand Trunk Railroad Co. case is taken to 
mean the valuation of capital stock by the Department of Revenue must 
conform to value fixed by a local assessor on a corporation subject to his 
jurisdiction, then this statement is erroneous, and not in accord with the 
law. We have never previously so held, nor has it been so applied since, 
and to the extent that the statement may be so understood it is hereby 
overruled. 
Thus, while it has been shown, text to notes 79-84, supra, that the court 
in the Mobile & Ohio R. case did not rely on the second clause of Art. IX, 
§I, but simply relied on the rationale that the state was the taxing j urisdic-
tion of concern and that railroad property was uniformly assessed at the 
same ratio within that district, we now have the court shifting the basis 
for the Mobile & Ohio R. decision to the second clause of Art. IX, §I, 
thereby placing railroads in that category of corporations exercising or using 
franchises or privileges. 
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value of the capital stock and franchises of the appellant com-
pany, which law is general in its nature and character, and 
creates a class within the permissive power granted by the 
last clause of section 1 of article IX; that there is no require-
ment that the valuation of such property be uniform with 
property not subject to assessment by the Tax Commission; 
and that but for aught appearing in the pleading or proof 
the same uniform method of valuation has been pursued 
throughout the State of Illinois, within the classification ap-
plying to appellant.106 
Recalling the precise facts in issue, it is clear that the court 
is here ruling that property belonging to subjects enumerated 
in the second clause of Art. IX, § 1 may be classified and dif-
ferent ratios of valuation applied to each class. This is made 
particularly clear by a statement in which the court said ab-
solute uniformity in the ratio of valuation was required for 
property "assessed and valued" under the first clause of Art. 
IX, §1.1o7 
A very interesting and informative point made in the opin-
ion concerns an "inequality of tax burden" which the court 
felt would be established if the local assessment ratio were 
applied in such a factual situation as before the court. The 
court stated: 
106 People ex rei. Prindable v. Union Elec. Power Co., supra note 102 at 
287-288. Emphasis added. 
107 /d. at 286: 
The general principle of uniformity applies to both clauses of section 1 
but does not of necessity apply to them in combination. In other words, 
as to all property assessed and !!alued under the first clause the ratio must 
be uniform, whether actual value or debased !!alue is taken. The same 
principle of uniformity applies to valuations fixed under the last clause 
of section 1, but the difference between the two is that the General As-
sembly may as to certain subjects create, by general law, classes of tax-
payers, and in such cases the uniformity required must conform to all 
coming within that class, but need not be uniform in method or amount 
of assessment with the other classes, or with property coming under the 
first clause of section 1 of article IX. [Emphasis added.] 
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The evidence shows the debasing factors in the several coun-
ties range from 20 per cent to 7 5 per cent, and therefore to 
place the debased value of 21 per cent of fair market value 
to a utility in Lake County and 7 5 per cent in the adjoining 
county of Cook would indicate a gross and damaging lack of 
uniformity. The value of the property assessed by the De-
partment of Revenue is created by the privilege of incorpo-
ration granted by the State. The utmost inequality in tax 
burden would be created within the classes subject to valua-
tion by the Department if the debasement figure of the sev-
eral counties were applied. All real and tangible property is 
subject to the local debasement figure, and the benefit of such 
rate obtains. The value created by the State is subject to the 
valuation of its agents, and this we believe is fair in principle 
and lawful in operation.108 
This passage demonstrates the failure of the court to differ-
entiate clearly the several burdens of taxation-the same 
confusion that appeared in the railroad property cases dis-
cussed above.109 First, it must be remembered that no "bur-
den of taxation" can exist without the application of a per-
centage rate. It is the effective rate which determines the 
"burden of taxation." Second, there are two distinct taxing 
authorities involved in each of these cases, and consequently 
two "taxes"-the county general property tax rate, and the 
state general property tax rate. This distinction is essential to 
any significant comparison of tax burdens. The third, the 
valuation of certain property by state officers, serves two dis-
tinct purposes. That value serves as the base for both the 
county and the state taxes. Fourth, it is important to remem-
ber that when this case and the railroad-property cases were 
decided the following system was used: the state tax rate was 
extended by the county clerks on the equalized value of all 
property in their respective counties. All other taxes (i.e., 
l<lS !d. at 287. Emphasis added. 
109 Supra, text to notes 79-84. 
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the local taxes) were extended by the county clerks on the 
value of property which was assessed by local officers at the 
assessed value determined by such officers, and on the value 
of property which was assessed by state officers at the assessed 
value determined by such state officers. 
Thus, an inequality of tax burden would exist as to two 
species of property of equal value located in counties using 
different local assessment ratios (the situation described in 
the passage from the Union Electric case) only if the follow-
ing qualification is added. There would be an inequality of 
tax burden in such a fact situation if the tax imposing the 
burden was the state tax rate. On the other hand, if the 
county tax rate is being considered (and that was the tax un-
der consideration in Union Electric) a comparison of the tax 
burden resting on two species of property of equal value lo-
cated in different counties is meaningless for purposes of uni-
formity in taxation, because the property located in county A 
is not subject to any tax burden imposed by county B, and 
vice versa. Thus, the ratio figure used by the State Depart-
ment of Revenue is significant when comparing the tax bur-
den imposed by any one county only when the property to 
which that state determined ratio is applied is compared to 
other property taxed by the same county. 
As can be seen, the passage from Union Electric concern-
ing "inequality of tax burden" seems completely to disregard 
the point that the taxpayer should have made. The tax rate 
applied and burden thereby imposed which the Union Elec-
tric Company objected to was the St. Clair County tax bur-
den. Thus, the assessment ratio applied to capital stock with 
a situs outside of St. Clair County was completely irrelevant 
because such other capital stock was not-indeed, could not 
have been-subject to the St. Clair tax rate. This serves to 
point out that it is uniformity within a taxing district which 
160 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
is relevant.110 The court mistakenly spoke in terms of the 
state being the taxing district in the Union Electric case when 
in fact it was the county rate and, therefore, the county as a 
taxing district which was pertinent.111 
In any case, if the court were really only concerned with 
finding a uniformity within classes of property, then it would 
have been sufficient if the same assessment ratio had been 
used as to all capital stock of a class and located within St. 
Clair County, disregarding completely the ratio or ratios 
used as to capital stock in the other counties of the state. Of 
course, the "general law" requirement referred to in the 
Union Electric case may have caused some trouble in this re-
spect, as will be pointed out.112 
Regardless of how fallacious the court's view of "equality 
of tax burden" may appear, we may summarize its interpre-
tation of Art. IX, § 1 as follows:113 While the "general prin-
ciple of uniformity" applies to both clauses of Art. IX, § 1, 
it does not of necessity apply to them "in combination." 
11° For example, Anderson v. City of Park Ridge, supra note 42. 
111 Of course, there would have been a statewide inequality of tax burden 
if local factors were used and a state rate were applied thereto. However, 
the concern of the court for a statewide equality of burden, at the expense 
of an inequality of burden for local rates, was really of no consequence at 
that time, because since 1932 there has been no state property tax rate ap-
plied. Thus, even if the rate "zero" is considered the state tax rate because 
of a determination by officials that "no rate was necessary" (cf. the rationale 
of the court in the Mobile & Ohio R. case, supra text at note 82), there 
could in fact be no state tax "burden," consequently no inequality in burden, 
even though different species of property of identical value were debased 
to different values for the application of the rate "zero." 
112 Infra, text to note 115. 
113 In the Union Electric case, supra note 99, the court does not refer 
to an opinion of the Attorney General, Op. Atty. Gen., 1935, No. 782, 
p. 121, which reaches the same conclusion and uses the language of 
substantially the same cases. However, the Attorney General fails to mention 
the Grand Trunk Western R. Co. case, supra note 77. See Comment, 33 
Ill. L. Rev., supra note 5 at 77-78. 
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Property belonging to the enumerated subjects in the second 
clause of Art. IX, § 1 may be "classified under a general law, 
uniform in effect," with the ratio of valuation applicable to 
such a class of property needing to be uniform only within 
that class. The preceding propositions were necessary to the 
decision. As dictum the court added that the ratio of valua-
tion for property "assessed and valued" under the first 
clause of Art. IX, § 1. must be absolutely uniform, whether 
the actual or a debased value is used. 
(iii) The significance of the preceding cases. Several im-
portant questions remain to be answered in order to deter-
mine the significance of the preceding groups of cases. First, 
consider the Union Electric case (capital stock) and the 
Mobile & Ohio R. case (railroad property). Three impor-
tant questions are: ( 1) What is the limit as to that property 
which may be classified? (2) For what purposes may these 
classes of property be further classified? ( 3) What is the 
effect of the "general law" limitation? 
As for the first question, it may be noted that the precise 
words of the Union Electric case were limited to this: 
"among such classes [of property which may be classified by 
general law] is the property of corporations who own or use 
franchises and privileges." However, the implication of the 
Union Electric case is that any property belonging to those 
"subjects" enumerated in the second clause of Art. IX, §1 
may be classified by "general law." Thus, it would seem 
that the basis of permissible classification is "ownership" of 
property, with this identifying characteristic being limited to 
the following: 
... peddlers, auctioneers, brokers, hawkers, merchants, 
commission merchants, showmen, jugglers, innkeepers, gro-
cery keepers, liquor dealers, toll bridges, ferries, insurance, 
telegraph and express interests or business, vendors of 
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patents, and persons or corporations owning or using fran-
chises and privileges .... 
Nor is there anything in the Union Electric opinion which 
would limit power to classify property to certain types or 
kinds of property belonging to the enumerated subjects. On 
the face of the reasoning it would seem that any kind of 
property could be classified as long as it belonged to one of 
the enumerated subjects. 
On this point the Union Electric case (as to capital stock) 
and the Mobile & Ohio R. case (as to railroad property) 
may be merged, because in the Union Electric case the court 
stated that the two opinions were supported by the same 
reasoning.114 Of course, it is true that the only classifications 
of property actually ruled upon have been the capital stock 
of corporations centrally assessed and the property of rail-
roads. Moreover, the opinion in the Union Electric case rests 
both decisions upon the fact that the property belonged to 
"corporations owning or using franchises or privileges." 
Nevertheless-if the court is to be taken as really meaning 
what it said-the reasoning of the Union Electric opinion 
leads one inevitably to the theory that any property belong-
ing to, for example, "jugglers" may be classified by a gen-
eral law for purposes which will be discussed shortly. One 
may safely say that this assertion demonstrates by its mere 
statement the questionable nature of the interpretation given 
the second clause of Art. IX, §1 by the court in the Union 
Electric opinion.111' 
114 While it was not definitely clear in the Mobile & Ohio R. case, supra 
note 79, that the second clause of Art. IX, §I was the basis for the decision, 
nevertheless the result approved in each of the cases is as follows: a uni-
formity within a class throughout the state as a taxing district, with the 
class being established by a general law. 
115 Query, just how far would the rationale of the Union Electric 
opinion, supra note 99, be extended when Art. IX, §2 is taken into con-
sideration? 
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The second question (the "purposes" for which classifica-
tion is permissible) is quite important. The cases discussed 
are concerned solely with the classification of property for 
the purpose of applying different ratios of valuation to dif-
ferent classes of property. There is not even the slightest 
hint in the cases above discussed that the court is suggesting 
that classification is permissible for any other purpose. In-
deed, the court has most unequivocally ruled against classi-
fication of any property either for the purpose of exemp-
tion116 or application of different percentage rates.111 We may 
conclude, then, that the court has used this novel interpreta-
tion of the second clause of Art. IX, § 1 to rationalize its sup-
port of the de facto classification system which has been estab-
lished throughout the state of Illinois. 
This position is inconsistent with the fundamental princi-
ples which underlie the ruling that Art. IX, § 1 prohibits the 
classification of property for the purposes of applying dif-
ferent percentage rates. To allow classification of property 
for application of different ratios of valuation results in just 
as effective a classified property tax as allowing property to 
be classified for percentage rates. It is the effective rate that 
is significant, and to classify for either the ratio of valuation 
or the percentage rates results in the tax burden being equal 
only as among classes of property. 
The third question (the effect of the "general law" re-
quirement) points up an important limitation upon the clas-
sification concept built around the second clause of Art. IX, 
§ 1. In the Union Electric case the court emphasized that 
there was a uniformity within the class of property under 
consideration-namely, capital stock assessed by the State 
Board throughout the state. The court further emphasized 
lHl Supra notes 34--37. Note that three of the cases in note 35 were 
discussions concerning the exemption of capital stock. 
117 Supra note 39. 
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that the statute providing for such a central assessment was 
not "special." Thus it is indicated that one limitation on this 
power of classification derived from the second clause of Art. 
IX, § 1 is that classes cannot be limited to a local taxing dis-
trict, but must be "general."118 This emphasis in the Union 
Electric opinion coincides with the concern of the court in the 
Mobile & Ohio R. case (railroad property). The emphasis 
there was on the state as a taxing jurisdiction. As already 
pointed out, this confused the issue as to the taxing jurisdic-
tion actually in controversy. However, the result is consistent 
with this "general law" limitation. 
This consideration of the significance of the "railroad 
property cases" and the "capital stock cases" must be corre-
lated to the analysis of the first group of cases considered-
those in which all property in question was assessed locally, 
and in which there was evidence of a local de facto 
classification system. In examining those cases it was seen that 
since 1935 the court has in several cases either ( 1) talked in 
terms of classification, while not actually sanctioning any 
such system, or (2) actually enforced a de facto classifica-
tion system, while not necessarily abandoning in its opinion 
the rule of absolute uniformity theretofore developed. 
That analysis must be balanced against the dictum in the 
Union Electric case, stated by the court while expanding the 
concept of the relation of the second clause of Art. IX, § 1 to 
the entire provision. It was there indicated that property as-
sessed under the first clause must conform to a rule of abso-
lute uniformity.119 Perhaps the only safe conclusion which 
may be drawn at this point is that the court will not in fact 
upset these local de facto systems, although they may be a 
118 No attempt will be made in this study to analyze the scope of the 
"general law" limitation. Cf. 2 Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construc-
tion ( 3rd ed., by Horack, 1943), §§21 01-2125. 
119 See note 1 0 7, supra. 
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violation of the doctrine developed in the past as to the 
meaning of Art. IX, § 1.120 As the recognition of such a sys-
tem becomes more and more commonplace, the court un-
wittingly slips into language implying that only a limitation 
of uniformity within classes is required in applying different 
ratios of valuation within a single taxing district.121 
(c) Property taxation: conclusion 
We may conclude that the existence of a statewide practice 
of illegal classification (some may wish to call it "extra-
legal") has been the lever by which the court's position in-
dicating that the purpose of the proportionality clause in Art. 
IX, § 1, is to achieve an absolute uniformity in tax burden has 
been so altered as to undermine this fundamental tenet. 
Writers can undoubtedly point to the difficult practical situa-
tion with which a court is faced in coping with this wide-
spread use of de facto classification systems. It may be 
suggested that a court is ill-equipped to reestablish the equi-
librium of a system of absolute uniformity when the matter 
of proof is so difficult and it is faced with such a large-scale 
de facto classification system. 
This does not alter the fact, however, that the court in 
sanctioning and rationalizing these situations has taken a 
path which may logically lead to making completely unre-
alistic its ruling that absolute uniformity is required for per-
centage rates and exemptions. Of course, it remains to be 
seen how far the rationale of the Union Electric opinion will 
be carried. Nevertheless, on the basis of what the court said 
as well as what the court did in that case, it must now either 
approve other classifications or reject the rationale presented 
12° Cf. Cushman, supra note 5 at 2 36. 
121 Cf. the dissent in People v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., supra notes 
57, 58. 
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in support of the Union Electric and Mobile & Ohio R. 
decisions. 
Once again it is illustrated how the rule of absolute uni-
formity in property taxation leads substantially to a break-
down of the property tax system if enforcement is strictly 
attempted; and the result is more often than not a series of 
locally enforced de facto classification systems which apply 
different ratios of valuation and thereby achieve a classified 
effective rate while leaving as a fa~ade a single proportional 
percentage rate applicable to all property alike. When such 
systems are challenged, as here, they are often upheld, but 
with the result that one is often faced with a developing 
hodgepodge of conflicting interpretations of an already con-
fusing constitutional limitation. De facto classification sys-
tems are no substitute for de jure classification systems which 
are derived from statutory language and subject to a more 
certain constitutional limitation against arbitrary action by 
local assessors. 
4. Nebraska 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The first Nebraska Constitution, dated 1867, contained no 
provisions concerning uniformity of taxation. The second and 
present Nebraska Constitution came into force in 18 7 5. In 
its original form it contained both a basic uniformity clause, 
Art. IX, §1/ and a provision, Art. IX, §3, requiring the ex-
1 Article IX, §I read: 
The legislature shall provide such revenue as may be needful, by 
levying a tax by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay 
a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its property and franchises, 
the value to be ascertained in such manner as the legislature shall direct; 
and it shall have the power to tax peddlers, auctioneers, brokers, hawkers, 
commission-merchants, showmen, jugglers, inn-keepers, liquor-dealers, 
UNIFORMITY STRUCTURES 167 
emption of certain classes of property and permitting the 
exemption of others. 
In 1920 the uniformity structure of the 187 5 constitution 
was amended by the substitution of Art. VIII, §1, for Art. 
IX, §1, and Art. VIII, §2, for Art. IX, §3. The phraseology 
of the basic uniformity clause was changed, but in substance 
the clause remained the same except for a proviso removing 
the taxation of intangible property from the scope of the 
strict uniformity clause. The provision, Art. VIII, § 1, was 
again amended in 1952 to permit special treatment of motor 
vehicles. Section 1 now reads: 
The necessary revenue of the state and its governmental 
subdivisions shall be raised by taxation in such manner as the 
Legislature may direct. Taxes shall be levied by valuation 
uniformly and proportionately upon all tangible property[,] 
and franchises, except that the Legislature may provide for a 
different method of taxing motor vehicles .... Taxes uni-
form as to class may be levied by valuation upon all other 
property. Taxes, other than property taxes, may be author-
ized by law .... 2 
The only real changes accomplished by the 1920 amend-
ment were the addition of the proviso: "taxes uniform as to 
toll-bridges, ferries, insurance, telegraph, and express interests or busi-
ness, vendors of patents, in such manner as it shall direct by general law, 
uniform as to the class upon which it operates. 
2 The exception concerning motor vehicles also provides for the diversion 
of the revenue derived from the taxation of the same. Moreover, in 1954 a 
new section was added to Art. VIII which prohibits a state property tax if 
either an income tax or a general sales tax is adopted. Art. VIII, § lA. Prior 
to 19 52, Art. VIII, §I read: 
The necessary revenue of the state and its governmental subdivisions 
shall be raised by taxation in such manner as the Legislature may direct; 
but taxes shall be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately upon 
all tangible property and franchises, and taxes uniform as to class may be 
levied by valuation upon all other property. Taxes, other than property 
taxes, may be authorized by law •••• 
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class may be levied by valuation upon all other [i.e., intangi-
ble] property," and the simplification of the provision con-
cerning nonproperty taxes. The only change of importance in 
the exemption provision, for purposes of uniformity, was 
the addition of the following sentence: "No property shall 
be exempt from taxation except as provided in this section."3 
The only other provision in the Nebraska Constitution con-
cerning uniformity of taxation is Art. VIII, § 6, which pro-
vides that " [municipal] taxes shall be uniform in respect to 
persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body im-
posing the same." 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation4 
Nonproperty taxes are required only to be uniform 
within classes.5 The objects selected for nonproperty taxes 
and exemptions therefrom need only be reasonable classes,6 
3 For the text of the present Art. VIII, §2 see Appendix A, infra. 
4 See Nutting, "Taxation in Nebraska," 19 Neb. L. Bull. 7 at 1 0, 21-26 
( 1940). 
5 See the cases in notes 6 and 7, infra. The source of the limitation is 
restricted by the 1920 amendment of Art. XIII, §I to the equivalent of an 
equal protection clause in the Nebraska Constitution, Art. I, §I. The dele-
tion of the express "uniformity within classes" limitation applicable to taxes 
"other than property taxes" resulted in no substantive change. The court 
has used some careless language in a few nonproperty tax cases, which might 
leave the impression that such taxes are governed by the "proportionality" 
clause in Art. VIII, §I. See, for example, Continental Ins. Co. v. Smrha, 
131 Neb. 791 at 796, 270 N.W. 122 {1936), and Thorin v. Burke, 146 
Neb. 94 at 102, 18 N.W. 2d 664 (1945). The enumeration in the first 
uniformity provision in the 1875 constitution of taxable objects of non-
property taxes did not result in a restriction on the possible scope of non-
property taxes. It was held that the enumeration was not exclusive. See 
Nutting, supra note 4 at 25. 
6 For example, in the following cases classifications were found to be 
reasonable: Richter v. City of Lincoln, 136 Neb. 289, 289 N.W. 593 
{1939) {local "public service" tax, per cent of gross receipts; not invalid 
although including taxicabs but excluding trucks carrying freight); Ne-
braska Tel. Co. v. Lincoln, 82 Neb. 59, 117 N.W. 284 ( 1908) (holding 
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and such objects may be further classified for the purpose of 
applying different rates.7 A progressively graduated rate 
schedule is a reasonable classification. 8 The distinction be-
tween nonproperty and property taxes assumes a great deal 
of importance because of the more strict uniformity limita-
tion applicable to property taxes. Of interest for comparative 
purposes is the decision of the Nebraska court that an inherit-
ance tax is not upon property but upon the privilege of 
succession. 9 
Property Taxation. Before 1920, the former Art. IX, § 1 
was interpreted to require universality, 10 absolute uniformity 
that a gross earnings occupation tax on telephone businesses was a valid 
class); Rosenbloom v. State, 64 Neb. 342, 89 N.W. 1053 (1902) (license 
tax, peddlers, a valid class for selection); and see Magneau v. Fremont, 30 
Neb. 843, 74 N.W. 280 (1890) (a local system of various occupation taxes 
with flat rate for each tax). 
See the following cases for examples of classifications found to be arbitrary: 
Thorin v. Burke, supra note 5 (tax on oleo, with such imitation butter con-
taining domestic oil being exempt; held unreasonable and void, not con-
sidering the distinction made between oleo and butter; apparently treated as 
an excise tax); Continental Ins. Co. v. Smrha, supra note 5 (2% tax on 
gross premiums of fire insurance companies, but only on premiums from 
policies upon property within the corporate limits of all incorporated mu-
nicipalities; revenue apportioned to municipalities for fire fighting units; 
held, arbitrary classification); Lincoln v. Lincoln Gas & Elec. Light Co., 
100 Neb. 182, 158 N.W. 964 (1916) (local tax on manufacture and sale 
of gas and electric current; several public service corporations engaged in 
furnishing light, heat, and power to people of a city; fact that one furnishes 
such services by electric current conveyed by wire and others by gas con-
veyed by underground mains did not furnish sufficient basis for classification 
to justify occupation tax on one, not on the other). 
7 State ex rel. Slabaugh v. Vinsonhaler, 74 Neb. 675, 105 N.W. 472 
(I 90 5). The court upheld an inheritance tax, with a classified rate schedule. 
The classes were based on the degree of relationship of the heir or devisee, 
and upon the amount received from the estate. Thus, there was a graduated 
rate within the subclasses. 
8 See note 7, supra. 
9 See note 7, supra. 
10 See, for example, State v. Poynter, 59 Neb. 417, 81 N.W. 431 
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in the effective rate applicable to all property taxed by a tax-
ing jurisdiction,11 and the use of the ad valorem method in 
the taxation of property.12 The only change brought about by 
the introduction in 1920 of the new Art. VIII, § 1 is that 
intangible property may now be taxed at a different effective 
rate or rates from the rate applicable to tangible property.13 
{1899); Statev. Walsh, 31 Neb. 4-69,4-8 N.W. 263 (1891); Clother v. 
Maher, 15 Neb. 1, 16 N.W. 902 {1883). See Nutting, supra note 5 at 
11. However, the court has ruled that neither the failure of the legislator to 
select a class of property (In re Laub, 104- Neb. 4-02, 177 N.W. 749 
( 1920) {failure to provide method of valuing life insurance policies) nor 
the omission by the assessor of taxable property from the tax rolls {State v. 
Fleming, 70 Neb. 523, 524-, 97 N.W. 1063 (1903)) will invalidate the 
levy on other property in the taxing jurisdiction. 
11 While absolute uniformity is required in effective rate, less than a 
100% ratio of valuation may be used if all property in the taxing jurisdic-
tion is debased to the same percentage. State v. Osborn, 60 Neb. 415, 83 
N.W. 357 {1900); State v. Savage, 65 Neb. 714-, 91 N.W. 716 (1902); 
Beadle v. Sanders, 104 Neb. 427, 177 N.W. 789 {1920); Chicago, R.I. 
& P.R. Co. v. State, Ill Neb. 362, 197 N.W. 114- { 1923). Concerning 
percentage rate, see High School Dist. No. 137 v. Lancaster, 60 Neb. 147, 
82 N.W. 380 {1900). A provision for a reduction in the assessed valuation 
of only a particular class of land (i.e., that used for growing timber and 
fruit trees) violated this rule. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Saunders, 7 Neb. 228 
{ 1878). Providing an arbitrary method for the valuation of a class of 
property would violate this rule, because the ratio of actual value would not 
necessarily be uniform. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Omaha, 73 Neb. 527, 
103 N.W. 84- (1905); Homan v. Board of Equalization, Boone County, 
14-1 Neb. 4-00, 3 N.W. 2d 650 (194-2). 
12 McCann v. Merriam, II Neb. 24-1, 9 N.W. 96 (1881), followed in 
Covell & Ransome v. Young, II Neb. 510, 9 N.W. 694- ( 1881), holding 
road tax imposed with a specific rate {so many dollars per acre of land) to 
be a violation of the uniformity clause. A similar tax had been upheld under 
the 1865 constitution which contained no uniformity provision. Burlington 
& M. R. R. Co. v. Lancaster, 4 Neb. 293 (1876). Also see State v. Mac-
Farland, 104 Neb. 42, 175 N.W. 663 {1919). 
13 However, the court has held that the taxation of state bank shares at a 
higher rate than national bank shares is an arbitrary discrimination. State 
Bank v. Endres, 109 Neb. 753, 192 N.W. 322 (1923). The court has 
subsequently held that, if the shares in banks are taxed at a different rate 
from that applicable to shares of other corporations, there would be an 
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However, all intangible property must still be taxed, and 
taxed by the ad valorem method.14 Since 1952, motor ve-
hicles may be taxed as property at a different rate and by 
specific methods, although that class of property still is sub-
ject to the rule of universality.15 For comparative purposes, 
it is sufficient to note that under this type of uniformity 
clause-whether in the precise phraseology of either the 18 7 5 
or the 1920 provision-it was necessary to write in an ex-
press exception thereto if any class of property, such as in-
arbitrary classification. State ex rel. Spillman v. Ord State Bank, 117 Neb. 
189, 220 N .W. 265 ( 1928), and see Omaha Nat. Bank v. Heintze, I 59 
Neb. 520, 67 N.W. 2d 753 {1954). At the present time intangibles are 
divided into two classes (Class A: cash, savings accounts, and bank deposits; 
Class B: all other intangibles) with Class A taxed at a 20 mill rate and Class 
Bat a 4 mill rate. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§77-702, 77-703. 
14 That intangibles must still be taxed, see International Harvester Co. 
v. County of Douglas, 146 Neb. 555, 20 N.W. 2d 620 {1945), saying, 
as to the purpose of the 1920 amendment (at pp. 562-563): "A reading of 
the proceedings of the 1920 Constitutional Convention clearly indicates that 
the framers of these amendments, by the use of the term 'other property,' 
had reference to and meant to include therein intangible property; that it 
was their purpose so to draft the constitutional provisions that all property 
in the state would be subject to taxation and be taxed. . . • To make 
certain that intangibles were not to be exempt they placed the provision in 
section 2 [prohibiting the exemption of property]." However, note that 
certain financial institutions pay an earnings tax in lieu of intangibles taxes. 
In Sommerville v. Board of Com'rs of Douglas County, 116 Neb. 282, 216 
N.W. 815 (1927) the court, when faced with a gross premiums tax on in-
surance companies "in lieu of all other taxes upon intangible property," 
avoided making a decision whether this was in fact an exemption of property 
contrary to the uniformity clause. Thus, there may be some question as to 
the validity of an "in lieu" tax in Nebraska. 
15 See the amendment to Art. VIII, §I, supra at note 2. There has been 
no interpretation of this amendment by the court. But see Boyd Motor 
Co. v. Box Butte County, 159 Neb. 514, 67 N.W. 2d 774 (1954). The 
Attorney General, in an opinion dated Feb. 26, 195 3, stated that under 
the amendment motor vehicles might be taxed by any method, including 
a partial deferment of taxes or a small token payment for the year 1953, 
but that some assessment for the year had to be made. CCH Neb. Tax Re-
porter U24-507. 
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tangibles, was to be treated differently. Thus, the problem 
of avoiding the harshness of the strict uniformity require-
ment was solved in Nebraska by leaving the basic uniformity 
clause in its original form and writing in express exceptions 
thereto, rather than by adopting a more liberal basic clause. 
C. ANALYSES OF STATES WITH TYPE III CLAUSES 
1. Massachusetts 
a. The provisions; historical note 
Massachusetts has had but one constitution, and it came 
into force in I780. A basic uniformity clause was included in 
that constitution in its original form, and has remained un-
changed. Part II, Ch. I, §I, Art. IV reads (with numbers 
added): 
And further, full power and authority are hereby given 
and granted to the said general court. . . . [ I ] to impose 
and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates and 
taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and persons resident, and 
estates lying, within the said commonwealth; [2] and also 
to impose and levy, reasonable duties and excises, upon any 
produce, goods, wares, merchandize, and commodities, what-
soever, brought into, produced, manufactured, or being 
within the same. . . . 
Other relevant provisions are two of the many amendments 
which have been added to the Massachusetts Constitution.1 
1 One might also consider the general provision in the Bill of Rights 
(Art. X of Part I) which provides: "Each individual of the society ••• is 
obliged . . . to contribute his share to the expense of" government. This 
provision has not played an important part in Massachusetts insofar as uni-
formity of taxation is concerned. However, similar provisions have served 
as the basic uniformity clause in a few other states. See Part J of this 
chapter. 
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They deal with particular problems of uniformity in taxation. 
Amendment No. 44, added in 1915, provides that the legis-
lature may impose an income tax within certain limits.2 
Amendment No. 41 of 1912 provides for special treatment 
of "wild or forest lands" for purposes of property taxation. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
For purposes of uniformity in taxation in Massachusetts, 
taxes are either property taxes or "excises" ( nonproperty 
taxes). 3 Property taxes are limited by the first uniformity 
clause in Art. IV and must therefore be "proportional and 
reasonable." Nonproperty taxes are limited by the second 
uniformity clause and must be "reasonable," which in effect 
means only uniform within classes.4 Thus, the objects se-
2 For the text of the amendment, see Appendix A, infra. 
3 For example, in White Dental Mfg. Co. v. Comm., 212 Mass. 35, 37, 
98 N.E. 1056 (1912) the court said: "Under our Constitution, which has 
been the organic law of this Commonwealth since 1780, taxes are of two 
kinds, property taxes and excises. The first of these must be both propor-
tional and reasonable. The latter need not be proportional, but only reason-
able." At an earlier date, the habit of the court was to refer to property 
taxes as "taxes," and nonproperty taxes as "excises." See, for example, 
Oliver v. Washington Mills, II Allen (Mass.) 268, 274-275 (1865). 
4 See, for example, Portland Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 252 ( 1815) and 
the cases in notes 5 and 6, infra. It is interesting to note that the catch-all 
phrase in Art. IV used by the court in dealing with nonproperty taxes is: 
"reasonable . . . excises upon any . . . commodities. . . ." The word 
"commodities" has been interpreted to include all taxable privileges. Thus, 
the problem arises as to what "commodities," i.e., privileges, are taxable. 
Similar to the situation described in Arkansas, Part A of this chapter, supra, 
Massachusetts follows the doctrine that certain occupations or privileges are 
enjoyed as a matter of "common right" and are not subject to taxation. 
Thus, the court has held that unincorporated businesses, partnerships, and 
associations could not be subjected to a tax comparable to that applicable to 
corporations (an excise for the privilege of doing business). In re Opinion 
of the Justices, 266 Mass. 590, 165 N.E. 904 ( 1929); Gleason v. McKay, 
134 Mass. 419 (1880). Also see the decision in O'Keefe v. Somerville, 190 
Mass. 110,76 N.E. 457 (1906). 
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lected for "excises" and any exemptions therefrom must 
constitute reasonable classes; 5 such objects may be fur-
ther classified for the purpose of applying different rates.6 
The court has ruled that a progressively graduated rate is a 
reasonable classification. 7 
The decisions of the court concerning the nature of several 
taxes are of comparative interest. The court has held that an 
income tax was a tax upon property.8 However, it has held 
that a corporate franchise tax with a base of net income was 
an "excise,"9 and the same result was reached as to a selective 
corporate franchise tax with a base of capital stock.10 In one 
of the leading cases on the matter, the court ruled that an in-
heritance tax was not a property tax. 11 There has been some 
confusion concerning taxes upon the privilege of transferring 
or registering certain intangibles. On the one hand a stock 
11 See, for example, Portland Bank v. Apthorp, supra note 4 (franchise 
tax, financial companies, per cent of capital stock); White Dental Mfg. Co. 
v. Comm., supra note 3 (corporate franchise; capital stock); In re Opinion 
of the Justices, 196 Mass. 603, 85 N.E. 545 (1907) (stock transfer tax); 
Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Comm., 133 Mass. 161 (1882) (in-
surance companies). 
6 See, for example, Minot v. Winthrop, 162 Mass. 113, 38 N.E. 512 
( 1894) (inheritance tax; classification according to relation to the deceased, 
higher rates applicable to collaterals and strangers). 
7 In In re Opinion of the Justices, 266 Mass. 583, 587, 165 N.E. 900 
(1929), the court ruled that graduated rates for an income tax would not 
be proportional and therefore would violate the proportionality clause be-
cause an income tax was a property tax. The court cited Pratt v. Dean, 246 
Mass. 300, 140 N.E. 924 (1923) as holding that the graduated rates 
imposed by the inheritance tax, an excise tax, were valid. An examination of 
the case indicates that the rates were not challenged, but simply applied. 
8 Infra, at notes 26-29. 
9 See Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Comm., 244 Mass. 530, 139 N.E. 
158 {1923). 
10 See Farr Alpaca Co. v. Comm., 212 Mass. 156, 98 N.E. I 078 ( 1912) 
(public utilities); Portland Bank v. Apthorp, supra note 4 (financial institu-
tions). 
11 Minot v. Winthrop, supra note 6. 
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transfer tax was upheld in principle as an "excise,"12 and a 
realty conveyance tax was imposed in 1952 but has not yet 
been challenged. To the contrary, a mortgage bond registra-
tion tax, which was to be "in lieu" of any property taxation 
of the bonds indirectly affected, was held invalid because it 
was a property tax and violated the uniformity clause ap-
plicable to property taxes.13 However, it must be pointed out 
that the stock transfer tax had no such "in lieu" or exemption 
feature (neither does the realty conveyance tax). The cou-
pling of a purported excise tax with an "in lieu" feature will 
apparently result in an adverse decision.14 Moreover, the 
court has stated that the mere right to own and to hold in-
tangible property cannot be made the subject of an exc1se 
tax.15 
( 1 ) Property taxation 
The requirement that property taxes be "proportional and 
reasonable" does not prevent "some exemptions founded 
upon compelling reasons ... but extreme care must be 
exercised to see that they never go to such length as actually 
to impair the force of" the constitutional principle of propor-
tional taxation of property.16 Exemptions of property must 
12 In re Opinion of the Justices, 196 Mass. 603, 85 N.E. 545 (1907). 
No cases have arisen under the actual tax, in effect since 1914. 
13 Perkins v. Westwood, 226 Mass. 268, 115 N.E. 411 (1917). See 
notes 22 and 25, illfra, concerning the property tax limitation. 
14 See the text at notes 21 and 22, infra. 
15 In re Opinion of the Justices, 19 5 Mass. 607, 84 N.E. 499 ( 1907). 
This was in answer to the question whether it was within the power of the 
legislature to enact a law which would exempt classes of enumerated intangi-
bles from all other taxation, and impose thereon, either as a property tax or 
an excise, a uniform tax of 3 mills on each dollar of fair cash valuation 
thereof. The intangibles were money on hand and on deposit, other debts 
due, public stocks and securities, stocks and bonds of corporations. 
16 In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 Mass. 724, 85 N.E. 2d 222. The 
court summarized the whole problem of exemptions and reviewed the situa-
tion to that date. It ruled that proposed legislation which would have e.x-
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fall into "classes which cannot fairly be said to offend against 
the . . . requirement," derived from the principle of pro-
portional taxation, that 
... all property within the Commonwealth which is owned 
empted newly constructed residential buildings from local real estate taxation 
for a period of five years after construction would violate the proportionality 
clause, Ch. I, §I, Art. IV, and Art. X of the Bill of Rights. Also see: Day 
v. Lawrence, 167 Mass. 371, 4-5 N.E. 751 (1897) (exemption of house-
hold furniture not exceeding one thousand dollars in value held valid, the 
court saying (at p. 3 7 3): "Such exemptions have long existed, and it is too 
late to question the power of the Legislature to make them.") ; In re 
Opinion of the Justices, 261 Mass. 523, !59 N.E. 55 (1928) (exemption 
of bonds issued by a private transportation company upheld and justified on 
the basis that such bonds were in effect state issued and exemptible as 
"public property"; there was dictum indicating that the exemption might 
have been justified as being an avoidance of "double taxation" since an-
other tax was levied on the property of the transportation corporation; how-
ever the failure to exempt the bonds of other transportation corporations 
would have been an arbitrary classification); Board of Assessors of City of 
Quincey v. Cunningham Foundation, 305 Mass. 4-11, 26 N.E. 2d 335 
(194-0) (exemption of property of charitable corporations upheld); As-
sessors of Boston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 320 Mass. 559, 70 N.E. 2d 
806 ( 194-7) (justifying the exemption of the personal property of a foreign 
insurance corporation from the local property tax, on the basis that a state 
excise tax with a base of "net value of all policies in force" was imposed on 
foreign insurance corporations and therefore the exemption was granted 
simply to avoid "double taxation"; no mention was made of the fact that 
the state excise tax had a reciprocal feature, exempting those corporations 
whose home state exempted Massachusetts insurance corporations, and that 
the foreign corporation involved was a New York corporation, and further 
that the New York excise tax in effect exempted Massachusetts corpora-
tions); Assessors of West Springfield v. Eastern States Exposition, 326 Mass. 
167,93 N.E. 2d 4-62 (1950) (exemption of all property owned by "agri-
cultural societies" no matter to what use the property was put, held valid); 
Newhall v. Assessors of Brookline, 329 Mass. I 00, 106 N.E. 2d 4-32 ( 1952) 
(reaffirming the validity of the exemption of a minimum amount of house-
hold furniture, the amount having been increased from $1,000 to $5,000, 
and reviewing the Day case, supra and others). Also see Massachusetts 
General Hospital v. Belmont, 233 Mass. 190, 124- N.E. 21 (1919), 238 
Mass. 396, 131 N.E. 72 (1921); Boston Fish Market Corp. v. Boston, 224 
Mass. 31, 112 N.E. 616 (1916). 
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and held in such a way that it ought to be available by its 
owner to increase his ability and enlarge his duty to assist in 
defraying the expenses of the government, must be included 
in the property upon which assessments are made. 17 
The permissible "classes" are:18 ( 1) Exemptions of public 
property and quasi-public property, including property used 
for charitable, religious, educational purposes, etc. This type 
of exemption is said to tend "in some measure directly or 
17 In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 Mass. 724, 730-731 (1949), dis-
cussed in note 16, supra. The court clearly stated the relation of property 
exemptions to "proportionality" when it preceded its conclusion that "some" 
exemptions might be made with the following statement (at p. 729): 
It seems plain that a tax assessed upon most property at the current rate 
but upon other property at a lower rate, or in this instance (as to build-
ings) at no rate at all, is not "proportional" to property owned. • . . 
There would no longer be a uniform ratio between the value of property 
owned and the taxes upon it. [Emphasis added.] 
However, the court then recognized the difficulty in such a situation where 
there are no classes of property expressly described as exemptible by the 
constitution when it stated (at p. 730): 
Just how exemptions are to be reconciled with the requirement of "pro-
portional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes, upon all the in-
habitants of, and persons resident, and estates lying, within the said com-
monwealth" •.. contained in c. I, §I, art. 4, of the Constitution is a 
problem of some difficulty which cannot be said to have been fully solved. 
Probably the solution lies in recognizing that the Constitution states gen-
eral principles not ali of which can be applied with absolute literal ex-
actness. 
It was admitted that "some" exemptions might be made if they did not 
"actuaiiy impair" the constitutional principle, although this was admittedly 
not consistent in theory. 
18 I d. at 7 31-7 3 2. The court plainly recognized the crudeness of its at-
tempted classification of exemptions "long in existence," when it stated (at 
p. 7 3 3) : "The foregoing classification may not be whoiiy accurate or satis-
factory. In a few instances it might not stand too close scrutiny. There may 
even be some possible doubt of the validity of some of the exemptions." As 
to some exemptions, the sanction of "long usage" weighs heavily. See, for 
example, Day v. Lawrence, supra note 16, and Newhall v. Assessors of 
Brookline, supra note 16. 
178 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
indirectly to relieve public burdens." (2) Exemptions, the 
underlying purpose of which is to "prevent or mitigate 
double taxation.nl9 ( 3) "Hardship" exemptions, closely 
limited in amounts. ( 4) Exemptions of "certain articles of 
personal use," e.g., wearing apparel, cash on hand, tools, 
household goods, and the like, justified on the basis of hard-
ship, need for a minimum of necessities free of tax burden, 
freedom from minute inquiry into personal matters, and ad-
ministrative difficulties. 
Thus, Massachusetts stands somewhere between those 
states prohibiting all exemptions of property and those states 
in which such exemptions need only consist of reasonable 
classes. However, even in those states having a requirement 
of universality, the first class of exemptions is usually 
allowed. The last three classes of exemptions constitute the 
important exceptions to the rule of proportional taxation. 
The class of exemptions which may be made to "avoid double 
taxation" is of greatest interest because of the meaning the 
court has given to "double taxation" for this purpose. On 
the basis of this rationale it has sanctioned the exemption of 
property indirectly burdened by an excise tax-for example, 
the exemption of shares of stock because of a corporate fran-
chise tax, and the exemption of motor vehicles indirectly 
burdened by the motor vehicle registration nonproperty tax. 
However, when the exemption to avoid "double taxation" 
is made in the form of an "in lieu" provision written into a 
purported excise tax, the court evidently does not view the 
exemption too favorably. For example, in Perkins v. West-
wood/0 a statute which imposed a 3 mill "registration" tax 
19 /d. at 731. The court gives as examples: exemption of property of 
certain corporations, of property the income of which is taxable, of shares 
in certain business organizations, and motor vehicles subject to the excise 
tax. 
2ozz6Mass.268, 115N.E.411 (1917). 
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for mortgage bonds, and provided that such bonds were to 
be exempt from property taxation for one year upon payment 
of the "fee," was held to violate the principle of proportional 
property taxation. The court held that this was not a valid 
example of an exemption to avoid double taxation.21 The tax 
was characterized as a property tax, and as such it violated 
the rule requiring uniformity of rates. 
It is clear that the strictest form of uniformity prevails as 
to the other particular rules of uniformity. Absolute uni-
formity is required in the effective rate applicable to all prop-
erty taxed by any taxing jurisdiction, regardless of whether 
the variance in effective rates is the result of different per-
centage rates,22 "unequal methods of valuation,"23 or a 
21 It was the opinion of the court ( id. at p. 2 7 4) that even though an 
entire exemption might be made of the described bonds, so as to avoid 
double taxation, nevertheless it would not follow that a "conditional exemp-
tion" operative only on payment of an arbitrary fixed percentage which was 
not "proportional" would be permissible. Prior to this case a similar ob-
jection had been raised to a three mill intangibles tax imposed on enu-
merated intangibles. In In re Opinion of the Justices, 19 5 Mass. 607 
( 1907), supra note 1 5, it was ruled that the tax could not be upheld as a 
property tax because its rate was not uniform with the rate on other property, 
that the tax could not be upheld as an excise tax because the mere right to 
own and to hold property could not be made the subject of an excise tax, 
and finally, that the tax could not be upheld under the exemption power, 
because the power to exempt the whole does not authorize a partial exemp-
tion conditional upon the property exempted paying an arbitrary percentage 
which was not proportional. Followed in principle in In re Opinion of the 
Justices, 220 Mass. 613,624, 108 N.E. 570 (1915). 
22 For example, Oliver v. Washington Mills, supra note 3; In re Opinion 
of the Justices, 195 Mass. 607 ( 1907), supra note 15; In re Opinion of the 
Justices, 208 Mass. 616,94- N.E. 1043 (1911); Perkins v. Westwood, supra 
note 20; In re Opinion of the Justices, 266 Mass. 583 (1929), supra note 
7. And see the discussions in Northampton v. Hampshire, 145 Mass. 108, 
13 N.E. 388 ( 1887); Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Comm., supra 
note 5. 
23 For example, Cheshire v. Berkshire, 118 Mass. 386 (1875); In re 
Opinion of the Justices, 22 0 Mass. 613 ( 1 915), supra note 21. 
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"partial exemption.m4 In addition, property may be taxed 
only by the ad valorem method. 25 
(2) Income tax 
The Massachusetts decisions that an income tax is a prop-
erty tax are perhaps the leading state court decisions which 
have taken this position. In a 1915 advisory opinion/6 the 
court said that a tax upon the income from property would be 
in effect a tax upon the property itself. Therefore, such a tax 
would be a property tax subject to the proportionality limita-
tion which requires absolute uniformity in effective rates. No 
ruling was made concerning income derived from salaries, 
wages, and the like. 
To overcome this ruling by the court, Amendment No. 
4427 was added to the Massachusetts Constitution in 1915. 
That amendment expressly authorizes a "tax on income" in 
the "manner provided." Income derived from different 
classes of property may be taxed at different rates, and in-
come not derived from property may be taxed at a lower 
rate than income derived from property. Exemptions from 
the tax may be made, and property, the income of which is 
taxed, may be exempted from all property taxation. 
The Massachusetts legislature subsequently enacted an 
income tax. But in one opinion concerning that tax, the court 
has stated that it was a property tax, and since Amendment 
44 does not authorize graduated rates, such a rate schedule 
would violate the proportionality clause requiring absolute 
uniformity.28 It was said that the only exception made to the 
24 See note 21, supra. 
25 See, for example, the discussions in Portland Bank v. Apthorp, supra 
note 4, and Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Comm., supra note 5. 
26 In re Opinion of the Justices, 220 Mass. 613 ( 191 5), supra note 22. 
Cf. the earlier case of Wilcox v. Middlesex, 103 Mass. 544 (1870). 
27 For the text of the amendment, see the Appendix, infra. 
28 In re Opinion of the Justices, 266 Mass. 583 (1929), supra note 7. 
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rule of proportionality by the amendment was to permit 
classification according to sources of income.29 
2. New Hampshire 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The first and only constitution of New Hampshire came 
into force in 1784. Three provisions of that constitution con-
cern uniformity of taxation. The basic uniformity clause, Art. 
5 of Pt. II, provides that the legislature may 
levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and 
taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and residents within, the 
said state; and upon all estates within the same. . . . 
In 1942, that provision was amended by the addition of a 
sentence providing for special treatment of forest lands.1 
A companion clause is found in Art. 12 of Pt. I (the Bill of 
Rights). It provides that: 
Every member of the community has a right to be pro-
tected by it, in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and prop-
erty; he is therefore bound to contribute his share in the 
expense of such protection. 2 
29 For permissible classifications, see Tax Comm'r v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 
5 22, 116 N .E. 904 ( 191 7) (rate levied upon gains from sales of intangible 
personal property at 3 o/o, with the rate upon the dividends from stock and 
interest on bonds and notes being 6%; upheld as a classification of two 
sources of income not belonging to the same "class") ; In re Opinion of the 
Justices, 270 Mass. 593, 170 N.E. 800 ( 1930) (minimum exemptions, 
upheld as reasonable classifications). 
1 The sentence reads: "For the purpose of encouraging conservation of 
the forest resources of the state, the general court may provide for special 
assessments, rates, and taxes on growing wood and timber." [Emphasis 
added.] 
2 In New Hampshire the court has tended to rely on both Art. 12 of Pt. 
I and Art. 5 of Pt. II in developing the uniformity limitation. For example, 
in a leading case the court said: " ... immunity from disproportional 
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The third important provision is found in Art. 6 of Pt. II 
which was amended in 1903 by the addition of a new clause 
which definitely enlarged the scope of the taxing power in 
New Hampshire and contained important implications for 
the meaning of the uniformity limitation. Article 6, as 
amended, reads: 
The public charges of government, or any part thereof, 
may be raised by taxation upon polls, estates, and other 
classes of property, including franchises and property when 
passing by will or inheritance .... 3 
In New Hampshire the uniformity in taxation limitation is 
closely intertwined with the problem of taxable objects, that 
is, types of permissible taxes. As a result, one cannot intelli-
gently deal with the problem of uniformity without first dis-
cussing the problem of taxable objects, concerning which 
New Hampshire has reached a unique result. 
b. Permissible taxes {u taxable objects") 
1784 to 1903. Under the original New Hampshire Con-
stitution it was firmly established that only the taxation of 
"polls and estates" was permissible. Thus, nonproperty taxes 
(alternately designated "excise" or "occupation" taxes), ex-
cluding poll taxes, were not permitted.4 The court did not 
find it necessary to elaborate upon the word "estates." The 
characterization of a tax was obviously of crucial importance. 
taxation [is] expressly reserved in our bill of rights, and the power of 
proportional taxation only [is] granted the legislature by the constitution . 
. • . "Curry v. Spencer, 61 N.H. 624, 631, 60 Am. Rep. 337 (1882}. 
3 The omitted part of Art. 6 provides for mandatory periodic valuations 
of property. Prior to 190 3 the provision was of no importance to the uni-
formity limitation, since it dealt only with the periodic valuation require-
ment. The original Art. 6 read: "And while the public charges of govern-
ment, or any part thereof, shall be assessed on polls and estates in the manner 
that has heretofore been practiced. • . ." 
4 See the cases in notes 5 and 6, infra. 
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Two legislative experimentations failed when a tax upon the 
gross receipts of express companies at a fixed percentage was 
held to be an excise tax and therefore invalid,O and the in-
heritance tax was held to be upon the privilege of receiving 
property, not upon the property itsel£.6 
The cases demonstrate the alternate reasons which sup-
ported this interpretation. In the gross receipts tax case the 
court emphasized that there was a failure to mention taxes 
other than those upon "polls and estates" in Arts. 5 and 6 of 
Pt. II. In addition, it was reasoned that Art. 5 was copied 
substantially from the Massachusetts uniformity provision, 
and that the framers omitted the clause found therein which 
expressly provided for "exciscs.117 On the other hand, in the 
inheritance tax case the court primarily relied upon the 
rationale that nonproperty taxes would be invalidated by the 
requirement of "proportionality" of taxation. Therefore, 
whether the tax was on property or on a privilege was im-
material, "for the same principle of equality and due propor-
tion applies to every species of tax alike."8 
1903 to the present. The 1903 amendment of Art. 6 of Pt. 
II did not permit the imposition of nonproperty taxes-that 
is, "excise" or "occupation" taxes. Property and polls are still 
the measure of the tax power. However, because of the new 
clause in Art. 6 there are now two general classes of taxes 
upon property. There may be taxes upon "estates," and there 
may be taxes upon "other classes of property." This dual 
classification is the obvious result of the phraseology intro-
duced by the new Art. 6: 
The public charges of government . . . may be raised by 
taxation upon polls, estates, and other classes of property, 
6 State v. United States & Canada Express Co., 60 N.H. 219 (1880). 
6 Curry v. Spencer, supra note 2. 
7 State v. United States & Canada Express Co., supra note 5 at 239. 
8 Curry v. Spencer, supra note 2 at 63 I. 
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including franchises and property when passing by will or 
inheritance. . . . 
Conner v. State9 is the leading case developing the signifi-
cance of this dual classification of permissible taxes. In that 
case the issue concerned the validity of a tax upon income 
from intangibles. A crucial question was whether Art. 6, as 
amended, enlarged the legislative power. The court reasoned 
that prior to 1903 under Art. 5 the legislature could tax 
"estates," which was, in effect, the taxation of the ownership, 
possession, or enjoyment of property. Also, it was well 
established that all property-real and personal, tangible 
and intangible-could be taxed as "estates." Therefore, the 
new reference to "other classes of property" than "estates" 
must have reference to some element other than the owner-
ship, possession, or enjoyment of property as the factor de-
termining the taxability of property under the new grant of 
authority. Thus, in the court's language, the "incidence" of a 
tax of the new type is to be characterized by some factor 
other than mere ownership, possession, or enjoyment. As an 
example, the court referred to the named class of property 
which passes by "will or inheritance." That property is taxed 
annually because of ownership. Yet such property might now 
be subject to an inheritance tax because of the fact that the 
"estate" has passed from the ancestor to heir. Without 
further elucidating the test, the court merely passed on the 
validity of the tax under consideration and ruled that the 
receipt of income was a sufficient factor or event to validate a 
tax on the income from intangibles. 
This determinant-something other than mere ownership, 
possession, or enjoyment of property-was identified more 
precisely in a subsequent advisory opinion. The pertinent 
9 82 N.H. 126, 127-128, 130 Atl. 357 (1925). 
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questions before the court in that opinion10 concerned the 
validity of both a general sales tax and a timber severance 
tax. In considering whether the taxes could be sustained as 
taxes other than upon "estates," the court cautioned that the 
power granted by the amended Art. 6 still had its limitations. 
To interpret the 1903 amendment as giving the legislature 
the power to impose "any kind of tax known" would be, in 
the view of the court, erroneous, 
. . . since the power given still relates to property taxation 
only; yet the amendment ... contains a grant of a broad 
and general power. Authority is thereby given to lay various 
kinds of ad valorem taxes upon property, incident upon some 
characteristic event, which may fairly be considered to reason-
ably delimit a class of property, so that selection cannot be 
rejected as arbitrary if the event itself affords some rational 
basis for the imposition of a tax.11 
Thus, property may now be taxed once by the general prop-
erty tax, which is characterized as an "estates" tax. But the 
same property may also now be classified by some "character-
istic event" and taxed again as property "if the event itself 
affords some rational basis for the imposition of a tax." 
10 In re Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 574-577, 149 Atl. 321 
(1930). 
11 /d. at p. 576, emphasis supplied. The court made the following in-
teresting observation in rejecting the notion that any and all excise taxes 
were now permissible (at p. 576): 
It is immaterial whether such taxes are called excises or something else. In 
the sense that they are dynamic rather than static, that their incidence 
is dependent upon the happening of an event rather than upon the mere 
existence of property, they may properly enough be classed as excises. In 
the features of being laid upon property and ad valorem, they are like 
estate taxes. 
Thus if such taxes are properly called excises this does not prove that all 
kinds of excises are permitted. The limitation of Art. 6 is fixed by its lan-
guage, asserted the court, not by "classifications by economists." 
\ 
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Other cases support the rationale of these two leading 
opinions.12 
Therefore a unique situation is found in New Hampshire. 
Only "property" taxes may be imposed. However, the 
apparent rigidity of such a limitation is avoided by the use 
of a second category of "property" taxes which in its practical 
effect permits the imposition of most, but not quite all, of 
the taxes characterized as nonproperty or excise taxes in the 
other forty-seven jurisdictions. For example, before 1903 an 
inheritance ta:-s; was said to be a privilege tax and therefore 
prohibited.13 But after the 1903 amendment to Art. 6 the 
court noted that such a tax was expressly permitted by Art. 6. 
And the tax was held to be a tax upon a distinct class of prop-
erty characterized by the passing of such property by will 
or intestacy.14 Similar rulings and counterrulings are found 
concerning selective or general franchise taxes.15 Also ap-
proved as being taxes upon classes of property characterized 
12 See, for example: Thompson v. Kidder, 74 N.H. 89, 65 Atl. 392 
(1906) (inheritance tax); Williams v. State, 81 N.H. 341, 125 At!. 661 
( 1924) (inheritance tax); In re Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 13 8 
At!. 284 ( 1927) (general occupation tax; income tax; corporate franchise 
tax); Havensv.Atty. Gen.,91 N.H.115, 14A. 2d636 (1940) (tobacco 
products sales tax); Opinion of the Justices, 94 N.H. 506, 52 A. 2d 294 
(1947) (sale of soft drinks); Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 537,64 
A. 2d 320 (1949) (gross income tax). 
13 Curry v. Spencer, supra note 2. 
14 Thompson v. Kidder, supra note 12. 
15 State v. United States & Canada Express Co., supra note 5, holding 
that a tax on the gross receipts of express companies was a privilege tax; In 
re Opinion of the Justices, 8 2 N.H. 5 61 ( 1 9 2 7), supra note 12, ruling that 
both the franchise "to be" a corporation and the franchise "to do" corpo-
rate business might be taxed as classes of property under Art. 6; In re 
Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559 (1930), supra note 10, ruling that a 
tax on the franchise of public utilities would be valid. But see Opinion of 
the Justices, 95 N.H. 543,64 A. 2d 324 (1949), in which the court said 
that a proposed amendment to the public utilities franchise tax, which 
would have changed the base-rate to y,i of 1 mill for each kilowatt hour of 
electricity produced, would have converted the tax from one upon a class 
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by an "event" are a timber severance tax, 16 general and selec-
tive sales taxes, 17 and a tax upon income.18 Disapproved was 
an "occupation" tax on businesses and occupations in gen-
eral.19 
The rigidity of this second category of "property" taxes 
has been avoided in some cases by characterizing the revenue 
producer as a "toll" or "charge," and not a "tax." For ex-
ample, the "fuel tax" was so characterized.20 Nevertheless, 
this unique situation must be kept in mind when making a 
comparative study, because the designation of a tax-for 
example, an income tax or an inheritance tax-as a "prop-
erty" tax in New Hampshire is the sine qua non of its exist-
ence. The exact opposite will more than likely be the case in 
other jurisdictions. There the struggle will be to characterize 
a tax, such as an income tax, as a non property tax. 
c. Meaning of tlze uniformity limitation 
Prior to 1903, the uniformity limitation21 was said to apply 
to "all species of taxes," but, as pointed out above, only the 
of property to one upon a privilege disconnected with any class of property. 
Therefore, the tax would have been an "excise" tax of the type still not 
permitted in New Hampshire. 
16 In re Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 574-575 (1930), supra 
note I D. 
17 /d. at 575-577, approving the principle of a general retail sales tax. 
See Havens v. Atty. Gen., supra note 12, upholding a tobacco products 
sales tax; and Opinion of the Justices, 94 N.H. 5 06 ( 194 7), supra note 
12, approving a selective sales tax on bottled soft drinks. 
18 See the text at notes 4 5-5 I, infra. 
19 In re Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561 (1927), supra note 12. 
Also see Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 55 5, 65 A. 2d 876 ( 1949) ruling 
that a proposed assessment of one cent a bushel on all commercial apples 
grown in the state to promote the sale and use of apples would be an excise 
tax and not permitted. 
20 See note 44, infra. 
21 This refers to the requirement found alternately in Art. 5 of Pt. II and 
Art. 12 of Pt. I. See note 2, supra. 
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taxation of estates and polls was permissible. A further dis-
tinction was made to the effect that correlation of the uni-
formity in taxes on estates and taxes on polls was impossible 
because of fundamental differences in the two types of taxes. 22 
Thus, the ground was laid for the development of the similar 
rule after 1903. Subsequent to 1903 and the establishment 
of the power of the legislature to tax property by either of 
two types of "property" taxes, the court held that the rule of 
uniformity derived from Art. 5 of Pt. II and Art. 12 of Pt. I 
was still applicable to "all" taxes, including taxes upon 
"other classes of property" as well as taxes upon "estates." 
However, there was no requirement that there be a correla-
tion of uniformity as between a tax upon "estates" and taxes 
upon "other classes of property," nor as among the several 
taxes upon "other classes of property."23 The court relied 
upon the rationale which supported the ruling that no corre-
lation of uniformity was necessary between a "poll" tax and 
an "estate" tax-namely, that there are fundamental differ-
ences in the types of taxes. 
For comparative purposes it will be helpful to consider the 
meaning of the uniformity limitation separately as to the two 
basic types of taxes: taxes upon "estates" and taxes upon 
"other classes of property." These two categories conform 
roughly, but only roughly, to the property and nonproperty 
tax dichotomy. 
( 1) Property taxation: taxation of ((estates" 
The uniformity limitation applicable to the taxation of 
"estates" was unchanged by the 1903 amendment to Art. 6 
which broadened the scope of the taxing power in New 
Hampshire. Therefore, cases dated either before or after 
22 See Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Manchester, 70 N.H. 336, 46 Atl. 470 
(1900). 
23 See the cases in note 40, infra. 
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1903 may be cited indiscriminately in developing this limita-
tion. For the purpose of taxing property as "estates" all 
property constitutes a single class, but there is no requirement 
of universality, either as to selection or exemption. It is 
within the power of the legislature either to select less than 
all property for taxation on the basis of "mere ownership, 
possession or enjoyment," or, by general law, to provide for 
the exemption of classes of property.24 Property may be 
classified for the purpose of exemption on the basis of use, 
purpose, or inherent characteristics. The New Hampshire 
court has continuously reiterated that, while an inequality of 
taxes is forbidden, this does not include the inequality which 
is admittedly caused by taxing some property and not taxing 
other.25 
However, the power to exempt property is hedged by 
another limitation in addition to reasonable classifications. 
Exemptions must be supported by what is called "just 
reasons," a test which is met when the public welfare is bene-
fited.26 This additional limitation of "just reasons" appears to 
be, however, more illusory than real. For example, as stated 
in a recent advisory opinion,27 which approved the exemption 
24 In In re Opinion of the Justices, 77 N.H. 611, 93 Atl. 311 (191S) 
the court ruled that the legislature could either select for, or exempt from 
taxation as "estates" the following intangible property: bonds, notes, interest 
bearing credits, and corporate stock. In In re Opinion of the Justices, 84 
N.H. SS9 (1930), supra note 10, the court ruled that standing timber 
could be exempt from taxation as "estates." Also see Brewster v. Hough, I 0 
N.H. 138 ( 1839); Canaan v. Enfield Village Fire District, 74 N.H. S17, 
70 At!. 2SO (1908); Eyers Woolen Co. v. Town of Gilsum, 84 N.H. I, 
146 Atl. Sll ( 1929); State v. Berlin Street Ry., 84 N.H. 313, ISO Atl. 
14 (1930); and Opinion of the Justices, 9S N.H. S48, 65 A. 2d 700 
(1949). 
25 Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. S48, 5SO (1949), supra note 24. 
26 /d. at SSI, citing Rosenblum v, Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 321, 197 Atl. 
701 (1938). 
27 /d. at 5 SO. 
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by general law of certain privately owned airports from 
property taxation, 28 the legislature has a wide discretion in 
the selective process of classifying property for exemption 
and determining the existence of "just reasons" therefor. But 
it appears that any attempt to grant quantitative minimum 
exemptions will stand a substantial chance of running afoul 
the "just reason" limitation. 29 
Once property is selected for taxation as "estates" there 
may be no further classification. Absolute uniformity must 
prevail as to the effective rate applicable to all property taxed 
by a single taxing jurisdiction. This applies to both the ratio 
of valuation30 and the percentage rate.31 When ruling that 
the taxation of standing timber at 7 5% of its full value 
would violate the rule of proportionality if other property 
was taxed at full value, 32 the court said: 
A change in either factor, the rate or the valuation, affects 
the product, which is the tax, in the same way; and in order 
28 The requirement that exemptions be by general laws has been a much 
greater obstacle. See, for example, the discussion in Eyers Woolen Co. v. 
Town of Gilsum, supra note 24-. 
29 See note 39, infra. 
30 In re Opinion of the Justices, 76 N.H. 609,85 Atl. 757 (1913); 
French v. Lyme, 77 N.H. 63, 86 Atl. 823 ( 1913); Bow v. Farrand, 77 
N.H. 4-51, 92 Atl. 926 (1915); In re Opinion of the Justices, 76 N.H. 
588,78 Atl. 31 (1911); Rollins v. City of Dover, 93 N.H. 4-48,44- A. 2d 
113 ( 194-5). And see the recent case, Bemis Bro. Bag Co. v. Claremont, 98 
N.H. 4-46,4-51, 102 A. 2d 512 (1953), in which the court held that the 
assessment of plaintiff's stock in trade at its full market value and real estate 
and other such property at varying percentages lower than its market value 
was a "violation of the constitutional requirements of proportionality and 
equality." 
31 State v. United States & Canada Express Co., supra note 5; Curry v. 
Spencer, supra note 2; In re Opinion of the Justices, 76 N.H. 588, supra 
note 3 0. In re Opinion of the Justices, 77 N.H. 611 ( 1915), supra note 24. 
32 But see the 194-2 amendment to Art. 5, in note I, supra, which per-
mits special treatment for forest lands, interpreted in In re Opinion of the 
Justices, 114- A. 2d 327 (1955). 
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that the tax may be equal and proportional, all property must 
be valued alike and taxed at the same rate. 33 
As would be expected, the taxation of "estates" must be by 
the ad valorem method.34 Specific taxation of "estates" is 
prohibited. 
(2) Property taxation: taxation of "other classes of 
property" 
Taxes upon "other classes of property," imposed pursuant 
to the authority of Art. 6, as amended, are limited by the 
proportionality clause in Art. 5,35 but as stated above there 
need be no "correlation" of uniformity among such taxes. 
The objects of such taxes must be reasonable classes of 
property, classified according to some characteristic event. 36 
33 In re Opinion of the Justices, 76 N.H. 609, 611 (1913), supra note 
30. And see the excellent discussion of the concept of effective rates in 
Brock v. Town of Farmington, 98 N.H. 275, 98 A. 2d 162 {1953). 
34 Sec, for example, Opinion of the Justices, 4 N.H. 565 ( 1828), supra 
note 30; State v. United States & Canada Express Co., supra note 5. And 
see In re Opinion of the Justices, 76 N.H. 588, 591 (1911), supra note 30. 
35 They arc also limited by Art. 12 of Pt. I. See notes 2 and 21, supra. 
36 See, for example, Thompson v. Kidder, supra note 12 (inheritance 
tax: property passing by will or inheritance; under a collateral inheritance 
tax, the selection of only that property passing to collateral heirs was up-
held); Conner v. State, supra note 9 (intangibles income tax; the selection 
of only the income from intangibles of individuals thus excluding corporate 
income was upheld); In re Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 564-566 
( 1927), supra note 12 (franchises are valid classes of property; but if fran-
chises "to do" are taxed, since such franchises are granted to other than 
corporations, franchises exercised by other than corporations must be taxed); 
In re Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 564-570 (1930), supra note 
1 0 (tax on franchise of gas and electric utilities, valid classification based 
on use of property in described business; may exclude other franchises 
exercised); id. at 571-573 (tax on earned income; would be an invalid 
discrimination to exclude corporate earned income, distinguishing exclusion 
of income of corporations under intangibles income tax); id. at 574-575 
(selection of standing timber; tax imposed on same when severed, a distinc-
tive class), and see the discussion of the yield tax, imposed upon the stump-
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In later decisions the court has tended to permit a greater 
legislative discretion in determining what is to constitute a 
reasonable class of property. 37 As in the taxation of "estates," 
exemptions may be made from the class of property selected 
to be the object of a tax, but such exemptions must also con-
form to the "just reasons" test.38 In this respect, in an ad-
visory opinion the court has ruled that any quantitative mini-
mum exemptions are justified only on the basis that the 
holders are too poor to pay and that the public welfare is 
benefited by the exemption; and the court apparently will re-
quire such minimum exemptions to be a small amount.39 
age value of growing wood and timber, in Brock v. Town of Farmington, 
supra note 33; In re Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 575-577 
( 19 3 0), supra note 1 0 (retail sales tax; a valid class of property is that 
passing from seller to buyer); Havens v. Atty. Gen., supra note 12 (tobacco 
products sales tax; in a divided opinion, tobacco products sold were upheld 
as a distinctive class which was not too narrow); Opinion of the Justices, 94 
N.H. 506 (1947), supra note 12 (sales tax on bottled soft drinks; valid 
class). 
37 For example, although in the Havens case, supra note 36, there was a 
vigorous dissent directed against a selective sales tax (tobacco products) as 
being too narrow, in a subsequent advisory opinion, 94 N.H. 506, supra 
note 36, a selective sales tax on bottled soft drinks was approved without any 
dissent. Also note the small class of incomes approved as the object of a tax 
in the Conner case, supra note 36. But see the recent advisory opinion in 
which the court ruled that the legislature could not constitutionally impose 
a tax upon the sale of cigarettes at the rate of 20% of their value while im-
posing a tax upon the sale of other tobacco products at 1 5% of the value. 
In re Opinion of the Justices, II 3 Atl. 2d I I 9 ( 19 55). The court distin-
guished a prior 19 5 I advisory opinion, 97 N.H. 5 46, 81 A. 2d 8 53 ( 19 51), 
in which it had ruled that cigarettes were a distinctive class of property and 
might be selected as a class by themselves for the purposes of taxation. 
38 See, for example, In re Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 566-
574 (1927),supranote 12. 
39 See, for example, In re Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 571-
573 (1930), supra note 10, in which the court felt that a proposed mini-
mum exemption of $3,500 for the head of a family, plus $400 for each 
dependent, appeared to be in excess of what was permissible. The same was 
said for the exemption of the income of persons earning under $2,000. Such 
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Insofar as proportionality is required of the objects of 
taxes on "other classes of property," the requirement is 
hardly more stringent than the usual uniformity within 
classes required of nonproperty taxes in other states. How-
ever, the uniformity required of rates and methods of taxa-
tion marks the divergence of the New Hampshire limitation 
from the usual requirement imposed on nonproperty taxes. 
As in the taxation of property as "estates," an absolute uni-
formity is required of the rate to be imposed by any particu-
lar tax on "other classes of property." While the rates need 
not be correlated as between or among the several such taxes, 
nevertheless once a class of property is selected as the object 
of a tax, then the same rate must apply to the entire class.40 
Thus, the classification for varying rates according to rela-
tionship to the deceased as found in an inheritance tax was 
held to be "disproportional,"41 and graduated rates would be 
invalid for the same reason.42 
an excessive exemption was compared to a graduated rate, which was said 
to be prohibited (see note 42, infra) because "A tax levy cannot be sus-
tained here upon any theory that the richer one is the higher his tax rate 
should be .... It is only upon the narrow ground [that the exempted 
party is too poor to pay] .•. that any substantial quantitative exemption 
to the individual can be sustained." The court scaled down the amounts it 
had previously ruled as "fair" in In re Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 
561, 5 70, supra note 12. 
4° For example, Opinion of the Justices, 81 N.H. 552, 120 Atl. 629 
(1923); Williams v. State, supra note 12; Foster v. Farrand, 81 N.H. 448, 
128 Ad. 683 (1925); In re Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 571-
5 73 ( 1930), supra note I 0; Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 5 37 ( 1949), 
supra note 12; Brock v. Town of Farmington, supra note 33. Also see the 
recent advisory opinion in which the court indicated that the legislature 
could change the rate for the tax upon incomes (interest and dividend) 
from the average rate of taxation levied upon other property throughout the 
state to a rate of 2,0%- In re Opinion of the Justices, 112 Ad. 2d 44 
(1955). 
41 Foster v. Farrand, supra note 39, reversing In re Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 76 N.H. 597,79 Atl. 490 {1911). 
42 Williams v. State, 81 N.H. 552 (1924), 1upra note 12; In re Opinion 
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The limitation that particularly emphasizes the fact that 
the second principal category of permissible taxes is con-
sidered to consist of taxes upon property is the requirement 
that such taxes be imposed by the ad valorem method, which 
would invalidate the use of a specific base-rate structure.43 It 
is this limitation which would severely limit the New Hamp-
shire legislature in providing for a flexible over-all tax struc-
ture if the limitation were strictly applied. However, that 
result is avoided by calling some revenue producers 
"charges" or "tolls" rather than taxes, with the result that 
they are not subject to either the proportionality limitation or 
the prohibition against the imposition of "excises." For ex-
ample, that was the result when the validity of the fuel tax, 
with a specific base-rate structure, was challenged.44 Thus, 
while this requirement will invalidate in some instances some 
of the taxes commonly used in most other states, this is not a 
of the Justices, 81 N.H. 5 52 ( 1923), mpra note 40. See note 39, supra. In 
a recent advisory opinion, Opinion of the Justices, 113 A. Zd 547 ( 195 5), 
the court ruled that a proposed tax of I 0 per cent of the federal income tax 
paid by every individual resident of the state would be a graduated tax and 
therefore unconstitutional. As the court stated, (at p. 548): 
We recognize that the rate proposed is a flat or uniform rate of ten per 
cent. Such a rate applied directly to income would produce a tax per-
mitted by the Constitution. But the proposal is to apply it to amounts 
which are different percentages of the net incomes of the various taxpay-
ers, graduated according to the size of their incomes. It follows that a tax 
produced by superimposing a flat rate upon the products of graduated 
rates will be a graduated tax. 
43 See, for example, Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 555 (1949), supra 
note 19, ruling against a proposed assessment of one cent a bushel on all 
commercial apples grown in the state to promote the sale and use of apples. 
See Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 543 (1949), supra note 15, disap-
proving a proposed amendment to the utilities franchise tax, which would 
have changed the base-rate to mills per kilowatt hour of electricity produced. 
44 In re Opinion of the Justices, 81 N.H. 552, 554-555 (1923), ;upra 
note 40. The tax was imposed upon motor vehicles fuels sold in the state at a 
rate of two cents per gallon. The court stated that this was the ground upon 
which the state regulation system for automobiles was sustained. 
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foregone conclusion. Moreover, the tax structure in New 
Hampshire does not substantially deviate from the usual 
state structure regardless of the name given the revenue 
producers-''taxes" or "tolls" or "charges." 
(3) Income tax 
The New Hampshire decisions concerning the nature and 
validity of an income tax must be carefully distinguished 
when used for comparative purposes because of the unique 
situation in New Hampshire. The first relevant decision was 
an advisory opinion45 in which the court ruled that income 
from intangibles (interest or dividends from bonds, notes, 
interest bearing credits, and corporate stock) could be taxed 
at the same rate as that levied upon all other property in the 
taxing district; 46 in other words, that income could be taxed 
by the "estates" tax. In a vigorous dissent Justice Peaslee 
contended that the tax under consideration would be in 
reality an income tax, and that an income tax is an excise tax 
and, therefore, not permissible under the New Hampshire 
Constitution. 
Subsequently, the legislature imposed the intangibles in-
come tax in its original form, and in Conner v. State47 the tax 
was upheld. However, the basis of the decision shifted from 
that relied on in the advisory opinion. The tax as enacted im-
posed a single rate upon all such income, but a rate different 
from that applicable under the general property tax. The 
court held that the tax was valid under the amended Art. 6 
45 In re Opinion of the Justices, 77 N.H. 611 ( 1915), supra note 24-. 
46 The court at the same time said that the intangible producing property 
itself might be exempted from taxation as "estates." Prior to this opinion the 
court had ruled that both the intangible property and the income produced 
thereby could be taxed by the general property tax without being "double 
taxation" contrary to the rule of proportionality. In re Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 76 N.H. 588 (1911 ), supra note 30. 
47 Supra note 9. 
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as a tax upon "other classes of property."48 Therefore, a cor-
relation between the income tax rate and the rate of either 
the general property tax or any other taxes was not necessary. 
The prior advisory opinion was distinguished on the follow-
ing basis: the decisions in no way conflicted, the prior advi-
sory opinion related only to the taxation of income as 
"estates," which is permissible. That opinion did not rule out 
the separate classification of income to be taxed as "other 
classes of property." It is particularly interesting to note 
that Justice Peaslee wrote the opinion in the Conner case, 
and thereby rejected his dissent in the prior advisory opinion 
insofar as it assumed that there was no constitutional warrant 
for the imposition of an income tax. Thus he rejected his 
prior contention that an income tax is necessarily an excise or 
non property tax. But this later decision by Justice Peaslee 
must be always considered in light of the unique situation in 
New Hampshire, in which a second category of "property" 
taxes is substantially similar to the nonproperty or excise 
taxes of other states. 
In subsequent advisory opinions the court has cautioned 
that all income taxed must be taxed at the same rate/9 and 
that any minimum exemptions must be limited in amount to 
what the justices considered "fair."50 It has also ruled51 that 
while less than all income might be selected for such a tax, 
nevertheless to tax the earned income of individuals only, 
excluding earned income of corporations, would be an invalid 
discrimination. However, the only income tax ever actually 
48 The characteristic event on which the classification of the income was 
based was said to be the receipt of income. 
49 In re Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 566-574 {1927), supra 
note 12. Also see Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 537 {1949), supra note 
12, ruling the same as to a tax upon "gross income." 
I>Q See note 3 9, supra. 
51 Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 571-573 {1930), supra note 
10. 
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imposed in New Hampshire is the present intangibles in-
come tax. 
D. ANALYSES OF STATES WITH TYPE IV CLAUSES 
1. Michigan 
a. The provisions; historical note 
In the first Michigan Constitution, dated 1835, there were 
no provisions dealing with problems of uniformity in taxa-
tion. Michigan has had two subsequent constitutions, dated 
1850 and 1908, respectively, but the uniformity structure 
has remained substantially unchanged since 1850. In the 
present Michigan Constitution of 1908 there are two princi-
pal provisions concerning uniformity of taxation. Article X, 
§3, contains the basic uniformity clause comparable to that 
found in other constitutions, and it reads: 
The legislature shall provide by law a uniform rule of 
taxation, except on property paying specific taxes, and taxes 
shall be levied on such property as shall be prescribed by 
law .... 1 
1 The second clause of Art. X, §3, which is omitted, deals, in combina-
tion with Art. X, §5, with a special problem. The two sections provide for 
an exception to the rule of uniformity for ad valorem taxation insofar as 
property of corporations and property used for public utility purposes is 
concerned. This property may be centrally assessed and taxed at a separate 
average rate. For text of the provisions, see Appendix A, infra. 
In the 1850 constitution Art. XIV, §II was identical with the first clause 
of the present Art. X, §3, except that the words "by law" preceding "a 
uniform rule" did not appear. In 1900 Art. XIV, §II was amended by the 
addition of a second clause substantially similar to the present second clause 
of Art. X, § 3. Art. XIV, §I 0, infra note 2, was amended by the addition 
of a provision substantially similar to the present Art. X, §5. Thus, the 
special treatment of the property mentioned in the first paragraph of this 
note dates from 1900. 
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The other principal provision, Art. X, §4, contains a separate 
uniformity clause for the second category of taxes in Michi-
gan. Section 4 reads: 
The legislature may by law impose specific taxes, which 
shall be uniform upon the classes upon which they operate.2 
A minor provision for our purposes, Art. X, § 7 ,S provides 
that "All assessments hereafter authorized shall be on prop-
erty at its cash value." 
b. Application of the uniformity limitation 
For purposes of uniformity of taxation in Michigan, taxes 
are grouped into two categories: ad valorem and specific.4 
The applicable rule of uniformity depends upon the nature 
of the tax. Broadly stated, ad valorem taxes are limited by 
Art. X, §3, while specific taxes are limited by Art. X, §4.11 
The statement of this general principle leaves the most im-
portant question unanswered. What is the basis of the distinc-
tion between ad valorem and specific taxes? Since the 
"uniformity clause" of Art. X, §3 is a more strict require-
ment than the "uniformity clause" of Art. X, §4, it becomes 
of crucial importance to be able clearly to designate a given 
tax as either ad valorem or specific. 
In the other states, the constitutions of which have any 
form of uniformity clause, the applicable rules of uniformity 
2 This provision did not appear in the 1850 constitution. However, Art. 
XIV, § 10 of that constitution did provide expressly for certain specific taxes: 
" ... The legislature may provide for the collection of specific taxes from 
banking, railroad, plank-road, and other corporations hereafter created." 
3 Art. XIV, §12 of the 1850 constitution. 
4 This division is derived from the key words in the uniformity clause of 
Art. X, §3: "a uniform rule of taxation, except on property paying specific 
taxes." The term "ad valorem" is not actually used in the constitution. 
fi For example, Shapero v. State Department of Revenue, 3 22 Mich. 124, 
140-141, 33 N.W. 2d 729 (1948). Also see the cases discussed in notes 
50, 52-54 infra. 
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are determined by the basic distinction made between prop-
erty taxes as contrasted to nonproperty taxes.6 Thus, the 
characterization of taxes for purposes of uniformity in taxa-
tion ordinarily depends on the object of the tax-namely, 
whether the object is property or otherwise. Having de-
termined that the nature of a given tax is property or 
nonproperty, one particular question which arises in all other 
states is whether or not property must be taxed ad valorem 
in order to satisfy the requirement of the "uniformity 
clause" which limits property taxation. More often than not, 
the answer is yes. Thus, the application of the "uniformity 
clause" is determined by the object of the tax (i.e., whether 
property or non property), while the method used to tax 
property (i.e., ad valorem or specific) is determined by the 
applicable rules of uniformity. 
This orthodox approach has not been followed in Michi-
gan. Rather the basic classification of taxes in Michigan, for 
the purpose of determining applicable rules of uniformity, 
is that of ad valorem and specific taxes. Each category is 
governed by a different uniformity limitation. Moreover, the 
term "specific" is used in two distinct ways. First, it is used to 
denote all taxes which may be described as nonproperty 
taxes; second, to denote property taxes which have a base 
other than "according to the value" of the property taxed.7 
Thus, the applicable rules of uniformity in Michigan are de-
termined by both the object and the base of taxes. Regardless 
of the method used in imposing a nonproperty tax, such a tax 
is a "specific" tax for purposes of uniformity in Michigan 
6 Perhaps New Hampshire might be added as another exception. See 
Part C of this chapter, supra. But note the basic similarity of the classifica-
tion in that state to the distinction which is usually made, even though only 
taxes upon property are permitted. 
7 This is clearly demonstrated by the opinion in Union Trust Co. v. 
Wayne Probate Judge, 125 Mich. 487,84 N.W. 1101 (1901). See notes 
17 through 22, infra and text thereto. 
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constitutional law. However, if a tax has property as its ob-
ject, then the nature of the tax is determined by the base 
used, i.e., the method used for taxing the property. Thus, for 
property taxes, in Michigan, the method used to tax prop-
erty (i.e., ad valorem or specific) determines the applicable 
rules of uniformity-which is the reverse of the situation 
found in the other states. 
( 1) Distinction between ad valorem and specific taxes 
The most important problem, for the purposes of this 
monograph, concerns the test which is used to distinguish 
between a specific property tax and an ad valorem property 
tax.8 This issue has never been resolved to the extent that a 
clearly identified and easily applied rule is available. It will 
be helpful to review the relevant cases at some length before 
reaching any general conclusion as to this test. The first such 
case is Pingree v. Auditor General.9 The issue in that case 
concerned the validity of "An act to provide for the assess-
8 This distinction is valid regardless of some rather ambiguous language 
in some recent specific nonproperty tax cases, in which the court appears to 
oppose the term "specific taxes" to all "property taxes." For example, see 
Banner Laundering Co. v. State Board of Tax Admin., 297 Mich. 4-I9, 
4-27-428, 4-29, 298 N.W. 73 (I941) (general use tax), and Smith Co. v. 
Fitzgerald, 270 Mich. 659,672-673, 259 N.W. 352 (1935) (chain store 
tax). However, in the same paragraphs of these same opinions there is lan-
guage which apparently refers to "property paying specific taxes." These 
statements must be taken in context. In the above cases the allegations were 
simply that the taxes under consideration were "property taxes" within Art. 
X, §3 limitation. The court in ruling on this issue falls into the approach 
of courts in other jurisdictions wherein the general distinction for the 
applicability of the uniformity limitations is between property and non-
property taxes. This possible confusion in the language of the specific 
nonproperty tax cases serves to emphasize the uniqueness of the Michigan 
situation as to the applicability of its uniformity limitations. 
9 I20 Mich. 95, 78 N.W. I025 (1899). The decision was made under 
Art. XIV, §II of the I8 50 constitution, which was identical to the present 
Art. X, §3 in so far as the basic uniformity clause is concerned. See supra 
note I. 
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ment and taxation of telegraph and telephone lines within 
the State of Michigan."10 As viewed by the court, the sub-
stance of that act required certain state officers to assess tele-
graph and telephone lines at their true cash value, and to levy 
a tax upon that assessment at a rate equal to the average state 
and local rates levied throughout the state during the pre-
vious year.11 The tax was to be in lieu of all other taxes. 
In rendering the opinion of the court/2 after quoting at 
length from leading writers concerning the definitions of 
specific and ad valorem, Justice Hooker referred to certain 
statutes in force at the time the constitution of 1850 was 
adopted. He asserted that these statutes, as well as the defi-
nitions by the writers quoted by him, were indicative of the 
meaning of the term "specific taxes" as used in the constitu-
tional provisions.13 Of those statutes in force at the time the 
constitution of 1850 was adopted, Judge Hooker used cer-
tain taxes relating to banks, and to railroad, canal, and turn-
pike companies as the basis for the following significant 
statement: 
It will be noticed that they were not based upon the actual 
value of the real and personal property in possession of the 
companies at the time, but upon the amount of capital that 
had been previously invested in their business. The interposi-
10 Mich. Laws 1881, Act No. 168. 
11 /d. at 96. 
12 The court consisted of five judges at the time this case was decided. 
Hooker, J. gave the opinion of the court which was concurred in by all 
other judges. This is mentioned because separate concurring opinions 
were written by Montgomery (concurred in by all except Hooker) and 
Grant. It is from these two concurring opinions that many of the quota-
tions are taken when this case is used as authority for the distinction 
between specific and ad valorem taxes. However, it is the opinion of Hooker 
that is decisive, and it is in that opinion that the rationale is most clearly 
stated. 
13 /d. at 97-100. The provisions were Art. XIV, §§I 0 and 11 of the 
1850 constitution. See JUpro note 1. 
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tion of no assessing officer was required to value the prop-
erty.H 
Justice Hooker described the procedure used under those 
taxes in the following manner: "Reports were made by the 
companies, and the state treasurer was to determine the 
amount of the tax after making a deduction from the amount 
of capital stock equal in amount to such real and personal 
property of the banks as was locally assessed and taxed." 
Therefore, the opinion concluded: 
In view of these laws, some of which continued in force after 
the adoption of the Constitution, we are satisfied that the 
convention understood the meaning of the term "specific 
taxes," and used it in no other than the common and well-
settled sense of the term, which they understood to imply a 
tax which was made specific in rate and arbitrary in its stand-
ards, requiring no assessment beyond a mathematical com-
putation.15 
In further explanation of the term "specific taxes," Justice 
Hooker quoted Cooley's treatise on taxation as follows: 
. . . As regards all such [specific] taxes, the law by which 
they are laid is of itself a complete apportionment. Ministe-
rial officers have nothing to do but to list the subjects of 
taxation; ... ascertain the number, weight, measurement, 
etc., when taxation depends upon it; and collect the sum 
which the law has definitely fixed. . . . (Cooley, Taxation 
[2d ed.], 238).16 
Having held that the tax was for these reasons an ad valorem 
property tax, Judge Hooker went on to rule that the tax 
violated the "uniformity clause" applicable to such taxes. 
The next relevant case is Union Trust Co. v. Wayne Pro-
14 /d. at I 00-10 I. Emphasis supplied. 
15 /d. at I 0 I. Emphasis supplied. 
16 Ibid. 
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bate Judge. 17 The issue in that case concerned the validity of 
the Inheritance Tax Act of 1899.18 Justice Hooker also wrote 
this opinion. The details of the tax were not discussed in the 
opinion. However, it is clear from the opinion that the court 
had closely scrutinized the base of this tax. The act provided 
that the tax was to be at a specified rate "upon the clear mar-
ket value of such property" transferred by methods described 
in the act.19 Section 11 of the act is most significant. It pro-
vided that: 
The judge of probate . . . shall . . . appoint a com-
petent person as appraiser to fix the fair market value at the 
time of the transfer thereof, of property of persons whose 
estate shall be subject to the payment of any tax imposed by 
this act. . . . Provided, however, That when such estate, 
income or interest shall be of such a nature that its fair and 
clear market value cannot be ascertained at such time, it shall 
be appraised in like manner at the time when such value first 
became ascertainable. . . . 
Section 12 of the act provided for the proceedings by ap-
praisers, and these officials were clearly to exercise judgment 
in determining the "clear market value" of the property 
concerned. They were empowered to take evidence in reach-
ing a conclusion as to the "market value." Thus, it is clear 
that the determination of the value, used as a base for this 
tax, was more than a mere "mathematical computation"-
the term used by Judge Hooker in the Pingree case. 
As in the Pingree case, the court had to determine the na-
ture of the inheritance tax in order to determine the validity 
of the tax under the Michigan uniformity limitations. The 
court stated that if the tax was upon property then it was 
17 Supra note 7. 
18 Mich. Laws 1899, Act No. 188. That act is the basis for the inherit-
ance tax in force today, although it has been frequently amended. 
19 U. §§1 and 2. 
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contrary to the uniformity clause applicable to ad valorem 
taxation, unless it could be called a specific tax upon property 
and therefore within the exception to the rule of uniform-
ity.20 However, the court seemed to be of the opinion that the 
tax, if upon property, was clearly ad valorem. This is under-
standable in view of the base of the tax as described above. 
Justice Hooker stated: 
The conclusion that this statute imposes an ad valorem tax 
upon property can only be avoided by saying that it is not a 
tax upon the property, and that, therefore, the ad valorem 
feature, which, so far as assessment upon the value is con-
cerned, is certainly present, is wanting, because it is not an 
assessment upon the value of the property taxed. In short, 
the claim of the respondent is that this is a tax upon a privi-
lege, viz., the privilege of succession. . . . 21 
Justice Hooker also quoted approvingly from the concurring 
opinions in the Pingree case to the effect that "A tax based 
upon the assessed cash value of the property is not a specific 
tax." 
The court went on to hold that the inheritance tax was 
upon a privilege, and, therefore, was not an "ad valorem" 
tax-that is, the term ad valorem for purposes of uniformity 
is limited solely to ad valorem property taxation. The use of 
value (assessed value) as a base for privileges taxed was held 
not to change the nature of a specific nonproperty tax. In this 
respect the Pingree case was said to have "involved a tax 
upon property, and the discussion of the subject therein was 
limited to specific taxes upon property, although other spe-
cific taxes-such as taxes upon occupations and privileges-
were recognized."22 
The next case of interest, although it offers little enlight-
20 Union Trust Co. v. Wayne Probate Judge, supra note 7 at 490. 
21 !d. at 491. Emphasis by the court. 
22 /d. at 492-493. 
UNIFORMITY STRUCTURES 205 
enment for our problem, is Union Trust Co. v. Detroit.23 
The issue in that case concerned the validity under the uni-
formity provisions of the Michigan Constitution of the 
exemption provisions of the mortgage tax.24 The statute pro-
vided in section 2 that: 
A tax of 50¢ for each $1 0 0. 0 0 and each remaining rna j or 
fraction thereof of the principal debt or obligation which is 
. . . secured by a mortgage upon real property situated 
within this State . . . is hereby imposed on each such mort-
gage .... 
In holding that the act was valid, the court simply assumed 
that the tax was a specific property tax without any discussion 
of the question.25 However, it is pertinent to point out that 
the base of the mortgage tax was the "face value"-that is, 
the value of the debt secured by the mortgages subject to the 
tax. In addition, the mortgages (as property) were appar-
ently the object of the tax. On the face of the statute, no at-
tempt was made to impose the tax upon a "privilege of re-
cording." The value of the debt secured-which could be 
determined by a mere examination of records-was thus 
taken as the "arbitrary" value to be used as the base of the 
tax. One might say that the tax, therefore, required no as-
sessment "beyond a mathematical computation"-the term 
used by Justice Hooker in the Pingree case. 
The next two relevant cases are Shivel v. Kent County 
Treasurer26 and Shapero v. State Department of Revenue.27 
These cases concerned the validity of the intangibles tax im-
posed in 1939.28 Section 2 of the act read: 
23 170 Mich. 692,137 N.W. 122 (1912). 
24 P.A. 1911, No. 91. 
25 Union Trust Co. v. Detroit, supra note 23. 
2 6 295 Mich. 10,294- N.W. 78 (194-0). 
27 Supra note 5. 
28 Mich. Laws 1939, Act No. 301; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§7.556(1) et seq. 
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[T] here is hereby levied upon each resident or non-
resident owner of intangible personal property not here-
inafter exempted having a situs within this state ... an 
annual specific tax on each item of such property owned by 
him .... 29 
The following provisions of the act will be helpful in char-
acterizing, according to its base, the nature of this tax for 
purposes of uniformity of taxation. Section 2 of the act pro-
vided a base of "income" for income producing intangible 
personal property, with a rate of 6%.30 A base of "face, par 
or contributed value" was provided for non-income produc-
ing intangible personal property, with a rate of 1/10 of 1%. 
Contributed value is defined by section 2 of the act as "the 
average per share [of corporate stock or other evidence of 
corporate ownership having no par or face value] contribu-
tion to capital, surplus and other funds in consideration of 
which all of the then outstanding shares of stock of the same 
class of such corporation shall have been issued." The term 
"face value" is defined by § 1 (j) as "the amount appearing 
on the face of the instrument or other written record evi-
dencing the intangible personal property. . . ." Under sec-
tion 4 the owner is required to make an annual return show-
ing the "face, par or contribution value of each item of such 
property." The owner must also show the income, if any, 
29 The title of the act originally read: "An Act to provide for the impo-
sition and the collection of a specific tax upon the ownership of intangible 
personal property. • • ." In 194 5 the title was amended, so that it now 
reads: "specific tax upon the privilege of ownership of intangible personal 
property. . . ." Section 2, as quoted in the text, was amended by the in-
sertion of the italicized phrase: "annual specific tax on the privilege of 
ownership of each item of such property ..•• " [Mich. Laws 1945, Act 
No. 165] See i?zfra note 39, commenting on the lack of any legal operative 
effect being derived from the amendment. 
30 But, in any case, a minimum tax of 1/10 of I% of the "face, par or 
contributed value" was required. 
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from each item of property. Pursuant to section 5, the De-
partment of Revenue may examine the records of any cor-
poration to determine contributed value, if that value is 
omitted by the taxpayer in his return. 
The intangibles tax was first challenged in the Shivel 
case.31 The taxpayer contended ( 1) that the tax was an ad 
valorem tax, and as such failed to conform to the uniformity 
clause of Art. X, §3; (2) that the tax was without an as-
sessment of property at cash value as required by Art. X, 
§ 7; ( 3) that a specific tax, under the constitution, could not 
be imposed upon intangible personal property; and ( 4) if 
the tax was specific it was a violation of Art. X, §4, the uni-
formity provision limiting specific taxes. The court first held 
that the tax was a specific tax, and therefore not within the 
scope of the uniformity limitation in Art. X, §3.32 The court 
then held that the tax was uniform within classes, as required 
by Art. X, §4.33 While the Shivel case is a leading case on 
this problem, there was no discussion of the base of the tax 
in order to demonstrate why the tax was not ad valorem. Of 
course, if the court had ruled that the tax was a specific privi-
lege tax, this would not have been necessary. However, it ap-
pears clear from the language of the opinion that the tax was 
considered a specific property tax-and this is confirmed by 
the Shapero case. The sole discussion in the Shivel case opin-
ion concerning the nature of the tax was as follows: 
The tax is specific, being levied directly by legislative enact-
ment upon ownership of designated personal property and 
cannot be held arbitrary, discriminatory or inequitable, and 
the rule of uniformity required by the Constitution, art. 10, 
§3, in case of ad valorem tax, has no applicability. 
In C. F. Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald, 270 Mich. 659, 672, we 
31 Shivel v. Kent County Treasurer, supra note 26 at 14. 
82 /d. at 16. 
83 /d.atl7. 
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held: "The rule of uniformity does not extend to property 
paying specific taxes .... " 34 
In addition to this brief statement, the court quoted with ap-
proval Cooley on Taxation, which reads: 
A specific tax is one which imposes a specific sum by the head 
or number, or by some standard of weight or measurement, 
and which requires no assessment beyond a listing and classi-
fication of the subject to be taxed . ... 35 
In the Shapero case the intangibles tax was challenged as 
to its validity insofar as shares of stock were taxed thereby 
when those shares were in Michigan corporations, the tangi-
ble property of which was taxed under the ad valorem gen-
eral property tax.36 The case resulted in a split decision, with 
a vigorous three-judge dissent. However, there appeared to 
be no disagreement either by the majority or the dissenting 
judges from the proposition that the tax was a specific prop-
erty tax. The majority of five, in a very brief opinion, held 
that to impose a specific property tax and an ad valorem 
property tax upon the same property was not a violation of 
Art. X, §3, because specific taxes are not limited thereby. The 
majority simply cited and quoted the Shivel case as holding 
the intangibles tax to be a specific tax. It was said, " ... this 
rule of uniformity [in Art. X, §3] has no application to 
property paying specific taxes under the plain language of 
the constitutional provision."37 
Thus, it appears certain that the court did hold that the in-
tangibles tax was a specific property tax. However, there was 
no discussion or enlightenment as to why, beyond the state-
34 /d. at 16, emphasis supplied. 
35 /d. at 17-18, emphasis supplied. I Cooley, Taxation, §52, p. 143 (4th 
ed.; Callaghan & Co.). 
36 Shapero v. State Dept. of Revenue, supra note 5 at 127 (from the dis-
senting opinion). 
37 /d. at 140-142, emphasis supplied. 
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ment that the tax was specific, "being levied directly by leg-
islative enactment," and the quotation from Cooley which 
described specific taxes by pointing to the lack of an "as-
sessment beyond a listing and classification of the subject to 
be taxed." 
Nevertheless, it is permissible to examine more minutely 
the base of the tax, and thus have some idea as to the ele-
ments which were responsible for its being characterized as 
a specific base. There are two alternative bases: income for 
income-producing property, and "face, par or contributed 
value" for non-income-producing property. Somewhat like 
the mortgage tax, described above, the base of the intangibles 
tax is not necessarily the "actual cash value," or "market 
value."38 The value is determined by a fixed-i.e., "certain" 
-formula which leaves no room for exercise of judgment by 
the person computing the value. The value might be found 
simply by a look at the face of a written instrument. How-
ever, in the case of "contributed value," there is a computa-
tion to be made: "the average per share contribution to capi-
tal, surplus and other funds in consideration of which all of 
38 Cf. the thought behind the statements by Grant, C.J., in his concur-
ring opinion to Pingree v. Auditor General, supra notes 9 and 12. He said 
(atp.IOS, 109): 
Our Constitution authorizes only two kinds of taxes,-one, specific, im-
posed without regard to value of the thing taxed; the other, general, based 
upon assessed cash value, and requiring uniformity. 
* * * 
A tax based upon the assessed cash value of the property assessed is not a 
specific tax. It is an ad valorem tax and any enactment by a legislature 
that it is a specific tax docs not make it so; ... The fact that, in im-
posing a specific tax, the value of the thing taxed is taken into considera-
tion in determining the amount of it, does not change the nature of the 
tax. A tax upon the capital stock of a corporation, paid or unpaid, or upon 
its bonds issued or money borrowed, is just as much a specific tax as is so 
much per article upon the thing produced. The real value of the capital 
stock is not its par t'alue. [Emphasis supplied.] 
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the then outstanding shares of stock of the same class of such 
corporation shall have been issued." But, as contrasted to the 
method used under the inheritance tax, described above, this 
computation may surely be termed a mere "mathematical 
computation"-the term used by Justice Hooker in the Pin-
gree case. 
However, it would not be denied that it might be permis-
sible to use "face, par or contributed value" of corporate 
stock as conclusive evidence of the "actual cash value" ( usu-
ally equated to "fair market value") of such stock for pur-
poses of taxation by an ad valorem property tax. The use of 
this formula to determine the base ("actual cash value") 
would probably be held reasonable. However, the use of such 
a formula does not necessarily indicate an intent to tax by 
the ad valorem method-that is, levy the tax on the "actual 
cash value" of property. And it is not improbable that "face, 
par or contributed value" will not be the "market value" of 
intangibles. 
In any case, the use of "income" and "par, face, or con-
tributed value" of intangibles as the base of a property tax 
does not require the exercise of judgment by a ministerial 
officer in order to determine the "value" of the property 
taxed. These bases, when used in the intangibles tax, were 
evidently considered by the Michigan Supreme Court in the 
Shivel and Shapero cases to be specific-not ad valorem.39 
In Pingree v. Auditor General (concerning the tax on 
39 The Shive] and Shapero cases concerned the nature and validity of the 
intangibles tax before the 194 5 amendment which added the phrases, in 
the title and operative section of the act, concerning the "privilege of" 
ownership of intangibles. See supra note 29. There has been no decision by 
the court whether this amendment changed the nature of the tax for pur-
poses of uniformity of taxation, so that it is now a specific privilege tax. 
However, in two subsequent "territorial jurisdiction" cases, the Michigan 
Supreme Court has indicated that the insertion of these phrases did not 
effect a change in the nature of the tax. Goodenough v. Department of 
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telephone and telegraph poles) and Union Trust Co. v. 
Wayne Probate Judge (concerning the inheritance tax) the 
court stressed the point that under both of the taxes the ex-
ercise of judgment by some ministerial officer was necessary 
in order to reach a conclusion as to the value of the property 
concerned. This element was not present in either the mort-
gage tax or the intangibles tax. Therefore, in light of the 
above analysis, it is not unreasonable to conclude that ( 1) 
when this element (exercise of judgment40 by a ministerial 
officer) is present in a tax, and (2) if property is the object 
of the tax, then, and only then, the tax may be considered 
ad valorem in Michigan for purposes of uniformity of taxa-
tion. 
Having reached a conclusion as to the test used to distin-
guish between ad valorem and specific taxes in Michigan for 
purposes of uniformity, it might be helpful before discussing 
the content of the uniformity limitation to summarize the de-
cisions of the court concerning the nature of some taxes of 
comparative interest. The following taxes have been held to 
be specific privilege taxes: inheritance tax; 41 motor vehicle 
tax; 42 corporate franchise tax, with a base of capital stock;48 
Revenue, 328 Mich. 56, 43 N.W. 2d 235 (1950); same opinion on re-
hearing, 328 Mich. 502, 44 N.W. 2d 161; and Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. 
v. Department of Revenue, 329 Mich. 225, 45 N.W. 2d 46 (1950). 
40 There must be more than mere action by a ministerial officer. There 
must be an action which requires an exercise of judgment, not a "mere 
mathematical computation." 
41 Union Trust Co. v. Wayne Probate Judge, supra note 7, discussed in 
the text. See also In re Estate of Fish, 219 Mich. 369, 189 N.W. 177 
(1922). 
42 Jasnowski v. Board of Assessors of Detroit, 191 Mich. 287, 157 N.W. 
891 (1916). 
43 Union Steam Pump Sales Co. v. DeLand, 216 Mich. 261, 185 N.W. 
3 53 ( 1921). The tax had a base of capital stock, and it was held to be a 
tax upon the privilege "to do," rather than the privilege "to be." This 
latter distinction was necessary because of a "diversion limitation" in Art. 
X, § 1 of the constitution. 
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general use tax; 44 and others.45 The following taxes have 
been held to be specific property taxes: intangibles tax; 46 and 
mortgage recording tax.47 There has been no decision con-
cerning the taxation of income in Michigan.48 
c. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
Ad valorem (property) taxes. The court has ruled that 
there is no requirement of universality in the "uniformity 
clause" of Art. X, §3 which limits ad valorem taxes; there-
44 Banner Laundering Co. v. State Board of Tax Admin., supra note 8. 
45 For example: a fuel tax, Lake Shore Coach Lines v. Sec. of State, 327 
Mich. 146, 41 N.W. 2d 503 (1950); chain store tax, Smith Co. v. Fitz-
gerald, supra note 8; and in Miller v. Michigan State Apple Commission, 
296 Mich. 248,296 N.W. 245 (1941) it was held that a tax of one cent 
per bushel, or two cents per hundredweight imposed "upon ali apples" 
grown during the year was a specific privilege tax upon "the privilege of 
putting Michigan-grown apples on the market." See also Kuii v. Michigan 
State Apple Commission, 296 Mich. 262, 296 N.W. 250 ( 1941). 
46 Shive] v. Kent County Treasurer, supra note 26, and Shapero v. State 
Department of Revenue, supra note 5, discussed in the text. 
47 Union Trust Co. v. Detroit, supra note 23, discussed in the text. 
48 Nor is there any real indication found in opinions of the court relating 
to other taxes. The only relevant statement by the court occurred in the 
Shive] case, supra note 26, in which the court upheld the intangibles tax. 
With no discussion the court concluded its opinion with the foilowing 
observation (at pp. I 8-1 9) : 
After submission of this case we caiied upon counsel to consider and file 
briefs on the foiiowing questions: •.. 
3. Does the act in some respects tax income and is it, therefore, an in-
come tax contrary to the rejection of such a tax by r;ote of the people in 
1922, 1924, 1934, and 19361 ..• 
7. Does the provision ..• of the act, which provides: "The tax on 
income producing intangible personal property shall be six per cent of 
the income," impose a tax on income? .•. 
The questions have been briefed and we now make the foiiowing hold-
ings with respect thereto: ... 
Questions 3 and 7. The income basis for measuring the tax does not 
constitute it an income tax. 
As stated in Young v. IIIinois Athletic Club, 31 0 III. 7 5, 81 ( 141 N .E. 
369, 30 A.L.R. 985): "An income tax is an assessment upon the income 
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fore, reasonable classes of property may be exempted from 
taxation.49 As the preceding analysis has made clear, the uni-
formity clause of Art. X, §3 does not limit the method by 
which property may be taxed. Rather the method used (ad 
valorem or specific) determines the applicability of Art. X, 
§3. Therefore, the uniformity clause in that constitutional 
provision applies solely to the effective rate applicable to 
property actually selected for ad valorem taxation. Absolute 
uniformity is required of the effective rate applicable to prop-
erty actually taxed ad valorem by a taxing jurisdiction.110 
of the person and not upon any particular property from which that in-
come is derived." • • . 
Question 3 in the quotation refers to the fact that constitutional amendments 
authorizing an income tax in Michigan have been submitted to the elec-
torate on the four dates mentioned and have been defeated each time. See 
State of Michigan, Official Directory, pp. 57-59 (1937). 
Three opinions of the Attorney General have dealt with this question. 
Two opinions seem to cancel out one another. Op. Atty. Gen., 1923-1924, 
p. 162 and 19 31-19 3 2, p. I 71. Both are simply bare conclusions concerning 
the nature and validity of an income tax in Michigan. Neither makes any 
attempt to support its conclusion by legal analysis. A third opinion, by a third 
attorney general, concludes that a "graduated net income tax is constitu-
tional" in Michigan. Op. Atty. Gen., 1933-1934, pp. 261-268. This 
opinion makes some effort to support its conclusion by an analysis of perti-
nent material. It is primarily an analysis of the opinions of other state courts 
on the problem. 
49 See People ex rei. St. Mary's Falls Ship Canal Co. v. Auditor General, 
7 Mich. 84,90-91,96-97 (1859); Auditor General v. MacKinnon Boiler 
& Machine Co., 199 Mich. 489, 490, 165 N.W. 771 (1917); and Lucking 
v. People, 320 Mich. 495, 31 N.W. 2d 707 (1948). Also see Union Trust 
Co. v. Detroit, supra note 23 at 697, and Jasnowski v. Board of Assessors, 
supra note 42 at 291, in which the exemption of certain property was tied 
in with "in lieu" specific taxes. While the court has simply ruled that the 
rule of uniformity has no relation to the exemption of property from taxa-
tion, it might well have used the actual phraseology of Art. X, §3 to buttress 
this conclusion. See the following significant words: " .•• and taxes shall 
be levied on such property as shall be prescribed by law ..•• " 
50 See, for example, Pingee v. Auditor General, supra note 9 at 102, 
discussed in the text, supra notes 9 through 16. The tax under consideration 
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Specific taxes (property and nonproperty ). Specific taxes, 
whether property or nonproperty, are limited only by the 
uniformity clause in Art. X, §4 which requires a uniformity 
within classes. This limitation has been equated to the federal 
equal protection clause.51 Thus, the objects of such taxes need 
only be reasonable classes, and exemptions therefrom may be 
made.G2 The objects may be further classified for purposes of 
applying different rates,53 and it has been ruled that pro-
in that case would have applied, in lieu of all other taxes, an average of the 
state and local property tax rates upon an assessment of the property of 
telephone and telegraph companies. It was held that the tax was in fact an 
ad valorem tax, and that it violated the uniformity clause requiring absolute 
uniformity in effective rates because the rate would have been different in 
amount from that imposed upon all other property subject to a state ad 
valorem tax. Also see the cases holding that the taxation of corporate property 
to the corporation and the shares thereof to the shareholder by the same ad 
valorem property tax is "double taxation" and a violation of the requirement 
of absolute uniformity in effective rates: Bacon v. Board of State Tax 
Comm'rs, 126 Mich. 22,85 N.W. 307 (1901); Stroh v. Detroit, 131 
Mich. 109, 90 N.W. 1029 ( 1902); Thrall v. Guiney, 141 Mich. 392, 
104 N.W. 646 (1905); Detroit v. Kresge, 200 Mich. 668, 167 N.W. 39 
(1918); and Voorhies v. Walker, 227 Mich. 291, 198 N.W. 994 (1924). 
See First Nat. Bank v. Common Council of Detroit, 253 Mich. 89, 234 
N.W. 151 (1931), discussed infra note 55. However, the court has ruled 
that the taxation by the same tax of both a mortgage and the land mortgaged 
is not "douLle taxation," that is, in such cases the "same" property is not 
being taxed: Attorney General v. Sanilac, 71 Mich. 16, 38 N.W. 639 
(1888); Marquette v. Michigan Iron & Land Co., 132 Mich. 130, 92 
N.W. 934; and Stumpf v. Storz, 156 Mich. 228, 120 N.W. 618 (1909). 
Also see Thoman v. City of Lansing, 315 Mich. 566, 24 N.W. 2d 213 
(1946) and Ontonagon v. Gogebic, 74 Mich. 721, 42 N.W. 170 (1889). 
51 Shivel v. Kent County Treasurer, supra note 26. 
52 Banner Laundering Co. v. State Board of Tax Administration, supra 
note 8 (upholding the numerous exemptions from the general use tax as 
reasonable classes); Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald, supra note 8 (chain store tax; 
exemption of gasoline filling stations held to be reasonable) ; and see Miller 
v. Michigan State Apple Commission, supra note 45 (tax imposed on apples 
grown, a privilege tax; held the selection of growers of apples out of all 
engaged in agricultural pursuits is reasonable). 
53 In Shivel v. Kent County Treasurer, supra note 26, the court held that 
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gressively graduated rates constitute a reasonable classifica-
tion based on quantity.M However, here one should be very 
careful in making generalizations. It might well be that the 
court would be more strict in examining classifications under 
specific property taxes; for example, classification of prop-
erty according to quantity for purpose of applying a gradu-
ated rate under a specific property tax might well be re-
quired to conform to a stricter test than that applied to the 
graduated rates under specific privilege taxes concerning 
which the actual decisions have been made. 
Also, the court has held that there is no constitutional in-
hibition against the same taxing authority taxing the same 
property by both an ad valorem property tax and a specific 
property tax.55 Any prohibition against "double taxation" is 
the classification of intangibles into income producing and non-income pro-
ducing, and the imposition of a different rate on each class, was reasonable. 
Also see: Lake Shore Coach Lines v. Sec. of State, supra note 4-5 (motor fuel 
tax; classification for rates thereunder valid, the rates were four cents per 
gallon for diesel motor fuel used in vehicles operated under municipal 
franchise, and five cents per gallon for all other users of diesel motor fuel); 
Union Steam Pump Sales Co. v. Sec. of State, supra note 4-3 (corporate 
franchise tax, with a base of capital stock; holding that Art. X, §4- was not 
violated because of the fact that a provision fixed a maximum and minimum 
in the amount of the tax to be paid; the court stated that "the difference 
upon which the classification shall be based ... need not be great or 
conspicuous."); Jasnowski v. Board of Assessors, supra note 4-2 (motor 
vehicle tax; holding that difference in ownership of vehicles created a 
reasonable distinction and support for a classification under which individual 
owners paid a different rate schedule than that paid by manufacturers). Also 
see the cases in note 54-, infra. 
54 Union Trust Co. v. Wayne Probate Judge, supra note 7 (inheritance 
tax; the graduated rates were held to be a reasonable classification, primarily 
relying on the federal case Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 170 
U.S. 283, 18 S. Ct. 5 94- ( 1897)) and Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald, supra note 8 
(chain store tax; graduated rates held reasonable). 
55 Shapero v. State Dept. of Revenue, supra note 5 (intangibles tax). 
There was a dissent of three judges, relying on the prior case First Nat. 
Bank v. Common Council of Detroit, supra note 50 at 94--96. However, in 
that early case (ruling as to the taxation of credits belonging to a bank 
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derived from the uniformity clause in Art. X, §3 which ap-
plies only to ad valorem taxation. Thus, the court, besides 
ruling that specific property taxes do not have to conform in-
ternally to the uniformity clause in Art. X, §3 has also 
ruled that there is no limitation derived from Art. X, §3 
which applies to the external relation between a specific prop-
erty tax and ad valorem property taxation. This result is 
reached because "double taxation" is but a shorthand way of 
describing the absolute uniformity required of the effective 
rate imposed by ad valorem taxation.56 While the court has 
had no occasion to actually make a decision on the precise 
issue, it would seem equally clear that Art. X, §3 and any 
prohibition therein against "double taxation," has no relation 
to two specific property taxes imposed on the same property.117 
secured by liens upon real property upon which a specific tax, the mortgage 
tax, had been paid, and the failure to allow a deduction of those credits from 
the shares of capital stock in banks which were to be taxed under the general 
property tax) there was no discussion of the fact that the cases relied on 
therein (see the cases supra note 50) concerned taxation by the same ad 
valorem tax. In any case, on this point the Shapero case makes a clear-cut 
ruling. 
116 See the cases cited in supra note 50. Also see the discussion in Chapter 
I, supra. 
57 The reason for stressing this rather obvious conclusion is to correct any 
erroneous impressions that might be drawn from Op. Atty. Gen., 1941-
1942, p. 262. An opinion was there given that oil royalties were not sub-
ject to the intangibles tax. The opinion rested on interpretation of that tax 
statute. However, in support of his interpretation that the intangibles tax was 
not intended to include royalties upon oil produced in Michigan and sub-
ject to the Michigan "severance" tax, the Attorney General asserted (at 
p. 263): 
The rule of uniformity applies to specific taxes by the express language 
of the Constitution. [Art. X, §4 had just been quoted.] The rule forbids 
double taxation. In the present instance, two different specific tax statutes 
are imposed upon the same objects. 
The opinion then cites the Stroh case, supra note 50, and quotes therefrom 
to the effect that the constitution requires a uniform rule of taxation which 
forbids double taxation. Unfortunately the opinion appears to be inaccurate. 
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2. New Jersey 
a. The provisions; historical note 
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The first constitution of New Jersey, adopted in 1776, had 
no provisions concerning uniformity in taxation-indeed, no 
provision concerning taxation at all; neither did the second 
New Jersey Constitution adopted in 1844. However, the 
1844 constitution was amended in 18 7 5 by the addition of 
section VII ( 12) to Art. IV (the general legislative article). 
Subsection 12 read: 
Property shall be assessed for taxes under general laws, 
and by uniform rules, according to its true value. 
In 1 94 7 the present constitution of New Jersey was 
adopted. In the new constitution only slight changes were 
made insofar as taxation is concerned. The former uniformity 
provision is now found in Art. VIII, § 1 ( 1) in a somewhat 
altered form, but with substantially the same basic phrase-
ology: 
Property shall be assessed for taxation under general laws 
and by uniform rules. All real property assessed and taxed 
locally or by the State for allotment and payment to taxing 
districts shall be assessed according to the same standard of 
value; and such real property shall be taxed at the general 
tax rate of the taxing district in which the property is situ-
ated, for the use of such taxing district. 
A new provision, appearing as Art. VIII, §1(2), provides 
In the first place, the Stroh case was decided under Art. X, §3 concerning 
the taxation twice of the same property by the same ad valorem property 
tax. The Attorney General refers to Art. X, §4-which does govern specific 
property taxes-but which does not "forbid double taxation," for indeed 
property may be classified for different rates under specific property taxes. 
See, supra note 52. Moreover, while the First Nat. Bank case, supra note 55, 
was referred to, nevertheless even that case related only to the use of an ad 
valorem and a specific property tax, and not to two specific property taxes. 
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that "Exemption from taxation may be granted only by gen-
eral laws .•.. " 1 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
Since the present New Jersey Constitution was adopted as 
late as 194-7, there has been little opportunity for develop-
ment of any comprehensive meaning of the new uniformity 
provision. However, this new provision is sufficiently similar 
to the prior provision which governed from 1875 to 194-7, 
that a brief statement of the meaning of the prior uniformity 
limitation will give a key to the significance of the changes 
made in the phraseology of the new uniformity clause. 
187 5 to1947.2 Under the prior constitutional provision the 
courts ruled that the requirement that "Property shall be as-
sessed for taxes . . . by uniform rules, according to its true 
value" did not contain a rule of universality. Therefore, 
property could be classified for exemptions from taxation. In 
the exemption cases the court developed the rule that classi-
fication had to be of property according to its characteristics 
or the use to which it is put, and not according to the status 
of the owner or the mere incidence of location of the prop-
erty.3 This result is not unexpected in view of the fact that 
1 The omitted part of Art. VIII, §I (2) deals with the status of certain 
exemptions which were granted before the constitution came into effect. 
With certain exceptions, "Exemptions from taxation may be altered or re-
pealed." Art. VIII, §1(3) deals expressly with the exemption of property 
belonging to veterans. 
2 Primary reliance for this summary statement is placed on a monograph 
prepared for The Governor's Committee on Preparatory Research for the 
New Jersey Constitutional Convention (May, 1947), written by A. K. 
Neeld and entitled "Taxation-The Tax Clause." 
8 For example, an attempt to create an exemption of property to the 
amount of $500 belonging to persons enrolled as active members of any fire 
company was held to be arbitrary. Tippett v. McGrath, 70 N.J.L. 110, 56 
Atl. 134 ( 1903). The same result was reached as to an attempt to exempt 
improvements on real property within a period of five years. Koch v. Essex 
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no constitutional provision provided for the exemption of 
property usually exempted to some degree, such as public 
property, charitable property, and the like. Moreover, at 
times the court stressed the fact that the word "all" did not 
modify the word property in the uniformity clause. 
The most interesting ruling under the old uniformity pro-
vision was that it did not require absolute uniformity in ef-
fective rates applicable to property taxed by any one taxing 
authority.4 Property could be classified for the purpose of ap-
plying different percentage rates by the same taxing author-
ity.5 But it seems that an absolute uniformity of "true value" 
was required by the express words of the uniformity 
clause,6 so that classification could not legally be made for 
County Board of Taxation, 97 N.J.L. 61, 116 Atl. 328 (1922). Also see 
Alpha Rho Alumni Ass'n v. New Brunswick, 126 N.J.L. 233, 18 A. 2d 
68 ( 1941) ; State v. Mercer County Board of Taxation, 118 N.J.L. 408, 
19 3 Atl. 55 5 ( 19 3 7). 
4 A leading case establishing this is State Board of Assessors v. Central R. 
Co., 48 N.J.L. 146, 4 Atl. 5 78 ( 1886), in which there was a dissent on 
this point although unanimous agreement that the uniformity provision con-
tained no rule of universality. Subsequent opinions developing this point 
are: Central R. Co. of New Jersey v. State Board of Assessors, 75 N.J.L. 
120,67 Atl. 672 (1907); Central R. Co. of New Jersey v. State Board of 
Assessors, 75 N.J.L. 771, 69 Atl. 239 (1908). Broadly speaking, railroad 
property was separately classified, and further classified into two groups, one 
of which was taxed at the same rate as other property and one of which was 
taxed at a special fixed percentage. 
1i No general classified property tax has been attempted, nor has there 
been a classification of intangibles for a low rate. However, at present in-
tangibles are exempt entirely. Classifications consisted of special treatment 
for smaller classes of property such as, for example, bank stock and some 
railroad property. See Neeld, supra note 2 at 9. Despite some comments to 
the contrary, it appears clear that the legislature had the power to impose a 
general classified property tax under the prior uniformity clause, and that 
any lack of "reform" in the tax structure in the form of a classified system 
was "due, not to necessity, but to choice or inertia." From a report of 1919 
Commission to Investigate Tax Laws, quoted in Neeld, supra note 2 at 24. 
Also generally on this question, see Neeld, supra note 2 at 23-27. 
6 Neeld, supra note 2 at 7-8, states that the New Jersey courts have ruled 
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the purpose of using different ratios of valuation. 7 Of course, 
this should not affect the possibility of a classified property 
tax, since classification for either percentage rate or ratio of 
valuation achieves the same purpose. 
As expected, the uniformity provision was limited in its 
application to property taxes. Nonproperty taxes were re-
quired only to be uniform within classes, and an inheritance 
tax (having a classified object and a graduated rate schedule) 
was upheld as a nonproperty tax.8 There is no precedent re-
garding an income tax. 9 
1947 to the present. There seems to have been very little 
change of substance in the uniformity provision as it was car-
ried over into the new 194 7 constitution. First, an express 
provision was added requiring exemptions of property to be 
by "general law." While a great deal of controversy appears 
to have existed concerning the manner in which exemptions 
had been theretofore made, and while this problem is un-
doubtedly of considerable importance to the peoples con-
cerned, nevertheless it is a minor item for purposes of this 
study. Indeed, the only important change for purposes of 
this study was the elimination of the requirement that prop-
that assessment at "true value" prevails over any requirement of uniformity 
in ratio, and that the remedy in cases where it can be shown that other prop-
erty is assessed at a ratio of less than I 0 0% is an application to increase all 
assessments below true value, citing Royal Mfg. Co. v. Board of Equalization 
of Taxes, 78 N.J.L. 337,74 Atl. 525 (1909), aff'g 76 N.J.L. 402, 70 Atl. 
978 (1908). Also see Baldwin Construction Co. v. Essex County Board of 
Tax., 16 N.J. 329, 108 A. 2d 598 (1954). 
7 However, it appears that in the absence of a legal classification for ap-
plication of different percentage rates local assessing officers have enforced 
de facto classification systems based on different ratios of valuation. See, for 
example, the complaints recorded in Neeld, supra note 2 at 16. Also see the 
discussion in the dissenting opinion by Vanderbilt, C. J., in Baldwin Con-
struction Co. v. Essex County Bd. of Tax., supra note 6 at 610-612. 
8 For example, Eastwood v. Russell, 81 N.J.L. 672, 81 Atl. 108 (1911). 
9 See Neeld, supra note 2 at 35-38. 
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erty be assessed "according to its true value." In place of 
this requirement, it appears that all real property must now 
be assessed "according to the same standard of value," and 
that an absolute uniformity must prevail as to the effective 
rate applicable to all realty within a taxing jurisdiction. 
There have been no judicial decisions concerning these 
changes. However, the omission of the phrase "according to 
value" as a modifier of "property" possibly opens the way 
for the specific taxation of personal property. Moreover, the 
requirement concerning the rate applicable to real property 
apparently restricts to a degree the legislature's freedom of 
classification, since there had been no ruling before 194 7 that 
realty could not be further classified by the legislature under 
its power to classify property for purposes of taxation. How-
ever, the uniformity limitation remains in substance practi-
cally the same under the new 194 7 constitution as it was 
from 18 7 5 to 194 7 under the amended 1844 constitution. 
3. Ohio 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The first constitution of Ohio, adopted in 1802, had no 
provision concerning uniformity in taxation. The second, and 
present, constitution of Ohio was adopted in 1851 and origi-
nally contained an elaborate uniformity clause in Art. XII, 
§2, which read: 
Laws shall be passed, taxing by a uniform rule, all 
moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint stock 
companies, or otherwise; and also all real and personal prop-
erty, according to its true value in money; but burying 
grounds, public schoolhouses, houses used exclusively for 
public worship, institutions of purely public character, and 
public property used exclusively for any public purpose, and 
personal property, to an amount not exceeding in value $200, 
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for each individual, may, by general laws, be exempted from 
taxation .. 1 
This basic uniformity provision was supplemented by two 
provisions dealing with special problems of uniformity which 
were probably covered implicitly by the general clause. 
Those provisions were intended to ensure an equality in tax 
burden as between property of individuals and "all property 
employed in banking" (Art. XII, §3) and corporate property 
(Art. XII, §4 ). 
In 1929 a substantial change was made in the scope of 
the basic uniformity clause. Article XII, §2 was amended, 
and now reads: 
Land and improvements thereon shall be taxed by a uni-
form rule according to value. All bonds [of a specific charac-
ter, being types of state and local issues] shall be exempt 
from taxation, and without limiting the general power, sub-
ject to the provisions of article I of this constitution, to de-
termine the subjects and methods of taxation or exemptions 
1 Art. XII, §2 was amended several times before 1929, but not in such 
a manner as to alter substantially the effective uniformity limitation. In 
190 5 a proviso was added, following the words "according to its true value 
in money," which provided for the exemption of certain bonds of state and 
local governmental units. This was altered in details in 1912 and 1918. 
Also in 1912 the minimum exemption of personal property was raised to 
$500, and the phrase "institutions of purely public character" in the ex-
emption clause was changed to "institutions used exclusively for charitable 
purposes." 
In 1918 a more important change for the purposes of this study was 
made. Following the exemption clause a provision was added sanctioning 
exemptions designed to avoid "double taxation" in the taxation of both 
realty and mortgages thereon. The provision read: 
... laws may be passed to provide against the double taxation that re-
sults from the taxation of both the real estate and the mortgage or the 
debt secured thereby, or other lien upon it .••. 
This amendment followed a ruling that the taxation of both an item of 
property and a mortgage thereon was not prohibited by the uniformity 
clause. 
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therefrom, general laws may be passed to exempt burying 
grounds, public school houses, houses used exclusively for 
any public purpose. 2 
At the time of the 1929 amendment to Art. XII, §2, Art. 
XII, §3 concerning the taxation of banking property was 
repealed. 
The significant changes in the uniformity provision found 
in Art. XII, §2 were, first, the restriction of the operation of 
the unifromity clause to "land and improvements thereon," 
and, second, the alteration of the exemption clause which 
had theretofore modified the uniformity clause. The refer-
ence to the exemption of $200 worth of personal was de-
leted, and this curious clause was added: "without limiting 
the general power, subject to the provisions of article I of 
this constitution, to determine the subjects and methods of 
taxation or exemptions therefrom." The exemption clause 
remained permissive, however, as contrasted to mandatory. 
Prior to this establishment of a new effective uniformity 
limitation in 1929, three important provisions had been 
added in 1912. Inheritance and income taxes were expressly 
provided for in Art. XII, §7,S and Art. XII, §8/ respec-
2 The section was further amended in 1929 by the addition of a maxi-
mum rate limitation provision which preceded the uniformity clause. 
3 Section 7 reads: 
Laws may be passed providing for the taxation of the right to receive, or 
to succeed to, estates, and such taxation may be uniform or it may be so 
graduated as to tax at a higher rate the right to receive, or to succeed to, 
estates of larger value than to estates of smaller value. Such tax may also 
be levied at different rates upon collateral and direct inheritances, and 
a portion of each estate not exceeding twenty thousand dollars may be 
exempt from such taxation. 
4 Section 8 reads: 
Laws may be passed providing for the taxation of incomes, and such 
taxation may be either uniform or graduated, and may be applied to such 
incomes as may be designated by law; but a part of each annual income 
not exceeding three thousand dollars may be exempt from such taxation. 
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tively, and the uniformity limitation applicable thereto was 
spelled out. Art. XII, § 10, was phrased so as to refer ex-
pressly to the power of the legislature to impose nonproperty 
taxes in general. 5 To summarize, the present uniformity 
structure consists primarily of Art. XII, §2, as amended in 
1929, which contains the basic uniformity clause, and Art. 
XII, §§7, 8, and 10, which concern particular taxes.6 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
The Ohio uniformity clause, both in its original and 
amended form, is obviously directed to the taxation of 
property, so that nonproperty taxes are limited only by a 
requirement of uniformity within classes. 7 That limitation is 
derived from the equivalent of an equal protection clause 
found in the state constitution.8 However, before 1912 there 
was considerable controversy concerning the strictness of the 
uniformity limitation applicable to nonproperty taxes. This 
5 Section 1 0 reads: 
Laws may be passed providing for excise and franchise taxes and for the 
imposition of taxes upon the production of coal, oil, gas and other min-
erals. 
6 Art. XII, §4, concerning an equality of tax burden between corporate 
and individual property, also remains. In addition, an exception to the uni-
formity required of property taxation was made in 1912 by the addition 
of Art. II, §36 providing that forestry lands "may be exempted, in whole 
or in part from taxation. . . ." 
7 See, for example, Southern Gum Co. v. Laylin, 66 Ohio St. 578, 64 
N.E. 564 ( 1902) (corporate franchise tax with a base of capital stock); 
Saviers v. Smith, I 0 I Ohio St. 132, 128 N.E. 269 ( 1920) (motor vehicle 
tax); State ex rel. Walls v. Wallace, 138 Ohio St. 410, 35 N.E. 2d 167 
( 1941) (motor vehicle tax). Also see the inheritance tax cases, discussed in 
the text. 
8 Art. I, §2, which for this problem has substantially the same meaning as 
the federal equal protection clause. See State ex rel. Struble v. Davis, 132 
Ohio St. 555, 9 N.E. 2d 684 (1937), in which the court ruled upon the 
present limitation on the taxation of personal property. See infra note 21. 
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controversy centered on an inheritance tax. The first such 
attempted tax was struck down in State ex rel. Schwartz v. 
Ferris. 9 The statute purported to impose a graduated rate 
on the whole amount when the estate received was valued 
at more than $20,000. Estates received which were valued at 
not more than $20,000 were entirely exempt. Thus, the 
recipient of $20,00 I would be subject to a tax on the entire 
amount, while the recipient of $20,000 would not be subject 
to any tax whatsoever. The court held that the tax was a 
nonproperty tax imposed on the "right and privilege to re-
ceive."10 However, the court also ruled that the tax was not 
uniform within classes on two counts.11 First, it was said 
that graduated rates violated the uniformity within classes 
requirement. Second, the exemption of $20,000 went only to 
those estates received which were valued at that amount or 
less, and consequently was arbitrary. The unfortunate thing 
about the decision was the court's attempt to limit nonprop-
erty taxes by the "spirit" of the uniformity clause in Art. 
XII, §2. Thus it was asserted that an exemption of more than 
$200 (the amount expressly allowed in Art. XII, §2 for 
personal property) would not be allowed, and that "The 
exemption must be equally for all, and the rate per cent must 
be the same on all estates."12 
The strictness of the Ferris opinion was departed from to 
a considerable degree in subsequent opinions. In Hagerty v. 
State13 the court ruled that a collateral inheritance tax was 
9 53 Ohio St. 314,41 N.E. 529 (1895). 
10 /d. at 325-336, rejecting the dictum of prior cases insofar as they 
intimated that property was the only proper object of taxes. 
11 /d. at 3 3 6-341. 
12 /d. at 338. 
13 55 Ohio St. 613,45 N.E. 1046 (1896). The tax under consideration 
had a single proportional rate and a general exemption of $200. Thus, to a 
degree, it conformed to the Ferris opinion, although it was limited to col-
lateral heirs. 
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valid. In State ex rel. Taylor v. Guilbert14 the court in effect 
overruled the dictum in the Ferris case and held that a 
$3,000 minimum exemption was valid. By 1912, the only 
doubtful issue which was left concerned the validity of a 
graduated rate schedule. 
The amendments which now expressly provide for inherit-
ance and income taxes-Art. XII, §§7 and 8-leave no doubt 
that graduated rates may be imposed.15 Furthermore, it ap-
pears unlikely that the ruling of the early Ferris case, to the 
effect that graduated rates were arbitrary, would be carried 
over to other taxes. Thus today the uniformity limitation 
applicable to nonproperty taxes in Ohio is substantially the 
same as that in other states, except that the uniformity ap-
plicable to inheritance and income taxes is no longer derived 
from a general limitation. The provision which expressly 
sanctions an income tax renders moot any discussion of the 
nature of such a tax. Moreover, the express provision was not 
preceded by any opinions concerning the nature of such a tax 
which are of interest for comparative purposes.16 
14 70 Ohio St. 229, 71 N.E. 636 (1904). Also see Humphreys v. State, 
70 Ohio St. 67, 70 N.E. 957 (1904). 
15 Some question has arisen in construing Art. XII, §7 because of the 
following words: "a portion of each estate not exceeding twenty thousand 
dollars may be exempt from such taxation." In Harvard College v. State, 
106 Ohio St. 303, 140 N.E. 189 (1922) the court held that this proviso 
only set a maximum exemption for the classes of estates received and taxed, 
and that it did not prohibit "total" exemption, that is, a class selected on a 
reasonable basis (in that case educational institutions) might be wholly ex-
empt. It had been argued (and two dissenting judges agreed) that while 
before Art. XII, §7 it was true that valid classes could be entirely excluded 
from inheritance tax, section 7 altered this. Also see Sherman v. Tax Comm. 
of Ohio, 125 Ohio St. 367, 181 N.E. 539 (1932). 
16 Since Art. XII, §8 was adopted no state income tax has been enacted. 
However, several cities in Ohio have imposed income taxes which were 
upheld in Angell v. City of Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E. 2d 250 
(1950). The only issue in that case, however, concerned the power of local 
units to impose such a tax. In reaching an affirmative answer the court did 
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(1) Property taxation: 1851 to 1929 
There was no doubt concerning the content of the uni-
formity limitation in its original and more elaborate form. 
It is clear that there was a requirement of universality which 
prohibited any exemptions of property other than those 
classes enumerated in the second clause of the original Art. 
XII, §2; that property had to be taxed by the ad valorem 
method; and that all property taxed within a taxing jurisdic-
tion had to be taxed at the same effective rate.17 Thus, the 
strictest degree of uniformity in the taxation of property was 
required. 
In one of the earliest cases interpreting this uniformity 
provision, Exchange Bank v. Hines/ 8 the court went to great 
lengths in order to locate precisely the source of each of the 
rules of uniformity in the original Art. XII, §2. The court 
took note of the fact that the universality and the ad valorem 
method requirements were spelled out in words apart from 
the "uniform rule" clause. 19 However, it is important for the 
offer some gratuitous statements, such as (at 182): "While an income tax 
may be regarded as in the nature of an excise tax, the Constitution of Ohio 
differentiates an excise tax from an income tax." Reference was then made 
to Art. XII, §8 (income tax) and §10 (excise and franchise taxes). Also 
see the recent cases, Clark v. City of Cincinnati, 163 Ohio St. 532, 127 
N.E. 2d 363 (1955), and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. City of 
Youngstown, I 0 8 N.E. 2d 5 71 (Court of Appeals of Ohio, 19 51). 
17 Sce, for example, Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. I (1853); 
Zanesville v. Richards, 5 Ohio St. 5 89 ( 18 55); State v. Jones, 51 Ohio St. 
492, 37 N.E. 945 ( 1894) (pointing out, however, that the requirement did 
not necessarily demand the same method of determining the value of every 
species of property without regard to classification); and see the more recent 
case, State v. Hess, 113 Ohio St. 52, 148 N.E. 347 (1925). In Treasurer 
v. Bank, 47 Ohio St. 503,25 N.E. 697 (1890) the court pointed out that 
Art. XII, §2 was, in effect, broad enough to cover the special limitations 
spelled out in Art. XII, §4. 
18 3 Ohio St. I (I 8 53). 
19 /d. at 13: "The language of the constitution is comprehensive and 
explicit in the requirement, that all property of every description, excepting 
only that which falls within the specified exemptions, should be taxed." 
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purpose of interpreting the uniformity provision as amended 
in 1929 to note the court's assertion that the phrase "uniform 
rule" contains within it a requirement of universality. The 
oft-quoted passage is: 
What is meant by the words "taxing by a uniform rule?" 
And to what is the rule applied by the constitution? No lan-
guage in the constitution, perhaps, is more important than 
this; and to accomplish the beneficial purposes intended, it is 
essential that they should be truly interpreted, and correctly 
applied. "Taxing" is required to be cc by a uniform rule;" 
that is, by one and the same unvarying standard. Taxing by a 
uniform rule requires uniformity, not only in the rate of 
taxation, but also uniformity in the mode of assessment upon 
the taxable valuation. Uniformity in taxing implies equality 
in the burden of taxation; and this equality of burden cannot 
exist without uniformity in the mode of assessment, as well 
as in the rate of taxation. But this is not all. The uniformity 
must be co-extensive with the territory to which it applies. 
If a state tax, it must be uniform over all the State; if a 
county, town, or city tax, it must be uniform throughout the 
extent of the territory to which it is applicable. But the uni-
formity in the rule required by the constitution does not 
stop here. It must be extended to all property subject to taxa-
tion, so that all property may be taxed alike, equally-which 
is taxing by a uniform rule. 20 
A classic statement of the meaning of a strict uniformity 
clause, this passage is often quoted by other state courts when 
they restrictively interpret a uniformity provision. 
(2) Property taxation: since 1929 
Property other than ccland and improvements." By its 
terms, the amended uniformity clause in Art. XII, §2 applies 
only to the taxation of "land and improvements thereon." 
Therefore, other property-in effect, personal property-
20 !d. at 15, italics by the court. 
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may be taxed without regard to the "uniform rule" require-
ment. 21 The court has held that taxes imposed upon personal 
property need only be uniform within classes.22 This limita-
tion is derived from the state and federal equal protection 
clauses. This means that personal property may be classified 
for the purpose of applying the different effective rates to the 
several classes, 23 and there is no longer a prohibition against 
21 The leading case is State ex rel. Struble v. Davis, supra note 8, in which 
the court reviewed the history of the uniformity provisions in the Ohio 
Constitutions. It pointed out that before the present 18 51 constitution there 
was no limitation upon the taxation of property except that classifications 
be reasonable, and that by the amendment of 1929 the power of the legisla-
ture over the taxation of personal property was restored substantially to the 
status which existed under the provisions of the first constitution of 1802. 
In the Struble case the state equal protection clause, Art. I, §2, was equated 
to the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution. Also see the cases 
infra notes 23-25. 
22 Since real property is subject to a stricter uniformity limitation, this 
obviously gives rise to a very important "factual" determination: is a particu-
lar item of property to be classified as personal or real property for purposes 
of taxation. See, for example, Zangerle v. Republic Steel Corp., 144 
Ohio St. 529, 60 N.E. 2d 170 ( 1945); Zangerle v. Standard Oil Co., 
144 Ohio St. 506, 60 N.E. 2d 52 {1945); Standard Oil Co. v. Zangerle, 
144 Ohio St. 523, 60 N.E. 2d 59 (1945); and Roseville Pottery v. Board 
of Revision of Muskingum County, 149 Ohio St. 89, 77 N.E. 2d 608 
( 1948). Generally, see Holden, "Classification of Property as Real or 
Personal for Ohio Property Taxes: An Appraisal," I I Ohio State L. J. I 53 
(I950). Also see Reed v. Board of Revision of Fairfield County, 152 
Ohio St. 207, 88 N.E. 2d 701 (I949). 
23 See Reed v. Board of Revision, supra note 22, holding that the legisla-
ture is not prohibited from classifying personalty as realty and taxing such 
personalty at the higher real property tax rates, if such personalty constitutes 
a reasonable class. The first classified property tax law imposed under the 
I 929 amendment was upheld in State ex rei. Lampson v. Cook, 44 Ohio 
App. 501, 185 N.E. 2I2 {1932). Ohio has utilized the I929 amendment 
in this way: intangible personal property is classified, with the several classes 
(except "income producing" intangibles) being taxed at different millages 
on their value. Income producing intangibles have been taxed at a per cent 
of their yield (see note 2 5 infra). Tangible personalty has been classified 
for purpose of applying different ratios of valuation, with the same per-
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the exemption of personal property.24 In addition, it would 
appear that personal property may be taxed by either the 
specific or the ad valorem method. 25 
"Land and improvements thereon." Under the amended 
uniformity clause in Art. XII, §2 there appears to be no 
question but that the strictest degree of uniformity is re-
quired in the taxation of "land and improvements thereon" 
insofar as effective rates and the method of taxation are con-
cerned. No change has been made in that respect. However, 
there has been some controversy whether any realty, other 
than that specified in Art. XII, §2, may be exempted. Does 
a requirement of "universality" still govern the taxation of 
"land and improvements thereon?" 
Until 1950 one could have answered affirmatively. In a 
line of decisions dated from 1944 to 1950, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio clearly ruled that the requirement in Art. 
XII, §2, as amended, "Land and improvements thereon 
shall be taxed by a uniform rule according to value," pro-
hibited the exemption of any realty, other than that desig-
nated as exemptible by Art. XII, §2.26 
centage rate applicable to all such tangible personalty. Thus, both systems of 
classification have been used in Ohio. 
24 State ex rei. Struble v. Davis, supra note 8 (statute upheld exempting 
property of interurban railroad companies, other than real estate used for 
railroad purposes, from taxes during specified periods). Also see State ex rei. 
Williamsv. Glander, 14-8 Ohio St. 188,74- N.E. 2d 82 (194-7); State ex 
rei. Hostetter v. Hunt, 132 Ohio St. 568, 9 N.E. 2d 676 (1937). 
25 See Bennett v. Evatt, 14-5 Ohio St. 587, 62 N.E. 2d 34-5 (194-5), in 
which the court clearly intimated in the several opinions that specific taxes 
upon personal property are not necessarily prohibited. 
26 Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Thatcher, 14-0 Ohio 
St. 3 8, 4-2 N .E. 2d 4-3 7 ( 194-2). A provision of the property tax act pro-
vided that "public property used for a public purpose" should be exempt, 
and a provision of the code providing for the housing authority stated that 
all property of the same should "be deemed public property for public use." 
The court construed the provisions in light of Art. XII, §2 of the constitu-
tion to mean: "public property used exclusiflely for public purposes." It was 
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However, in 1 9 50 and 19 51 a series of cases were decided 
which indicate that the above interpretation has been reversed 
in an unusual manner.27 Article IV, §2, of the Ohio Constitu-
said that the legislature did not "intend" to declare such property to be of 
the class exemptible since it was clearly not within the constitutional class 
established in Art. XII, §2. The court made some rather questionable state-
ments which might imply, when taken out of context of the decision, that 
realty might now be exempted. In Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority 
v. Evatt, 143 Ohio St. 10, 53 N.E. 2d 896 (1944) a similar factual situa-
tion as that in the Columbus case, supra, involving the same statutes was 
dealt with. The court construed the exemption statute to intend "exclusive" 
use, and thus conform to the constitution. The same result was reached as in 
the Columbus case, but without use of any such questionable language. In 
Federal Public Housing Auth. v. Guckenberger, 143 Ohio St. 251, 55 
N.E. 2d 265 (1944) only the tax statute providing for the exemption of 
"public property" was involved and the court stated that the entire ex-
emption statute was based on Art. XII, §2 of the constitution which au-
thorizes the exemption of only such property as is used "exclusively" for 
such purpose, and construed the statute as not exempting the property in 
question, since otherwise it would have been unconstitutional. In Youngs-
town Metropolitan Housing Auth. v. Evatt, 143 Ohio St. 268, 55 N.E. 2d 
122 ( 1944) the same statutory structure involved in the Columbus and 
Dayton cases was again in question, and the court now left no doubt as to 
its view of Art. XII, §2, viz., that only such real property as is described in 
Art. XII, §2 may be exempted from taxation. And see, with similar factual 
situations, Hospital Service Ass'n of Toledo v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 179, 
57 N.E. 2d 928 ( 1944); Zangerle v. City of Cleveland, Division of Mu-
nicipal Transp., 145 Ohio St. 347, 61 N.E. 2d 720 ( 1945); and New 
Orphans' Asylum Etc. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 150 Ohio St. 219, 80 N.E. 
2d 761 (1948). In each of the preceding cases the court had to determine 
whether a given item of real property, not falling within the classes enu-
merated in Art. XII, §2 as excmptible, was exempt, and in each case con-
strued the statute involved as having no intent to exempt the property in 
question, because to interpret otherwise would render the statutes uncon-
stitutional. 
27 It is interesting to note that this reversal was preceded by an article 
vigorously propounding the view that the amended Art. XII, §2 no longer 
prohibits the exemption of realty, and that the rationale of that argument 
is the same as that accepted by the two new judges. See Caren, "Constitu-
tional Limitations on the Exemption of Real Property from Taxation," II 
Ohio State L. J. 207 (1950). Evidently this view was held by many vocal 
proponents. 
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tion requires that at least all but one of the judges of the 
Supreme Court of that state concur before a law may be 
declared unconstitutional. Subsequent to the 1944-1950 line 
of decisions, and prior to the 19 5 0-19 51 line of decisions, two 
new judges took their seats on the bench, and thus changed 
the composition of the seven-man court. 
After this new alignment the court was faced with de-
termining the constitutionality of a statute which left no 
doubt that it intended to exempt property admittedly not 
within the classes described in Art. XII, §2.28 Five members 
of the court were of the opinion that such a statute violated 
the uniformity clause, but the two new members took a con-
trary view. They were of the opinion that Art. XII, §2 
28 In re University of Cincinnati, 153 Ohio St. 142,91 N.E. 2d 502 
(1950) concerned the validity of a statute (not involved in any of the cases 
cited in note 26 supra) which purported to exempt certain school property. 
A majority of five judges were of the opinion the statute was unconstitu-
tional because the power of the legislature to exempt real property from 
taxation was, in their view, limited to that property enumerated in Art. XII, 
§2 of the constitution. All agreed that the statute purported to exempt prop-
erty not so enumerated. However, two judges were of the opposing view as 
to the nature of the constitutional limitation. Therefore, although the ma-
jority was of the opinion that the statute involved was unconstitutional, 
more than one member of the court not concurring, the statute was held 
constitutional. Art. IV, §2. Then in In re Application for Exemption, I 55 
Ohio St. 590, 99 N.E. 2d 761 (1951) the court had to determine the 
validity of the "housing authority property" exemption statute, supra note 
26, now amended to read that such property was to be considered public 
property used "exclusively" for a public purpose within the meaning of Art. 
XII, §2, and that it should be exempt from taxation. For the same reason 
governing the case of In re University of Cincinnati, supra, the statute was 
held to be constitutional. One of the two minority judges in the Cincinnati 
case was not sitting in this case, being represented by a lower-court judge 
who agreed with the opinion of the majority that Art. XII, §2 would pro-
hibit such an exemption and that the statute was unconstitutional. However, 
a "re"-reversal was prevented because Judge Zimmerman disagreed with 
the interpretation of "exclusive" in Art. XII, §2, contending that the hous-
ing authority property was within the class designated as exemptible in Art. 
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contained no restriction on the power of the legislature to 
exempt realty, and that consequently the exemption of realty 
was permissible, limited only by a requirement of reasonable 
classes (Art. I, §2). It was the view of the two-judge 
minority that the "uniform rule" requirement applies only 
to effective rates, and that the source of the universality 
limitation in the original uniformity provision was express 
language now removed.29 Therefore, in the view of the 
minority, the statute was not unconstitutional. 
More than one judge (two in fact) not concurring in the 
view that the statute was unconstitutional, the exemption had 
to be upheld. Thus, we have a reversal of the former in-
terpretation of the meaning of the "uniform rule" clause, and 
XII, §2. Judge Zimmerman had so dissented in the earlier cases, though 
agreeing with the view as to the prohibition of other exemptions of realty. 
Thus, two judges disagreed as to the unconstitutionality of the statute, but 
for different reasons, and it was upheld. 
The result of these cases had been foreshadowed in City of Cleveland v. 
Board of Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 97, 91 N.E. 2d 480 ( 1950), in which 
the two new judges had an opportunity to express their view on the nature 
of the amended uniformity clause. However, the majority interpreted the 
statute involved as not exempting the property in question, since they would 
have otherwise found it unconstitutional. In other words, in the Cleveland 
case the majority was not faced with deciding the constitutional issue because 
there was room for interpreting the statute to avoid it. 
29 It appears to this writer that the majority of the court stands on firmer 
ground in reaching its decision. It is true that the word "all" does not 
modify "land and improvements thereon" in the amended uniformity 
clause. However, regardless of one's predilections on what type of limitation 
would be preferable, it seems clear that the majority is correct when they 
point to the interpretation of the original clause to the effect that the words 
"uniform rule" contain a rule of universality apart from the separate words 
in the original provision spelling out that all property should be taxed. See 
supra note 20, quoting from Exchange Bank v. Hines, supra note 17. It also 
seems clear to this writer that a careful reading of State ex rel. Struble v. 
Davis, supra note 8, relied upon by the "minority" view, reveals that the 
opinion in that case referred only to the new freedom of the legislature to 
exempt personal property, leaving unchanged the prior requirement of uni-
versality concerning real property. See note 21 supra. 
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the view of a minority of two80 is now the law in Ohio. "For 
the time being, at least, the question of the authority of the 
general assembly to grant tax exemptions [of realty] is 
settled. . . ."31 
4. Wisconsin 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The state of Wisconsin has had but a single constitution, 
that of 1848. The only provision of that constitution which 
concerns uniformity of taxation is Art. VIII, § 1, which 
originally read: 
The rule of taxation shall be uniform, and taxes shall be 
levied upon such property as the Legislature shall prescribe. 
There have been three amendments to this provision, none of 
which has altered the basic rule of uniformity derived from 
the provision as it originally stood. In 1908, a second sentence 
80 That is, a view of the two-judge minority when combined with the 
view of a majority of the state legislature, particularly as to the statute in-
volved in In re Application for Exemption, note 28 supra. The legislature 
had amended the statute there involved so that there would be no doubt 
that its purpose was to do what a majority of the court had said that it 
could not do. Of course, we do not know whether one should attribute to 
the legislative "intent," if such a thing ever exists, a view that it could 
exempt any real property, or a view that the housing property was in fact 
such property as described in Art. XII, §2. The words of the statute might 
suggest the latter. 
81 Caren, supra note 27 at 213, emphasis added. The quoted statement 
was made by that writer after the majority had ruled that exemptions of 
realty were prohibited. It would not take a substantial change in the court's 
personnel to emphasize the significance of the words: "For the time be-
ing •... "Query: On a newly constituted court, all seven of whom believed 
that a proper interpretation of Art. XII, §2, as amended, would prohibit the 
exemption of realty, would and should the court feel compelled to follow the 
view of a minority of two which was established as law by the unusual con-
stitutional provision concerning the invalidation of statutes? 
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was added which expressly permits taxes on "incomes, 
privileges and occupations" and provides for the degree of 
uniformity required of such taxes. In 1927, an exception was 
made to the rule of uniformity applicable to property taxes, 
so that special treatment of forest and mineral lands is now 
permissible. A 1941 amendment concerned the method of 
collecting local property taxes.1 The basic uniformity pro-
vision, Art. VIII, §1, now reads: 
The rule of taxation shall be uniform but the legislature 
may empower cities, villages or towns to collect and return 
taxes on real estate located therein by optional methods. 
Taxes shall be levied upon such property with such classifica-
tion as to forests and minerals including or separate or 
severed from the land, as the legislature shall prescribe. 
Taxes may also be imposed on incomes, privileges and occu-
pations, which taxes may be graduated and progressive, and 
reasonable exemptions may be provided. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
Even before the 1908 amendment which added the pro-
vision spelling out the uniformity required of taxes other 
than property taxation, it was clear that the uniformity clause 
in Art. VIII, § 1 had been interpreted to limit only property 
taxes. 2 Nonproperty taxes were required only to be uniform 
1 The installment payment of real estate taxes was made possible by this 
amendment. Wisconsin Annotations I6I4, I6I6 (3d ed., 1950) (Wisconsin 
Constitution: History). 
2 The leading case is Nunnemacher v. State, I 29 Wis. 190, 204-220, 
I08 N.W. 627 (I906) (holding an inheritance tax valid as a privilege tax). 
Also see the following cases decided at the same term: State v. Chicago & 
N.W. R. Co., I28 Wis. 449, 108 N.W. 594 (1906) and Chicago & N.W. 
R. Co. v. State, 128 Wis. 553, I08 N.W. 557 (I906), discussed infra, 
under "Property taxation." In these three cases the confusion that might 
have resulted from rather ambiguous language of prior decisions (see, for 
example, State v. Whitcom, I22 Wis. I IO, 99 N.W. 468 (I904), in which 
a peddlers' license tax was held to violate the federal and state equal protec-
tion clauses, but Art. VIII, §I was also cited) was dispelled, but not without 
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within the classes to which they applied. 3 Therefore, the ob-
jects of nonproperty taxes and exemptions therefrom had to 
be only reasonable classes.4 An exemption from an inheritance 
tax which would have exempted estates if the estate of the 
deceased did not exceed $10,000 was held to be arbitrary. 11 
dissenting opinions. For example, in the Nonnemacher case, supra, two of 
the six judges dissented on this point. The majority in that decision pointed 
out that in any case Art. VIII, § 1 if applicable to non property taxes would 
mean nothing more than the federal equal protection clause. In other words, 
if it be insisted that all taxes should be "uniform," then the limitation had a 
"dual" meaning depending upon the type of tax involved, property or non-
property. 
8 The sources of this limitation are the state (Art. I, § 1) and federal 
(14th Amend.) equal protection clauses. See supra note 2. The two pro-
visions are generally equated. 
4 For example: Nonnemacher v. State, supra note 2 (inheritance tax; 
minimum exemptions valid); State v. Frear, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N.W. 673 
(1912) (income tax; allowance of certain exemptions to individuals and 
denial of same to partnerships, held not arbitrary); Welch v. Henry, 223 
Wis. 319, 271 N.W. 68 (1937) (emergency tax on "Certain 1933 Divi-
dends"; the object of the tax was certain dividends not subject to the 1933 
net income tax; held, a valid class was selected). Also see the following cases 
in which exemptions were found to be reasonable: State ex rei. Transp. 
Ass'n v. Zimmerman, 181 Wis. 552, 196 N.W. 848 (1923); State ex rei. 
Atwood v. Johnson, 170 Wis. 218, 175 N.W. 589 (1919); State ex 
rei. Bernhard Stearn & Sons v. Bodden, 165 Wis. 75, 160 N.W. 1077 
( 1917). For a reasonable class selected for the object of a privilege tax, see 
Nash Sales v. City of Milwaukee, 198 Wis. 281, 224 N.W. 126 (1929). 
In In re Will of LeFeber, 223 Wis. 393, 2 71 N.W. 95 ( 1937) an arbitrary 
classification was found. 
5 Black v. State, 113 Wis. 205, 89 N.W. 522 (1902). The court 
pointed out (at p. 221): 
•.• under this provision the $10,000 limitation or exemption is based 
on the size of the whole property devised or granted, and not upon the 
amount received by each individual legatee or grantee. Thus it results 
that one collateral relative, receiving a legacy of $2,000 from one testator, 
whose estate amounts to but $9,500, pays no tax, while another collateral 
relative in the same degree, receiving a legacy of $2,000 from another 
testator whose estate amounts to $10,500 is obliged to pay a tax. Here is 
unlawful discrimination, pure and simple. No rational distinction or dif-
ference can be drawn between the two legatees simply because the estates 
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The objects of such nonproperty taxes may be further classi-
fied for the purpose of applying different rates,6 and gradu-
ated rates have been held to be a reasonable scheme of classi-
fication.7 
For comparative purposes it is interesting to note that in 
Wisconsin an inheritance tax8 and a selective public utilities 
gross-earnings tax9 have been considered nonproperty taxes.10 
from which their legacies come are of slightly different size. They are 
both within the same class, surrounded by the same conditions, and re-
ceiving the same benefits. 
6 For example: Nunnemacher v. State, supra note 2 (inheritance tax; 
five classes were established based upon relation to the deceased; for each 
class there was a different graduated rate schedule; held to be reasonable 
classes); State v. Frear, supra note 4 (income tax; different schedule of 
rates applicable to income of corporations from that applied to income of 
individuals, upheld as reasonable). 
7 N unnemacher v. State, supra note 2 at 221-22 3, relying to a great de-
gree on Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 20 S. Ct. 747 (1899) and 
Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 18 S. Ct. 594 
( 1898). The court first stated, "If this question were an original one it 
would seem serious." However, noting that the United States Supreme 
Court had held that such graduated rates do not violate the federal equal 
protection clause, the court concluded that: 
. . . as the general equality guaranties of our own constitution are sub-
stantially the equivalent of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by 
the XIVth Amendment, we are content to follow the decisions of the 
United States supreme court, and hold that the progressive feature does 
not violate the constitution. 
Also see In re Will of Harnishfeger, 208 Wis. 317,242 N.W. 153 (1933). 
However, the court in Schuster & Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 506, 261 N.W. 
20 ( 193 5) held that a statute imposing a graduated rate on the gross income 
of chain stores was void as arbitrary and violative of the state and federal 
equal protection clauses, following Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 
U.S. 550,55 S. Ct. 525 (1934) in which the United States Supreme Court 
held that a Kentucky chain store tax with a graduated rate feature applied 
to gross income as a base violated the federal equal protection clause. 
8 N unnemacher v. State, supra note 2. 
9 State v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., supra note 2, discussed infra, "Prop-
erty taxation." See infra notes 26 and 27. 
10 Also see State ex rel. Bernhard Stearn & Sons v. Bodden, supra note 4, 
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There have been Wisconsin decisions concerning the nature 
of an income tax for purposes of uniformity of taxation. 
However, those decisions11 are not particularly useful for 
this monograph because they were made after the amend-
ment to Art. VIII, § 1 which now expressly permits income 
taxes, and, in addition, the decisions were based on the words 
of the constitutional amendment.12 
holding a "Grain Handlers Tax" to be an occupation or privilege tax and 
not a tax upon the grain handled. In State ex rei. Froedtert v. Tax Comm. 
of Wisconsin, 221 Wis. 225, 267 N.W. 52 (1936) the court held that a 
"Privilege Dividend Tax" was in fact a privilege tax on the "transfer" of 
such dividends. No question of uniformity was raised, the issue being pri-
marily one of territorial jurisdiction (due process). However, the court 
discussed at some length the scope of the word "privilege" as used in Art. 
VI II, §I, concluding that it was broad enough to cover any species of tax 
except property or capitation taxes. 
11 The leading case is State v. Frear, supra note 4. For a description of 
the Wisconsin tax, see Ford, Taxation of Intangibles in Michigan {1939), 
Univ. of Mich., Michigan Governmental Studies No. 2. 
12 In Welch v. Henry, supra note 4, it was indicated that a tax on gross 
income, as opposed to net income, might be characterized as a tax upon 
property. The tax there involved was a tax imposed on "certain 1935 
dividends." In brief, the legislature made certain dividends not subject to 
the 19 3 3 net income tax the object of an emergency relief tax. The rate 
scale was not the same as that applied under the I 9 3 3 net income tax. In 
the Welch case one contentiou was that the tax was a tax upon property. 
The court ruled that it was a tax upon the net income from a particular 
kind of property and therefore within the constitutional description of 
income taxes and not a tax upon the property from which the income is 
derived. The rather questionable statement was then made: 
This is, of course, true only if the tax be upon the net income. A tax upon 
the gross income of particular kinds of property or particular taxpayers or 
a particular business is doubtless within the condemnation of [the Steward 
and Schuster cases, supra note 7, chain store tax] ••• and constitutes 
in effect a tax upon the property itself. 
Query. In the cases cited, the objectionable feature was the application of 
a graduated rates schedule to gross receipts. The ruling was that such was 
arbitrary classification. The decisions did not rest on any notion that such 
taxes were "property taxes." Also see State v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., suprtJ 
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( 1) Property taxation 
The extent to which Art. VIII, § 1, limits the power of the 
legislature to tax property has been the subject of extended 
controversy in the Wisconsin cases. Conflicting views are 
found in a line of cases beginning in 1855. However, these 
conflicting decisions and dicta were either reconciled or re-
jected by the court in 1906 and a definitive meaning of the 
uniformity clause, Art. VIII, § 1, was then set forth. In view 
of these 1906 cases which purported to set at rest any con-
troversy theretofore existing, it will suffice for our purposes 
simply to record the points of disagreement without any ex-
tended critical analysis of the particular decisions. 
The first of these decisions was Milwaukee & M.R. Co. v. 
Waukesha County/3 decided in 1855. This case concerned 
the validity of a statute which required railroad companies 
to pay annually a tax of 1% of their gross earnings, the tax 
to be in lieu of "all other taxes" on the company and its 
property. The local authorities of the jurisdiction in which 
the plaintiff company was located had deemed the act to be 
unconstitutional, and had levied the local property-tax rate 
upon plaintiff company's property. Plaintiff company brought 
an action seeking to restrain collection of the local property-
tax rate. There was a demurrer, alleging the act to be un-
constitutional, and the demurrer was overruled. On appeal 
note 2, mfra notes 26 and 27, ruling that a tax upon the gross receipts of 
railroads was a privilege tax, not a property tax. 
13 9 Wis. 4 3 I ( I 8 55). This decision is recorded only as a footnote by 
the Reporter to Knowlton v. Rock County, 9 Wis. 410 ( 1859). There was 
no written opinion for the decision, and only the decision and opinion of 
the circuit court judge is set forth in the footnote. Evidently Judge Smith 
of the court in 18 55 was assigned to write the opinion, but it was never 
recorded and no record remained even in Judge Smith's records. Also on 
the court at that time were Judges Cole and Whiton. Only Judge Cole re-
mained on the bench when the Knowlton decision was made in 1859, and 
he relies in that case on what was his view of the rationale for the Milwaukee 
& M.R. Co. case. 
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to the Supreme Court, the judgment was affirmed. Thus the 
tax statute and its "in lieu" provision were upheld. The pre-
cise rationale supporting the Supreme Court's ruling is not 
known because the opinion was not reported.14 However, it is 
clear that the Circuit Court upheld the tax statute as a 
"partial" exemption, thus seemingly taking the view that the 
tax on gross receipts was on the property itsel£.15 The Su-
preme Court was at that time composed of three justices. 
In 1859, the Supreme Court passed upon the validity of a 
statute16 which provided that "rural" property within the city 
limits of the city in question was not to be subject to an 
annual city tax exceeding one half that levied on other land 
in the city. In Knowlton v. Rock County17 the statute was 
held unconstitutional because it violated the uniformity 
clause in Art. VIII, § 1. A two-judge majority ruled that 
absolute uniformity in rates was required by section 1, and 
rejected the contention that the legislature might classify 
property for different rates which were to be uniform within 
classes. In addition, the majority rejected any theory which 
viewed "partial" exemptions as permissible. Partial exemp-
tions were equated with classified rates. It was admitted that 
there was no requirement of universality, but the court held 
that once property was selected it must be taxed entirely and 
at the same rate applied to other property within the 
territory.18 Judge Cole, in a dissent, would have followed 
14 See note 13. There is some question whether the particular tax struc-
ture was viewed as a privilege tax combined with an "in lieu" feature ex-
empting property from property taxation, or whether the tax was viewed 
as a valid attempt at "partial" exemption of property. Cf. the view of the 
lower court, text to note 1 5, infra. 
15 Milwaukee & M.R. Co. v. Waukesha, supra note 13. 
16 The statute involved was a "local" law, setting forth the Charter of 
the city in question. 
17 Supra note 13. 
18 Also see Slauson v. Racine, 13 Wis. 398 (1861) for a similar holding. 
A proviso in a tax statute provided, in substance, that "rural" lands in Racine 
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what he considered the doctrine of the Milwaukee & M.R. 
Co. case, namely, that the legislature had the power to 
classify property for purposes of different rates. He seemed 
to consider the railroad gross-receipts tax which was ruled 
on in the prior case to be a property tax with a base of gross 
earnings. Thus, in effect, he rejected the view that the ad 
valorem method was required in taxing property. Of the 
three justices on the bench for the Knowlton case, only Judge 
Cole was serving when the Milwaukee & M.R. Co. case was 
decided. 
Subsequently, in State ex rel. Attorney General v. Winne-
bago Lake & Fox River Plank Road Co./9 dated 1860, the 
same two-judge majority approved the Knowlton case and 
considered and overruled the Milwaukee & M.R. Co. case. 
The same gross-receipts tax considered in the Milwaukee & 
M.R. Co. case was in question, and it was held unconstitu-
tional on the ground that it was a property tax with a rate 
different from that applicable to other property. Apparently 
the majority gave no serious consideration to the possibility 
that the tax might be an "in lieu" excise tax. It was said 
that the object of Art. VIII, §1 was to "secure equality as 
between different kinds of taxable property .... And this 
can only be attained by a uniform rate." However, the 
power to exempt property was again reaffirmed, and again 
Judge Cole dissented, still adhering to the view that the 
Milwaukee & M.R. Co. case correctly interpreted the uni-
formity clause as sanctioning classification for either rates, 
exemptions, or partial exemptions. 
The same railroad gross receipts tax was again considered 
were to be taxed at a different and lesser rate than other land. The proviso 
was held unconstitutional and the entire statute was consequently held in-
operative. The decision rested simply on a citation of the Knowlton case, 
supra note I3. 
19 II Wis. 3 5 ( I860). This was an action to compel the payment of the 
gross receipts tax by defendant railroad company. 
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in Kneeland v. Milwaukee/0 decided in 1862. In that case 
the plaintiff sued to restrain the issuing of tax deeds for land 
sold for taxes due under the local property-tax rate for cer-
tain prior years. During those years the "in lieu" provision 
of the railroad gross-earnings tax had been followed and the 
local authorities had not assessed railroad property. One 
contention of plaintiff was that such an omission invalidated 
the property tax. The court was of the opinion that if the 
railroad tax was held unconstitutional then the entire state 
and local general property tax for the years in question was 
unconstitutional because property was omitted by "other than 
error of judgment." A prior decision was relied on for this 
proposition.21 On rehearing-after first having defended its 
position assumed in the Winnebago case, namely, that the 
railroad tax was unconstitutional-the court overruled the 
Winnebago case and followed the Milwaukee & M.R. Co. 
case, citing the dual reason of "stare decisis" and the "prac-
tical results" of a contrary opinion. It must be admitted that 
the court seemed most impressed with the result which a 
decision invalidating the entire state and local general prop-
erty taxes for the prior years would have brought about-
apparently, a chaos in governmental matters. 
In 1881 the court, in Wisconsin Central R. Co. v. Taylor,22 
reviewed the above cases. The statute before the court ex-
empted the property of the Wisconsin Central Railroad 
Company for a period of ten years (extended by amend-
ment for three additional years). Thus, the only issue 
properly raised concerned the power of the legislature to 
exempt property. However, in holding that the statute was 
constitutional, the majority "approved" the Milwaukee & 
M.R. Co. case of 1855, saying that anything inconsistent 
2015 Wis. 454 (1862). 
21 Weeksv. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242 {1860). 
22 52 Wis. 37,8 N.W. 833 (1881). 
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therewith was overruled. Furthermore, language was used 
indicating that the power to classify property for both rates 
and exemptions existed.23 Of course, there was no need for 
this language. The only issue raised concerned the exemp-
tion of a "part of a class," i.e., an unreasonable classification. 
The majority never faced the real issue of whether the ex-
emption of the property of a single railroad company was the 
exemption of a reasonable class of property.24 In effect, the 
purpose of the majority opinion appeared to be to reaffirm 
the 1855 Milwaukee & M.R. Co. case on its merits rather 
than on the lone principle of stare decisis. 
Thus the situation stood until 1906. None of the cases 
decided after 18 81 and before 1906 contributed to a solution 
of the problem.25 In 1903, the Wisconsin legislature changed 
23 In making an extensive comparative study of the uniformity clauses 
existing in other state constitutions at that time, the court placed an em-
phasis on the absence of the word "equal" (i.e., "equal and uniform") in 
the Wisconsin provision, as a basis for its conclusion that an absolute uni-
formity was not required by the Wisconsin uniformity clause. 
24 In Chicago & N.W. R. Co. v. State, supra note 2 at 643, this decision 
was described as follows: "There [in the Wisconsin Central case] ••• a 
very small subclass of real estate, a class so small as to be confined to one 
owner, was deemed sufficiently different from realty generally to warrant 
the legislature in exempting it from taxation. It is not likely, as we have 
before indicated, that this court will soon go further on that line than it did 
in that case." 
25 The following cases contain discussions of the uniformity limitation but 
contributed nothing new: Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Lincoln, 57 Wis. 137, 
15 N.W. 121 (1883} (re different assessment times for personalty and 
realty); State ex rei. Holt Co. v. Bellew, 86 Wis. 189, 56 N.W. 782 
( 1893) (essentially a question of "situs," not of uniformity); State ex rel. 
Milwaukee St. R. Co. v. Anderson, 90 Wis. 550, 63 N.W. 746 (1895) 
(re method of selection of assessors, language of uniformity irrelevant); and 
Lund v. Chippewa, 93 Wis. 640, 67 N.W. 927 (1896) (re the territorial 
nature of the uniformity limitation}. Also see State ex rei. Barabou v. Sauk, 
70 Wis. 485, 36 N.W. 396 ( 1888} and Battles v. Doll, 113 Wis. 357, 89 
N.W. 187 (1902}. For the importance of Kingsley v. Merrill, 122 Wis. 
185,99 N.W. 1044 (1904} see infra notes 31 and 32. 
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the method of taxing railroad companies. It abandoned the 
method which had required a payment of a percent of gross 
earnings, to be "in lieu of other taxes" imposed on the com-
panies and their property; and by Chapter 315, Laws of 
1903, the property of railroads was to be thereafter taxed by 
the ad valorem method, with the rate applicable thereto being 
the statewide state-local average ad valorem rate. In two 
cases decided in 1906 the court felt compelled to pass upon 
the nature and validity of both the prior system of taxing 
railroads and their property and the system inaugurated in 
1903. In State v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co./6 the court ruled 
that the "gross earnings" tax was not a property tax (the 
distinction between "direct" and "indirect" taxes on property 
was relied upon) but was a "privilege tax" with an "in lieu" 
feature which simply provided for the exemption of certain 
property from the general property tax.27 
The more important case for our purposes was Chicago & 
N. W.R. Co. v. State,28 in which an action was brought to en-
join collection of taxes levied upon the property of plaintiff 
railroad company for the year 1904 pursuant to the new tax 
law embodied in the 1903 statute.29 The new method of ad 
valorem taxation of railroad property raised anew the funda-
mental problem of the precise meaning of the uniformity 
26 Supra note 2. This was an action to recover the penalty for noncom-
pliance with the law relating to the payment to the state of a per cent of 
defendants' gross earnings, due to the state for 1903. 
27 /d. at 484-495. 
28 Supra note 2. 
29 Note how the court framed the issue: The action was "to test the 
validity of the law changing the method of requiring railway companies in 
[the] state to share with other property owners therein the burden of its 
government from the indirect way to the ad valorem method." [Emphasis 
added.] ld. at 5 59. There was a challenge both as to the validity of the 
law itself, generally, and the procedure thereunder to determine certain 
values. Of course, the opinion writer anticipated his conclusion in so framing 
the question to be answered. 
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clause in Art. VI II, § 1. The lower court had ruled that under 
the uniformity clause the legislature might properly classify 
property for the purpose of applying different rates, and that 
the application of a different rate to railroad property from 
the rate applicable to other property in the state was an 
example of the exercise of this power. 
The Supreme Court first reviewed the cases discussed 
above, and concluded30 that they could all be "reconciled" 
with an "accurate" interpretation of the uniformity clause. 
The court summed up the content of the uniformity limita-
tion as follows: ( 1) There is no requirement of universality, 
thus exemptions of reasonable classes of property are per-
missible; 31 however, there can be no "partial" exemption. 
(2) Absolute uniformity must prevail in the effective rate 
applicable to all property taxed by any taxing district.32 Thus 
property selected for taxation must be taxed at the same rate. 
On this point, of course, the court faced the difficult problem 
of reconciling the prior cases. However, it asserted that this 
view was never departed from in the decisions, although some 
language might appear to the contrary. ( 3) The requirement 
of absolute uniformity in effective rates does not extend to 
30 /d. at 604, 614. 
31 Also see the following cases on exemptions of property: Lawrence 
University v. Outagamie, 150 Wis. 244, 136 N.W. 619 (1912) (finding 
an exemption arbitrary, and saying that the "rule of uniformity would be 
violated" by arbitrary classifications for the exemption of property) ; Mil-
waukee E.R. & L. Co. v. Tax Comm., 207 Wis. 523, 242 N.W. 312 
( 19 3 2). In the earlier case of Kingsley v. Merrill, supra note 25 at 194-198, 
the court had held that the taxation of "debts due from solvent debtors," and 
exemption of "debts due from others" was not a violation of Art. VIII, § 1. 
It was held that there was a reasonable distinction between "good" and 
"bad" debts. 
32 In Kingsley v. Merrill, supra note 25 at 198-201, the court held that 
notes and mortgages are "property" and that the taxation of credits is not 
such double taxation as would violate the uniformity clause, Art. VIII, § 1. 
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the "mechanics" of valuation or assessment. ( 4) Property 
taxed must be taxed ad valorem.83 
Having ruled that an absolute uniformity of rates was 
required the court faced some difficulty in upholding the 
average rate feature of the railroad property ad valorem tax. 
Such property was not subject to the local rate where it might 
be physically located, nor was it subject to the state general 
property-tax rate-rather it was taxed at an average of these 
rates. Those challenging the validity of the tax naturally 
fell back on a determination by the Michigan court only a 
few years before, in Pingree v. Auditor General,S4 that such a 
tax was in essence a state tax and therefore a violation of the 
Michigan uniformity clause, which was the same type as the 
Wisconsin provision. The Pingree case was distinguished by 
the court on the basis of the characterization by the Michigan 
court of the nature of such a tax.35 The Wisconsin court held 
that the tax in question was of a "multi-nature," that is, that 
there was a conformity with the requirement of absolute uni-
33 This limitation is not necessarily derived from the requirement of a 
"uniform rule." In Chicago & N.W. R. Co. v. State, supra note 2, the 
limitation was said to be implied from the words as they appeared in the 
original Art. VIII, §I: "and taxes shall be levied upon such property as the 
legislature shall prescribe" (the so-called "second clause" of the original 
provision). The court stated (at p. 607): 
••. when the second clause was added [in the constitutional conven-
tion], it impliedly prescribed value as the basis since ••• "the rule of 
property taxation is that the property is the basis of taxation. It . • • 
rests solely upon value .•.• " 
The idea of taxation on a value basis being necessarily embodied in the 
second clause of sec. I, all that was necessary to the first [clause] was the 
idea of uniformity. 
This was stated in reference to the omission of the word "equal" from the 
phraseology of the basic uniformity clause. 
84 I20 Mich. 95, 78 N.W. I025 (I899). See the Michigan discussion, 
in this chapter at notes I 0-16, supra. 
8G Chicago & N.W. R. Co. v. State, supra note 2 at 649-652, 667-669. 
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formity in rates because the average rate feature was a 
reasonable compliance with the uniformity limitation which 
requires "uniformity of burden, not necessarily uniformity 
of methods of imposing burdens." There was a reasonable 
compliance because a tax burden was assessed on railroad 
property which was substantially equal to that imposed upon 
all other property in the state. 86 
Judge Cassoday87 concurred in the result of the majority 
opinion (holding the new average-rate method of taxing rail-
road property valid) only because in his opinion "under the 
uniformity clause of the constitution the legislature has power 
to classify property for the purposes of taxation and then to 
impose different rates of taxation upon the different classes of 
property. "38 
Thus, after some confusion concerning the meaning of 
the uniformity limitation which governs the taxation of prop-
erty in Wisconsin, one may conclude that absolute uniformity 
36 /d. at 671, 675-676. Compare Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M.R. Co. v. 
Douglas, 159 Wis. 408, 150 N.W. 422 (1914). An ore and merchandise 
dock, which was a necessary part of the terminal facilities of a railroad, was 
taxed by local authorities at a higher rate than the balance of the railroad's 
property under the ad valorem tax law. This was held to be a violation of 
the constitutional rule of uniformity. 
In addition, the court held in Chicago & N.W. R. Co. v. State, supra 
note 2, that the procedure under the law in question was not invalid, that 
the uniformity clause does not prohibit classification for methods of assess-
ment. Different methods were to be used by the assessors to determine the 
value of the railroad property. 
37 Judge Cassoday was the only member of the court at the time of the 
Chicago & N.W. R. Co. case, supra notes 2, 35, who had been on the bench 
when the Wisconsin Central R. Co. v. Taylor case, supra note 22, was de-
cided in 1881. His opinion was more fully set forth in State v. Chicago & 
N.W. R. Co., supra note 2 at 519-5 52. 
38 Chicago & N.W. R. Co. v. State, supra note 2 at 677-678. It was his 
opinion that the majority could not reach their decision without a departure 
from the rule set forth in the Knowlton case, supra notes 13, 17, although 
that case was purportedly followed. 
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is required of effective rates,39 but that exemption of classes 
of property may be made. 
E. ANALYSES OF STATES WITH TYPE V CLAUSES 
1. Mississippi 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The state of Mississippi has had four constitutions. In 
the constitutions of 1817 and 1832 there were no provisions 
which expressly dealt with uniformity of taxation. In the 
constitution of 1869, two provisions concerning the uni-
formity limitation were introduced in Art. XII, §§ 13 and 20. 
In the present constitution of 18 90, those uniformity pro-
visions of 1869 were carried over substantially, without any 
change in phraseology, but with some elaboration. The basic 
uniformity clause is now found in Art. IV, § 112 of the 18 90 
constitution, and reads as follows: 
Taxation shall be uniform and equal throughout the state. 
Property shall be taxed in proportion to its value. • • . 
39 The latest statement by the court concerning this requirement is found 
in State ex rel. Baker Mfg. Co. v. City of Evansville, 261 Wis. 599, 53 
N.W. 2d 795 (1952). The court stated (p. 609): 
As we heard the city's oral argument and read its brief we gained the 
impression that it contends that there is uniformity of taxation if one 
fraction of true value is applied to all real property, although some other 
fraction thereof may be used in the case of personalty,-that the re-
quirement of uniformity is satisfied so long as there is uniformity within 
the class. We do not consider this to be the law. In our view the command 
of Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the Wisconsin constitution requires uniformity of 
taxation, according to value, of real and personal property without distinc-
tion ..•• [W]hen once the true value is arrived at, each dollar's worth 
of one sort of property is liable for exactly the same tax as a dollar's worth 
of any other sort of property, and to assess real property at a different 
fraction of the value than personalty is error. 
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Property shall be assessed for taxes under general laws, and 
by uniform rules, according to its true value. . . .1 
In addition, Art. VII, § 181 provides: 
The property of all private corporations for pecuniary 
gain shall be taxed in the same way and to the same extent 
as the property of individuals .... 2 
The present constitution has also introduced the practice of 
providing for industrial exemptions for a limited period in 
order to "encourage" the establishment of such industries.3 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
The court has consistently ruled that the requirement that 
1 The first omission indicated in the text concerns a "per capita" tax 
upon certain destructive domestic animals, thus establishing an exception to 
the "proportionality" requirement. The second omission provides that the 
legislature may provide for special modes of "valuation and assessment" for 
property "not situated wholly in one county," with a proviso that all such 
property shall be assessed at its "true value." 
Art. XII, §20 of the 1869 constitution was identical with the first two 
sentences of the present Section 112, except that the word "All" modified 
the word "property" in the second sentence, and the second sentence con-
tained the additional phrase "to be ascertained as directed by law." The 
1869 provision was limited to those two sentences. 
2 The omission contains the following proviso: 
•.. but the legislature may provide for the taxation of banks and bank-
ing capital, by taxing the shares according to the value thereof {aug-
mented by the accumulations, surplus, and unpaid dividends), exclusive 
of real estate, which shall be taxed as other real estate. . •. And do-
mestic insurance companies shall not be required to pay a greater tax in 
the aggregate than is required to be paid by foreign insurance companies 
doing business in this state, except to the extent of the excess of their ad 
valorem tax over the privilege tax imposed upon such foreign companies; 
and the legislature may impose privilege taxes on building and loan 
associations in lieu of all other taxes except on their real estate. 
Art. XII, § 13 of the 1869 constitution contained only the following brief 
requirement: "The property of all corporations for pecuniary profits shall 
be subject to taxation, the same as that of individuals." 
3 Art. VII, § 182 and § 192. 
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"Taxation shall be uniform and equal throughout the state" 
applies only to the taxation of property, and that nonproperty 
taxes need only be uniform within classes.4 Thus, the objects 
of nonproperty taxes and the exemptions therefrom need 
only be reasonable classes.5 The objects of such taxes may be 
further classified for the purpose of applying different rates.6 
A schedule of graduated rates has been held a reasonable 
classification. 7 
Since the uniformity limitation applicable to property 
taxes is more stringent, it is apparent that the characteriza-
tion of a tax is extremely important. In a series of cases often 
cited in other jurisdictions, the Mississippi court has ruled 
that certain taxes were really taxes upon the "privilege of 
ownership" of certain property and therefore on the property 
itself, and consequently the taxes were held to violate the 
stricter property-tax uniformity limitation. In the first such 
case, Thompson v. Kreutzer,8 decided in 1916, the court 
considered the validity of a statute which purported to im-
pose "an annual privilege tax, or occupation fee" of twenty 
cents per acre upon "each person, association of persons, or 
business firms and corporations pursuing the business of buy-
ing, owning or holding more than one thousand acres of 
4 See, for example, Coca Cola Co. v. Skillman, 91 Miss. 677, 44 So. 985 
(1908). While the source of this limitation has not been made entirely 
clear, it appears to be solely the federal equal protection clause, although a 
number of the older cases refer at times to section 112 of the Mississippi 
Constitution and at other times to the due process provision of the state 
constitution, Art. III, § 14. 
5 See State ex rel. Knox v. Gulf, M. & N.R. Co., 138 Miss. 70, 104 So. 
689 (1925) (exemptions from the net income tax); Notgrass Drug Co. v. 
State, 175 Miss. 358, 165 So. 884 (1936) (business and occupation tax, in 
substance a sales tax, numerous classifications in the object); Clarksdale Ins. 
Agency v. Cole, 87 Miss. 637, 40 So. 228 (1906); Johnson v. Long Fur-
niture Co., 113 Miss. 373,74 So. 283 (1917). 
6 State ex rel. Knox v. Gulf, M. & N.R. Co., supra note 5. 
Tfd. 
8 112 Miss. 165,72 So. 891 (1916). 
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timber land or lands in this state." It held that the tax was in 
fact upon property and, not being "in proportion to its 
value," violative of the property-tax uniformity limitation. 
In an oft-quoted statement, the court said: "· .. a tax on 
the right of ownership of a thing is necessarily a tax on the 
thing itself."9 
During the same term, in Thompson v. McLeod/0 the 
court considered "an annual privilege tax or occupation fee 
upon all persons, associations of persons, or business firms and 
corporations, pursuing the business of extracting turpentine 
from standing trees." This tax was also held to be, in fact, a 
tax upon the property involved and violative of Art. IV, 
§ 112.11 The reasoning was essentially the same as that found 
in the Kreutzer case. Subsequently, in Barnes v. Jones12 the 
court passed on the validity of a tax upon the rights of resi-
dents of Mississippi to own shares of capital stock of non-
resident corporations, stock companies, associations, or trust 
companies organized and conducting business for profit, such 
tax amounting to one half of one per cent of the value of such 
shares. It ruled that the tax was, in fact, a tax upon the prop-
erty involved and a violation of the property-tax uniformity 
clause. 
The broad implication often drawn from these cases has 
been limited by the Mississippi court in subsequent opinions, 
so that the cases are now restricted to their particular facts. 
9 /d. at 167. 
10 112 Miss. 383, 73 So. 193 (1916). 
11 !d. at 391, 392. The invalidity of the tax stemmed from the fact it 
resulted in "double taxation" of the property involved. The court reasoned 
that to tax the standing pine trees with an ad valorem tax, and at the same 
time "exact tribute from the owner as a condition precedent to his right to 
lay hands upon the trees" would result in "double taxation upon the tree 
itself," which would be contrary to the uniformity clause. Two justices 
dissented, asserting that the tax was a tax upon the privilege of engaging in 
the "business of extracting crude turpentine." 
12 139 Miss. 675, 103 So. 773 (1925). 
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Not infrequently the cases have been distinguished. For ex-
ample, in 1925 in State ex rel. Knox v. Gulf, M. & N.R. 
Co./3 the court held that a net income tax was not a tax upon 
property; in 1942 in Stone v. General Contract Purchase 
Corp.,14 the court held that a "Finance Companies" tax with 
a base consisting of the amount of indebtedness secured by 
tangible property in the state was a privilege tax; and in 
1945 in Gulf Refining Co. v. Stone/5 the court held that an 
oil severance or production tax was not upon the oil severed 
but upon an occupation. The court has also ruled that the 
Mississippi inheritance tax was not a tax upon property.16 
Property taxation. The court has ruled that the uniformity 
provision of the Mississippi Constitution, Art. IV, § 112, does 
not require universality.17 As stated by the court: 
Section 112 does not require all property to be taxed. 
It commits to the legislature the duty of designating and 
classifying property for taxation and all property not within 
the classes selected will be exempt from taxation. It does not 
deprive the legislature of the power which it has been ac-
customed to exercise from the inception of the state govern-
ment to exempt from taxation property of a particular class 
embraced within a general class that is subjected to taxation.18 
13 Supra note 5. This position reaffirmed the stand taken in the earlier 
case of Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss. 34, 88 So. 4 
( 1921). In the Robertson case the tax did not have a graduated rate. Thus, 
the Knox case is more important because it restated the position of the court 
on the nature of an income tax, and also ruled that graduated rates were 
permissible. 
14 193 Miss. 301, 7 S. 2d 806 (1942). 
15197 Miss. 713,21 S. 2d 19 (1945). 
16 Enochs v. State, 133 Miss. I 07, 97 So. 5 34 ( 1923). 
17 See, for example, Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Love, 20 I Miss. 
676,27 S. 2d 850 (1946); Jackson v. Mississippi Fire Ins. Co., 132 Miss. 
415,95 So. 845 (1923), followed in Miller v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 158 
Miss. 7 53, 131 So. 282 ( 1930). Also see City of Jackson v. Edwards House, 
145 Miss. 13 5, II 0 So. 231 ( 1926); Brennan v. Mississippi Home Ins. 
Co., 70 Miss. 531, 13 So. 228 (1893). 
18 Jackson v. Mississippi Fire Ins. Co., supra note 17 at 419. 
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It is said that there are only two limitations on the exemption 
of property. Such exemptions must be based upon "some 
principle of public policy that can support a presumption that 
the public interest will be subserved by the exemption 
granted," and the class of property must constitute a reason-
able classification.19 
However, the court has interpreted section 112 to require 
an absolute uniformity in the effective rate applicable to all 
property taxed by a single taxing jurisdiction, saying: "In 
order that the equality of taxation contemplated by this sec-
tion may exist ... there must be no discrimination in rates 
between different species of property. All property must be 
taxed at the same rate on its true value."20 In addition, as 
might be expected in view of the additional words found in 
the Mississippi uniformity clause, taxation of property must 
be ad valorem. 21 
2. Texas 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The present constitution of Texas, which became effective 
in 18 7 6, contains two basic uniformity provisions, both 
found in Art. VIII. Section I of Art. VIII provides, in part: 
Taxation shall be equal and uniform. All property in this 
State, whether owned by natural persons or corporations, 
19 Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Love, supra note 17 at 690. 
2° Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Robertson, 122 Miss. 417, 422, 84 So. 
499 (1920). And section 112 is said to require "uniformity" in assessed 
value over "true" value in situations where both are impossible. For dis-
cussion of the uniformity required under the uniformity clause in the 1869 
constitution, see Vicksburg Bank v. Worrell, 67 Miss. 47, 7 So. 219 
{1889); Hawkins v. Mangum, 78 Miss. 97, 28 So. 872 {1906); Adams 
v. Miss. State Bank, 75 Miss. 701,23 So. 395 (1898); and Dams v. Bank 
of Oxford, 78 Miss. 532, 29 So. 402 (1900). 
21 For example, Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Robertson, supra note 20. 
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other than municipal, shall be taxed in proportion to its 
value .... 
Section 1 further provides for particular types of taxes, in-
cluding the taxation of income, 1 and contains a proviso re-
quiring the exemption from taxation of $250 of household 
furniture belonging to each family. The uniformity struc-
tures in the prior constitutions of Texas were limited sub-
stantially to the above provisions. 2 The second uniformity 
clause in the present constitution is specifically concerned 
with "occupation taxes." Section 2 of Art. VIII provides: 
All occupation taxes shall be equal and uniform upon the 
same class of subjects within the limits of the authority levy-
. th t 8 mg e ax .... 
1 The provision reads: 
... The Legislature may impose a poll tax. It may also impose occupa-
tion taxes, both upon natural persons and upon corporations, other than 
municipal, doing business in this State. It may also tax incomes of both 
natural persons and corporations other than municipal, except that per-
sons engaged in mechanical and agricultural pursuits shall never be re-
quired to pay an occupation tax .••• 
2 The first constitution of the State of Texas, dated 1845, contained a 
provision, Art. VII, §27, substantially identical to Art. VIII, §1 of the 
present constitution with the important difference being that the following 
italicized clause was present: "All property in this State shall be taxed in 
proportion to its value . . • ; except such property as t•wo-thirds of both 
houses of the legislature may think proper to exempt from taxation." Com-
pare the proviso of the present Art. VIII, §2, described in the text. The 
constitution of 1845 also contained a provision, Art. VII, §28, which was 
identical to the present proviso in Art. VIII, § 1 exempting household fur-
niture from property taxation. In the subsequent constitution of 1866 Art. 
VII, §§27 and 28 were identical to Art. VII, §§27 and 28 of the 1845 
constitution. In the constitution of 1868 there was a single provision, Art. 
XII, § 19, identical to Art. VII, §27 of the 1845 constitution. The next 
constitution was the present one of 1876. 
8 In Art. VIII, § 17 the constitution provides: 
The specification of the objects and subjects of taxation shall not 
deprive the Legislature of the power to require other subjects or objects 
to be taxed in such manner as may be consistent with the principles of 
taxation fixed in this Constitution. 
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The second clause of this provision requires the exemption 
from taxation of designated classes of property and concludes 
with the proviso that "all laws exempting property from 
taxation other than the property above mentioned shall be 
null and void."4 Another provision of interest is Art. VIII, 
§20, providing that property shall never be assessed for ad 
valorem taxes at a greater value than its "fair cash market 
value." 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
In Texas taxes are classified for purposes of uniformity as 
either property taxes or nonproperty taxes. Because of the 
use of the term "occupation" taxes in Art. VIII, §2, the 
Texas courts have generally referred to most of the "nonprop-
erty" taxes as "occupation" taxes,11 although the term has a 
more narrow significance in most other states. In any case, it 
is clear that "nonproperty" taxes are limited only by that de-
gree of uniformity required by Art. VIII, §2-a uniformity 
within classes. 6 Texas has had a substantial number of cases 
4 The designated classes of property are "public" and "quasi-public." 
Other provisions of the constitution provide for the exemption of special 
classes of property. See Art. XI, §9; Art. VIII, §§1b, 19; Art. VII, §6a. 
11 For purposes other than uniformity it may become of some importance 
in Texas to distinguish between those nonproperty taxes designated "occu-
pation" taxes and those held not to be occupation taxes. For example, mu-
nicipalities are exempt from certain "occupation" taxes. This was held not 
to include a fuel use tax. See State v. City of El Paso, 13 5 Tex. 359, 143 
S.W. 2d 366 ( 1940), in which this problem is developed. 
6 See, for example, the leading case, Texas Co. v. Stephens, 100 
Tex. 628, 103 S.W. 481 (1907). The court has oftentimes equated 
the uniformity limitation in Art. VIII, §2 with the federal equal protection 
clause. See, for example, Dallas Gas Co. v. State (Tex. Civ. App.), 261 
S.W. 1063, 1069 (1924); Hurt v. Cooper, 130 Tex. 433, 441, 110 
S.W. 2d 896 (1937). Under the prior constitutions of Texas there was no 
uniformity provision directed expressly to nonproperty taxes, and the broad 
uniformity clause identical to that now found in Art. VIII, § 1 could have 
possibly been interpreted to apply to all taxation. However, as expected, the 
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applying this limitation and determining its meaning for 
"nonproperty" taxes. The court has permitted the legisla-
ture a wide discretion as illustrated in its opinions ruling 
that the objects of nonproperty taxes and exemptions or ex-
clusions therefrom need only be reasonable classes, 7 and that 
subclassifications may be made within the larger class con-
stituting the object of a given tax for the purpose of applying 
different rates to different subclasses. 8 The court has ap-
court ruled that nonproperty taxes need only be uniform within classes. 
While some of the older cases implied that the requirement that "taxation 
shall be equal and uniform" limited nonproperty taxes, they also read in 
the phrase "within classes." For a review of the situation under prior con-
stitutions, see Dallas Gas Co. v. State, swpra. 
7 See, for example, the leading case, Texas Co. v. Stephens, supra note 
6, in which the court upheld an occupation tax upon the persons engaged 
in the wholesaling of oil. In the same case, the court upheld another section 
of the statute which imposed a tax on the gross receipts of pipeline companies 
engaged in conveying oil. Also see: Hurt v. Cooper, supra note 6 (chain 
store tax, upholding both the object of the tax as a class, and exemptions 
therefrom); State v. Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co., 145 Tex. 24, 193 S.W. 
2d 675 (1946) (chain store tax, exemption of certain utilities owning and 
operating stores selling gas and electric appliances in towns of 3,000 popula-
tion or less upheld); Lockhart v. American Mutual Life Ins. Co. (Tex. Civ. 
App.), 194 S.W. 2d 285 (1946) (insurance companies, gross premiums 
tax, exemption of fraternal benefit societies upheld); San Jacinto Nat. Bank 
v. Sheppard, (Tex. Civ. App.) 125 S.W. 2d 715 ( 1938) (inheritance tax, 
exemption of a minimum amount for religious organizations if the devise 
was to be used within the state). See Pullman Palace Car Co. v. State, 64 
Tex. 274, 53 Am. Rep. 758 (1885) for one of the few cases finding a 
classification to be arbitrary. 
8 For example, Texas Co. v. Stephens, supra note 6 (gross receipts tax, 
different businesses classified for different rates); Dallas Gas Co. v. State, 
supra note 6 (gross receipts tax, utilities, rate varied according to population 
of town in which utility operated); Hurt v. Cooper, supra note 6 (chain 
store tax, rates graduated according to number of stores operated); Garr, 
Scott & Co. v. Shannon, 52 Tex. 634, 115 S.W. 361 ( 1909) (corporation 
franchise tax); State v. Hogg, 123 Tex. 568, 72 S.W. 2d 593 ( 1934) 
(inheritance tax, classification for different rates according to relationship 
to deceased). 
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proved the principle of progressively graduated rates as a 
reasonable classification. 9 
Of comparative interest are the decisions that the follow-
• • 10 mg are nonproperty taxes: gross recetpt taxes, severance 
and production taxes11 (which play an important part in the 
Texas tax structure), and an inheritance tax.12 Texas has 
never imposed an income tax; however, such a tax is ex-
pressly provided for in Art. VIII, § 1, thus removing any 
doubt as to the validity of such a tax in Texas.13 
Property taxation. The court has ruled that a requirement 
of universality governs the taxation of property in Texas. 
This limitation is spelled out in Art. VIII, § 1, which pro-
vides that "All property ... shall be taxed in proportion 
9 See the cases in footnote 8, supra. 
IO Texas Co. v. Stephens, supra note 6; Lockhart v. American Mutual 
Life Ins. Co., supra note 7 (insurance companies, gross premiums tax). 
11 Producers' Oil Co. v. Stephens, 44- Tex. Civ. App. 327, 99 S.W. 157 
( 1906). 
12 State v. Hogg, supra note 8. 
13 In an opinion by the Texas Attorney General, dated October 17, 
1932, it was concluded that the Texas legislature might constitutionally 
impose an income tax with graduated rates. (Summarized in the Texas 
CCH Tax Reporter, U 1 0-000.) Of course, in favor of this conclusion con-
cerning graduated rates are the inheritance tax case and the chain store tax 
case, supra note 8. However, the result might not be quite so clear as is 
suggested in the opinion of the attorney general. Which uniformity require-
ment limits income taxation? The context of Art. VIII, § 1 could indicate 
one of several results. For example, is the taxation of income the taxation of 
property specially provided for in Art. VIII, § 1, and thus still limited by 
the stricter property tax uniformity limitation requiring absolute uniformity 
in rates? Or, is the provision in Art. VIII, § 1 relative to taxation of income 
indicative of an intent to emphasize that taxation of income is not to be 
considered taxation of property, and thus would be limited only by the 
uniformity within classes clause found in Art. VIII, §21 Or, is it possible 
to conclude that the income tax clause indicates that the income tax in 
Texas is to be sui generis, leaving open the problem then as to which of the 
two uniformity limitations is applicable? These questions are the type which 
perhaps make the conclusion in the opinion of the attorney general a bit 
optimistic. 
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to its value." However, the court has expressed the view 
that the requirement would be derived in any case from the 
following words in section 1: "Taxation shall be equal and 
uniform."14 The several classes of property designated as ex-
emptible by the Texas constitution constitute the only excep-
tion to the above limitation, and the universality limitation 
is further buttressed by the proviso in Art. VIII, §2, which 
stipulates that only that property listed may be exempted.111 
In developing the meaning of the property tax limitation, 
the court has ruled that a breach of uniformity caused by an 
omission of taxable property from the tax rolls or by a failure 
to provide means to assess and tax such property does not 
invalidate the tax as a whole. The only redress for the tax-
payer whose property is listed and taxed would appear to be 
a remedy requiring the tax official to list the omitted prop-
erty.16 
14 For example, Austin v. Austin Gas Light & Coal Co., 69 Tex. 180, 
7 S.W. 200 {1887}. In that case the municipality in question had at-
tempted to contract that the company would be free from all taxes for a 
period of twenty-five years. Saying that the power to commute taxes is but 
an incident of the power to exempt, the court held that the purported 
exemption was unconstitutional. This case arose under a prior constitution, 
containing, however, a uniformity clause identical to that now found in 
Art. VIII, §I. See supra note 2. At that time the legislature was expressly 
given the general power to exempt property. However, the court held that 
(I) the city had not been delegated that power, and (2} therefore such an 
exemption was a violation of the uniformity clause in the absence of an 
express exception thereto. 
15 For example, see City of Abilene v. State, (Tex. Civ. App.) 113 S.W. 
2d 631 ( 19 3 7), indicating that any power that might exist concerning the 
exemption of property, independent of constitutional authorization, is 
expressly prohibited by the last clause of Art. VII, §2. The most recent de-
cision is Dickison v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc., 280 S.W. 2d 
31 5 ( 19 55), in which the court held that a statute was "inoperative" insofar 
as it attempted to exempt the property of fraternal benefit societies from 
taxation. 
16 See City of Wichita Falls v. J. J. & M. Taxman Refining Co., (Tex. 
Civ. App.) 74 S.W. 2d 524 {1934}. The plaintiff taxpayer brought an 
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The court has interpreted the "equal and uniform" clause 
as requiring an absolute uniformity in the effective rate ap-
plicable to all property taxed by a taxing jurisdiction.11 
However, it is pertinent to note that, in fact, intangible 
property is more often than not omitted from the tax rolls by 
local assessors. The requirement of uniformity in effective 
rate has been expressly related to the ratio of valuation used 
by the assessors.18 However, this requirement does not pro-
action to recover taxes already paid, and alleged-and the facts showed-
that large amounts of intangibles were not rendered for assessment. It was 
therefore contended that the whole assessment was void. The court held 
that the tax was not void as to the levy on plaintiff's real property simply 
because a great deal of property was omitted from the tax rolls. Also see City 
of Arlington v. Cannon, 271 S.W. 2d 414 (1954). Compare the treatment 
by the court if some property is taxed at a lesser effective rate because of a 
lower ratio of valuation being used. In such a situation the court will enjoin 
the collection of the tax on the property at a greater rate than that called 
for by the lowest ratio found to have been used. Note 18, infra. Query, is 
not the omission situation a case of the lowest ratio used being "zero1" 
17 See the cases in note 18, infra. 
18 See Lively v. Missouri K. & T. R. Co. of Texas, 102 Tex. 545, 120 
S.W. 8 52 ( 1909). Plaintiff's intangible property was placed on the rolls at its 
true value, but tangible property was assessed for taxation at 66 2/3% of its 
fair market value. It was held that the valuation of plaintiff's property at full 
value for purposes of this levy was a violation of the uniformity clause in 
Art. VIII, §I. The court pointed out that it had an alternative in remedies 
available; it could either (I) increase the valuation of other property to 
full value, or (2) reduce plaintiff's property to conform to the general 
standard. The latter was chosen as the "practicable" and proper remedy. 
Also see Houston v. Baker, (Tex. Civ.App.) 178 S.W. 820 (1915) (hold-
ing the "Houston Plan" contrary to the uniformity clause; land was taxed 
at 70% of its full value; improvements at 2 5%; tangible personalty at 
SO%; and intangibles were deliberately omitted). The interesting point 
of the Baker case is the discussion of the remedy available. The court 
pointed out that generally in such a situation the court will restrain the 
collection of taxes from property at a higher ratio of value than that applied 
to other classes of property. However, the court wondered if this would not 
be disastrous to the city in this case because, while three classes were valued 
at 25%, SO%, and 70% of full value, the lowest ratio was in effect "zero" 
as to the intangible omitted. The court sidestepped the dilemma, finding 
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hibit the use of different methods of valuation for different 
classes of property.19 Finally, specific property taxation is 
prohibited, both expressly and by implication from the 
"equal and uniform" clause.20 
3. West Virginia 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The present constitution of West Virginia became effective 
in 1872. Its basic uniformity structure is found in Art. X, 
the question not necessary for decision here, for it could simply enjoin the 
discriminatory valuation and not interfere thereby with the taxing discre-
tion of the local officers who were thereafter free to revalue the property at 
any ratio which was uniform. This remedy was available because the tax 
had not yet been levied. Other cases are: Garza Land & Cattle Co. v. Red-
wine Independent School Dist., (Tex. Civ. App.) 282 S.W. 905 (1926); 
Willis v. State, (Tex. Civ. App.) 14-2 S.W. 2d 385 (194-0) (finding an 
arbitrary method was used in fixing the value of acreage land for tax pur-
poses). The latest decisions illustrating the problems dealt with in the Lively 
case, supra, and Houston v. Baker, supra, are: City of Arlington v. Cannon, 
supra note 16, and Aycock v. Travis County, 255 S.W. 2d 910 (1953). 
19 See the leading case, Missouri K. & T. R. Co. of Texas v. Shannon, 
100 Tex. 379, 100 S.W. 138 (1907), upholding the intangibles act which 
provided for a different method of assessing intangibles of certain named 
corporations. In effect, central assessment for such property was provided, 
with the state board apportioning proper amounts to local tax units. The 
court ignored the reality of the situation here, for it was known that local 
units failed to assess other intangible property, thus making the ultimate 
effect of the act in question to be the taxation of the named intangibles, 
while all other intangible property remained untaxed. Followed in Drues-
dow v. Baker, (Tex. Com. App.) 229 S.W. 4-93 (1921). In Texas Pipe 
Line Co. v. Anderson, (Tex. Civ. App.) 100 S.W. 2d 754- (1937), the 
aforementioned act was held not to be unconstitutional even though in 
actual practice it was the only law providing the means for taxing intangi-
bles, and local authorities did not in fact tax intangibles of corporations or 
persons not within the act. 
20 There are no cases holding specifically on this point; however, it is 
an obvious conclusion from Art. VIII, §I in which the requirement is 
spelled out. 
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§1, which was substantially modified by amendment in 1932. 
The phraseology of the uniformity clause itself remains un-
changed, but by the amendment a significant proviso was 
added which radically changed the meaning of the effective 
limitation. Article X, § 1 reads, in part, as follows (with that 
part added by the 1932 amendment italicized): 
Subject to the exceptions in this section contained, taxation 
shall be equal and uniform throughout the State, and all 
property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in propor-
tion to its value to be ascertained as directed by law. No one 
species of property from which a tax may be collected shall 
be taxed higher than any other species of property of equal 
value; except that the aggregate of taxes assessed in any one 
year upon personal property employed exclusively in agri-
culture, including horticulture and grazing, products of ag-
riculture as above defined, including live stock, while owned 
by the producer, and money, notes, bonds, bills and accounts 
receivable, stocks and other similar intangible personal prop-
erty shall not exceed fifty cents on each one hundred dollars 
of value thereon and upon all property owned, used and oc-
cupied by the owner thereof exclusively for residential pur-
poses and upon farms occupied and cultivated by their own-
ers on bona fide tenants one dollar; and upon all other 
property situated outside of municipalities, one dollar and 
fifty cents; and upon all other such property situated within 
municipalities, two dollars; . . . but property used for edu-
cational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes, 
all cemeteries, public property, and personal property, in-
cluding live stock, employed exclusively in agriculture as 
above defined and the products of agriculture as defined 
while owned by the producers may by law be exempted from 
taxation; household goods to the value of two hundred dol-
lars shall be exempted from taxation.1 
1 The indicated omission provides that the maximum rates on the classes 
of property may be increased by the voters, but with a limit of a 50% 
increase over the maximum rates listed in Art. X, §I. The prior and origi-
nal constitution of West Virginia, dated I863, contained a provision in Art. 
VIII, §I substantially identical to Art. X, §I of the constitution of I8 72 as 
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By its operation this amendment changed the uniformity re-
quirement in West Virginia from a strict absolute uniformity 
to a liberal uniformity within classes. 
Article X, § 1, also contains a second uniformity clause ex-
pressly directed to nonproperty taxes-or, at least, some non-
property taxes. Before the 1932 amendment the following 
clause was found immediately after that part of Art. X, § 1, 
quoted above: 
The Legislature shall have power to tax, by uniform and 
equal laws, all privileges and franchises of persons and cor-
porations. 
In 1932 this was amended to read: 
The legislature shall have authority to tax privileges, fran-
chises, and incomes of persons and corporations and to clas-
sify and graduate the tax on all incomes according to the 
amount thereof and to exempt from taxation, incomes below 
a minimum to be fixed from time to time. . . . 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitatiotf 
Unfortunately, the language of the West Virginia deci-
sions dealing with problems of uniformity is at times con-
fusing and even misleading. However, concentration on the 
rules actually necessary for the several decisions concerning 
the uniformity problem avoids those errors into which one 
might fall by relying on some generalities repeated through-
out the decisions. 
it originally appeared, with the exception that the class of permissible ex-
emptions did not include "cemeteries." By an amendment in 1946, a new 
provision was added to the West Virginia Constitution (Art. VI, §53) 
which authorizes special treatment for "forest lands," both for exemption 
and method of taxation, including the imposition of a severance tax. These 
uniformity provisions are not applicable to local taxes. The latter are gov-
erned by Art. X, §9, which reads: " ..• but such [local] taxes shall be 
uniform, with respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of 
the authority imposing the same." 
2 Generally, see Michie's West Va. Juris., Taxation, §17. 
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Both before and after the 1 9 3 2 amendment to Art. X, § 1, 
it is quite clear that nonproperty taxes have been required 
only to be uniform within classes. The clause in the original 
section 1 providing that privileges and franchises were to be 
taxed "by uniform and equal laws" was, in effect, held to 
mean "uniform and equal within classes."3 The omission of 
this clause in the amended version of Art. X, § 1 has had no 
significance, the same uniformity within classes limitation 
still being applicable to nonproperty taxes.4 Thus, the objects 
of such taxes need only be reasonable classes/ and subclas-
sifications may be made within the general classes for purpose 
of applying different rates.6 In view of the stricter uniformity 
limitation applicable to property taxes, the characterization 
3 See, for example, Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, I 02 W. Va. 272, 13 5 
S.E. 5 82 ( 1926) (Gross Sales Tax Law of 1921, in effect, a general occupa-
tion tax with base of gross income); State v. Azel Meadows Realty Co., 108 
W.Va. 118, ISO S.E. 378 (1929) and Blue Jacket Consol. Copper Co. v. 
Scherr, 50 W.Va. 533, 40 S.E. 514 (1901) (corporate franchise tax, base 
of capital stock). 
4 Laing v. Fox, 115 W.Va. 272, 175 S.E. 354 (1934) (business and 
occupation tax, base of gross income). The contention was made that since 
the amended Art. X, §I authorized the legislature to classify income taxes it 
impliedly rejected the power to classify privileges and franchises. The court 
summarily rejected this argument. 
11 Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, supra note 3 (exemption of $10,000, 
and reasonableness of the object); Laing v. Fox, supra note 4 (exemption 
of farmers from business and occupation tax). Also see Central Trust Co. v. 
State Tax Com'r, 116 W.Va. 37, 178 S.E. 520 (1935) (inheritance tax, 
exemptions). 
6 See Arslain v. Alderson, 126 W.Va. 880, 30 S.E. 2d 553 (1944); 
Blue Jacket Consol. Copper Co. v. Scherr, supra note 3 (corporate franchise 
tax, different rates for foreign and domestic corporations upheld); Central 
Trust Co. v. State Tax Com'r, supra note 5 (inheritance tax); State v. 
Azel Meadows Realty Co., supra note 3. There have been no West Virginia 
cases concerning the validity of a graduated rate. But see Eureka Pipe Line 
Co. v. Hallahan, 87 W.Va. 396, 105 S.E. 506 (1920). In respect to the 
chain store tax, see the leading federal case under the federal equal protec-
tion clause, Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 294 U.S. 7, 55 S. Ct. 
333 (1934). 
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of a tax as either property or nonproperty is of crucial im-
portance.7 
Income tax. The cases give no indication as to what would 
have been the result had Art. X, § 1 not been amended so as 
to provide expressly for an income tax. Probably the closest 
precedent concerned the Gross Sales Tax Law enacted in 
1921, which was, in effect, a general business and occupation 
tax with a base of gross income.8 However, the validity of 
such a tax furnishes little basis for assuming that the tradi-
tional net income tax would have been characterized as a 
nonproperty tax, thus avoiding the strictness of the property 
tax uniformity limitation. In any case, the drafters of the 
amended Art. X, § 1 forestalled any controversy when they 
spelled out the scope of a permissible income tax-including 
a graduated rate and at least minimum exemptions. 
However, despite this permissive provision, the West 
Virginia legislature has imposed a net income tax for only 
a brief period: 19 3 5 to 1943.9 In two cases the court was con-
cerned with the interpretation of the net income tax statute, 
and in each case some dictum is found concerning the uni-
formity requirement. Indeed, the language used in Dickinson 
v. J amei0 might well lead one to believe that but for the 
7 The court has held an inheritance tax to be a non property tax. See 
Central Trust Co. v. State Tax Com'r, supra note 5. 
8 The Gross Sales Tax Law of 1921 was upheld in Hope Natural Gas Co. 
v. Hall, supra note 3. It is the predecessor of the present West Virginia 
business and occupation tax, upheld in Laing v. Fox, supra note 4-. 
9 Imposed by W.Va. Laws 1935, c. 89. Repealed by W.Va. Laws 194-3, 
c. 96. 
10 120 W.Va. 222, 197 S.E. 633 {1938), in which the court said (at 
224-): 
It will be noted .•. that the tax is controlled by the provision in [Art. 
X, §I] that "Subject to the exceptions uniform throughout the State . 
. . • " The exceptions are those with respect to classification of property, 
certain exemptions, and the power to classify and graduate the tax on all 
incomes according to the amount thereof. They are limited to those spec-
ified in the constitution, and but for the exceptions so noted do not 
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exceptions concerning graduated rates and minimum exemp-
tions an income tax is governed by the "equal and uniform" 
clause which limits property taxes. This line of reasoning, if 
followed, would prevent the exemption of reasonable classes 
of income. However, dictum in a later case, Christopher v. 
James,11 would indicate that income taxes need only be uni-
form within classes to the same extent that nonproperty taxes 
infringe upon [Art. X, §I] before the so-called Tax Limitation Amend-
ment, adopted in I932 ..•. [A]nd it seems clear that once a tax is 
imposed, under whatever classification it falls, it must be applied with 
equality and uniformity to all persons and corporations subject thereto. 
[Emphasis added.] 
The issue in the Dickinson case concerned the date as to which profits or 
losses on property purchased was to be considered in computing annual 
gross income. The statute was construed so that the tax was limited to actual 
profits or gains realized in the tax year for which the taxpayer made his 
returns. This was said to be the meaning of income as required by Art. X, 
§I, the court, at 226, concluding: 
..• any construction which requires him [the taxpayer] to do more 
[than pay a tax on his actual income realized during the tax year as the 
basis of the tax] results in injustice to him, and violates the principles of 
equality and uniformity in taxation, as well as the elementary rule of fair 
play. It is obvious that, if through the use of an arbitrary date for the as-
certainment of profits, a taxpayer is made to pay on income he has not 
actually received, there is no equality or uniformity of payment when 
compared with the taxpayer who pays only on his actual income .••• 
[Emphasis added.] 
11 I22 W.Va. 665, I2 S.E. 2d 8I3 {I940), in which the issue con-
cerned the deduction from gross income of certain other taxes paid by the 
taxpayer. The court in reaching a conclusion as to the meaning of the 
statute stated (at p. 670): 
The taxpayer also draws into consideration the constitutional requirement 
of "equal and uniform" taxation. • . • Art. X, §I. That provision 
means merely that as to classes of property, businesses or incomes there 
shall be uniformity of taxation. "A tax upon all business of the same 
class, which is uniform as to that kind of business, is not unconstitutional." 
Charleston & S. Bridge Co. v. County Court, 41 W. Va. 658 .... 
But as to the misuse of the quotation from the Charleston Bridge Co. case, 
see the discussion under property taxation, text at notes I 2- I 8, infro. 
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are required to be. Nevertheless, it is not at all certain, in 
view of the equivocal language of these opinions, just what 
the West Virginia court would decide as to the nature of an 
income tax and the validity of exemptions other than the 
minimum exemptions expressly provided for in Art. X, § 1. 
( 1 ) Property taxation 
Prior to the 1932 amendment of Art. X, § 1, it was clear 
that the strictest uniformity limitation governed property 
taxes in West Virginia-at least, in theory. The requirement 
was based upon the first part of Art. X, § 1, which was in-
terpreted to require universality/2 absolute uniformity in 
effective rates, 13 and the use of the ad valorem method.14 
The property tax uniformity clause of Art. X, § 1, did not, 
however, limit local taxes, but a similar uniformity require-
ment for such taxes was derived from Art. X, §9.111 
12 Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Miller, 19 W.Va. 408 (1882), holding 
that the legislature was prevented from passing a law exempting the prop-
erty of a railroad from taxation. The court (at pp. 435 ff.) emphasized the 
sentence in Art. X, § 1 which provided that "All property" shall be taxed in 
proportion to its value, underlining the word "all." There was no indication 
that this requirement of universality would not stand in the absence of this 
supplementary provision to the "uniform and equal" clause. Also see State v. 
McDowell Lodge, 96 W.Va. 611, 123 S.E. 561 (1924). 
13 The problem was never squarely faced, but see Harvey Coal & Coke 
Co. v. Tax Com'r, 59 W.Va. 605, 53 S.E. 928 (1906) and State v. Gray-
beal, 60 W.Va. 357, 55 S.E. 398 (1906), both concerned with "double tax-
ation" and representative property. In the Graybeal case, the issue was one 
of statutory interpretation, and the court interpreted the general property-
tax act so that a bank might deduct the value of its realty in ascertaining 
the taxable value of its capital stock, the court reasoning that this was 
necessary in order to void an unconstitutional "double taxation." Also see 
West Penn Power Co. v. Board of Review & Equalization, 112 W. Va. 
442, 164 S.E. 862 (1932), discussed infra note 18. 
14 There are no cases on this point, but the requirement is so obvious 
and certain that this is not unexpected. 
111 Powell v. Parkersburg, 28 W. Va. 698 ( 1886); Douglas v. Harrisville, 
9 W.Va. 162, 27 Am. Rep. 548 {1876). See note I, supra. 
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However, this strict limitation did not prohibit the classifi-
cation of property for the purpose of using different methods 
of valuation for the different classes, since the purpose of 
such classification was to ascertain more precisely the "true" 
value of all classes of property.16 It was in the leading case 
on this point that careless language was used which has often 
been quoted and reported in annotations and digests in a 
misleading manner.17 Nevertheless, the opinions and their 
holdings bear out the above analysis, despite the fact that 
broad misleading language was often used during the course 
of an opinion. Before 1932, property could not be classified 
for other than the purpose of mechanics of valuation. How-
ever, it is true that, despite the theoretical requirement of 
the strictest uniformity, the West Virginia court has shown, 
and still does show, a marked reluctance for examining valua-
tions of property in order to determine whether or not the 
particular property was assessed at precisely the same ratio as 
property of the same class.18 
16 Charleston & S. Bridge Co. v. Kanawha County Court, 41 W. Va. 
658, 24 S.E. 1002 (1896), upholding a special mode of assessment for toll 
bridges and ferries. 
17 Charleston & S. Bridge Co. v. Kanawha County Court, supra note 16. 
In the syllabus by the court it was stated that "A tax upon all business of 
the same class, which is uniform as to that kind of business, is not unconstitu-
tional." However, only the property tax was under consideration, and all 
relevant classification related only to mode of assessment. Nevertheless, the 
statement is often repeated out of context, and other cases could leave the 
impression that property could be classified for rates prior to 1932. An 
example of an unwarranted citation of the Charleston & S. Bridge Co. case 
is found in note II, supra, from Christopher v. James. Also compare In re 
Charleston Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 5 06, 512, 3 0 S.E. 2d 
513 ( 1944), and In re N a tiona! Bank of West Virginia at Wheeling, 7 3 
S.E. 2d 655, 660-661 (1952). 
18 For example, a recent case is In re Charleston Fed. Savings & Loan 
Ass'n, supra note 17, discussed infra notes 21-23, and distinguishing West 
Penn Power Co. v. Board, supra note 13, decided before the 1932 amend-
ment of Art. X, §I. ln the West Penn Power case it was clear that taxpayer's 
realty was assessed at a greater ratio of true value than other realty in the 
268 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
With the amendment of Art. X, § 1 in 1932, a significant 
change was made in the meaning of the property tax effective 
uniformity limitation. The phraseology of the basic uni-
formity clause governing the taxation of property remained 
unchanged. However, a proviso was added which in fact 
changed the nature of the effective uniformity limitation. 
The uniformity clause was made "subject to the exceptions in 
this section contained." The new "exception" clause divided 
all property into the following four classes. Class 1: Property 
employed exclusively in agriculture; and money, notes, 
bonds, bills and accounts receivable, stocks and "other similar 
intangible personal property." Class 2: Residential property 
used for such purposes by the owner. Class 3: All property, 
other than that in Classes 1 and 2, situated outside munici-
palities. Class 4: All property, other than that in Classes 1 
and 2, situated within municipalities.19 A different annual 
maximum aggregate rate was established for each class of 
property. The importance of this new proviso for our pur-
poses is not as a "maximum rate limitation" clause, but as a 
clause which in fact provides for a classification of property 
for different rates. The requirement of universality remains 
intact/0 but insofar as effective rates are concerned, there 
same taxing district. The court invalidated the assessment. It seems clear in 
light of the case of In re Charleston Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, supra at 519-
521, that a very "clear" case of discrimination must be proven. 
19 It is obvious that Class 1 consists of two unrelated classes, agricultural 
property and intangibles, grouped together simply for the purpose of limit-
ing the tax rate upon such property the lowest maximum rate. It is interest-
ing to note the basis of the classifications: Two Classes {Ia and 2) are es-
tablished on the basis of the personal use of such property. One class ( 1 b) is 
established on the basis of the nature of the property. Two classes ( 3 and 4) 
are established on the basis of the location of such property. 
2° Central Realty Co. v. Martin, 126 W. Va. 915, 3 0 S.E. 2d 720 
{1944), overruling Prichard v. Kanawha County Court, 109 W.Va. 479, 
155 S.E. 542 {1930). Also see In re Hancock County Fed. Savings & 
LoanAss'n, 125 W.Va. 426,25 S.E. 2d 543 (1943). 
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now need only be a uniformity within classes. Of course, the 
constitution defines the classes, leaving the legislature no 
discretion on this matter. 
A leading case concerning the classification of property for 
rates is In re Tax Assessments Charleston Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n,Z1 decided in 1944. The taxpayer contended that other 
property of the same class belonging to it (intangibles, Class 
1, supra) was assessed at approximately 70% of its true 
value, but taxpayer's property was assessed at its full true 
value. It was contended that this was a violation of the uni-
formity clause, Art. X, § 1. It was shown that certain bonds 
were assessed at less than 100% of their face value, that 
certain agricultural property belonging to Class 1 was as-
sessed at less than 100% of its purchase value, but that plain-
tiff's securities were valued at 1 00% of their face value. The 
court held that Art. X, § 1 was not violated. It concluded that 
the above method of assessment was only an attempt to get 
at the "true" value for all property, and that plaintiff's 
securities were undoubtedly worth 100% of their face value, 
but that this was not necessarily true as to all property. Thus, 
the situation described by plaintiff was characterized as being 
nothing more than a rough way of subclassifying property 
belonging to a "minimum" constitutional class for the pur-
pose of mechanics of valuation, and in the end all property 
was to be levied on at the same ratio of "true" value. There-
fore, it was held that the evidence was insufficient to establish 
a case of discrimination which would justify the application 
of the uniformity provision. The court's view of the difficul-
ties of the general problem was apparent in this statement: 
While our State Constitution requires uniformity and 
equality in taxation, no one has ever believed that either 
21 Supra note 17. For similar cases, see: Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. 
McDowell County Court, 135 W.Va. 174,62 S.E. 2d 801 (1950); In re 
National Bank of West Virginia at Wheeling, supra note 17. 
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could be attained as a practical matter. The constitutional 
provision is a statement of an ideal, and is implemented by 
numerous statutes, all seeking to put into practice such ideal 
so far as humanly possible. But do all we can, and attempt as 
rigidly as we may to enforce such statutes, we will fall short 
of attaining equality, uniformity and justice in levying taxes.22 
Thus, the court, in effect, threw up its hands insofar as the 
enforcement of absolute uniformity is concerned, even within 
a subclass of property. 23 In other words, in West Virginia the 
requirement of uniformity of rates even within constitution-
ally established classes is pretty much of a fa~ade, since more 
often than not the real story of the property-tax rates is to 
be found in a de facto classification system established by the 
assessors. 
4. Wyoming 
Wyoming has had but a single constitution, that of 1890, 
and the uniformity provisions found therein have remained 
unchanged. The basic uniformity clause is not found in the 
revenue article (Art. XV), but in the Bill of Rights. Article 
I, §28, reads: "· .. All taxation shall be equal and uni-
22 Supra note 17 at 515. 
23 The court further indicated the freedom allowed the assessor when 
it described the plan in question as follows (at p. 5 17): 
We do not have a case where the true and actual value was ascertained and 
a discount allowed from that value; but rather a case where the discount 
was allowed, particularly as to intangibles, in an effort to reach the true 
value. The more or less arbitrary allowance of the discount as to notes and 
accounts may have been an erroneous exercise of the duties of the assessor. 
We think it was. Some plan which would take into account the difference 
between the secured notes and unsecured notes and accounts could, and 
should be devised; but mere error of judgment as to the plan adopted is 
not sufficient to establish discrimination, where the plan, though imperfect 
is adopted in a good faith effort to secure fair and equitable assessment, 
and equality and uniformity in taxation. 
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form." In addition, the following provisions in the revenue 
article are pertinent. Article XI, § 11, in the absence of Art. I, 
§28, would probably have served as the basic uniformity 
clause for property taxation. Section 11 reads: 
All property, except as in this constitution otherwise pro-
vided, shall be uniformly assessed for taxation, and the legis-
lature shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just 
valuation for taxation of all property, real and personal. 
Article XV, § 12 provides that designated classes of "public" 
and "quasi-public" property 
shall be exempt from taxation, and such other property as the 
legislature may by general law provide. 
Article I, §34 of the Bill of Rights is also important. It reads: 
"All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform opera-
tion." 
Meaning of the uniformity limitation. The uniformity 
clause in Art. I, §28 is framed in the most general terms, i.e., 
"all taxation," and it is not adjacent to the property tax pro-
visions. However, the Wyoming court has generally taken 
the position that this uniformity clause limits only property 
taxes, and that, in any case, even if construed to apply to non-
property taxes it would require only a uniformity within 
classes.1 Thus, regardless of the source of the limitation, non-
1 The very few cases in Wyoming concerning uniformity in nonproperty 
taxes have generally arisen from a challenge of the object (exemption or 
selection) of a particular tax. See Ludwig v. Harston, 65 Wyo. 134, 197 
P. 2d 252 ( 1948) (oleo tax, object held to be a valid class as defined); 
Unemployment Compensation Comm. v. Renner, 59 Wyo. 437, 143 P. 2d 
181 ( 1943) (upheld exemption of farmers from the unemployment tax; 
general class in question was "employers"); Continental Supply Co. v. 
People, 54 Wyo. 185, 188 P. 2d 488 (1939) (use tax, upheld different 
treatment between retailers maintaining place of business within the state 
and "peddlers"; the latter class was not subject for the tax) ; Public Service 
Comm. v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 158, 53 P. 2d I (1935) (motor vehicle 
tax, several exemptions upheld, e.g., motor vehicles of farmers). Also see 
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property taxes (generally designated "excise" taxes in 
Wyoming) are only subject to the usual uniformity within 
classes limitation. It is always of some importance to de-
termine the nature of a particular tax, since property taxes 
are subject to a stricter limitation.2 
Property taxes are limited by the general uniformity clause 
of Art. I, §28, and by the clause in Art. XV, §11. It has been 
established that there is no requirement of universality.3 
This result is based upon the express words in Art. XV, § 12, 
which are said to state an exception to the rule of uniformity 
otherwise stemming from Art. I, §28 and Art. XV, §11.4 
State v. Willingham, 9 Wyo. 290, 62 Pac. 797 ( 1900). In the Ludwig and 
Renner cases the court maintained the alternative proposition as to the ap-
plicability and meaning of Art. I, §28. In the Grimshaw case only Art. I, 
§34 (uniform operation of laws) was cited, along with the federal equal 
protection clause. There have been no cases concerning the validity of clas-
sification for rates. Note, for example, that the inheritance tax has its object 
classified for varying fiat proportional rates, with certain minimum exemp-
tions. 
2 No cases have arisen concerning the inheritance tax, and Wyoming has 
never had any form of an income tax. The tax structure of Wyoming has 
remained relatively simple. The sales tax, fuel tax, and general property tax 
are the primary sources of revenue. Article 15, §3 of the Wyoming Consti-
tution provides specifically for a gross products tax as to mining claims. In 
Miller v. Buck Creek Oil Co., 38 Wyo. 505, 269 Pac. 43 (1928) the 
court held that this was a property tax rather than a license, privilege, or 
occupation tax. The issue, however, did not relate to uniformity of taxation 
but concerned the problem of who was to pay the tax, lessor or lessee. 
3 State v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 199, 212 Pac. 771 ( 1922), upholding an 
exemption of $2,000 of property belonging to certain veterans and their 
relatives. Also see Harkin v. Board of Com'rs of Niobrara County, 30 Wyo. 
455, 222 Pac. 35 (1923). 
4 State v. Snyder, supra note 3 at 221-224. The court stressed the follow-
ing phrase in Art. XV, §II: "except as in this constitution otherwise pro-
vided." On this point of interpretation concerning the reading of all the 
provisions in the light of the others, the court distinguished State ex rei. 
Chamberlain v. Daniel, 17 Wash. Ill, 49 Pac. 243 (1897), in which a 
different result was reached in a similar situation. That case and its rather 
strained construction is discussed infra, Part H of this chapter. 
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Thus, the uniformity provisions apply only to that property 
selected for taxation, but as to such property an absolute 
uniformity in effective rates is required.5 However, classifica-
tion of property for the use of different modes of assessment 
is not prohibited if the purpose is to assess all property at the 
same ratio of actual value. 6 
F. ANALYSES OF STATES WITH TYPE VI CLAUSES 
1. Florida 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The uniformity clause of the present Florida Constitution 
(dated 1885) is found in Art. IX, §1, as amended in 1924. 
The 1924 amendment left the basic uniformity clause un-
changed in phraseology, but added a proviso which made an 
important change in the effective limitation.1 Article IX, § 1 
reads as follows, with that material added by the 1 924 
amendment in italics: 
The Legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate 
of taxation, except that it may provide for special rate or rates 
5 See Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing Ass'n, 29 Wyo. 4-61, 215 Pac. 
24-4- ( 192 3). The use of a higher ratio of valuation for taxpayer's property 
than was used on other property was held to violate the requirement of Art. 
15, § 11. That section was expressly relied on rather than the general uni-
formity clause in Art. I, §28. The court (at p. 4-89) stressed the constitu-
tional requirement that all taxable property should be assessed uniformly, so 
as to bear a just proportion of burdens of taxation. 
6 Kelley v. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 237, 51 Pac. 593 (1897), upholding the use 
of a different mode of valuation for transient grazing sheep, taxable under 
the personal property tax. It was asserted (at p. 26 5) that the uniformity 
limitation was met when the same rate and basis of valuation was used for 
all taxable property. 
1 Compare the same approach which was found in West Virginia, Part E 
of this chapter, supra. 
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on intangible property, but such special rate or rates shall not 
exceed two mills on the dollar of the assessed valuation of 
such intangible property . ... The special rate or rates, or 
the taxes collected therefrom, may be apportioned by the 
legislature, and shall be exclusive of all other state, county, 
district, and Municipal taxes; and shall prescribe such regu-
lations as shall secure a just valuation of all property, both 
real and personal, excepting such property as may be ex-
emptied by law for municipal, education, literary, scientific, 
religious or charitable purposes. 2 
Other provisions of some importance are: the section added 
in 1930 which provides for special treatment of motor ve-
hicles for purposes of property taxation; 3 the several sections 
providing for the special exemption of designated property; 4 
2 The indicated omission within the italicized portion is a 1944 amend-
ment which added the following proviso for the alternate treatment of some 
intangible property: 
• • . provided, that as to any obligations secured by mortgage, deed or 
transfer, or other lien, the Legislature may prescribe an intangible tax of 
not more than two mills on the dollar, which shall be payable at the time 
such mortgage, deed of trust or other lien is presented for recordation, 
said tax to be in lieu of all other intangible assessments on such obligations. 
In addition, this 1944 amendment lowered the maximum rate on intangibles 
to two mills. In the original 1924 amendment a five-mill maximum rate 
had been provided for. 
Florida has had several prior constitutions. The original Florida constitu-
tion became effective in 1838 and had the following uniformity clause: 
The General Assembly shall devise and adopt a system of revenue, 
having regard to an equal and uniform mode of taxation, to be general 
throughout the State. 
An identical provision was found in the subsequent constitutions of 1861 
and 1865, except that in the 1865 version the phrase "to be general" was 
omitted. The next succeeding constitution of Florida was dated 1868. 
Article XII, § 1 therein was phrased identically to Art. IX, § 1 of the present 
constitution of 18 8 5 as quoted in the text. 
8 Art. IX, § 13. For the text, see the appendix, infra. There is to be a 
single license tax in lieu of all ad valorem taxes assessed against the motor 
vehicles as personal property. 
4 Article IX, § 11, added in 1924, requires the exemption from taxation 
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the section added in 1 924 which prohibits taxes upon inherit-
ances or upon incomes;~ and the section added in 1 940 which 
forbids a state tax upon any property except intangible prop-
erty.6 In addition, Art. IX, §5 deals expressly with the uni-
formity required of local property taxes.7 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
The court has repeatedly stated that nonproperty taxes are 
not limited in any way by the uniformity clause found in Art. 
IX, § 1, and that such taxes are only required to be uniform 
within classes. 8 Thus, the Florida legislature is free to select 
"to the head of the family residing in [Florida] household goods and per-
sonal effect to the value of Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars"; Art. X, §7 
provides for a homestead exemption of $5,000; and Art. IX, §9 provides for 
a minimum exemption to certain disabled persons. In addition, there is a 
provision which relate's to the last clause of Art. IX, §I as quoted in the 
text. Article XVI, § 16 provides: 
The property of all corporations, except the property of a corporation 
which shall construct a ship or barge canal across the peninsula of Florida, 
if the Legislature should so enact, whether heretofore or hereafter in-
corporated shall be subject to taxation unless such property be held and 
used exclusively for religious, scientific, municipal, educational, literary 
or charitable purposes. 
5 Article IX, §II, added in 1924. In 19 3 0, that section was amended to 
provide that the legislature might impose an estate tax to take advantage of 
the provision in the federal estate tax for deductions allowed for state in-
heritance or estate taxes paid. Sec the Appendix, infra, for text. 
6 Article IX, §2: " ... after December 31st, AD 1940, no levy of ad 
valorem taxes upon real or personal property except intangible property, 
shall be made for any State purpose whatsoever .... " 
7 Section 5 provides that the legislature may authorize local taxes, "and 
all property shall be taxed upon the principles established for State taxation." 
8 For example, Jackson v. Neff, 64 Fla. 326,60 So. 350 (1912); Shiep 
Co. v. Amos, I 00 Fla. 863, 130 So. 699 ( 1930); Gaulden v. Kirk, 47 S. 
2d 56 7 ( 19 50). The source of this limitation is both the state equal pro-
tection clause in Sec. I of the Bill of Rights of the Florida Constitution, and 
the federal equal protection clause. At times only the federal clause is re-
ferred to. See, for example, State ex rei. Chavers v. Lee, 122 Fla. 638, 163 
So. 92 (1935) (chain store tax). 
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classes for the objects of nonproperty taxes and to provide for 
exemptions therefrom so long as such classifications are 
reasonable; 9 and, of course, different rates may be applied to 
the different classes.10 The principle of graduated rates has 
been approved, although the Florida court did find that a 
rather unusual form of graduated rate embodied in the chain 
store tax was an arbitrary classification.11 In any case, under 
9 See, for example, Gaulden v. Kirk, supra note 8 (sales tax, which in 
Florida includes rentals and admissions; exemption of rental of two family 
apartment buildings justified on a de minimus basis; exemption of rental 
to guests staying in same hotel or apartment for period longer than six 
months justified as a reasonable classification); Peninsular Industrial Ins. Co. 
v. State, 61 Fla. 3 76, 55 So. 398 ( 1911) (tax of 2% of the gross receipts 
of premiums received by companies or associations engaged in business of 
sick and funeral beneficial insurance in the state; selection held valid and 
not unreasonably discriminatory). Also see Jacksonville Gas Co. v. Lee, 110 
Fla. 61 , 1 + 8 So. 1 8 8 ( 1 9 3 3) . 
10 See, for example, Florida Sugar Distributors v. Wood, 13 5 Fla. 126, 
184- So. 64-1 (1938) (different treatment under separate taxes for whole-
salers and retailers held valid); Jackson v. Neff, supra note 8 (licenses tax 
for motor vehicles; higher rates for commercial vehicles; held a valid classifi-
cation). 
11 The second Florida chain store tax was imposed in 19 3 5, and its 
validity was considered in State ex rei. Lane Drug Stores v. Simpson, 122 
Fla. 582, 166 So. 227 (1935), cert. den. 299 U.S. 54-3, and State ex rel. 
Chavers v. Lee, supra note 8, cert. den. 299 U.S. 54-2. The tax provided 
for two separate sets of rates. First, there was the usual type of graduated 
rate found in the chain store taxes, a flat sum increasing in amount accord-
ing to number of stores operated. This rate schedule was upheld in the Lane 
Drug Stores Case as a reasonable classification. The second rate schedule 
was an additional excise tax. The base was gross receipts and the rate was 
a proportional rate increasing as the number of stores in the chain increased. 
This rate schedule was held invalid because the classification was found to 
be arbitrary. 
The first Florida chain store tax, imposed in 19 31, was struck down in a 
leading United States Supreme Court Case, Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 
5 I 7, 53 S. Ct. 4-81 (I 9 3 3), as a violation of the federal equal protection 
clause. The objectionable feature of that tax was the rate schedule which 
imposed a higher rate on stores according to their geographic location. The 
higher rates were imposed upon stores in counties with the greater popula-
tion. See Chapter IV, infra. 
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the Florida Constitution as it now stands, questions concern-
ing the validity of graduated rates are not likely to be raised 
because of the prohibition against either an income or inherit-
ance tax. 
An important issue in all cases is whether the tax in ques-
tion is to be characterized as a property or nonproperty tax. 
Thus, in Sheip Co. v. Amos12 the court upheld a motor fuel 
storage tax because it was characterized as being upon the 
privilege of storing the fuel, not upon the fuel itself. The 
taxpayer challenging the tax argued that the tax was upon 
the "mere right to acquire and possess" the property and 
therefore upon the property itself. If this position had been 
sustained, the tax would have run afoul of the uniformity 
clause in Art. IX, § 1. A similar problem was faced in Floyd 
Fruit Co. v. Florida Citrus Comm./3 in which a "borderline" 
tax was involved and its validity depended upon its being 
characterized as a nonproperty tax. The tax, which was sus-
tained, was imposed on citrus fruit, and the revenue went into 
an advertising fund for the promotion of such fruit. 14 There 
have been no decisions in Florida concerning the nature of 
either an income or an inheritance tax insofar as uniformity of 
taxation is concerned, nor are there likely to be any, since 
those taxes are now expressly prohibited.15 
12 Supra note 8. The court distinguished the Mississippi cases concerning 
a tax on the "use" and "ownership" of property. See Part E of this chapter, 
supra. 
13 128 Fla. 565, 175 So. 248 (1937). As the court stated (at p. 571): 
"It is a tax upon the privilege of handling fruit, of selling fruit, of deliver-
ing fruit for shipping or delivering fruit for canning or processing into 
by-products. The tax is not levied upon the right of ownership or produc-
tion, or of possession." In this way Thompson v. McLeod, 112 Miss. 383, 
73 So. 193 (1916) was distinguished. See the reference in note 12, supra. 
14 Compare the similar Michigan tax for advertisement of Michigan 
grown apples, referred to in Part D of this chapter, supra. 
l5 The several cases concerning income taxes dealt with local taxes which 
were challenged on the ground that they were "income'' taxes prohibited 
by Art. IX, §II. Thus, in City of Lakeland v. Amos, I 06 Fla. 8 7 3, 14 3 
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( 1 ) Property taxation 
First, the uniformity provision in Art. IX, § 1, has been 
interpreted as requiring universality. In establishing this 
limitation the court has relied upon that part of Art. IX, § 1, 
which reads: "a just valuation of all property" (emphasis by 
the court), although some support apparently is drawn from 
the words of the uniformity clause itsel£.16 It should be 
noted, however, that before the proviso concerning special 
treatment for intangibles was written into Art. IX, § 1, the 
actual practice in Florida was to fail to assess intangibles, 
although such property was within the terms of the general 
property-tax act.17 
So. 7 44 ( 1932), the court held that a tax on the "gross receipts" of cor-
porations receiving payment for electricity, etc., was not a "tax on income" 
but merely a "license" or "excise" tax. Also see Bentley-Gray Dry Goods 
Co. v. Tampa, 137 Fla. 641, 188 So. 758 (1939) for a similar decision. 
But in State ex rei. McKay v. Keller, 140 Fla. 346, 191 So. 542 (1939), 
the court held that a local tax with a base of gross income, when applied to 
attorneys, was in fact a tax "upon income" and therefore prohibited. Up-
holding the state intangibles tax on this point, see Owens v. Fosdick, 15 3 
Fla. 17, 13 S. 2d 700 (1943). 
16 State ex rel. Burbridge v. St. John, 143 Fla. 544,550, 197 So. 131 
(1940). In that case the court ruled that property owned and controlled 
by a housing authority was not exempt under Art. XVI, § 16 of the con-
stitution referring to property held and used exclusively for a "municipal 
purpose." Since such property was not designated as exemptible by the 
constitution, it would be unconstitutional to exempt it because the legisla-
ture cannot add to the classes of property designated as exem ptible by the 
constitution. See Op. Atty. Gen., Oct. 14, 1947, in which serious doubt 
is raised as to the validity of Fla. Laws 1947, c. 24045, which would classify 
aircraft as motor vehicles and thus exempt aircraft from all ad valorem 
property taxation. 
17 See Op. Atty. Gen., Nov. 13, 1930, in which it is stated, after a 
description of the de jure situation, that in fact tax assessors for years ig-
nored putting on the rolls and would not put thereon intangible property, 
and therefore in actual practice such property was not assessed. Indeed, in 
recognition of this de facto classification system, the legislature in 1929 
expressly failed to require the listing of intangibles for taxation in enacting 
the compulsory tax return law. 
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Second, the "cardinal principles of equality and uniformity 
in taxation" can not be met unless there is an absolute uni-
formity in the effective rate18 applicable to all property taxed 
by any one taxing authority.19 The court has realized that the 
rationale underlying the requirement of absolute uniformity 
is that all taxpayers should share a proportionate effective 
tax burden, and that this is achieved regardless of whether 
the assessment is at full value as long as the same percentage 
rate and ratio of valuation is applied to all property taxed by 
any one taxing authority.20 
Of course, the above analysis is subject to the exception 
made by the 1924 amendment of Art. IX, § 1, concerning 
18 Camp Phosphate Co. v. Allen, 77 Fla. 341, 365,81 So. 503 (1919). 
In that case, the court found that there was a deliberate systematic under-
valuation of certain classes of realty, and an arbitrary valuation of other 
classes which resulted in different ratios of the full value being used as to 
the several classes of realty. Such a system was held to violate Art. IX, § 1 . 
The court pointed out that a mere error of judgment would not violate the 
principle. There must be established a deliberate systematic violation of the 
uniformity requirement. Other cases finding that the same ratio of valuation 
was not used for all property within the territory of the taxing authority, 
and therefore finding a violation of the principles of uniformity are: 
Coombes v. City of Coral Gables, 124 Fla. 374, 168 So. 524 (1936); 
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Amos, 98 Fla. 350, 123 So. 745 (1929). Also 
see Klemn v. Davenport, 100 Fla. 627, 129 So. 904 (1930); Colonial 
Investment Co. v. Nolan, 100 Fla. 134,131 So. 178 (1930). Porter v. 
First Nat. Bank, 96 Fla. 740, 119 So. 130 ( 1928) is discussed in note 22, 
infra. 
19 That the uniformity required is only a "territorial" uniformity, see: 
Town of Palm Beach v. City of West Palm Beach, 55 S. 2d 5 66 ( 19 5 I) ; 
Howey Co. v. Williams, 14 2 Fla. 41 5, 1 9 5 So. 1 81 (1940) ; State v. City 
of Miami, 103 Fla. 54, 137 So. 261 (1931). 
20 Thus, in Camp Phosphate Co. v. Allen, supra note 18 at 349-3 52, the 
court concluded that although the statute required all property to be as-
sessed at I 0 0% of true cash value, it was sufficient if all property taxed by 
the taxing authority was assessed on the basis of 50% of cash value, for this 
would not defeat the purpose of the constitutional requirement of uniform-
ity. The adoption of I OO% ratio would not make a difference as to the 
ultimate effective burde11. 
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intangible property. The 1924 amendment left the basic uni-
formity structure unchanged in phraseology, but the added 
proviso now permits the classification of intangible property 
for the purpose of applying different effective rates, with a 
maximum rate stipulated.21 But note that this intangible 
property proviso is permissive-thus, if the legislature does 
not choose to exercise this express power to classify intangi-
bles for rates lower than the rate applicable to all other 
property, then such intangible property must be assessed 
under the general property tax. This is so because the 1 924 
proviso does not alter the universality requirement. Only the 
strictness of the uniformity limitation as it applies to property 
tax rates is affected. 22 
Since 1940 another amendment has changed the uni-
formity picture to some degree. By that amendment, Art. 
IX, §2 now forbids the state taxation of any property other 
than intangible property. Thus, the state is limited to an 
intangible property tax which must only be uniform within 
classes, although all intangibles must be reached. 
The court has ruled that Art. IX, §5, which governs local 
property taxes, imposes the same effective uniformity limita-
tion that Art. IX, § 1 imposed upon state taxation of prop-
21 At the present time intangible personal property is to be assessed at its 
full cash value. Cash, bank deposits, and the like, are taxed at 1/20 of one 
mill. Obligations for the payment of money are taxed at two mills. This is 
not a recurring tax. All other intangible personal property is taxed at one 
mill. Fla. Rev. Stat. §199.11 (1941). 
22 Porter v. First Nat. Bank, supra note 18, rehearing den. 96 Fla. 740. 
The court stated that the amendment obviously operates as an exception to 
the organic general rule of uniformity and equality in the rate of taxation. 
However, the amendment is neither self-executing nor mandatory, but 
merely confers upon the legislature permissive authority to provide for 
special rate of taxation for intangible property. "Therefore, until the Legis-
lature does duly provide for special tax rate or rates on intangible property, 
the organic general rule of uniformity and equality in the rate of taxation 
of all property, real and personal, including intangible property, remains in 
force." 
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erty. 23 The only extent to which this requirement is altered 
by the 1924 amendment is that intangibles will now be 
exempt from local taxation if subject to a special state rate. 
In summary, the present situation in Florida is this: The 
state property tax is limited to intangible property, all of 
which must be taxed, no exemptions being allowed. How-
ever, classification of such property is allowed for the purpose 
of applying different rates. The local general property tax 
is still governed by the strictest of uniformity requirements, 
but that tax is now limited in scope to tangible property. 
2. Indiana 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The uniformity structure of the Indiana Constitution of 
1851, now in force, is quite simple. Prior to 1932 the consti-
tution contained but a single provision pertinent to the prob-
lem of uniformity in taxation. That was Art. X, § 1, provid-
mg: 
The General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a uni-
form and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall 
prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for 
taxation of all property, both real and personal, excepting 
such only for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, 
religious, or charitable purposes, as may be specially ex-
empted by law. 
In 1932 a new section, Art. X, §8, was added to the constitu-
tion. It provides for an income tax and reads: 
The general assembly may levy and collect a tax upon 
income, from whatever source derived, at such rates, in such 
manner, and with such exemptions as may be prescribed by 
law. 
23 Merrell v. St. Petersburg, 64- Fla. 367,60 So. 34-9 (1912). 
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Indiana has had only one other constitution, that of 1816. 
In that constitution there was no provision expressly con-
cerning uniformity in taxation. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
As the Indiana court has stated: "It is well settled that 
Article I 0, Section 1, which provides for uniform and equal 
rate of assessment and taxation, and forbids exempting prop-
erty except for specific purposes, applies only to property 
taxes under a general levy."1 In imposing nonproperty taxes 
the legislature is governed only by the requirement that such 
taxes be uniform within classes.2 The objects of nonproperty 
taxes and exemptions therefrom need only be reasonable 
classes.3 Further classifications may be made for the applica-
1 Miles v. Dept. of Treasury, 209 Ind. 172, 177, 193 N.E. 855 (1935), 
(gross income tax) and cases there cited, as well as cases discussed in notes 
3 through 5, infra. Also see the very important case, Lutz v. Arnold, 208 
Ind. 480, 193 N.E. 840 (1935), concerning intangibles taxes, discussed 
infra. 
2 See the cases in notes 3 through 5, infra. The source of this limitation is 
Art. I, §23 of the Indiana Constitution, an equivalent of the federal equal 
protection clause. The court has said: "The requirements of Section 23 of 
Article I of the Indiana Constitution are substantially the same as the re-
quirements of the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution .••. " 
Kelly v. Finney, 207 Ind. 557, 579, 194 N.E. 157 (1935). But see note 
8, infra. 
3 See, for example, Crittenberger v. State Savings & Trust Co., 189 Ind. 
411, 127 N.E. 552 (1920) (holding exemptions to charities under the 
inheritance tax to be valid); Gafill v. Bracken, 195 Ind. 551, 145 N.E. 
312 ( 192 5) (object of gasoline tax a valid class, selection of use of gasoline 
for propelling vehicles on highways of the state); Kersey v. Terre Haute, 
161 Ind. 471, 68 N.E. 1027 (1903) (the object of a municipal vehicle 
tax which excluded electric street cars and automobiles was upheld); Kelly 
v. Finney, supra note 2 (motor vehicles for hire tax of 1933, Ind. Laws 
193 3, c. 15 3, upholding the distinction made between trucks for hire and 
those not used for hire, selecting the former; and upholding the exemption 
of vehicles used in transportation of school children, those carrying the 
mail, etc.); Richmond Baking Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 215 Ind. II 0, 18 
N.E. 2d 778 (1939) and Eavey Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 216 Ind. 255,24 
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tion of different rates/ and the court has approved the 
principle of graduated rates.5 However, the validity of the 
Indiana chain store tax6 was challenged in Midwestern Pe-
N.E. 2d 268 (1939) (motor vehicle weight tax, Ind. Laws 1937, c. 255, 
superseding the tax referred to in the Kelly case, again upholding the object 
and certain exemptions therefrom). See Henderson v. London & Lancashire 
Ins. Co., 13 5 Ind. 23, 34- N.E. 565 ( 1893) for one of the few cases finding 
a classification arbitrary. 
4 For example, Miles v. Dept. of Treasury, supra note I (finding that the 
segregation of income according to its source and the application of a 
different rate to the several classes was valid; the gross income tax, discussed 
separately, infra); Crittenberger v. State Savings & Trust Co., supra note 3 
(stating that classifications for different rates might be made under the 
inheritance tax according to the relationship to the deceased); Barber 
Grocery Co. v. Fleming, 229 Ind. 14-0,96 N.E. 2d 108 (1915) (classifi-
cation of vehicles according to carrying capacity, held reasonable; motor 
vehicle tax), followed in Eavey Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, supra note 3. 
11 For example, in Crittenberger v. State Savings & Trust Co., supra note 
3, the court, at 4-22-4-23, stated: "An inheritance tax law providing for an 
increased rate of taxation upon inheritances as the amount of the inheritances 
increased does not violate the constitutional provisions as to uniformity and 
equality." This was dictum, however, since the rate schedule was not in 
use. Also see Terre Haute v. Kersey, 15 9 Ind. 300, 64- N.E. 4-69 ( 1902); 
Baldwin v. State, 194- Ind. 303, 14-1 N.E. 34-3 (1924-). 
6 The tax was imposed by the Indiana Legislature in 1929. Ind. Laws 
1929, c. 207; Ind. Stat. Ann. §§4-2.30 1-4-2.313. Section 5 thereof provided 
that: 
Every person, firm, corporation, association or co-partnership opening, 
establishing, operating or maintaining one or more stores or mercantile 
establishments, within this state, under the same general management, 
supervision or ownership, shall pay the license fees hereinafter prescribed 
for the privilege of opening, establishing, operating or maintaining such 
store or mercantile establishments. 
The prescribed license fee was to be paid annually, and was graduated as 
follows: 1st store, $3; 2d to 5th store, inclusive, $10 each; 6th to lOth 
store, $20 each; lith to 20th store, $30 each; 21st and succeeding stores, 
$150 each. This tax was immediately challenged in a federal court as 
being a violation of the federal equal protection clause. In a leading chain 
store tax case the United States Supreme Court upheld the tax. State Board 
of Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 51 S. Ct. 54-0 
{1931), discussed in Chapter IV, infra. 
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troleum Corp. v. State Board of Tax Com'rs/ and the court 
indicated that it had some difficulty in justifying the gradu-
ated rate schedule insofar as all lines of business were con-
cerned. The issue was resolved by simply holding that the 
chain store tax law could be upheld as an exercise of the 
police power intended to prevent monopolies and combina-
tions in restraint of trade, rather than as a strict revenue 
measure. 8 One might question whether this evasive approach 
would be necessary today in order to uphold the tax. 9 One 
can easily conclude, as did the court at an earlier date, that in 
imposing nonproperty taxes the legislative power is "un-
7 206 Ind. 688, 187 N.E. 882 (1934). Plaintiff first contended that 
"filling stations" were not "stores" within the meaning of the act, and that 
the tax was therefore not applicable to its business. The court rejected the 
plaintiff's argument on this issue of statutory construction and then con-
sidered the second contention that the tax was unconstitutional as a viola-
tion of the equal protection clause of the Indiana Constitution, Art. 1, §23. 
8 The court, id. at 691-692, took note of the fact that the Jackson case, 
supra note 6, was conclusive as to the federal equal protection clause, but 
pointed out that it was not controlling, though strongly persuasive authority, 
as to the meaning of the state equal protection clause. It was felt to be de-
sirable that there should be no conflict between state and federal decisions 
upon the subject. The court further noted that the Supreme Court of the 
United States upheld the act as a revenue measure, being of the opinion 
that substantial and significant difference exists between the business and 
operation of chain stores and that of a single store, and that these differences 
were sufficient to sustain the legislative classification for revenue purposes. 
However, the Indiana court, at 694-, stated that: 
It cannot be doubted that the differences in practices and advantages 
between the operation of a single and a chain of stores may vary with the 
lines of merchandise handled. That the question of the constitutionality 
of the act as a revenue measure prevents many difficulties is evidenced by 
the division of opinion among the learned Justices in the Jackson case. 
And the court then, at 694--704-, shifted to the proposition that the act 
could be upheld as a regulatory measure, and that "the graduation of license 
fees upward is justified, since the larger the chain the greater is the threat-
ened damage." 
9 For example, the division among the United States Supreme Court 
Justices on this question is no longer in evidence. See Chapter IV, infra. 
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trammeled, except that invidious discrimination will not be 
permitted."10 
The judicial development of the meaning of the uni-
formity limitation in Indiana aptly demonstrates the im-
portance of determining the nature of a given tax when 
property taxes are subject to a stricter uniformity limitation. 
The Indiana court has ruled that an inheritance tax is a non-
property tax, 11 and in a more controversial area the same 
result was reached as to the Indiana gross income tax.12 But 
the most important decision on this problem dealt with the 
nature of the Indiana intangibles taxes. 
( 1) Property taxation; intangibles taxes 
There has been no controversy or unusual development 
concerning some of the particular rules of uniformity limit-
10 Gafill v. Bracken, supra note 3 at 5 59, and cases there cited. Of 
course, just when is a discrimination "invidious?" This is nothing more 
than saying in a different fashion that such discriminations must not be 
"arbitrary." The words are not much help; one must inevitably turn to the 
specific examples to determine what a particular court at a particular time 
considers "arbitrary." However, it would seem clear that a heavy burden is 
placed upon one attempting to show that a classification found in non-
property tax is arbitrary. Certainly the presumption of validity is deeply 
entrenched here. As the court in a leading case has said: 
As to classification, it may be said that the rule is that, while the state is 
not at liberty to resort to a classification that is palpably arbitrary, any 
classification is valid, provided it rests upon some ground of difference 
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so 
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. And it is 
generally admitted and conceded that absolute equality in taxation can 
never be attained and that that system is best which comes the nearest to 
it. All that is required to make valid any classification that the legislature 
may adopt is that it shall be based upon a rational ground-some differ-
ence that bears a just relation to the purpose to be served as limited by 
state and federal Constitutions. Lutz v. Arnold, supra note 1 at +98-+99. 
11 Crittenbergcr v. State Savings Trust Co., supra note 3. 
12 Miles v. Dept. of Treasury, supra note 1. That case is discussed sep-
arately, infra notes 52-62. 
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ing property taxes. Thus, it is settled that there must be an 
absolute uniformity in effective rate, "co-extensive with the 
territory to which the tax applies."13 This means that the 
same ratio of valuation and same percentage rate must be 
applied to all property taxed by any one taxing authority of 
the state.14 However, it has also been settled by the court that 
this requirement of strict uniformity in effective rates does not 
apply to the method of ascertaining the value of the property 
that is to be taxed. Thus, property may be classified for the 
purpose of using different methods to value the different 
classes.15 The opinions in these latter cases reveal the diffi-
13 Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind. 223, 230 (1866), in which the court 
rejected the contention that if the uniformity clause of Art. X, §I applied 
to local taxes, then such rates had to be the same in all counties and town-
ships in the state. To the contrary, the provision was construed to mean: 
... that the rate of assessment and taxation must be uniform and equal 
throughout the locality in which the tax is levied. If the levy is for state 
purposes, then the rate must be uniform and equal in all parts of the 
State; and if the levy be for county purposes, the rate must be uniform 
and equal throughout the county in which the levy is made; and so in 
townships, when the levy is for township or road purposes. . • • [The 
object of this provision was] to devise a system for the assessment and 
levy of taxes that would distribute these burdens, among those liable to 
them, upon principles of uniformity, equality, and justice. To this end 
the primary principle adopted is that taxes shall be assessed on the prop-
erty liable thereto, according to its just value, and by a uniform and 
equal rate. 
However, the tax with which the court was concerned in the Bright case 
was struck down for reasons stated in note 16, infra. 
14 For example, Johnson v. Board of Park Com'rs of Ft. Wayne, 202 
Ind. 282, 174 N.E. 91 (1930); Ehle v. State, 191 Ind. 502, 133 N.E. 
748 (1922); Forrey v. Board of Com'rs of Madison County, 189 Ind. 
257, 126 N.E. 673 (1920); Wright v. House, 199 Ind. 247, 121 N.E. 
433 (1918). And see Cleveland & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Backus, 133 Ind. 513, 
33 N.E. 421 (1892). 
15 Cleveland & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Backus, supra note 14, upholding the 
method by which railroad assets and miles of track were assessed centrally 
and then pro-rated among the several counties on the basis of mileage. As 
the court pointed out, at 535-536, the statute under consideration was 
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culty faced when the goal is to ascertain the same ratio of 
value, e.g., the "true" value, of all property to be taxed. 
Goals such as absolute uniformity, "just valuation," and the 
like are always sought but seldom attained. Nevertheless, 
absolute uniformity in effective rate is required, and "theo-
retically" the requirement is adhered to by the tax laws. Also, 
it is certain that specific taxation of property is forbidden so 
that only an ad valorem property tax may be levied.16 
valid since all property was to be assessed at its true cash value and the rates 
were the same within the respective taxing districts. As for the second part 
of the uniformity clause ("shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a 
just valuation"), it was said that this left to the General Assembly the 
problem of prescribing the mode by which valuation of all property was to 
be ascertained, with a single limitation that it be a "just" valuation. The 
provision for the fixing of value of railroad property by a state board, while 
other property was assessed by local boards was, in fact, an attempt to pro-
vide for valuation by those best qualified, thus achieving a "just" valuation. 
In Johnson v. Johnson, 173 Ind. 76, 89 N.E. 590 (1909) the court 
found the method of assessing banking property to be valid, saying (at p. 
92): "Perfect equality of assessment is practically impossible, nor does the 
Constitution require uniformity in the methods or rules of assessment or 
valuation, but it does require a just valuation of all property, so that the 
burdens may be distributed with uniformity ...• It does require a rate 
that is uniform and equal." This case concerned the right of the taxpayer, 
an unincorporated private banking business, to deduct its deposits from all 
taxable property owned by it, except real estate, rather than to deduct the 
same only from its "credit proper." The statute was construed to permit the 
former, and held not to violate the uniformity clause even though individ-
uals were permitted only to deduct indebtedness from "credits proper." 
It was said (at p. 90): "The spirit of the taxing laws is not the taxation of 
apparent values; disassociated from all else, nor the taxation of all property 
at its gross value, but by securing a just valuation upon principles of uniform-
ity, equality and justice." The case well illustrates the difficulties faced 
when attempting to assess all the property, tangible and representative, once 
at its full value. For other cases on this problem, see Clark v. Vandalia R. 
Co., 172 Ind. 409, 86 N.E. 851 ( 1909); Smith v. Stephens, 173 Ind. 564, 
91 N.E. 167 (1910). 
16 Bright v. McCullough, supra note 13, in which the court struck 
down a township tax of "one cent on each acre of taxable land ••• for 
road purposes for the year 1863." It was admitted by township authorities 
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There remains the very unusual development concerning 
the requirement-or lack of requirement-of universality. 
The court has quite explicitly stated the proposition that 
" [ t] he exemption of any property necessarily produces in-
equality, and confers rights on some which are not granted 
to others, and thereby increases the burdens which they must 
bear."17 Any direct attempts to exempt property other than 
the classes of property specially designated as exemptible by 
the constitution, and any methods of assessments judicially 
determined to be, in fact, "exemptions," have all been held 
by the court to be violations of the uniformity provision, Art. 
X, §1.18 However, the court has made an important distinc-
tion between the "selection" and the "exemption" of prop-
erty. The former process, it has been held, is not limited by 
the uniformity requirement. The significance of this distinc-
tion is demonstrated by the judicial development concerning 
the intangibles taxes. 
The first hint of this development occurred in 1898 in 
that under Art. X, § 1 taxes levied exclusively for state purposes "must be 
ad valorem, and not specific; that they must be levied of a given per cent 
on the appraised value of the property subject to taxation, and not as a spe-
cific tax on designated articles of personal property or on real estate, at a 
fixed amount, without regard to value." However, it was contended that this 
rule did not prohibit specific local property taxes. Finding that all property 
taxation was governed by the limitation, the court struck down the tax 
since it was specific and therefore was neither upon a "just valuation" nor 
could the rates be uniform upon the property taxed. Also see Conter v. 
Commercial Bank, 209 Ind. 510, 199 N.E. 567 (1936); and Johnson v. 
Board of Park Com'rs of Ft. Wayne, supra note 14. 
17 Johnson v. Johnson, supra note 15 at 93. However, the court sanc-
tioned "deductions" when the purpose was to avoid double taxation by the 
taxation of both tangible property and representative property. 
18 See Stark v. Kreyling, 207 Ind. 128, 188 N.E. 680 (1934); State 
ex rei. Lewis v. Smith, 158 Ind. 543,63 N.E. 25 (1902); State ex rei. 
Morgan v. Working Men's Bldg., Loan Fund & Savings Ass'n, I 52 Ind. 
2 7 8 ( 18 99) ; State ex rei. Tieman v. Indianapolis, 69 Ind. 3 7 5, 3 S Am. 
Rep. 223 (1879). 
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State Board of Tax Com'rs v. Holliday. 19 In that case, suit 
was brought to enjoin the listing and valuing of life insurance 
policies for the general property tax. The taxpayer alleged 
that the State Board of Tax Commissioners was attempting 
to cause all assessors in the state to assess and value for taxa-
tion all such policies. The cardinal question to be decided was 
said to be whether life insurance policies were legally subject 
to taxation in Indiana. Such property had in fact never been 
taxed theretofore. Nor was there any statutory provision 
authorizing by name the taxation of life insurance policies. 
On the part of the state it was argued that the policies were 
"personal property" within the general section of the general 
property tax which required the taxation of "personal prop-
erty," and that, indeed, Art. X, § 1, required the assessment 
of such policies as personal property. 
There was no question on the part of anyone concerned 
that the legislature had the power to include such policies 
within the general class of personal property for purposes of 
taxation. The questions for decision were as follows: ( 1) 
whether the legislature had in fact done so; and ( 2) if it had 
not, whether it was constitutionally required to do so. On the 
first issue, that of statutory interpretation, the court decided 
that the legislature had not intended to include life insurance 
policies in the general category of "personal property."20 
Thus, the actual "holding" of the case was that the action of 
the State Board in providing for the assessment of the policies 
was without authority of law, and void. 
19 ISO Ind. 216,49 N.E. 14 (1897). 
20 Ibid. The explanation of the court's construction on this point was 
that such policies by their nature demanded special provisions for their 
valuation, and no such regulations or provisions had been made by the legis-
lature. The court warned, however, that this interpretation of the general 
term "personal property," so as not to include insurance policies because of 
the absence of special provisions for valuation, must be strictly confined to 
the case before it. 
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As for the constitutional requirement, the court had this 
to say: 
It may be conceded that it was a duty devolved on the legis-
lature by the constitutional provision . . . to provide for 
the taxation of all property, both real and personal, except 
such only for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, 
religious, or charitable purposes as it might especially exempt 
by law .... [However] the constitutional provision ... 
is not self-executing, but requires appropriate legislation to 
carry it into effect.21 
Nevertheless, said the court, no provision had yet been made 
for the taxation of life insurance policies, and without such 
legislation they could not be taxed. "It is ... a legislative 
power to select the subjects for taxation," and Art. X, § 1 is 
a limitation upon the exercise of that inherent legislative 
power. Nevertheless, " [ w] here the legislature has not exer-
cised this power, no other department of the State govern-
ment can supply the omission; and where no such regulation 
has been prescribed by law as to any particular species of 
property, then such property cannot be taxed."22 
The preceding analysis was all that was actually necessary 
for the decision. However, the court went on to assume that 
the tax law was constitutional, even though it failed to 
21Jd. at 228-229, emphasis added. It may be noted that the Holliday 
case was a 3-2 decision. The dissent asserted that the legislature had in-
tended to select all property including insurance policies; and in any case, if 
there was doubt the act should be construed so as to include the policies 
because "under our constitution, .•• the legislature must do, what it has 
in fact done, that is, select as the subjects of taxation all property both real 
and personal, save that only which the constitution itself, for reasons of 
public policy, provides may be exempt." !d. at 241. Indeed, the dissent 
claimed, that "It is conceded that the constitution requiru that all property 
within the jurisdiction of the State should be taxed . ••. It is further 
conceded that it was the solemn duty of the legislature to obey this mandate 
of the constitution, in respect to this as all other property." ld. at 259-260, 
emphasis added. 
22 /d. at 220. 
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provide for the assessment of a class of personal property not 
designated as exemptible by the constitution, and therefore 
failed to carry out the constitutional mandate in full.23 In 
order better to evaluate the selection-exemption dichotomy 
subsequently developed by the court, a doctrine based in part 
upon the Holliday case, it will be helpful to state as precisely 
as possible what the court in the Holliday case did not decide, 
as well as what it did decide. 
The true import of the case seems to be as follows: The 
constitution (Art. X, § 1) does require the legislature to tax 
all property. However, if the legislature fails to provide 
legislation which reaches all property, no tax can be levied 
upon that property which is not within the terms of the legis-
lation. Apparently, although this was dictum, such legislation 
which reaches less than all taxable property and which other-
wise conforms to the uniformity limitation will stand as 
constitutional. But this does not suggest that the failure on 
the part of the legislature to select some taxable property 
was an exercise of de jure legislative power. To the contrary, 
the court clearly viewed such action as a violation of Art. X, 
§1-that is, no more than the exercise of de facto power.24 
(a) Intangibles tax 
This, then, was the judicial development on the meaning 
of the uniformity limitation until 1933, at which time the 
Indiana General Assembly, by several companion acts, in fact 
segregated intangible property from all other property and 
provided a separate means for taxing such intangibles. In-
tangible property in general was dealt with by one act/11 sec-
tion 2 of which provided that: 
. . . every person residing in and/ or domiciled in this state, 
23 /d. at 229. 
24 Compare the position of the dissent, note 21, supra. 
25Ind. Laws 1933, c. 81; Ind. Stat. Ann. §§64-901-64-940. 
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shall pay a tax to the State of Indiana at the rate and in the 
manner provided in this act, for the right to exercise any one 
or more of the following privileges: 
(a) Signing, executing and issuing intangibles; 
(b) Selling, assigning, transferring, renewing, removing, 
consigning, mailing, shipping, trading in and enforcing 
intangibles. 
(c) Receiving the income, increase, issues and profits 
of intangibles. 
(d) Having and possessing the right to transmit the same 
by will and of making gifts thereof and therefrom and of 
having the right to allow such property to pass to other per-
sons by descent under the intestate laws of the state of 
Indiana. 
(e) For the right to have such intangibles separately 
classified for taxes levied, assessed and collected on account 
thereof and/ or measured thereby. 
The rate imposed on intangibles in general was 25¢ on each 
hundred dollars "of the actual value of" such intangibles. 
A second ace6 dealt with bank and trust company shares 
and deposits, and surplus and undivided profits of savings 
banks. The tax was described by section 2 as follows: 
. . . all of the shares of the capital stock of every bank hav-
ing a capital stock, and of every trust company, and the sur-
plus and undivided profits of every savings bank, and all of 
the property of and all deposits in every bank and trust com-
pany, except as herein otherwise provided, shall be assessed 
for taxation and taxed in the manner and at the rate and 
value prescribed in this act and not otherwise. 
The rate was the same as that applicable to intangibles m 
general.27 
26 Ind. Laws 1933, c. 83; Ind. Stat. Ann. §§64-801-64-821. 
27 Section 4, providing for the rate, also contains language susceptible of 
being construed as indicating that the tax is upon the shares as such. It 
provides that such shares and deposits "shall be assessed to the respective 
owners of such shares of stock and to the respective owners of such deposits, 
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A third aces dealt with the shares of building and loan 
associations. After stating in section 2 that "every association 
and its property shall be assessed and taxed in the manner 
and at the rate prescribed in this act, and not otherwise," 
it was provided in section 4 that: 
In addition to the tax upon its real estate and tangible 
personal property [that is, under the general property tax], 
there shall be levied and imposed upon each such association 
for the privilege of exercising its franchise and transacting its 
business, an annual excise tax which shall be assessed and 
computed and paid at the time, in the manner and at the rate 
prescribed in this act. 
The rate was again 25¢ on each hundred dollars of the value 
of shares and each hundred dollars of surplus, deducting 
from the capital stock and surplus the amount of the value 
of all tangible property subject to taxation. 
The several acts also purported to relieve these intangibles 
from all other taxes except estate, inheritance, and gross 
income taxes. Thus, section 31 of the act, concerning intangi-
bles in general, provides: 
The tax hereby imposed shall be in lieu of all other taxes 
except estate and/ or inheritance and gross income taxes, . . . 
imposed upon intangibles or against the owners or holders 
thereof by virtue of the provisions of any law of this state 
enacted prior to the passage of this act. No tax except gross 
income, inheritance and estate taxes shall be imposed upon 
any intangibles in account of which a tax is imposed by the 
provisions of this act by virtue of the provisions of any other 
law of this state enacted prior to the passage of this act.29 
in the township, town or city wherein such bank or trust company is lo-
cated, and such shares of stock and such deposits shall be taxed at the rate 
of" 25 per year upon each $100.00 value. 
28 Ind. Laws 1933, c. 82; Ind. Stat. Ann. §§64-822-64-835. 
29 Ind. Laws 1933, c. 81, §31. Section 16 of c. 83, concerning the taxa-
tion of bank shares, is substantially the same as the quoted provision. Section 
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In 1935, soon after their enactment, these companion acts 
were held to be constitutional in Lutz v. Arnold30 by a 
majority of three of the five judges. The majority31 decided 
that the tax was a nonproperty tax32 and therefore not subject 
to the uniformity limitation in Art. X, § 1. 33 In addition, it 
9 of c. 82, concerning the taxation of shares of building and loan associa-
tions, provides: 
The excise taxes imposed by the terms of this act shall be in lieu of all 
other taxes on mortgages, notes, contracts for sale of real estate, and the 
shares of capital stock and surplus of each such association, and no associa-
tion and no owner of shares of capital stock therein shall be liable for 
any other tax on such shares of stock and surplus except estate and inherit-
ance and gross income taxes. 
30 Supra note I. 
81 /bid. There was a majority opinion written by Judge Hughes, con-
curred in by one other judge. A separate concurring opinion was written by 
Chief Judge Treanor. There was a single dissenting opinion by Judge Roll, 
concurred in by one other judge. 
82 /d. at 500. The court upheld the several acts as parts of a single inte-
grated intangibles tax law, saying: "Chapters 81, 82, and 83 must be con-
strued together as parts of one body of law and as together expressing the 
legislative will. These three chapters were enacted by the same legislature 
and approved on the same day." Several actions below, all seeking declaratory 
judgments declaring the taxes unconstitutional and injunctions to prevent 
their enforcement, were consolidated for this opinion. The court began its 
opinion by saying that these three causes "relate to chapters 81, 82, and 83 
of the Acts of 1933, being the intangible tax law .... The greater part 
of all questions presented in the different causes are the same." However, 
throughout the opinion the judges refer solely to the chapter imposing the 
tax on intangible property in general. 
33 !d. The court held that the intangibles tax conformed to the uniform-
ity required of nonproperty taxes, i.e., a uniformity within classes. The 
plaintiffs had contended that the classification in the act reaching intangibles 
in general was invalid because financial institutions were not reached. Dis-
missing this argument, the court pointed out that the three chapters must 
be read together so that the situation complained of was nonexistent. When 
it was pointed out that certain intangibles, such as judgments for the pay-
ment of compensation under the workmen's compensation laws, and like 
judgments as to alimony, were not included within the scope of the act, 
the court replied: "It was the evident purpose of the legislature in making 
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was ruled that the in lieu provisions did not amount to "ex-
emptions" of property but were simply illustrations of the 
power of "selection" vested in the legislature. Therefore 
those provisions were not violations of Art. X, § 1, which pro-
hibits the exemption of property. Each of these two proposi-
tions will be examined separately. 
The tax under consideration aptly illustrates how very 
important it is to characterize a tax for the purpose of de-
termining the applicable uniformity limitation. If the in-
tangibles tax was to be upheld, then clearly it had to fall 
outside the scope of operation of the strict property-tax uni-
formity limitation in Art. X, §1. The majority opinion 
started with the proposition that if the tax was "an excise tax 
it must [have been] so because the tax [was] imposed against 
the person because of privileges enjoyed and not against the 
property of the taxpayer."34 And the majority pointed out 
that the clear intention of the legislature was to impose a 
nonproperty tax. While not conclusive, such legislative intent 
was nevertheless to be given some weight. As evidence of 
such intent on the part of the legislature the court referred 
to that act concerning intangibles in general, the language of 
which indicated that the tax was for the "right to exercise 
any one or more of" the enumerated privileges. 311 The 
majority concluded that the tax was imposed upon the exer-
this classification to base it on grounds of sound public policy and classifica-
tion on this ground is permitted." See note 10, supra, for the general 
statement found in this opinion concerning the power of the legislature to 
classify. 
34 /d. at 489. In stating the general nature of an excise, or nonproperty 
tax, the court said (at p. 489): 
An excise tax has been defined to be a tax imposed upon the performance 
of an act, the engaging in an occupation, or the enjoyment of a privi-
lege, and that every form of tax not imposed directly upon property 
must constitute an excise if it is a valid tax of any description. 
8ll See text to note 25, supra. Also see note 32, supra. 
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cise of the enumerated acts.36 Some indication of the attitude 
of the majority on the immediate problem is found in its 
approval of the following statement: 
In deciding upon the validity of a tax with reference to these 
[constitutional] requirements, no microscopic examination as 
to the purely economic or theoretical nature of the tax should 
be indulged in for the purpose of placing it in a category 
which would invalidate the tax. 37 
In addition, the court referred to the history of the adoption 
36 Lutz v. Arnold, supra note 1 at 491. The majority opinion framed its 
conclusion in these words: 
The tax is not payable unless the privileges as set out are exercised and 
the exercising of the privileges is made the occasion for the tax. The tax 
imposed may be said to be an excise upon the particular privilege or 
privileges enumerated in doing certain things. There is a distinct differ-
ence between the mere ownership of property and the performance of 
certain acts of business. And the act in question, . . . relates alone to 
the performance and doing of certain acts, and unless done there is no 
tax. The tax is therefore imposed upon the doing of the things described. 
One might well view the assertion that "the tax is not payable unless the 
privileges as set out are exercised" is a bit misleading. This conclusion of 
the court is so only because of the broadest possible description of privileges 
which seem to describe just about every possible incident of ownership. The 
method of the payment of the tax on intangibles in general is interesting in 
this respect. Payment is made by attaching a stamp to the intangible. Ind. 
Laws 1933, c. 81, §§9, 10; Ind. Stat. Ann. §§64-909, 64-910. On all 
current intangibles the payment is made annually. Thus, one might pay a 
tax annually on the "exercising" of the privilege of "the right to have such 
intangibles separately classified for taxes levied, assessed and collected on 
account thereof and/or measured thereby." Somehow, this does appear to 
put a bit of a strain on the orthodox conception of "exercising a privilege." 
Perhaps this is some sort of a "bootstrap" privilege. The court also rejected 
the contention that the act in question taxed the right to exercise the inci-
dents of ownership, and the right to devote the property to the only uses to 
which it was adapted, rather than taxing the exercise of any privilege. The 
court's answer to this was that the same could be said of other privilege 
taxes, such as, for example, the gasoline use tax. !d. at 494. 
87 /d. at 493. The court quoted this. passage from Nicol v. Ames, 173 
U.S. 509, 19 s. Ct. 522 (1898). 
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of the tax, which it asserted was a matter of common knowl-
edge. This, of course, was a reference to the fact that in-
tangibles were escaping from taxation, and the alleged need 
for a low rate tax on intangibles to encourage compliance with 
the tax.38 
Having thus established the validity of the intangibles tax 
as a tax, there remained what the court considered to be the 
more difficult question. This concerned the validity of the "in 
lieu" provisions. Were they in effect "exemptions" of prop-
erty from property taxation and therefore violations of Art. 
X, §I? 39 The contention of the taxpayers, as restated in the 
majority opinion, was that the intangible property, which the 
legislature attempted to relieve from property taxation by 
use of the "in lieu" provisions, had theretofore been and 
was still covered by the Indiana general property tax law. 
Therefore, it was argued, the "in lieu" provisions were 
merely attempts to exempt such intangible property from the 
general property tax, and were therefore unconstitutional 
because the described intangible property was not within any 
class of property named in Art. X, §I as being exemptible 
from the general property tax. 40 
This argument was rejected by the majority, which found 
that the "in lieu" provisions were constitutional. The reasons 
are more articulately stated in the concurring opinion by 
38 /d. at 506. Cf. Ind. CCH Tax Reporter ~25-00l. 
39 /d. It was upon this point that the dissent concentrated its fire. The 
dissent doubted whether the tax could be properly designated an excise tax, 
but did not belabor the issue since from the dissent's viewpoint the tax was 
invalid regardless of its nature. See notes 4-8, 4-9 and 50, infra. The concur-
ring opinion by Judge Treanor also concerned itself with this problem of 
the in lieu provisions. He stated, id. at 512, that at the time the decision 
was rendered he was in doubt as to the nature of the tax, "But after more 
mature consideration [he was] convinced that they [were] excise taxes." 
Judge Treanor voted with the majority at the time of decision, but delayed 
filing an opinion. 
40 !d. at 502. 
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Treanor, C. J., than in the majority opinion.u It was asserted 
that the taxpayers' contention that the several "in lieu" 
provisions violated Art. X, § 1, of the Indiana Constitution 
posed the problem: 
. • . whether the inhibition against tax exemptions encom-
passes and destroys the sovereign power of the General As-
sembly to select and classify the subjects of taxation. 
It is elementary that the General Assembly's power to 
select subjects of taxation is unlimited, except insofar as 
such power is restricted by some provision of the Constitu-
tion; and Art. X contains no provision which expressly re-
quires the General Assembly to select all classes of real and 
personal property of the state as subjects of taxation.42 
Having thus framed the issue, Judge Treanor asserted that 
the taxpayers' conclusion that Art. X of the constitution re-
quires the General Assembly to subject "all real and per-
sonal property to a property tax" could be reached only by 
drawing such an inference from those limitations in Art. X, 
§1, concerning uniformity of taxation and the permissible 
exemption of certain classes of property. 
The majority decided that such an inference could not be 
justifiably drawn and that the Indiana Constitution contains 
no universality limitation, at least, insofar as the process of 
"selection" is concerned. Both the majority and concurring 
opinions relied to some degree on the Holliday case. Ac-
cording to Judge Treanor, in the Holliday case the court 
held that the legislature did not intend to make life insur-
ance policies subjects of taxation and that this was a valid 
exercise of the plenary power of selection resting in the 
41 /d. The discussion of the majority on this question is at 502-507. The 
same thesis was used as that which is found in the opinion by Judge Treanor, 
but it is stated much less convincingly. 
42 /d. at 513. Judge Treanor did point out that the court had recognized 
the definitely restrictive force of the prohibition against exemptions in Art. 
X, §I, citing Stark v. Kreyling, supra note 18. See cases there cited. 
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legislature. Certainly the first part of that proposition was 
"held" in the Holliday case but, as pointed out above, the 
Holliday case characterized the failure to select such policies 
as a violation of Art. X, § 1. Nevertheless, accepting Judge 
Treanor's proposition, the taxpayer-plaintiffs in the Lutz 
case made the distinction that the Holliday rule was not ap-
plicable because insurance policies had never been selected 
as subjects of taxation, while intangible property generally 
was formerly taxed and would now be relieved of such taxa-
tion by the provisions in controversy. Judge Treanor an-
swered: 
If the foregoing distinctions have legal significance it is be-
cause ( 1) the General Assembly has no power to withdraw 
from the subjects of taxation any class of property which has 
once been subject to taxation; and (2) any such withdrawal 
constitutes an exemption.43 
Dealing first with the issue whether "withdrawal consti-
tutes an exemption," Judge Treanor relied on the brief sup-
porting the validity of the "in lieu" provisions to make the 
following distinction between "exemption" and "selection." 
An exemption takes property which is in the taxable class and 
removes it from taxation upon some designated ground of 
ownership or use. . . . Exemption as permitted by section 
1 of article 1 0 of the Constitution is a discrimination within 
a taxable class on the basis of municipal, educational, liter-
ary, scientific, religious or charitable purpose. Selection, on 
the contrary, is the determination of the taxable class, and 
unless impressed with such arbitrary methods of classifica-
tion as violate the equal privileges and immunities provision 
of the Constitution, it is valid.44 
43 /d.at515. 
44 I d. at 516. To demonstrate this distinction the opinion pointed out 
that an educational institution may own real estate, tangible personal prop-
erty, and intangible personal property for the purposes of education. Assume 
that the legislature selects all of these classes of property for taxation. They 
are thereby taxable unless exempted, which the legislature may do pursuant 
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Thus, he reasoned, the exemptions contemplated in section 1 
are exemptions of property on the basis of use alone, and 
not on the basis of the nature or character of the property. 
In the opinion of Judge Treanor, section 1 presupposes that 
the particular items of property which are exempted belong 
to a class of property which has been subjected to taxation 
by the General Assembly in an exercise of its power to select 
the objects of taxation. 
Treating the question of the power of the legislature to 
"withdraw" as one aspect of its power to "select,"45 Judge 
Treanor concluded that the General Assembly had the 
power to withdraw intangibles from the general class of tax-
able property because the limiting provisions of Art. X, § 1, 
left unimpaired the plenary, inherent legislative power to 
select the objects of taxation.46 This, then, is the meaning 
of Art. X, § 1 : the restrictive provisions therein are directed 
to Art. X, § 1. However, having selected all classes for taxation, the legisla-
ture cannot exempt a manufacturing establishment which possesses all three 
classes. On the other hand, the legislature may withdraw intangible personal 
property from taxation, and as a result thereof both the educational institu-
tion and the manufacturing establishment will be relieved from paying taxes 
on such tangible personal property, but not on the principle of exemption, 
rather because the same is not in the taxable class. 
45 !d., the opinion stated the issue as follows (at p. 517): 
Consequently, we come back to the question of the power of the General 
Assembly to classify property for the purpose of selecting subjects for 
taxation. And more particularly, to the question of whether the provi-
sions of § 1, Art. X, deprive the General Assembly of the power to re-
classify personal property into tangibles and intangibles for the purpose 
of withdrawing intangibles from the classes of property subject to a 
property tax. 
46 /d. at 517. Judge Treanor admitted that the actual holding of the 
court on the facts in the Holliday case was not determinative of the question 
of power to "withdraw." However, he asserted that the "principles an-
nounced and the reasoning therefrom appear to support the conclusion that 
the General Assembly had the power to withdraw intangibles from the 
general class of property taxables." But for actual import of the Holliday 
case, see supra, text at notes 19-24. 
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to the mechanics of the taxing system and are not restric-
tions on the substantive power to select the subjects for taxa-
tion. 
The requirement that the General Assembly "shall provide, 
by law, for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxa-
tion" cannot be the source of an implied restriction of the 
legislative power to select subjects of taxation; and the 
clause "prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just 
valuation of all property, both real and personal," cannot 
be said reasonably to constitute a constitutional mandate to 
the General Assembly to select all property, both real and 
personal, as subjects of taxation. It seems more reasonable 
to assume that it is a mandate to prescribe regulations to 
secure a just valuation for taxation of all property which is 
subject to taxation. And since §1, Art. X does not purport 
to select subjects for taxation it follows that the power of the 
General Assembly in that respect is full, unimpaired and 
continuing. 47 
The Lutz case was not unanimous; two of the five judges 
recorded a vigorous dissent.48 The dissent was essentially 
based on two premises. First, the dissent seriously doubted 
whether the intangibles taxes could be designated nonprop-
47 /d. at 518-519, emphasis added. An interesting bit of dictum by 
Judge Treanor was added at this point. In his view of the constitutional 
limitation, the tax would be valid even if it were characterized as a property 
tax. The basis of this conclusion was that the word "rate," as used in Art. 
X, §I, was intended to mean-and reasonably construed must mean-
"mode" or "rule" or "method," and not the percentage rate of tax; and, 
further, that the "equal and uniform rate" restriction does not prevent 
classification for the purpose of imposing different percentage rates. He 
would rule that intangibles could be treated as a separate class of personal 
property for the purpose of imposing a lower rate per centum than is im-
posed upon other personal property. This interpretation was, of course, not 
shared by the other justices. If this had been his reason for finding the tax 
valid, he would have stood alone. Also there might have been some basis 
for the rash conclusion in the Comment, "Indiana's Intangible Tax Law," 
10 Ind. L.J. 450, 455 (1935). 
48 /d. at 520-526. 
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erty taxes. If considered property taxes, then clearly there 
was violation of the uniformity clause, Art. X, § 1, which 
requires absolute uniformity of rates, 49 because the intangi-
bles tax rates would vary from the rate applicable to prop-
erty taxed under the general property tax. 
Second, even assuming that the tax was a nonproperty 
tax, the dissent argued that the "in lieu" provisions 
amounted to exemptions of property in violation of Art. X, 
§1. The distinction made by the majority between "selec-
tion" and "exemption" was rejected with the observation 
that such an analysis "would have the effect of making the 
constitutional provision absolutely nugatory, and permitting 
the legislature to except from taxation not only property 
for the purposes set out in the Constitution but any other 
class of property which the legislature itself might deem it 
wise or expedient to exempt."50 The dissent further reasoned 
that it was obvious from the words of the statute that the 
legislature did not intend to add the tax in question to the 
general property tax on intangibles, and therefore the "in 
lieu" provisions alone could not be struck down as severable, 
but the whole act had to fall. 
49 /d, at 523. In support of this proposition citing Johnson v. Johnson, 
supra note 15. Sec notes 13, 14 and 15 supra. Compare Judge Treanor's 
view on this, note 47, supra. 
50 /d. at 521-522. The dissent also rejected the majority interpretation 
of the Holliday case. They viewed that case in this manner: 
.•. it was held in that case that, while the legislature might not ex-
pressly exempt life insurance policies from taxation, since they are prop-
erty, the failure of the legislature to provide machinery for levying and 
collecting a tax, had the practical effect of leaving them unburdened by 
a property tax. 
!d. at 521, emphasis added. In any case, the dissent here would not extend 
the rule laid down by the Holliday majority so as to permit the legislature 
to exempt any class of property which it might choose to exempt merely by 
repealing the law which provides machinery for levying an assessment upon 
such property. 
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(b) Summary: property taxation 
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To summarize, the Indiana uniformity structure which 
limits property taxation is interpreted to require the strictest 
degree of uniformity for the purpose of effective rates and 
method. But, although exemptions of property are prohib-
ited, this restriction is avoided to some degree by the inter-
pretation that the power to "select" property for taxation 
is left unimpaired by the strict uniformity requirement. 
Thus, strictly speaking, a full requirement of "universality" 
is not found in Indiana. Furthermore, it is apparent that 
this doctrine concerning the power of "selection" developed 
from a rather questionable use of precedent, although the 
Lutz case does not purport to rest entirely on the earlier 
Holliday case. 
Nevertheless, by holding first that the intangibles tax 
was a nonproperty tax, and then by holding that the power 
to select property for property taxation was not limited by 
the strict uniformity requirement, the Indiana court has in 
effect given constitutional sanction to a limited classified 
property-tax system in Indiana. 51 This result demonstrates 
the crucial importance of determining the nature of a given 
tax, and of the need for precise analysis of the particular 
rules of the uniformity limitation. Whether or not this re-
sult was reached by the use of overly refined distinctions, it 
demonstrates that the strictness of the property-tax uni-
formity limitation has been avoided by some states when 
necessity seemed to demand in the tax structure a flexibility 
which the constitution would at first blush prohibit. 
51 On this general problem, compare the Indiana tonnage tax which is "in 
lieu" of all other taxes, and the forest reserve tax which ensures a lower 
effective rate for forest lands by the placing of an arbitrary valuation of 
$1.00 per acre on approved forest lands. Neither tax has been challenged as 
to its constitutionality. Tonnage tax: Ind. Stat. Ann. §§64-741-64-748; 
Forest tax: Ind. Stat. Ann. §§32-301-32-319, and 32-401-32-406. 
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(2) Income tax 
In 1933, the Indiana legislature enacted the Gross In-
come Tax Act,r;2 section 2 of which provided: 
There is hereby imposed a tax, measured by the amount 
or volume of gross income, and in the amount to be deter-
mined by the application of rates on such gross income as 
hereinafter provided. Such tax shall be levied upon the en-
tire gross income of all residents of the state of Indiana, and 
upon the gross income [derived within the state by nonresi-
dents] .... r;3 
Section 3 of the act divided gross income into two broad 
classes according to its source for the purpose of applying 
different rates to each class.54 Provision was also made for 
certain deductions and exemptions. 
Shortly after its enactment, the act was challenged and 
upheld in Miles v. Department of Treasury.55 The first 
problem concerned the nature of the tax, since it was chal-
lenged as a violation of the property-tax uniformity limita-
tion, Art. X, § 1, in that the rates were not absolutely uni-
form. After a lengthy review of the split of opinion among 
other state courts on this issue, the court held that this tax 
was a nonproperty tax, saying: 
. . the tax in question is an excise, levied upon those domi-
52 Ind. Laws 193 3, c. 50; Ind. Stat. Ann. §§64-260 I et seq. 
53 Note the following changes in phraseology made by a 1937 amend-
ment: "There is hereby imposed a tax upon the receipt of gross income . 
. • Such tax shall be levied upon the receipt of the entire gross income • 
. . . " Ind. Stat. Ann. §64-2602. The italics indicate the added words. 
54 The first class consisted of income from manufacturing, mining, pro-
ducing oil or timber, agriculture, wholesaling, and jobbing of tangible com-
modities. The rate applied to the class of income was ,% of I%- The 
~econd class of income consisted of income from all other sources, and the 
rate applied to this class was I%. 
55 Supra note 1. Plaintiff brought an action to enjoin payment of public 
funds for the costs of printing and publication of the act on the grounds 
that the act was unconstitutional. 
UNIFORMITY STRUCTURES 305 
ciled within the state or who derive income from sources 
within the state, upon the basis of the privilege of domicile 
or the privilege of transacting business within the state, and 
. . . the burden [of the tax] may reasonably be measured 
by the amount of income.56 
In reaching this conclusion the court approved the use of in-
come as a base as an equitable means of spreading the bur-
dens of government among those most able to pay.57 Also of 
interest was the court's rejection of the argument that a tax 
upon income is a tax upon property if the income is derived 
from property.58 Having determined that the tax was not a 
property tax, and therefore not subject to the stricter uni-
formity limitation, the court disposed of the second prob-
lem, the validity of the classifications embodied in the tax. 
Both the classification of income according to its sources for 
the purpose of rates and the various exemptions in the tax 
were found to be reasonable.59 
However, one should be quite cautious in using this case 
for comparative purposes. The features of the Indiana tax 
set it apart from other state taxes characterized as income 
06 /d. at 177-188. See Chap. V, infra. 
57 /d. at 187, saying: 
It is universally recognized that the burdens of government cannot be 
distributed with exact justice upon all persons and property. It is also 
recognized that to distribute the burden of government per capita would 
work an injustice upon those who are least able to pay and least able to 
cope with social and economic problems, in favor of those better equipped 
to meet social and economic problems, and who, because of their more 
complex activities, receive more protection from and put more burden 
upon the instrumentalities of government. To distribute the burden with 
exact justice is impossible. The legislature has chosen to measure the 
share of each by his gross income. It cannot be said that that method is 
unreasonable. 
Of course, this argument is the one usually used to justify progressive rates 
under an income tax. However, the Indiana tax had only proportional rates. 
58 /d. at 185. 
59 /d. at 189-192. 
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taxes. The Indiana tax is more in the nature of what is usu-
ally called a "gross receipts" tax. However, it can be dis-
tinguished from the usual gross-receipts tax in that it ap-
plies to all persons, whether in business or not, and includes 
all forms of earned and unearned income.60 The court in the 
Miles case recognized that a distinction might be drawn be-
tween this tax and the ordinary income tax-although be-
littling such a distinction-when it said: 
While there may be a "theoretical distinction" or a "very 
slight" difference between a net income tax and an excise 
measured by income, it is difficult to find any practical dis-
tinction to be made between a gross income tax and an ordi-
nary excise tax. It is a tax "on the recipient of the income, the 
tax being upon the right or ability to produce, create, re-
ceive, and enjoy, and not upon specific property."61 
Finally, an amendment to the Indiana Constitution now pro-
vides that a tax on income may be imposed in Indiana, thus 
removing any doubt as to the validity of such a tax. 62 Thus, 
further refinements of the Miles case are unnecessary. 
00 Cf. CCH Ind. Tax Reporter n10-001, quoting from the foreword to 
the 1946 Regulations to the tax. 
61 Miles v. Department of Treasury, supra note I at 184, emphasis added. 
62 In 1932 Art. X, §8 was added to the Indiana Constitution by amend-
ment. It reads: 
The general assembly may levy and collect a tax upon income, from 
whatever source derived, at such rates, in such manner, and with such 
exemptions as may be prescribed by law. 
This amendment was not referred to in the Miles case, discussed in the 
text, even though in a case decided shortly before the Miles case in the same 
year the Supreme Court of Indiana had ruled regarding the necessary votes 
for an amendment to the constitution so that it would seem that the new 
Art. X, §8 was validly a part of the constitution. Sec In re Todd, 208 Ind. 
168, 193 N.E. 865 (1935). Before that case it appears that the court had 
held that the constitution required a majority of votes of the voters voting at 
the election when an amendment was submitted to approve the proposed 
amendment before it could be valid. Thus, a simple majority voting for the 
amendment did not necessarily ensure its adoption. In the Todd case the 
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3. Kansas 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The uniformity structure of the Kansas Constitution of 
1859 is relatively simple. Article XI, § 1 contains the basic 
uniformity clause and originally read: 
The legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate 
of assessment and taxation; but all property used exclusively 
for state, county, municipal, literary, educational, scientific, 
religious, benevolent and charitable purposes, and personal 
property to the amount of at least two hundred dollars for 
each family, shall be exempted from taxation. 
This basic uniformity clause and the accompanying "man-
datory" exemption clause were supplemented by the original 
Art. XI, §2, which expressly required that banking property 
bear its just share of the tax burden.1 
However, in 1924 a significant change was made in the 
uniformity structure by the addition to Art. XI, §1, of a 
clause providing for special treatment for "intangibles" and 
the resultant repeal of the original Art. XI, §2. Thus, 
since 1924 Art. XI, § 1 has read: 
The legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal 
court reversed itself and held that a majority voting thereon was sufficient. 
Since the amendment proposing Art. X, §8 received a majority of those 
voting thereon, but not a majority thereat, there was some doubt before the 
ruling in the Todd case as to whether Section 8 of Art. X was validly 
adopted. See Comment, "In re Todd and Constitutional Amendment," 10 
Ind. L.J. 510 (1935). 
1 That provision read: 
The legislature shall provide for taxing the notes and bills discounted 
or purchased, moneys loaned, and other property, effects, or dues of every 
description, (without deduction) of all banks now existing, or hereafter 
to be created, and of all bankers; so that all property employed in banking 
shall always bear a burden of taxation equal to that imposed upon the 
property of individuals. 
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rate of assessment and taxation, except that mineral products, 
money, mortgages, notes and other evidence of debt may be 
classified and taxed uniformly as to class as the legislature 
shall provide. • • . 
The exemption clause of the original Art. XI, § 1 remains 
unchanged, except that it is now a separate sentence. 
The only other pertinent constitutional provisions are 
those dealing with special problems, all added since the basic 
change in 1924. For example, Art. XI, §2, added in 1932, 
expressly authorizes an income tax.2 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
As in a great many other states, the distinction between 
property and nonproperty taxes is of utmost importance for 
the purposes of the uniformity limitation. The uniformity 
clause found in Art. XI, § 1 does not limit non property 
taxes, which are only required to be uniform within classes.3 
Thus, the objects of nonproperty taxes need only be reason-
able classes,4 and such objects may be further classified for 
the purpose of applying different rates to the subclasses.5 In 
2 Article XI, §2 reads: 
The state shall have power to levy and collect taxes on income from 
whatever source derived, which taxes may be graduated and progressive. 
Another provision, added to the constitution by amendment in 1928 is 
Art. XI, § 1 0 which reads: 
The state shall have power to levy special taxes, for road and highway 
purposes, on motor vehicles and on motor fuels. 
3 A leading case is State ex rei. Arn v. Cline, 91 Kan. 416, 137 Pac. 932 
( 1914), upholding an inheritance tax. See the cases in notes 4 through 6, 
infra. 
4 State ex rei. Arn v. Cline, supra note 3 (inheritance tax; exemptions 
therefrom reasonable classes); State ex rei. Arn v. State Comm. of Revenue 
& Taxation, 163 Kan. 240, 181 P. 2d 532 (1947) (fuel tax, exemptions 
therefrom found reasonable). Also see State v. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789, 168 
Pac. 679 ( 1917) (local trading stamp license tax, exemptions, upheld as 
valid classifications). 
5 See the cases in note 6, infra. 
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a leading case the court held that progressively graduated 
rates did not violate the uniformity within classes require-
ment.6 
The importance of characterizing a given tax as either 
property or nonproperty is best illustrated in Kansas by the 
decision that the mortgage recording tax of 1915 was a prop-
erty tax and therefore unconstitutional because it violated 
the stricter property-tax uniformity limitation/ whereas had 
the tax been held to be an "excise" or "nonproperty" tax it 
would have withstood the attack. Also of interest for com-
parative purposes is the decision of the Kansas court that an 
inheritance tax was a nonproperty tax.8 The constitutional 
amendment of 1932, expressly authorizing the imposition 
of an income tax, rendered moot any controversy concerning 
the nature of an income tax for purposes of the Kansas uni-
formity limitation.9 
6 State ex rei. Arn v. Cline, supra note 3. Also see the following cases in 
which local privilege taxes upon merchants were held to be excise taxes, and 
the rates reasonable classifications. The rates were graduated according to 
the average amount of stock, with the rate being a flat amount increasing 
within brackets of increasing amounts of stock. In re Martin, 62 Kan. 638, 
64Pac.43 (1901); Newtonv.Atchison, 31 Kan.151, 1 Pac. 288 (1883). 
7 Wheeler v. Weightman, 96 Kan. 50, 149 Pac. 977 ( 1915), discussed 
under Property Taxation, infra, text at notes 14-17, 25-29. 
8 State ex rei. Arn v. Cline, supra note 3. In State ex rei. Arn v. State 
Comm., supra note 4, the court held that Art. XI, §10, added in 1928 (see 
note 2, supra), was nothing more than a recognition of the legislative power 
existing before the section was adopted, and that probably its only purpose 
was to make that power express because of several challenges of such taxes. 
The classifications under the fuel tax were upheld, and the tax itself was 
held to be an excise tax. See the earlier case, State ex rei. Beck v. Board of 
Com'rs of Barton County, 142 Kan. 624, 51 P. 2d 33 (1935). Also, in 
City of Chanute v. State Comm. of Revenue & Taxation, 156 Kan. 538, 
134 P. 2d 672 ( 1943), the court held that the state sales tax was a non-
property tax and, therefore, not limited by the provision of Art. XI, §I 
which requires the exemption of municipal property. 
9 But see Hartman v. State Comm. of Revenue & Taxation, 164 Kan. 67, 
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( 1) Property taxation: generally 
The 1924 amendment of Art. XI, § 1, which incorporated 
an exception, changed in only a limited way the content of 
the basic uniformity clause. Therefore, the meaning of the 
basic uniformity clause as it developed before 1 924 will be 
described first. The special treatment provided for in the 
1924 amendment will then be analyzed to determine its ef-
fect on the general effective uniformity limitation. 
Except for an anomaly in 1949, the Kansas court has un-
failingly paid lip service to the formal rules derived from 
the property-tax uniformity limitation, although several 
cases have resulted in the "bending," if not the "breaking" 
of those rules. The court has held that Art. XI, §I does not 
contain a rule of universality, saying: 
While the constitution provides that certain property shall 
be exempt from taxation, it does not declare that other ex-
emptions may not be made, but does provide that property 
subject to taxation shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate. 
So it has been held that the enumerated exemptions must be 
made, but that more exemptions may be made by the legis-
lature.10 
187 P. 2d 939 (1947), in which the court indicated that its past decisions 
might stand for the proposition that an income tax is not a property tax. 
However, in light of Art. XI, §2, a decision on the matter was not necessary. 
10 Gunklev. Killingsworth, 118 Kan. 154,156,233 Pac. 803 (1925), 
emphasis added, upholding the exemption of rural-credit shares of building 
and loan associations from the general property tax. Also see: City of Harper 
v. Fink, 148 Kan. 278, 80 P. 2d 1080 (1938); Ritchie v. Ahlstedt, 105 
Kan. 739, 186 Pac. 131 (1919); State ex rei. Fatzer v. Board of Regents, 
167 Kan. 587,207 P. 2d 373 (1949); Sumner County v. Wellington, 66 
Kan. 590, 72 Pac. 216 (1903). In the following cases exemptions were 
found to be violations of the uniformity provisions: Alpha Tau Omega v. 
Board of Com'rs of Douglas County, 136 Kan. 67 5, 18 P. 2d 573 ( 1933); 
Graham v. Chautauqua County, 31 Kan. 473, 2 Pac. 549 (1884); Hamil-
ton v. Wilson, 61 Kan. 511, 59 Pac. 1069 (1900); Marion & M. Ry. Co. 
v. Champlin, 37 Kan. 682, 16 Pac. 222 (1887). 
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However, exemption of property other than that charac-
terized as exemptible in Art. XI, § 1 must not only meet a 
test of reasonable classification, but such exemptions must 
also be "in the public interest." The court has explained 
this in the following manner: 
The imposition of taxes upon selected classes of property to 
the exclusion of others, and the exemption of selected classes 
to the exclusion of others, constitute invidious discrimina-
tions which destroy uniformity. 
The exemption provision of the constitution is a qualifica-
tion of the rule of uniformity and equality. 
[ E] xemptions must rest on the definite basis of pro-
moting the public welfare in some peculiar and substantial 
way, and even they cannot be tolerated to the extent of 
building up large accumulations of favored property which 
would disturb general equality and uniformity.11 
It may be noted that this dual test of reasonable classifica-
tion plus "public interest" has in fact limited the Kansas 
legislature to the exemption of very little property other 
than that specifically enumerated in Art. XI, § 1.12 
A stricter rule governs the effective rates of property 
taxes. An absolute uniformity, whether in ratio of valuation 
or percentage rate, is required of the rate levied by any tax-
11 Wheeler v. Weightman, supra note 7 at 58, 59, 68. 
12 For example, a number of cases upholding exemptions concerned prop-
erty which might well have been within the enumerated classes of exempt-
ible property in Art. XI, § 1 except for a controversy over the meaning of 
the words "exclusively used for." As to municipal water works, see City of 
Harper v. Fink and Sumner County v. Wellington, supra note 10. But see 
the Gunkle case, supra note 1 0. 
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ing unit.13 Thus, in Wheeler v. Weightman,14 the 1915 
mortgage recording tax was held to be a property tax and a 
violation of Art. XI, § 1, one of the reasons being that the 
rate was not uniform as compared with the rate applied to 
all other property taxed by the state. Moreover, in that 
case the court found that the tax also violated the require-
ment that taxation of property must be by the ad valorem 
method.15 
13 As to ratio of valuation, see Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Atchison 
County, 54 Kan. 781,39 Pac. 1039 (1895). Railroad property had been 
assessed at I 00% of full value, while the rest of the property in the county 
was assessed at only 2 5% of full value. The court held that this violated 
the uniformity clause, Art. XI, §I, and that the railroad was entitled to an 
injunction as to the illegal excess. As to percentage rate, sec: Atchison 
T. &S. F. Ry. Co. v. Howe, 32 Kan. 737,5 Pac. 397 (1884-); Midland 
Elevator Co. v. Stewart, 50 Kan. 378, 32 Pac. 33 (1893); In re Page, 60 
Kan. 84-2, 58 Pac. 4-78 (1899). The court has ruled that a different 
method of valuation for different classes of property is not forbidden. First 
Nat. Bank v. Geary, I 02 Kan. 3 34-, 170 Pac. 3 3 ( 1918). Nor is the taxation 
of stock in a foreign corporation "double taxation" even though the corpora-
tion had considerable property located in the state which was subject to the 
general property tax. Hunt v. Allen, 82 Kan. 824-, 109 Pac. 106 (1910). 
14 96 Kan. 50, 14-9 Pac. 977 ( 1915). See note 16, infra. 
15 /d. at 77-78. Also see In re Page, supra note 13; State v. Cumiskey, 97 
Kan. 34-3, 155 Pac. 4-7 (1916). One of the early and leading cases is Hines 
v. Leavenworth, 3 Kan. 186 ( 1864-), in which the court held that certain 
assessments on realty were "special assessments" and therefore not within the 
scope of the uniformity limitation. Nevertheless, in an often quoted passage, 
the court interpreted the uniformity clause in these words (at p. 200): 
It will be observed that the constitution does not in terms require that 
the property in the State should be taxed according to its value, but it 
must be apparent to every one that such was the intention of the constitu-
tion makers. Taxes cannot be levied by an equal and uniform rate except 
upon the value. If so much were levied upon each acre, lot, horse, cow, 
sheep, note, bond, etc., the rate might be uniform, but it would be very 
unequal. [Emphasis added.] 
Apart from the general principle, one may well question whether the char-
acterization made in the Wheeler case, and discussed in the text, would 
stand today. The court was there concerned with the fact that the tax rate 
was to be applied to the value of the obligation secured, and it ruled that 
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In the Wheeler case the Kansas court made one of its 
strongest statements in support of the strict rules of uni-
formity derived from Art. XI, § 1, of the constitution, 16 
even though the court conceded that such might well be the 
reason for an ineffective tax structure.17 The court could 
only apply the constitution, no matter what the conse-
quences. However, the court has, at least on three other oc-
casions, been faced with the problem of applying the con-
stitution, no matter what the consequences. Those decisions 
are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the rules of 
uniformity as developed above. A pair of cases arose in 1877, 
Francis v. Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co.18 and Ottawa v. Nel-
son.19 
The Francis case concerned the validity of an act provid-
ing for the collection of the state general property tax rate 
on railroad property located in the unorganized counties of 
there was an absence of the necessary valuation by taxing officials. However, 
after the intangibles amendment, discussed infra, which relieved intangibles 
from the uniformity-in-rate requirement but not from the ad valorem re-
quirement, a similar tax was upheld in Citizens' Bank v. Tax Comm. of 
Kansas, 132 Kan. 5, 294- Pac. 94-0 (1931), and no question was raised as 
to the method of taxation. See text to note 53, infra. 
16 By Chapter 2 50 of the Laws of 191 5 the legislature provided that 
before any real estate mortgage could be recorded there had to be paid a 
"registration fee" of fifteen cents on each one hundred dollars of the 
principal debt or obligation secured by such mortgage. The payment of 
the fee exempted the mortgages from all other taxes, and the failure to pay 
the fee meant that the mortgage could not be enforced. The court held that 
the rate and method used violated the uniformity clause, the tax being char-
acterized as a property tax. The court also carefully scrutinized the in lieu 
feature, but did not pass upon it since it held that the tax was a property 
tax. Had the tax been held to be an excise tax, the court indicated that it 
had serious doubt as to the validity of the exemption proviso, suggesting 
that no public interest would be served. !d. at 68-69. 
17 See the text at note 27, infra. 
18 19 Kan. 303 (1877). 
19 19Kan.234 (1877). 
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the state. The taxpayer (a railroad having property in such 
counties) challenged the validity of the tax. It was admitted 
that the machinery for all ordinary assessments was in the 
county organization, and consequently in unorganized coun-
ties the machinery was wanting and all property therein 
escaped taxation. This inadequacy was remedied only as to 
railroad property. State assessment was provided for such 
property. The taxpayer contended that this arrangement 
violated the rule that a tax to be valid must be levied upon 
all the property in the taxing district. The act was upheld, 
but with some doctrinal difficulty on the part of the court, 
which expressed its quandary in the following manner: 
The question is a difficult one. A negative answer [i.e., that the 
act was constitutional] seems to conflict with the general idea 
of uniformity, which common justice as well as the general 
understanding of both legislatures and courts places as the 
foundation of all valid taxation. But an affirmative answer 
if carried to its logical result produces an effect so startling, 
and so fatal to all taxation from the commencement of our 
state history, as to compel the clearest conviction of its truth 
before it can be given.20 
The court recognized that all would admit that taxation 
must be equal and uniform; nevertheless, "this general 
proposition has some limitations." The court then looked at 
the "facts," namely, since the admission of the state there 
had always been unorganized counties within the borders, 
and never had property therein been made subject to taxa-
tion for support of state government. The court questioned 
whether such a failure invalidated the state tax for all those 
years. Such a proposition and its implications (for example, 
its effect upon the validity of all titles which were founded 
upon tax proceedings during those years) were not to be ac-
20 Francis v. Atchinson T. & S.F.R. Co., supra note 18 at 308. 
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cepted without a battle. So, the struggle ensued.21 After ap-
proaching its dilemma from several directions the court con-
cluded that, indeed, "underlying all valid taxation rests 
the principle of uniformity .... " Nevertheless, the court 
felt it could not ignore reality, for 
. . . in practical operation, a general rule or principle is 
often limited by some other general rule or principle, or by 
the facts and conditions under which its application is in-
voked. And sometimes it happens that a general rule is given 
its truest and most thorough enforcement by an apparent 
disregard in minor and temporary matters of its mandates.22 
Applying this approach to the facts at hand, the court rea-
soned: 
Thus it may be that uniformity in the burden of taxation, 
will be secured in the truest and best sense by not attempting 
to extend the machinery of taxation into unorganized coun-
ties where the expense of the machinery may exceed the 
proceeds of the tax; and this being so, the principle of uni-
formity is in no just sense overthrown or disregarded by 
leaving the property in those counties untaxed. In a limited 
sense, it may be said, that there is a disregard of the obliga-
tions of uniformity because there is no attempt to reach all 
property; but in a higher and better sense, it is clear that 
there is secured an equality and uniformity in the burden of 
taxation. The spirit is present, though the letter may be 
wanting.23 
Having been touched by the spirit, the court eventually held 
21 /d. Before proceeding, the court salved its judicial conscience by say-
ing {atp. 309): 
It is doubtless true, that results do not change rules, and that conse-
quences may not be invoked to overthrow established principles, and that 
courts may not disregard plain constitutional requirements to save from 
the injurious effects of illegal legislative action. 
22 !d. at 314-. Emphasis added. 
23 !d. at 314--315. Emphasis added. 
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the act in question to be valid, although not without some 
uneasmess. 
The conclusions which we have reached are by no means en-
tirely satisfactory to us. We hold the section to be constitu-
tional and valid, not because it is clear to us that it is so, but 
because it is not clear to us that it is not. And the benefit of 
the doubt must be given to the law.24 
The court at a later date, in 1915, when deciding Wheeler 
v. W eightman/5 made a lengthy review of the uniformity 
cases to that date. The Francis case was noted. However, 
"Little assistance in the elucidation of the constitution" was 
afforded by that decision.26 Now, one might not be disposed 
to criticize the result of the Francis case, certainly not this 
writer. Indeed, some sympathy is felt. But what of "the 
facts and conditions under which [the mortgage tax's] ap-
plication [was] invoked?" The opinion in the Wheeler case 
included the following answer: 
It is a matter of common know ledge and regret that the 
effort to assess and tax real-estate mortgages on the ad val-
orem plan as a part of the general property of the state has 
been neither satisfactory nor successful. The method is rep-
robated as involving double taxation. To what extent this 
criticism is economically sound is not now material. The 
prejudice created by the double-taxation argument against 
the method is widespread and deepseated. It is certain that 
the method is productive of shameful tax evasion .... It is 
estimated that the holdings of securities of this character by 
residents of Kansas are four times the amount listed, but the 
resources of the tax collecting officials for uncovering such 
holdings appear to be substantially exhausted . . . [the 
high per cent of income taken by taxing such mortgages at 
the general property tax rate was referred to]. . . . The 
24 I d. at 316. Emphasis added. 
25 Supra note 14. See text at notes 14-1 7, supra. 
26 !d. at 62. 
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result is inequality greater than should result from the ad-
ministration of a fair and just system .... 
The struggle for tax reform in this state is an interesting 
story which need not be told here. It has long been recog-
nized that the constitution provision [requiring uniformity] 
has outlived its usefulness, and, as outlived restraints usually 
do, now bars the pathway to the establishment of an equita-
ble system of taxation adequate to the present economic 
needs of the state. 21 
However, the court was not sitting to express an "opinion 
regarding the soundness of the policy [behind the mortgage 
recording tax] because it has no legal concern with the wis-
dom or unwisdom of legislative policies."28 The court would 
not ignore "reality"-the tax was a property tax,29 and as 
27 /d. at 51-52. Emphasis added. 
2 8 !d. at 74. But note the following statement by the court, at p. 68, 
made in reference to the exemption scheme of the mortgage tax: 
••. it is quite unlikely that any great reservoir of capital, whose move-
ments are controlled by economic forces and conditions not merely na-
tional but international in character and extent, would be drained into 
local real-estate mortgage basins by tinkering with local tax laws. So say 
careful investigators and economists of high qualification and repute. But 
the legislature may be of a different opinion. It may entertain a belief 
that its acts will in some way find exemption from the natural laws gov-
erning the business world and will be attended by tmusually propitious 
consequences. It may believe that by a simple exemption statute it can cor-
rect a crying evil of our system of taxation and at the same time solve for 
this state the problem of rural credits which is now engaging the earnest 
attention of statesmen and publicists throughout the United States, in-
cluding those states which now have mortgage exemption and mortgage 
registration fee laws. Who has knowledge that the scheme is wholly 
chimerical? [Emphasis added.] 
29 The court saying, id. at 74: 
The method . . . is the method of the property tax. The only marked 
difference between the statutes of the states referred to and the Kansas 
statute, barring matters of detail, is that in the latter the soothing term 
"registration fee" is used instead of the rude word "tax." The voice is 
the voice of crafty Jacob, but the hands are the hands of hairy Esau, and 
the court declines to be deceived by a name when it knows what every-
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such had to conform to the requirements of uniformity, 
which it did not. Here, again, "the spirit was present"-
though perhaps a spirit of a different sort-and certainly 
"the letter was wanting." 
What purpose has been served by the preceding compari-
son? Certainly no attempt has been made to show that one 
decision was more "right" than the other. That would 
serve little purpose for this study. However, the two cases 
should illustrate the difficulties which are faced when a 
court attempts to apply the strict property-tax uniformity 
limitation. Of more importance, they should illustrate the 
selective process used by the court of one state. In one in-
stance "the facts and conditions under which the uniformity 
clause's application was invoked" led to a struggle to uphold 
legislative action even at the risk of sacrificing "letter" for 
"spirit," in order that a practical effort might be made to 
provide, at least, a workable tax structure. Perhaps the 
"facts and conditions" in the Wheeler case did not warrant 
such an effort as was made in the Francis case. Perhaps the 
legislative action was too blatantly in violation of the uni-
formity requirement. Or perhaps the Wheeler case indicates 
that the Francis approach has been quietly shelved, and that 
the court will not engage in such a selective process; the 
constitution shall mean what the words say, not what the 
court says! Before reaching that conclusion, "let's look at 
the record" again. 
In 1949, the court decided Associated Ry. Equipment 
Owners v. Wilson. 30 One issue concerned the validity of the 
one else knows, that the statute embodies a method now becoming com-
mon of taxing real-estate mortgages. 
It appears that all taxes looked upon with disfavor by Justice Burch, the 
writer of the opinion, are "the hands of hairy Esau." See Stevenson v. 
Metzker, infra note 51, with appropriate comment in the dissenting opin-
ion by Justice Harvey. 
30 167 Kan. 608, 208 P. Zd 604 (1949). 
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statutory provisions whereby private car companies are re-
quired to pay annually for each current year a sum, "in the 
nature of a tax," of two and one-half per cent upon the total 
gross earnings received from all sources by reason of the use 
or operation of their cars within the state of Kansas. The tax 
is in lieu of all other state taxes upon the property of such or-
ganizations. 31 However, it is the "declared intention" of the 
legislature that the tax imposed "be not greater than the 
amount of tax such orgaizations would pay if their cars were 
taxed on an ad valorem basis .... " In order to accomplish 
this intent, further provisions are made for the filing of a 
complaint with the Commission of Revenue and Taxation 
concerning the correctness of the rate used or the amount of 
tax imposed. Upon the hearing of such a complaint, it be-
comes the duty of the Commission to raise or lower the rate 
specified in order to make the amount of tax due equivalent 
to such ad valorem tax. 32 The court stated that the first ques-
tion was "the constitutional validity of the act"33 under both 
the federal and state constitutions. The court provided some 
rather amazing reasons for finding that the tax did not vio-
late the uniformity clause in Art. XI, § 1. The court's own 
words are: 
It is safe to say the equal protection clause of the federal 
constitution and state constitutional provisions pertaining to 
equality and uniformity of taxation are substantially similar 
and that, in general, what violates one will contravene the 
other and vice versa. (51 Am. Jur., Taxation, §169.) At any 
rate no distinction is apparent with respect to any matter 
31 /d. at 61 0. 
32 Kan. Gen. Stat. §79-911 a, quoted id. at 616. 
33 Associated Ry. Equipment Owners v. Wilson, supra note 30 at 615. 
It is said, at 617, that "Appellants [taxpayer] •.. contend the entire act 
is invalid for the reason it contravenes the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the federal constitution and article II, section I, of 
our state constitution which require a uniform and equal rate of assessment 
and taxation except as to property not here involved." 
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raised here and the two complaints will be considered to-
gether.84 
Having stated the guiding "principle," the court applied it 
to the facts. The court rejected the contention that the clas-
sification in question was based on "ownership" of property. 
On the contrary, the classification was said to be based on the 
"use or operation" of the equipment within the state. The 
court left no doubt as to the nature of the tax involved-it 
was a property tax, and the classification was of property. 
In reality it is not a tax on the gross receipts accruing from 
the use and operation of the machinery. It is a tax on the 
property itself. The tax on the property is merely measured 
by a percentage of the gross earnings received from the use 
and operation of the property within the state. It is actually 
a lieu tax placed on the property in the absence of the physi-
cal property for assessment purposes. In order, however, 
that the tax should be equal and uniform the legislature 
stated it to be its intention" ... that the tax herein imposed 
be not greater than the amount of tax such organization 
would pay if their cars were taxed on an ad valorem basis. 
na5 
Furthermore, the court looked to the "reality" of the situa-
tion-reminiscent of the court's attitude in the Francis opin-
ion-and pointed out that the rolling stock of these com-
panies never came to rest within any particular county in 
the state so that it might be assessed. "Absent some method 
of this nature for taxing such property it could not be taxed 
at all."36 
84 /d. at 617, emphasis added. The quote in the text follows the quote 
set forth in note 3 3, supra. In one place the court refers at the same time to 
the due process clause and the equal protection clause. Probably a slip of the 
pen. The due process clause is of no concern in a discussion of the equality 
issue. 
85 /d. at 618. Emphasis added. 
36 Ibid. 
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To buttress its dubious general proposition the court noted 
that not only had the need for similar legislation been recog-
nized, enacted, and upheld "in other states with substantially 
the same constitutional provisions" where it was subjected 
to the same contentions as those advanced here by the tax-
payers, but that each of such contentions had been laid at 
rest in one or more of the decisions cited in the opinion. Un-
fortunately for the persuasiveness of the Associated opinion, 
some of the several decisions cited were decided with refer-
ence to state constitutions expressly sanctioning the classifica-
tion of property for effective rates/7 while others were 
37 Two cases concerned such a tax imposed by California. People v. Keith 
Ry. Equipment Co., 70 Cal. App. 2d 339, 161 P.2d 244 (1945), and 
Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 185 Cal. 484, 197 P. 346 (! 922), id., 261 
U.S. 330,43 S. Ct. 366 (1922). As shown in the California study (Part B 
of this chapter, supra), the constitutional uniformity structure in that state 
was amended expressly to permit the classification of some property for pur-
poses of taxation, and the type of tax under consideration was imposed after 
the amendment. In the Keith case a second issue concerned the federal equal 
protection clause, and in the Pullman Co. case, in fact, the only issues raised 
were federal questions: namely, whether the tax was a violation of the com-
merce clause, and whether the tax violated the territorial j urisdictionallimi-
tation derived from the federal due process clause. A third case concerned 
such a tax imposed by Minnesota. Almer Ry. Equipment Co. v. Commis-
sioner of Taxation, 213 Minn. 62, 5 N .W. 2d 63 7 ( 1942). As the discussion 
of the Minnesota limitation shows (Part G of this chapter, infra), the type 
of tax in question is expressly provided for by a special constitutional pro-
vision, and an amendment in 1906 permits the classification of property for 
purposes of taxation. The Almer Ry. case also raised a federal question con-
cerning the territorial limitation derived from the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. A fourth case concerned a tax imposed by Missouri. 
Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U.S. 339, 12 S. Ct. 250 (1891). The 
primary issues were federal questions: the commerce clause and the federal 
equal protection clause. However, the United States Supreme Court also 
ruled that the tax did not violate the state uniformity clause. This ruling 
departed from Missouri decisions (Part G of this chapter, infra) which 
had interpreted the then existing uniformity clause to require absolute uni-
formity. Interestingly enough, the United States Supreme Court equated 
the state limitation to the federal equal protection clause and indicated that 
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United States Supreme Court opinions concerning the va-
lidity of state taxes under the commerce and equal protec-
tion clauses of the federal Constitution.38 Nevertheless, the 
court confidently summed up as follows: 
All property within the classification of the statute is taxed 
equally and uniformly under the statute. This meets all con-
stitutional requirements if the classification is a reasonable 
one for tax purposes. (People v. Keith Railway Equipment 
Co., supra.p9 
The Keith case, cited in the quotation (and the only case 
cited as authority for the conclusion), is one of the cases re-
ferred to above, and it was decided by a California inter-
mediate appellate court which approved a classification un-
der the California constitutional provisions which expressly 
only arbitrary classification was prohibited; but there was not a single refer-
ence to Missouri decisions interpreting this state constitutional provision. In 
other words, the Seibert decision was no authority for sustaining such a tax 
under the then existing strict uniformity clause in the Missouri Constitu-
tion. The Missouri study indicates that the Kansas court could find no 
comfort for its Associated Ry. Equipment Owners decision by reference to 
Missouri taxes. 
38 Two cases, Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minn., 246 U.S. 450, 38 S. Ct. 
373 (1917) and United States Express Company v. Minn., 223 U.S. 335, 
32 S. Ct. 211 ( 1911), concerned the validity of a Minnesota tax under the 
federal commerce clause. One case, People v. Keith Ry. Equipment Co., 
supra note 37, concerned the validity of a California tax under the federal 
equal protection clause, and one case, Pullman Co. v. Richardson, supra 
note 37, concerned the validity of a California tax under both the federal 
commerce clause and due process clause (territorial jurisdiction). One case, 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. State of Indiana, 165 U.S. 304, 17 S. Ct. 345 
( 1897), concerned the validity of an Indiana tax under both the federal 
equal protection clause and due process clause (territorial jurisdiction). 
39 I d. at 61 8. Emphasis added. The court further stated at 619: 
The fact railroad property generally is not assessed at the same rate does 
not render the instant act invalid. The entire property of railroads is 
assessed in one manner while other property may be assessed in another 
manner and be valid. 
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provide for the classification of certain property for purposes 
of taxation.40 
One may well wonder just how much "assistance in the 
elucidation of the constitution" is afforded by the Associated 
Railway Equipment Owners case. The opinion leaves no 
doubt that the court found the tax to be a tax upon property. 
Some slight suggestion is made that one provision in the tax 
might have offered at least some support for reconciling the 
tax with the prior judicial development of the meaning of 
the uniformity limitation in Kansas. This, of course, refers 
to that provision stipulating that if some objection is raised 
by the taxpayer, the tax should not be greater than the 
amount of a tax which would be paid on the property in-
volved if it were taxed at the general property tax rate. 
However, there was no real reliance on this approach, and 
the court never even partially developed its possibilities. 
Essentially, the court relied on the proposition that "All 
property within the classification of the statute is taxed 
equally and uniformly under the statute" and that nothing 
else is required by Art. XI, § 1. Also the court found that the 
base of the tax was "merely" gross earnings rather than 
"value." Further comment on the future influence of this 
anomalous case will be delayed until after a discussion of the 
constitutional changes made in 1924. Then the opinion by 
Justice Wedell in the 1949 Associated Railway Equipment 
Owners case can be evaluated along with the opinion by the 
same Justice Wedell in Hunt v. Eddy, a case decided in 1929 
and of considerable importance in interpreting the 1924 "in-
tangible amendment" to the uniformity clause in Art. XI, 
§1. 
( 2) Tax at ion of "intangibles" since 19 2 4 
The 1 924 amendment to the uniformity clause in Art. XI, 
40 See Part B of this chapter, supra. 
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§ 1, inserted the following proviso: "except that mineral 
products, money, mortgages, notes and other evidence of 
debt may be classified and taxed uniformly as to class as the 
legislature shall provide." Two problems are raised by this 
amendment. First, precisely what property is included 
within the scope of the proviso? "Mineral products" and 
"intangibles?" Or, does the enumeration of "money, mort-
gages, notes and other evidence of debt" indicate that there 
remain some intangibles beyond the effect of this liberalizing 
amendment? Second, to what degree has the strict uniform-
ity requirement applicable to property taxation in general 
been liberalized in its application to the taxation of the 
enumerated classes of property? 
In 1925, immediately after the amendment, the legisla-
ture made use of its new power in two ways. It passed a 
mortgage registration tax law41 providing that real-estate 
mortgages could not be received and filed for record until 
the payment of a fee of 25 cents per $100 of the principal 
debt was made. On payment of the fee, the mortgage and 
the note secured by it could not thereafter be otherwise 
taxed. The constitutionality of this tax was established in 
Citizens Bank v. Tax Comm. of Kansas/2 decided in 1931. 
It was contended that the law violated the constitutional re-
quirement of uniform taxation of classes embodied in the 
1924 proviso, in that the law discriminated against unre-
corded real-estate mortgages, mortgages on personal prop-
erty, and mortgages on land and personal property in other 
states held by residents of Kansas. This contention was re-
jected as "unsound," the court saying: 
The plain reading of the amended statute is that mineral 
products may be classified by placing oil in one class, coal in 
4l Kan. Laws, 192 5, c. 2 7 4-; Kan. Gen. Stat., c. 79, Art. 31. 
42 132 Kan. 5, 294- Pac. 94-0 (1931). The more important issue con-
cerned the "money and credits" tax. See text at note 53, infro. 
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another, and lead and zinc in another; and so with other 
classifiable things, including mortgages. . . . 
So mortgages may be classified for purpose of taxation if 
there is fair basis for classification. 43 
Thus, the segregation from the larger class of mortgages in 
general of recorded real-estate mortgages on realty located in 
Kansas was said to be a reasonable classification. This mort-
gage registration tax is still in force in Kansas, in substan-
tially the same form. Moreover, other than the case already 
discussed, there has been no real controversy as to its con-
stitutionality under the amended Art. XI, § 1. 
To the contrary, the companion measure enacted by the 
legislature in 1925 has been the source of the utmost con-
fusion and controversy. This companion measure placed a 
low rate tax on "intangibles." The main controversy con-
cerned whether all intangibles, including stock, were in-
cluded in the tax, and secondly, if they were, whether this 
was permitted under the amended Art. XI, § 1. In the com-
panion measure, the legislature imposed an annual low rate 
tax on "money" and "credits," to be in lieu of all other taxes 
upon such property.44 The catalyst for the inevitable conflict 
was the decision of a federal district court in February, 
1927.45 That court held that it would be a violation of the 
controlling federal statute, section 5219, to apply the higher 
general property tax rate to shares of national bank stock if 
moneyed capital coming in competition with such bank 
shares were taxed at the lower "money and credits" rate.46 
43 /d. at 8-9. 
44 Kan. Laws 1925, c. 277, c. 278. By Kan. Laws 1927, c. 326, the rate 
was raised from 20 mills to S mills. The tax was repealed by Kan. Laws 
1930, c. 18, and reenacted by Kan. Laws 1931, c. 311, c. 312. 
45 Central National Bank v. McFarland, 20 F. 2d 416 (1927). 
46 State taxation of national bank shares is a federal statutory problem 
because 
National banks are not merely private moneyed institutions but agencies 
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Thus, shares of stock in national banks could only be taxed 
at the lower rate. 
A direct result of the above decision was the case of V oran 
v. W right.41 The legislature had so defined "credits" to ex-
clude shares of stock in either state or national banks.48 A 
stockholder in a state bank brought an action to compel the 
of the United States created under its laws to promote its fiscal policies; 
and hence the banks, their property and their shares cannot be taxed 
under state authority except as Congress consents and then only in con-
formity with the restrictions attached to its consent. 
First National Bank of Guthrie Center v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 341, 347, 
46 S. Ct. 13 5 ( 1926), as quoted in First National Bank of Hartford v. City 
of Hartford, 273 U.S. 548, 550,47 S. Ct. 462 (1927). Congress has pro-
vided for such taxation in the familiar "Section 5 219," which is now 
embodied in 12 U.S.C.A. §548. Generally on the problems involved in state 
taxation of national bank shares, see Woosley, State Taxation of Banks 
(1935). Also see Lutz, "The Evolution of Section 5219," Bul. N.T.A., 
XIII, 20 5-212; Ford, Taxation of Intangibles in Michigan, Univ. of Mich., 
Michigan Governmental Studies, No.2 (1939), pp. 127-135. 
47 129 Kan. I, 281 Pac. 938 (1929), rehearing, 129 Kan. 601, 284 
Pac. 807 (1930). 
48 Kan. Laws I 92 7, c. 3 26, §I of which read, in part: 
The term "credits" shall mean and include notes, mortgages, foreign 
stocks, bonds, annuities, royalties, contracts, copyrights, claims secured by 
deeds and every liquidated claim and demand for money, shares of stock 
in building and loan associations, other than permanent stock, or other 
valuable thing, except notes or obligations secured by mortgages on real 
estate, which mortgages have been recorded in this state, and registration 
fee or tax paid thereon, and shares of stock upon which taxes are other-
wise payable under the laws of this state: Provided, That nothing in this 
act shall be construed to apply to money or credits, as herein defined, be-
longing to persons, partnerships, associations or corporations, the taxation 
of which is otherwise provided for by law, or to any national banking as-
sociation, or the stock thereof, or to moneyed capital in the hands of 
individual citizens of this state coming into competition with the busi-
ness of national banks: Provided further, That bonds, notes or other evi-
dences of indebtedness in the hands of individual citizens not employed 
or engaged in the banking, loan or investment business and representing 
merely personal investments, not made in competition with the business 
of national banks, shall not be deemed such moneyed capital. 
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acceptance of a tender of an amount due for taxes on state 
bank shares computed at the "money and credits" rate in-
stead of the higher general property tax rate. The decision, 
at least, is clear enough. The court held that state bank 
shares could only be taxed at the lower "money and credits" 
rate. In effect, the rationale was this: National bank shares 
could not be taxed at the higher rate, and to distinguish be-
tween items of property on the basis of "ownership" was 
not permissible.49 Thus, state bank shares had to be taxed at 
the same rate as that applicable to national bank shares. 
Otherwise, the "uniform within classes" requirement in the 
amended Art. XI, § 1 would have been violated. There was 
no clear explanation of just how bank shares were to be 
taxed as "credits." 
It was on this point that Justice Harvey dissented. He 
too agreed that national bank shares could only be taxed at 
the lower rate, and that to tax state bank shares at a higher 
rate would be discriminatory. However, it was his opinion 
that bank shares were not "evidence of debt" and therefore 
were not classifiable under the 1924 amendment to Art. XI, 
§ 1. Thus, since state bank shares could only be taxed at the 
lower rate, it would follow that all property in the state 
could only be taxed at the lower rate, otherwise the basic 
uniformity clause would be violated. In other words, only 
"money, notes, mortgages and other evidence of debt" are 
classifiable under the amended uniformity provision. If 
bank shares are not "evidence of debt," then they are a part 
of the mass of property which may be reached only by an 
absolutely uniform rate. If bank shares are taxable only at 
49 Voran v. Wright, supra note 47. Overruling to the extent that it might 
be contrary to the proposition in the text: Davis-Wellcome Mtg. Co. v. 
Haynes, 119 Kan. I, 2 3 7 Pac. 918 ( 192 5), in which a distinction between 
money and "credits" owned by domestic corporations and manufacturing 
merchants and the same money and "credits" owned by others was sustained. 
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the lower rate, then all property could be taxed only to that 
extent. Go 
This fundamental issue of uniformity, as posed by Justice 
Harvey in his V oran case dissent, was raised more clearly in 
Stevenson v. Metsker,~1 decided in 1930. Here the plaintiff 
taxpayer was the owner of real estate, and he sought manda-
mus to compel the acceptance of a sum of money sufficient 
to discharge the taxes due on such real estate if computed at 
the "money and credits" tax rate rather than the higher 
general property tax. The basis of the taxpayer's claim was 
that state bank shares were taxable, since the V oran case, at 
the lower "money and credits" rate; that shares of bank 
stock were not property falling within any of the classes 
50 Justice Harvey recognized the practical consequences of the view which 
he held. As he succinctly summed up, id. at 623: 
... Under our present constitution and statutes, and giving force to 
the federal statute (Rev. Stat. 5219), as we must do, we cannot have a 
valid tax . . . on any property in the state at a rate greater than that 
which can be lawfully made on the shares of stock of national banks. This, 
as we have heretofore seen, is measured by the rate provided by our stat-
utes for the taxation of moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens 
of the state which comes into competition with the business of national 
banks, none of which is taxed at more than the intangible tax rate of 
50 cents per $100 valuation. We all know, of course, that if no property 
in the state can be lawfully taxed at more than 50 cents per $1 00 valua-
tion, the functions, not only of the state but of every subdivision of it, 
supported in the main by our general-property tax, will be seriously im-
paired. 
How can this situation be remedied? Broadly speaking, it may be 
done in any of three ways: By (I) changing the federal statute . • • ; 
(2) changing our constitution (§1, art. 11), or our [tax] statutes .•• ; 
or (3) raising the additional necessary funds by methods other than a 
direct tax on property. Which changes, or combination of them, should 
be used involves the consideration of questions of economics and state-
craft. To determine what should be done comes within the functions of 
the executive and legislative branches of our government rather than the 
judicial. 
51 130 Kan. 251,286 Pac. 673 (1930). 
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mentioned in the amended Art. XI, §1 and, therefore, un-
less all property was taxed at the same rate as that applied 
to bank shares, the uniformity clause of Art. XI, § 1 would 
be violated. The majority, in denying the taxpayer's claim, 
never really held that bank shares were "evidence of debt," 
but, in effect, ruled that "in reality" the taxation of such 
shares was the taxation of the "assets" of the banks which 
were, in turn, made up of substantially the "credits" enu-
merated in the tax law. Therefore, it was not a violation of 
the general uniformity clause to tax such shares at a lower 
rate than other property, i.e., realty. Again Justice Harvey 
dissented, and for the same reasons.52 The position of the 
Voran and Stevenson cases was reaffirmed one year later in 
Citizens Bank v. Tax Comm. of Kansas,53 and Justice Har-
vey still dissented. 
So the matter stood until 1939, although the "money and 
credits" tax had been repealed in 1930 and reenacted in 
1931. Then in 1939, the legislature amended the definition 
of "money and credits" so as to leave no doubt that all types 
of shares of stock were to be taxed at the lower rate. Further-
more, such shares were defined in such a manner to be in-
52 ld. at 262-290. Justice Harvey emphasized the pressure under which 
the decision was made, and the undue speed, in his opinion, with which a 
decision was reached. He also noted that the Central National Bank case 
(supra note 4-5), the appointment, work, and report of a tax commission, 
and the decision in the Voran case (supra note 4-7), all brought about a 
special session of the legislature, which was in progress when the Stevenson 
action was brought and determined. "Opposing influential political and 
financial groups, apparently almost equal in legislative strength, were con-
tending over pending legislative measures. It is no secret that this action 
was hurriedly brought and an early decision sought with the view of having 
the ruling of this court influence pending legislation. This accounts largely 
for the speed in the presentation and disposition of the case." In a detailed 
dissenting opinion, Justice Harvey meets the majority opinion point for 
point. 
63 Supra note 1 5. 
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eluded within the term "notes and other evidence of debt."n• 
Thus, the issue was squarely presented and faced in Hunt 
v. Eddy/5 decided in 1939. The court held that shares of 
stock in corporations were taxable at the "intangibles" rate, 
and that such shares of stock were "evidence of debt." The 
majority opinion of Justice Wedell stressed what was termed 
a "non-legalistic" interpretation of the meaning of the words 
in the amended Art. XI, § 1 of the constitution. The court 
"readily concede [ d] that according to the processes of re-
fined judicial research an ordinary certificate of stock is not 
technically an 'evidence of debt,' but rather a certificate evi-
dencing the ownership of unit of a corporate entity." But, 
discarding such a strictly technical and legalistic meaning of 
the "words," the court sought "the common understanding, 
the true intention, of the people at the time they adopted 
the constitutional provision." And "a majority of this court 
[was] not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the man 
on the street, the lay mind, did not regard a 'certificate evi-
dencing shares of stock' as an 'evidence of debt.' " 56 The ma-
jority also stressed the continual use of the term "intangi-
bles" to characterize both the amendment to Art. XI, § 1, and 
the "money and credits" tax. They were generally referred 
54 The following italicized words were added to Kan. Gen. Stat. §79-
3108: 
The term "notes and other evidences of debt" shall include and mean 
certificates evidencing shares of stock otherwise taxable to the owner or 
holder . ••• 
55 150 Kan. 1, 90 P. 2d 747 (1939). Plaintiff brought a mandamus 
proceeding to compel the county assessor to tax five shares of corporate 
common stock owned and listed for taxation by him at the intangible rate, 
rather than at the ad valorem rate applied by the defendant. Defendant 
contended that the amendment to the tax statute, bringing shares of stock 
within the meaning of "notes and other evidences of debt," was unconstitu-
tional. 
MJd. at 10-11. To the extent that the prior decision, Ryan v. Tax 
Comm. of Kansas, 132 Kan. 1, 294 Pac. 938 (1931), might conflict with 
this ruling, the views expressed in the Hunt case were said to be controlling. 
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to as the "intangibles amendment" and the "intangibles 
tax."57 Again Justice Harvey dissented, this time gaining an 
adherent (Justice Thiele) from the new members of the 
court. 58 
One thing seems to be certain after the Hunt case. The 
amendment to Art. XI, § 1 regardless of its phraseology, is 
now in fact an "intangibles" amendment, and intangibles in 
general may be classified by the Kansas legislature under the 
amended uniformity provision. This brief survey of a really 
difficult problem hardly does justice to the complex way in 
which it developed. However, the summary treatment is 
justified since it delineates the problem to the extent neces-
sary for this comparative study of uniformity clauses found 
among the several states. A more critical evaluation of the 
manner in which the court made this inclusive interpretation 
of the words of the amendment to Art. XI, § 1 is entirely 
possible, and would undoubtedly be of considerable value. 
However, the limitations of space and strict relevancy rule 
out such an evaluation here. 
( 3) Property taxation: summary 
In summary, it can be seen that the taxation of all prop-
erty, except intangible property, is governed by a strict re-
quirement of absolute uniformity in effective rates and the 
ad valorem method. However, only a "semi" requirement 
of universality is found. The requirement of "public inter-
est" has in fact limited the power of the legislature to ex-
empt property to substantially that property listed as ex-
emptible in the constitution, Art. XI, § 1. As for intangible 
property, only the strictness of the requirement of absolute 
GT Jd. at 6-10. 
GB Justice Hoch concurred only in the result, preferring to rely solely on 
the rationale of the Voran and Stevenson cases, namely, that the taxation of 
shares was in effect the taxation of the assets. I d. at 14. 
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uniformity in effective rates has been relaxed. Such property 
may be classified for the purpose of applying different rates. 
This leaves aside, of course, any possible change in the 
effective uniformity limitation which might be derived from 
the 1949 case, Associated Railway Equipment Owners v. 
Wilson. Has that decision in fact reversed the interpretation 
formerly given the basic uniformity clause in Art. XI, § 1 
so that property in general may now be classified for rates, 
and so that the general property tax may have a base of "in-
come produced" rather than "value?" One is hardly 
warranted is reaching such a conclusion. In all probability 
the Associated case must simply stand as an anomaly. It does, 
however, raise some interesting questions. What happened 
to the dissenting justices in Hunt v. Eddy, decided in 1939, 
just ten years before Associated? Justice Harvey, who so 
vigorously fought the extensive interpretation given the "in-
tangibles" amendment of Art. XI, § 1 and so forcefully 
stated the strict uniformity limitation, was still on the bench 
when Associated was decided, but he did not participate in 
the opinion. Justice Thiele, who joined Justice Harvey in 
the Hunt dissent, was also still on the bench when Associ-
ated was decided. However, he registered no dissent in As-
sociated, voting with the unanimous majority. Certainly the 
Associated case aptly illustrates the manner in which these 
very strict uniformity limitations have caused great difficulty 
for the courts, and how at times the limitation is simply 
ignored. Kansas stands as a state having a strict uniformity 
requirement for property, other than intangible property. 
However, that requirement has at times been relaxed on the 
basis of subjective value judgments made by the court, or a 
majority thereof. The Associated case offers little help in 
predicting when in the future the Kansas court will see fit 
to ignore the strict and inflexible degree of uniformity which 
it has said is required by the constitution. Perhaps it simply 
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aids to the extent of indicating that at times such a relaxa-
tion is possible. ~9 
4. Nevada 
Nevada has had but a single constitution, that of 1864. 
The uniformity clause is found in Art. X, § 1, which was 
amended in 1942 to provide for the mandatory exemption 
of representative intangible property. Section 1 now reads 
(with those words added in 1942 in italics) : 
The legislature shall provide by law for a uniform and 
equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe 
such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation 
of all property, real, personal and possessory, except mines 
and mining claims, when not patented, the proceeds alone of 
which shall be assessed and taxed . . . ; shares of stock (ex-
cept shares of stock in banking corporations), bonds, mort-
gages, notes, bank deposits, book accounts and credits, and 
securities and chases in action of like character are deemed 
to represent interest in property already assessed and taxed, 
either in Nevada or elsewhere, and shall be exempt. No in-
heritance or estate tax shall ever be levied, and there shall 
also be excepted such property as may be exempted by law 
for municipal, educational, literary, scientific or other pur-
poses.1 
59 It is not inappropriate to raise a query at this point concerning the va-
lidity of the grain handling tax. The tax is clearly correlated with the ad valo-
rem property tax. The statute purports to levy an occupation tax, and is levied 
upon dealers at the rate of ~ mill per bushel upon all grain received during 
the preceding calendar year whether or not such grain is owned by the 
dealer. Producers pay a tax at the rate of ~ mill per bushel upon all grain 
over and above 1,000 bushels harvested in the state. The grain is thereafter 
exempted from property taxation. Kan. Gen. Stat. §§79-3901-79-3910. 
1 The omitted part of Art. X, §1 deals with the manner in which 
patented mines and mining claims shall be taxed. Such patented property is 
to be assessed at not Jess than $500, except where $100 in labor has been 
actually performed on such property during the year, in addition to the tax 
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The only other provision of interest is Art. VIII, §2, which 
provides that all property of corporations "shall be subject 
to taxation the same as property of individuals; provided, 
that the property of corporations formed for municipal, 
charitable, religious, or educational purposes may be ex-
empted by law." 
Nonproperty taxes, as contrasted to property taxes, are 
not limited by the uniformity clause in Art. X, § 1 and are 
only required to be uniform within classes.2 There have been 
no cases in Nevada concerning the nature of certain contro-
versial taxes, which is understandable in light of the limited 
scope of the Nevada tax structure. No income tax has ever 
been imposed, nor are there any express constitutional pro-
visions concerning such a tax. An inheritance tax is now pro-
hibited by the 1942 amendment to Art. X, § 1 and while 
Nevada did at one time have such a tax, it was repealed in 
1925 and no questions appear to have been raised as to its 
validity. In the absence of such taxes as those mentioned, it 
is not surprising that the question of the validity of gradu-
ated rates has not been discussed. 3 
The taxation of property is governed by the strictest ef-
on net proceeds. This provision for special treatment of patented mines and 
mining claims was added by amendment in 1906. 
2 A leading case is Ex parte Robinson, 12 Nev. 263, 28 Am. Rep. 794 
( 1877), in which the court held that a state license tax upon itinerant ped-
dlers was valid. Also see: Ex parte Cohn, 13 Nev. 424 (1878) (a 2% tax 
on the gross premiums of foreign insurance companies was held to be 
valid and not within the uniformity clause limitation); Ex parte Dixon, 43 
Nev. 196, 183 Pac. 642 (1919) (local occupation tax on attorneys, up-
held as a non property tax); Ex parte lratacable, 55 Nev. 263, 30 P. 2d 284 
( 1934) (motor carrier tax, exemptions therefrom upheld as reasonable 
classes). 
8 But see Ex parte Dixon, supra note 2, in which the court stated that it 
was not pointed out by those attacking the ordinance in just what way the 
tax was not uniform. But the court noted that the tax provided for a gradu-
ated rate of taxation, based upon the individual income of attorneys. The 
rate was a Hat rate, increasing with brackets of increasing amounts of income. 
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fective uniformity limitation. Article X, § 1 is said to con-
tain a requirement of universality; thus before the 1942 
amendment intangible property had to be taxed since it was 
not generally a class characterized by the exemption proviso 
as exemptible.~ This requirement is said to stem from alter-
nate sources. First, there could not be a "uniform and equal 
rate of assessment and taxation" if some property is taxed 
and other is not. Also the court has stressed the words re-
quiring regulations for a just valuation of "all" property, 
with the exception of named classes of property which "may" 
be exempted. This requirement of universality has been 
restricted by the 1942 amendment which now expressly re-
quires the exemption of representative intangibles on the 
theory that the taxation of such property is "double taxa-
tion." The court had ruled before the amendment that such 
property had to be taxed because there was no "double 
taxation." 
As to that property actually taxed, there must be an abso-
lute uniformity in the effective rate.5 This was ruled upon in 
State v. Eastabrook,6 which held that the tax on mines and 
mining claims expressly provided for in Art. X, § 1 was a 
property tax, and therefore the rate imposed on such prop-
erty had to be correlated with the general property tax rate. 
The main difference made by the proviso in Art. X, § 1 is to 
sanction a different base for the taxation of such property. 
Instead of "value" the "proceeds" from such property must 
be used as the base. While no cases have been decided on the 
4 State v. Carson City Savings Bank, 17 Nev. 146, 30 Pac. 703 (1882), 
in which the court held that intangibles were taxable property even though 
the property mortgaged was also taxed. Also see State v. Eastabrook, 3 Nev. 
178 (1867); State v. Wells Fargo & Co., 38 Nev. 505, 150 Pac. 836 
(1915). 
5 However, classification for use of different methods of valuation is per-
missible. Sawyerv. Dooley, 21 Nev. 391,32 Pac. 437 (1893). 
6 Supra note 4. And see State v. Kruttschnitt, 4 Nev. 178 ( 1868). 
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matter, it seems clear that the ad valorem method is re-
quired in the taxation of property. The proviso for mines and 
mining property states an exception to that requirement. 
The sparseness of litigation and controversy concerning 
the uniformity limitation in Nevada is not unexpected in 
view of the fact that the tax structure of the state is rela-
tively simple insofar as variety of taxes is concerned, and 
the further fact that Nevada stands last among the states in 
total amount of revenue collected. 
5. South Carolina 
a. The provisions; historical note 
South Carolina, one of the original states of the Union, 
has had several constitutions, dated respectively 1778, 
1790, 1865, 1868, and the present constitution of 1895. 
There has also been a steady expansion of the constitutional 
uniformity structure from nothing in the first constitution of 
1778 to the long and redundant structure of the present 
constitution of 1 8 9 5. 
The basic uniformity clause is currently found in Art. X, 
§ 1 and reads: 
The General Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform 
and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall pre-
scribe regulations to secure a just valuation for taxation of 
all property, real, personal and possessory, except mines and 
mining claims, the products of which alone shall be taxed; 
and also excepting such property as may be exempted by 
law for municipal educational, literary, scientific, religious 
or charitable purposes: ... And provided, further, That 
the General Assembly may provide for a graduated tax on 
incomes, and for a graduated license on occupations and 
business. 
In 1932 Art. X, § 1 was amended by adding the following 
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important proviso authorizing special treatment for intangi-
bles: 
Provided, Further That the General Assembly may provide 
by law for the assessment of all intangible personal prop-
erty, including moneys, credits, bank deposits, corporate 
stocks, and bonds, at its true value for taxation for State, 
County, and municipal purposes or either thereof: Provided, 
that the total rate of taxation imposed thereon shall never 
exceed one-half of one per centum of the actual value of such 
intangible property; Provided, Further, that such intangible 
personal property shall not be subject to the three mill levy 
provided by § 1 0, Art. 11 of this instrument or to any other 
general or special tax levy, except such as is especially pro-
vided by the General Assembly by the authority and within 
the limitations of this provision; nor shall such intangible 
personal property be considered a part of "taxable prop-
erty," as such term is used in this instrument, of the State 
or any subdivision thereof. 
Article X, §4 requires the exemption of certain classes of 
property, and there are several other provisions dealing with 
special exemptions.1 In addition to the basic uniformity 
clause in Art. X, § 1, there is a provision which in some other 
states has been the sole source of uniformity for property 
taxation in general. Article I, §6 of the Bill of Rights pro-
vides: 
All property subject to taxation shall be taxed in propor-
tion to its value. 
Also of interest is Art. III, §29, found in the Legislative 
Article. Section 2 9 requires that 
All taxes upon property, real and personal, shall be laid 
1 For the text of Art. X, §4, see Appendix A, infra. Article VIII, §8 is 
a "manufactories" exemption provision, stating that " [ c] ities and towns 
may exempt from taxation . . . except for school purposes, manufactories 
established within their limits for five successive years from the time of the 
establishment of such manufactories ..•. " 
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upon the actual value of the property taxed, as the same 
shall be ascertained by an assessment made for the purpose 
of laying such a tax. 
Rounding out the uniformity structure of the present con-
stitution of 1895 are two sections dealing expressly with uni-
formity of local taxes.2 
In contrast to the rather cluttered and verbose uniformity 
structure found in its present constitution, the first constitu-
tion of South Carolina, dated 1778, and its successor, dated 
1790, had no provisions expressly relating to uniformity of 
taxation. The first such provision appeared in the third con-
stitution, that of 1865. That constitution was in force only a 
few years, and it had a single provision, Art. I, §8, which 
was identical to the present Art. III, §29. 
In the next constitution, dated 18 68, which served over a 
quarter of a century, the uniformity structure was quite simi-
lar to that found in today's constitution. Article II, §33 was 
a carry-over from the 1865 constitution, and identical to the 
present Art. III, §29. More important was Art. IX, §1, 
which was identical with Art. X, § 1 of the present constitu-
tion as it appeared before 1932, and excepting the proviso 
for income and occupation taxes which was added with the 
1895 constitution. In addition, the 1868 constitution added 
2 Article VIII, §6 provides that cities and towns are to be vested with the 
power to 
••• assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes, said taxes to be uni-
form in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the 
body composing the same; and all the property, except such as is exempt 
by law, within the limits of cities and towns shall be taxed for the pay-
ment of debts contracted under authority of law. License or privilege 
taxes imposed shall be graduated so as to secure a just imposition of such 
tax upon the classes subject thereto. 
Article X, §5 contains a provision substantially the same as the above for 
"counties, townships, school districts, cities, towns and villages," except that 
the last sentence as to license or privilege taxes does not appear. 
UNIFORMITY STRUCTURES 339 
Art. I, §36, which was identical with the present Art. I, §6, 
with the qualification that it had an additional clause3 similar 
to that which today serves two states (Rhode Island and 
Vermont) as a basic uniformity provision. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
Although the South Carolina Constitution is replete with 
uniformity provisions, one finds, as usual, that nonproperty 
taxes are not limited by the uniformity clause in Art. X, § 1, 
and need only be uniform within classes.4 The objects and 
exemptions therefrom need only be reasonable classes/ and 
further classification may be made for applying different 
rates. 6 In an unusual constitutional provision, graduated rates 
are expressly permitted for either income or occupation and 
business taxes.7 
3 Article I, §36 contained the following sentence: 
•.. Each individual of society has a right to be protected in the enjoy-
ment of life, liberty, and property, according to standing laws. He should, 
therefore, contribute his share to the expense of his protection .•.• 
4 A leading case is Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 166 S.C. 117, 164 S.E. 
588 (1932). Also see: State v. Touchberry, 121 S.C. 5, 113 S.E. 345 
(1922); Hay v. Leonard, 212 S.C. 81,46 S.E. 2d 653 (1948). That this 
was not always so clearly accepted, see the dissenting opinion of Mciver, J. 
in Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 27 S.C. 385, 402-403, 4 S.E. 49 
(1887). The case refers to Art. IX, §I of the 1868 constitution, which was 
identical to Art. X, §I of the present constitution insofar as the basic uni-
formity clause was concerned. 
5 For example, of the numerous cases, see: State ex rei. Roddey v. Byrnes, 
219 S.C. 485,66 S.E. 2d 33 (1951); Carolina Music Co. v. Query, 192 
S.C. 308,6 S.E. 2d 473 (1939); State ex rei. Coney v. Hicklin, 168 S.C. 
440, 167 S.E. 674 (1933). 
6 For example, of the numerous cases, see: Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea 
Co. v. City of Spartanburg, 170 S.C. 262, 170 S.E. 273 (1932); Hill v. 
Abbeville, 59 S.C. 396, 38 S.E. II ( 190 I); State v. Touchberry, supra 
note 4. For a classification found to be arbitrary, see Ex parte Bates, 127 
S.C. 167, 120 S.E. 717 (1923). 
7 See Alderman v. Wells, 85 S.C. 507, 67 S.E. 781 (1910), in which 
the court recognized the authority of the legislature to impose an income 
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As in other states having the strict uniformity limitation 
applicable to property taxes, important results flow from 
characterizing a tax as either a property or nonproperty tax. 
However, there have been few, if any, really difficult prob-
lems raised on this point in South Carolina. A graduated 
income tax is expressly sanctioned in Art. X, § 1, and there 
was no controversy concerning such a tax even before this 
provision was written into the present 1895 constitution.8 
Nor has the South Carolina inheritance tax,9 which has 
graduated rates, ever been challenged on this point. In 
Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query10 the fuel use tax was held to be 
a non property tax and therefore not within the Art. X, § 1 
uniformity limitation, and the same result was reached as to a 
local probate fee with a graduated rate. 11 
( 1) Property taxation 
Not unexpectedly, there are very few cases in South 
Carolina concerning the content of the uniformity limitation. 
However, it is clear that there is a requirement of univer-
sality.12 The source of the limitation is usually attributed 
mainly to the clause in Art. X, § 1, which states certain 
tax with a graduated rate. However, while graduated rates for excise taxes 
are .permitted, they are not required. Marshall v. South Carolina Tax 
Comm., 178 S.C. 57, 182 S.E. 96 (1935). 
8 South Carolina at the present does have an income tax with a graduated 
rate. S.C. Code (1952), tit. 65, c. 5. South Carolina, as a colony, had a 
"faculty" tax, and during the period of the Civil War imposed a tax of 1% 
on the professional incomes and salaries over $500, this latter tax being re-
pealed after the war. 
9 S.C. Code (1952) §§65-451-65-553. 
10 Supra note 4. 
11 Anderson v. Page, 208 S.C. 146,37 S.E. 2d 289 (1946). 
12 For example, Ellerbe v. David, 193 S.C. 3 3 2, 8 S.E. 2d 518 ( 1940) ; 
Germania Sav. Bank v. Darlington, 50 S.C. 337, 27 S.E. 846 ( 1897); 
Strong v. City of Sumter, 185 S.C. 203, 193 S.E. 649 (1937); Wofford 
College Trustees v. City of Spartanburg, 201 S.C. 315, 23 S.E. 2d 9 
(1942). 
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permissive exemptions. However, there is no indication that 
the result would necessarily be different even if there were 
only the general uniformity clause in Art. X, §1. Nor is 
there any indication that the requirement in Art. I, §6, that 
"All property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion 
to its value," would or would not be the source of this 
limitation. 
As for that property selected for taxation, it must be taxed 
by the ad valorem method, 13 and the effective rate applied by 
any one taxing authority must be absolutely uniform.14 Al-
though it would seem that the ratio of valuation would have 
to be a uniform 100%, since Art. III, §29 requires that 
"All taxes upon property ... shall be laid upon the actual 
value of the property taxed," in fact ratios of a much smaller 
per cent are actually used in the several taxing districts. 1~ 
The ad valorem requirement is usually attributed to Art. I, 
§6, the "proportionality" clause; however, there is no 
indication that such a requirement would not be derived 
from the basic uniformity clause itself. 
Intangibles: taxation of, since 1932. The 1932 amend-
ment to Art. X, § 1 is authority for special treatment for 
intangible property. To date the legislature has made no 
effort to implement this proviso. Therefore intangibles are 
apparently still subject to the general property tax.16 Conse-
quently, there has been no occasion on the part of South 
Carolina authorities to interpret the intangibles proviso. 
However, it would appear to be a reasonable conclusion that 
intangibles may be taxed only as a single class at the low 
18 State v. Cheraw & D. R. Co., 54 S.C. 564, 32 S.E. 691 (1898). 
Also see State v. Railroad Corporations, 4 S.C. 376 (1873), decided under 
the 1868 constitution. 
14 For example, Smith v. Robertson, 210 S.C. 99, 41 S.E. 2d 631 
(1947); Nettles v. Cantwell, 112 S.C. 24, 99 S.E. 765 (1919). 
15 See CCH S. Carolina Tax Reporter, ~70-501 and ~20-321. 
16Jd. at ~~20-004, 20-180. 
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rate. There is no relaxation of the ad valorem requirement, 
and it would not appear that intangibles could not be ex-
empted unless falling within one of the classes of property 
designated as exemptible by the constitution. Indeed, it ap-
pears to this writer that a good case could be made for the 
proposition that intangibles could not be constitutionally 
subject to the general property-tax rate if that rate is higher 
than that provided for in the proviso, namely, one half of 
one per cent of the actual value of such property. 
6. Utah 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The first and only constitution of Utah came into force in 
18 96. Two provisions constitute the essential parts of the 
uniformity structure: Art. XIII, §3, containing the basic 
uniformity clause, and Art. XIII, §2, containing a supple-
mentary proportionality clause. Both of these sections are 
rather lengthy, and have been the subject of several amend-
ments. However, it is the 1920 amendments to both sections 
2 and 3 of Art. XIII which are of considerable significance 
for the meaning of the effective uniformity limitation in 
Utah. The provisions will be examined in their present effec-
tive forms, and , then their historical development will be 
noted. Article XIII, §3, containing the basic uniformity 
clause, reads as follows (with the paragraph notations added 
by this writer for convenience): 
[~1] The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and 
equal rate of assessment and taxation on all tangible property 
in the State, according to its value in money, and shall pre-
scribe by law such regulations as shall secure a just valuation 
for taxation of such property, so that every person and 
corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, 
her, or its tangible property .... 
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[1T2] Intangible property may be exempted from taxation as 
property or it may be taxed in such manner and to such 
extent as the Legislature may provide. Provided that if 
intangible property be taxed as property the rate thereof 
shall not exceed five mills on each dollar of valuation. When 
exempt from taxation as property, the taxable income there-
from shall be taxed under any tax based on incomes, but 
when taxed by the State of Utah as property, the income 
therefrom shall not also be taxed. 
[1f3] The Legislature may provide for deductions, exemp-
tions, and/or offsets on any tax based upon income. The per-
sonal income tax rates shall be graduated. . . . 
The other important uniformity provision, Art. XIII, §2, 
reads in part: 
All tangible property in the State, not exempt under the 
laws of the United States, or under this constitution, shall be 
taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided 
by law .... 
The remainder of the section is concerned with the exemp-
tion of property, providing first that certain classes of 
property (the usual public and quasi-public classes) "shall 
be exempt from taxation." In addition, other special classes 
of property either "shall" or "may" be exempted.1 To be 
considered along with these two principal provisions is Art. 
XIII, § 12, which provides: 
Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to prevent 
the Legislature from providing a stamp tax, or a tax based 
on income, occupation, licenses, or franchises. 
In their original forms both sections 2 and 3 of Art. XIII 
were not limited to "tangible" property, but referred simply 
to "all property." Also, the second paragraph in Art. XIII, 
1 For the text of Art. XIII, §2, see the Appendix, infra. Article XIII, 
§4 provides for special treatment of mines or mining claims. 
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§3, providing for special treatment for intangible property, 
was not present. In addition, following the proportionality 
clause in Art. XIII, §2, there was originally a definition of 
"property" which left no doubt that intangible property was 
to be within the scope of the basic uniformity provisions. The 
1930 amendment made the following important changes, 
namely, it added the intangibles proviso, limited the other 
provisions to "tangible" property and, obviously, deleted the 
former definition of "property."2 Thus, an important excep-
tion to the general uniformity limitation was made in 1930. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
In view of the particular phraseology of the uniformity 
clause in the Utah Constitution, Art. XIII, §3, which adds 
the phrase "on all [tangible] property" to the words of uni-
formity, there should not be the shadow of a doubt that non-
property taxes are not limited by this clause. However, the 
court has found it necessary to rule upon the question when 
nonproperty taxes were challenged as violating Art. XIII, 
2 The word property was defined in the original Art. XIII, §2, as follows: 
The word property, as used in this article, is hereby declared to include 
moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, franchises, and all matters and things (real, 
personal, and mixed) capable of private ownership; but this shall not be 
so construed as to authorize the taxation of the stocks of any company or 
corporation when the property of such company or corporation repre-
sented by such stocks has been taxed. . . • 
Also to be noted is paragraph 3 of Art. XIII, §3, which was added by the 
1930 amendment and which deals with the details of a personal income tax. 
A particular problem of uniformity was dealt with by an earlier 1906 
amendment to Art. XIII, §3. A proviso was then added which declared: 
"Provided, further, that mortgages upon both real and personal property 
shall be exempt from taxation." This amendment dealt with a specific 
problem of "double taxation," and was a result of the Spencer case decided 
in 1897. See note 8, infra. This proviso, of course, was deleted with the 
1930 amendment because it was dealt with in the larger intangibles pro-
vision. 
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§3.8 Such taxes must only be uniform within classes,4 and a 
graduated rate schedule has been held reasonable.11 Of 
course, the question of graduated rates is expressly settled 
for income taxation by the requirement in Art. XIII, §3, that 
"The personal income tax rates shall be graduated." 
Because of the strict uniformity requirement applicable to 
property taxes, it is always of some importance to determine 
the character of any tax. The court has held that an inherit-
ance tax is not a property tax but a tax upon the privilege of 
succession. 6 Moreover, the greatest possible source of con-
troversy was removed by Art. XIII, § 12, which approves an 
income tax. 
( 1) Property taxation 
From 1896 to 1930. Before the amendments of 1930 the 
court had substantially outlined the effective uniformity 
limitation applicable to property taxes. There was a clear 
requirement of universality, because exemptions of property 
(other than those classes designated as exemptible by the 
constitution) were said to be not only contrary not only to 
the express requirement of Art. XIII, §2 that "All property 
. . . shall be taxed," but also violations of the uniformity 
8 For example, Salt Lake City v. Christensen Co., 34 Utah 38, 95 Pac. 
523 {1908). 
4 Davis v. Ogden City, 117 Utah 315, 330-332, 215 P. 2d 616 {1950) 
{local occupation tax, attorneys practicing law to exclusion of attorneys 
working for others, reasonable class); Dixon v. Ricketts, 26 Utah 215, 72 
Pac. 947 {1903) {inheritance tax, exemptions therefrom held valid); 
Garrett Freight Lines v. State Tax Comm., 103 Utah 390, 135 P. 2d 523 
{ 1943) {fuel use tax, subject found to be a reasonable class) ; Ogden City 
v. Crossman, 17 Utah 66, 53 Pac. 985 {1898). 
5 Salt Lake City v. Christensen Co., supra note 3. 
6 Dixon v. Ricketts, supra note 4. The present Utah corporate franchise 
tax has a base of net income. An earlier such tax had a base of authorized 
capital stock, and was upheld as a nonproperty tax in Blackrock Copper 
Min. & Mill. Co. v. Tingey, 34 Utah 369,38 Pac. 180 {1908). 
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clause of Art. XIII, §3 requiring "a uniform and equal rate 
of assessment and taxation on all property."7 As the court 
stated in Judge v. Spencer,8 a leading Utah uniformity case: 
The framers of the constitution . . . evidently intended 
that no property should be relieved from the burden of 
taxation, except such as was defined and specified for exemp-
tion by that instrument. Such intent appears to be empha-
sized in section 3. . .. This provision made it incumbent 
upon the legislature to provide a uniform system by which 
every species of property within the state, not exempt by the 
organic law, should equally and ratably bear its due propor-
tion of the public burden, and the legislature had no power 
to exempt property not exempt under the constitution. 
To carry out the purpose of the uniformity provisions there 
had to be an absolute uniformity in the effective rate appli-
cable to all property taxed by any one taxing authority.9 
However, this limitation was not violated by the taxation 
of both a mortgage and the property mortgaged because, as 
the court held in the Spencer case, they were two distinctly 
different species of property; consequently there was no 
"double taxation."10 The court never had an occasion to 
7 State ex rei. Richards v. Armstrong, 17 Utah 166, 53 Pac. 981 ( 1898), 
in which a statute authorizing the remission or abatement of taxes of any 
insane, idiotic, infirm, or indigent person to the amount not exceeding $10 
per year was held contrary to Art. XIII, §§2 and 3. It was held that calling 
the tax relief an "abatement" did not remove it from the universality re-
quirement. 
8 15 Utah 24-2, 24-5-24-6,4-8 Pac. 1097 (1897). 
9 For example, First Nat. Bank v. Christensen, 39 Utah 568, 118 Pac. 
778 ( 1911), in which it was held that the assessment by county taxing 
officers of realty, livestock, merchandise and chattels at SO'}'o to 70% of 
actual or cash value and the assessment of moneys or shares of stock in manu-
facturing or industrial enterprises, or investments, at actual or cash value, 
was a violation of the uniformity clause, Art. XIII, §3. Also see the dictum 
in Continental Nat. Bank v. Naylor, 54 Utah 4-9, 179 Pac. 67 ( 1919). 
10 Judge v. Spencer, supra note 8 at 24-7-249. It is to be noted that the 
original Art. XIII, §2, see note 2 supra, prohibited the taxation of corporate 
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specifically rule that property had to be taxed ad valorem.11 
In view of the prolix uniformity provisions, however, the 
answer was hardly in doubt since Art. XIII, §3 required 
the taxation of all property "according to its value," a "just 
valuation for taxation of all property," and that every person 
pay a tax "in proportion to the value" of his property; and, 
in addition, Art. XIII, §2 required all property to be taxed 
"in proportion to its value." Indeed, the universality re-
quirement, as well, was spelled out in several places, both in 
Art. XIII, §2 and §3. Thus, the strict uniformity limitation 
under the original Utah uniformity structure might well 
have stemmed from any one of several provisions, all of 
which standing alone have served as a basic uniformity clause 
in some of the other state constitutions. 
From 19 3 0 to the present; intangibles taxation. Insofar 
as the taxation of tangible property is concerned, the same 
effective uniformity limitation continues to be applicable 
after 1930 as was applicable before that time. However, the 
1930 amendments to Art. XIII, §2 and §3 limited the 
uniformity requirement, at least to some degree, to the tax-
ation of tangible property. Thus, since 1930 the problem has 
been: what degree of uniformity is required in Utah in the 
taxation of intangible property? There has been no interpre-
tation of the intangibles clause in Art. XIII, §3, and the only 
shares as property while the property of the issuing corporation was taxed 
at the same time. Cases interpreting this provision were: Commercial Na-
tional Bank v. Chambers, 21 Utah 324, 61 Pac. 560 (1900); McCornick 
& Co. v. Bassett, 49 Utah 444, 164 Pac. 8 52 ( 1917); and Stillman v. 
Lynch, 56 Utah 5 40, 192 Pac. 2 72 ( 1920). Because of the explicit con-
stitutional provisions which deal with this problem, the cases cited must be 
used with particular care in comparing with cases in other jurisdictions on 
this particular problem of "double taxation." 
11 But see the recent case, Commercial Bank of Utah v. State, 244 P. 2d 
364 ( 1952). Also see State ex rei. Cunningham v. Thomas, 16 Utah 86, 
50 Pac. 615 (1898). 
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extent to which the Utah legislature has utilized this pro-
vision is simply by exempting intangibles from taxation 
as property.12 Certainly there is no doubt that under the 
amended uniformity provision the total exemption of in-
tangibles is constitutional. However, there might be some 
question as to the scope of the discretion resting in the 
legislature insofar as the separate taxation of intangibles is 
concerned. It would appear to this writer that it is not an 
unreasonable reading of the intangibles provision to conclude 
that in the taxation of intangible property, as such, the legis-
lature is not limited either by an ad valorem requirement or 
a requirement that the effective rate be absolutely uniform as 
to all intangible property taxed. The key words are: "intan-
gible property may be exempted from taxation as property 
or it may be taxed in such manner and to such extent as the 
Legislature may provide." The words "such manner" cer-
tainly could well imply a classified intangibles tax or the use 
of a specific rather than an ad valorem tax. The sole limita-
tion would seem to be in the following sentence: 
"Provided that if intangible property be taxed as property 
the rate thereof shall not exceed five mills on each dollar of 
valuation." This provision, might, of course, carry a back-
handed implication that if intangibles are taxed "as prop-
erty," then a specific property tax would be prohibited, since 
the rate limitation is stated in terms of value. In any case, the 
Utah legislature has not separately taxed intangibles as such, 
and, consequently, the court has had no occasion to go into 
the ramifications of the intangibles amendment. 
12 Utah Code Ann. (1953) §59-1-1. 
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G. ANALYSIS OF STATES WITH TYPE VII CLAUSES 
1. Colorado 
a. The provisions; historical note 
Colorado has had but a single constitution, dated 18 7 6. 
The basic uniformity clause is found in Art. X, §3, and has 
remained unchanged. Section 3 reads: 
All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects 
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, 
and shall be levied and collected under general laws, which 
shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valua-
tion for taxation of all property, real and personal; pro-
vided, that the personal property of every person being the 
head of a family to the value of $200 shall be exempt from 
taxation .... 1 
A very important clause to be read in connection with the 
above uniformity clause is Art. X, §6, which provides: 
All laws exempting from taxation, property other than 
hereinbefore mentioned, shall be void; . . . 
The omitted part of Art. X, §6 is a proviso added by 
amendment in 1936. It provides for special treatment of 
motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers. That proviso 
requires the legislature to classify such vehicles and require 
the payment of a "graduated annual specific ownership tax 
thereon," the tax being in addition to the state license fees, 
but "in lieu of all ad valorem taxes upon such property . . . 
provided, further, that such laws shall not exempt from ad 
valorem taxation motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers in 
process of manufacture, or held in storage, or which con-
stitute the stock of manufacturers, or distributors thereof or 
of dealers therein." Rounding out the uniformity structure 
1 The omitted part of Art. X, §3 concerns certain property used for ir-
rigating land, for which special treatment is provided. 
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as it stood in the original constitution are Art. X, §§4 and 5, 
which require the exemption of designated classes of prop-
erty (the usual public and quasi-public classes).2 
An important change in the uniformity structure of the 
Colorado Constitution was made by amendment in 1936. 
The basic uniformity clause in Art. X, §3 was left un-
changed, and a new section, Art. X, § 17, was added to the 
constitution. It reads: 
The general assembly may levy income taxes, either grad-
uated or proportional, or both graduated and proportional, 
... and may, in the administration of an income tax law, 
provide for special classified or limited taxation or the ex-
emption of tangible and intangible personal property. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
The Colorado Supreme Court has simply assumed from 
the inception of the constitution that the uniformity clause in 
Art. X, §3 applies only to property taxes.3 Nonproperty 
taxes are required to be uniform within classes. The objects 
of such taxes must be reasonable classes/ but may be further 
2 For text of Art. X, §§4 and 5, see the Appendix, infra. Another pro-
vision which has some relevancy for determining the uniformity limitation 
is Art. X, §10, which provides that: 
All corporations ... shall be subject to taxation for state, county, 
school, municipal and other purposes, on the real and personal property 
owned or used by them within the territorial limits of the authority levy-
ing the tax. 
3 An early leading case is Denver City Ry. Co. v. Denver, 21 Colo. 350, 
41 Pac. 826 (1895). For a recent case, see, for example, Jackson v. City of 
Glenwood Springs, 122 Colo. 323,221 P. 2d 1083 (1950). 
4 For example, Altitude Oil Co. v. People, 70 Colo. 45 2, 202 Pac. 180 
(1921); Ard v. People, 66 Colo. 480, 182 Pac. 892 (1919); Brown v. 
Elder, 32 Colo. 527, 77 Pac. 853 (1904); Hughes v. State, 97 Colo. 279, 
49 P. 2d 1009 ( 193 5); Public Utilities Comm. v. Manley, 99 Colo. 15 3, 
60 P. 2d 913 (1936). In all of these cases, classifications were found to be 
reasonable. 
UNIFORMITY STRUCTURES 351 
classified for the purpose of applying classified rate sched-
ules.5 It appears that a graduated rate is permissible.6 It is 
interesting to note that in an early case establishing the rule 
as to nonproperty taxes, the court simply tossed the uni-
formity clause in section 3 into a single category with all 
other uniformity clauses found in other state constitutions. 
No distinctions were made as to differences in phraseology; 
indeed, the court quoted from a text which implied that 
regardless of phraseology all "uniformity clauses" produced 
the same result. 7 
In any case, the distinction between property and non-
property taxes is accepted, and because of the stricter uni-
formity required of property taxes it is always of consider-
able importance to characterize any given tax. As in most of 
the other states the court has used no ascertainable systematic 
approach which gives a reasonably sure test to distinguish 
between property and nonproperty taxes. 8 However, the 
court has held that an inheritance tax is a nonproperty tax on 
the privilege of succession,9 and that a corporate franchise 
5 Brown v. Elder, supra note 4; Jackson v. City of Glenwood Springs, 
supra note 3. 
6 The inheritance tax, upheld in Brown v. Elder, supra note 4, had a 
graduated rate. Also see Jackson v. City of Glenwood Springs, supra note 3, 
in which a city tax on businesses and professions, graduated according to the 
number of employees, was upheld. 
7 Denver City Ry. Co. v. Denver, supra note 3 at 3 5 3-4. 
8 The Colorado court has generally used the term "excise" to designate 
nonproperty taxes. And, especially in the earlier cases, the court went to 
some length to distinguish between property and "excise" taxes, ending 
with the rather hazy distinction that excise taxes were fundamentally 
grounded in the police power while "taxes" were "purely" revenue meas-
ures. At times the court has run into some difficulty, albeit a verbal difficulty 
of its own making, in determining whether a particular tax was an excise 
tax when there was little apparent regulatory purpose embodied in the 
statute. See the cases in notes 3 and 4, supra. 
9 Brown v. Elder, supra note 4. 
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tax with a base of capital stock was a nonproperty tax.10 In 
Walker v. Bedford,11 the court held that a motor vehicle tax 
with a base of value and a graduated rate schedule was a 
property tax and a violation of the uniformity clause in Art. 
X, §3, for reasons discussed below.12 A provision has been 
added to the Colorado Constitution (Art. X, § 17) which 
expressly sanctions an income tax. Thus, any controversy 
over the nature of such a tax has been rendered moot. Nor 
were there any cases prior to this 1936 amendment which 
might be useful for a comparative study of the problem. 
( 1 ) Property taxation 
From 1876 to 1936. It was never made quite clear just 
how far, if at all, the legislature was free to classify property 
for purposes of taxation under Art. X, §3, in the absence of 
Art. X, §17. It did seem clear that property could only be 
taxed by the ad valorem method; thus specific property taxa-
tion would have been prohibited.13 Also, it was made quite 
clear that there was a requirement of universality in the tax-
10 American Smelting & Refining Co. v. People, 34 Colo. 240, 82 Pac. 
531 (1905). 
11 93 Colo. 400,26 P. 2d 1051 (1933). 
12 The tax which was held invalid in the Walker case was an additional 
tax, intended to supplement a motor vehicle registration tax having a base 
of horsepower, rather than value. In Ard v. People, supra note 4, the regis-
tration tax was held to be a nonproperty tax. The type of tax struck down 
in the Walker case is now dealt with specifically by the amendment made 
in 1936 to Art. X, §6 of the constitution. Also see Public Utilities Comm. 
v. Manley, supra note 4. 
13 This point has not been squarely passed upon, but see the obvious im-
plication in Kiowa v. Dunn, 21 Colo. 185, 40 Pac. 357 (1895), discussed 
infra, text at note 20. This rule would, in any case, pretty obviously stem 
from the "just valuation for taxation of all property" clause in Art. X, §3. 
The issue was also raised in cases concerning taxes held to be nonproperty 
taxes, which consequently made it unnecessary to rule upon the question. 
See, e.g., Altitude Oil Co. v. People, supra note 4, upholding the fuel use 
tax as a nonproperty tax. 
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ation of property, and no distinction was made between "ex-
emption"14 and "selection."111 The prohibition against ex-
emptions, at least, was spelled out in Art. X, §6, which is 
quite explicit on that matter: "All laws exempting from tax-
ation, property other than hereinbefore mentioned, shall be 
void .... " The court has not, however, distinguished the 
failure to select from a positive exemption/6 and in an early 
leading case, Gunnison v. Owen,17 the uniformity clause it-
self was apparently relied on in striking down an exemption 
of property from taxation. 
This development left only the possibility that the legis-
lature might classify that property selected for taxation for 
the purpose of applying different effective rates to the sev-
eral classes. Indeed, the court indicated on a number of oc-
casions that such a classification was permissible. However, 
in fact the court never approved any attempted classifica-
tions. The classifications which were reviewed were held to 
14 Gunnison v. Owen, 7 Colo. 467,4 Pac. 795 (1884) (holding invalid 
a statute which exempted urban property from a general tax imposed by 
counties for road purposes); Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver, 51 Colo. 
456, 118 Pac. 970 ( 1911) (holding invalid the in lieu provision of a 
statute imposing a gross premiums tax on insurance companies; the in lieu 
provision purported to exempt the personal property of such corporations 
from all taxation), followed in Colorado Nat. Life Assur. Co. v. Clayton, 
54 Colo. 256, 130 Pac. 330 (1913). In Board of Com'rs of Washington 
County v. Murray, 71 Colo. 522, 208 Pac. 472 ( 1922) the court upheld 
a statute providing for the assessment of real estate mortgages. It had been 
contended that there was an unconstitutional exemption of property from 
taxation. But the court said that the taxation of real estate and a mortgage 
thereon separately would constitute "double taxation." The statute provided 
that both items should be assessed as a unit, and notes and mortgages were 
thereafter not to be otherwise assessed. This was not an "exemption." Also 
see Logan Irr. Dist. v. Holt, 110 Colo. 253, 133 P. 2d 530 (1943), dis-
cussed infra, note 28. 
111 Gordon v. Wheatridge Water Dist., 107 Colo. 128, 109 P. 2d 899 
(I 941), discussed infra, notes 27 and 28. 
16 See note 15, supra. 
17 Supra note 14. 
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be arbitrary discriminations violating the uniformity clause 
in Art. X, §3. One is perhaps justified in feeling that, apart 
from the special provisions introduced by Art. X, § 1 7, any 
classification of property more narrow than real property, 
tangible personal property, and intangible property would in 
all likelihood be disapproved under the court's construction 
of Art. X, §3. 
Several cases concern the effort of the legislature to sub-
ject certain "transient" personal property (livestock entering 
the county for grazing purposes after the general assessment 
date of April 1st) to the county general property tax rates.18 
This statutory scheme was held to be an arbitrary discrimina-
tion and therefore a violation of the uniformity clause in Art. 
X, §3. The court reasoned that other property of the same 
class (i.e., livestock brought into a county, but not for pur-
poses of grazing, as well as all other personal property 
brought into the county after the general assessment date) 
would not be subject to the tax.19 On closer analysis it would 
seem that these cases are really problems of selection for the 
general property tax. The opinions reasoned that all prop-
erty of a class, presumably personal property, was not sub-
ject to the tax. But the differentiation was not between two 
different rates, but between a rate for part of the class and 
"zero" rate, i.e., exemption, for the remainder of the class. 
The court on numerous occasions had held that a rule of uni-
versality obtains. It is not a matter of discrimination within 
a class of property when the question is one of either a tax 
at the general rate or no tax at all. Rather, all taxable prop-
erty should be taxed if any is taxed. And there was no ques-
tion in these transient livestock cases of classifying the prop-
18 Carbon County Sheep & Cattle Co. v. Routt, 60 Colo. 224, 152 Pac. 
903 ( 1915); Hutchinson v. Herrick, 70 Colo. 5 34, 20 3 Pac. 27 5 ( 1922). 
Also see Leonard v. Reed, 46 Colo. 307, I 04 Pac. 410 ( 1909). 
19 Carbon County Sheep & Cattle Co. v. Routt, supra note 18 at 226, 
229-230. 
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erty for different rates. In any case, on whatever rationale 
decided, the cases do indicate that classifications of property 
will be very, very critically examined. 
More in point is Kiowa v. Dunn.20 The legislature had 
provided that a special tax rate was to be applicable to live-
stock belonging to nonresidents and brought into the state 
for grazing. The rate was different from that applied under 
the general property tax. The court held that the statute 
was a clear violation of the uniformity clause, Art. X, §3, 
because the property of a nonresident was taxed at a different 
rate than that of a resident. No clarifying statement was of-
fered as to whether livestock was considered a minimum 
class of property, or whether personal property generally 
was considered the minimum class. The court simply em-
phasized that residence of the owner of the property was 
not a sufficient basis for a reasonable classification. 
Finally, in Walker v. Bedford/1 a 1933 case, the court 
quite clearly indicated its view of the rather limited power 
of classification resting in the legislature by virtue of the 
words in Art. X, §3. In that case, the issue concerned the 
validity of a statute, enacted by the legislature to gain 
revenue for purportedly emergency purposes, which levied 
an additional registration fee on motor vehicles used upon 
highways. There already existed a motor vehicle registra-
tion tax which had a base of horsepower and which had been 
upheld as a nonproperty tax.22 The base of the additional 
20 Supra note 13. The statute provided that all stock belonging to non-
residents brought into Colorado for grazing purposes was to be taxed at 50¢ 
per head, except sheep which were to be taxed at 20¢ per head. These taxes 
were to be in lieu of all local and state taxes. 
21 Supra note II. But see Hughes v. State, supra note 4, in which an ad-
ditional emergency tax on inheritances was held to be an excise tax. In that 
case a vigorous dissent asserted that the problem was identical to that in the 
Walker Case. 
22 Ard v. People, supra note 4. 
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tax was to be the value of the vehicle, and the rate was grad-
uated. In a 4-3 opinion, the majority of the court held that 
this additional motor vehicle tax was in fact a tax upon prop-
erty, as such, and void as contrary to the uniformity clause in 
Art. X, §3. The rationale of the court was as follows: 
It appears plain to us that the act imposes a property tax. 
. . . No other kinds of personal property are made the sub-
ject of the tax; motor vehicles alone are to bear the burden. 
No further elucidation was offered, other than a bare con-
clusion, stated after the tax had been distinguished from ex-
cise taxes upheld in the past: 
And since it is a property tax and is manifestly not 'uniform 
upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits 
of the authority levying the tax,' the act . . . is held to be 
repugnant to [the uniformity clause] . 23 
One may fairly conclude that the court was thinking in 
terms of personal property-at least-being a minimum 
class for purposes of taxation. 
Thus, before 1936 a reading of the uniformity clause and 
nothing more than a cursory examination of what the court 
has said24 might well have led one to believe that property 
23 Walker v. Bedford, supra note 11 at 405, 406. Emphasis added. 
24 The Colorado case most often quoted concerning the power of the 
legislature to classify property for purposes of taxation is, in fact, a case con-
cerning classification for the purpose of using different methods of assessment 
for the several classes. Ames v. People, 26 Colo. 8 3, 56 Pac. 656 ( 1899). 
The legislature may classify property under the general property tax for the 
purpose of method of valuation; however, those opinions and the broad 
statements therein must be read in the context of that particular issue. See, 
besides the Ames case, People v. Henderson, 12 Colo. 369, 21 Pac. 144 
(1888); Foster v. Hart Consol. Mining Co., 52 Colo. 459, 122 Pac. 48 
(1912). Also see the more recent case of Citizens' Committee v. Warner, 
127 Colo. 121, 254 P. 2d 1005 (1953). Nor are the cases concerning the 
issue of uniformity in ratio of valuation of much help on this problem. See, 
for example, People v. Pitcher, 56 Colo. 343, 138 Pac. 509 (1914). 
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could have been classified for the purpose of applying dif-
ferent effective rates. However, a closer examination of the 
decisions indicates that, in fact, little, if any, classification 
was permissible. Of course, it must be admitted that at no 
time was the court faced with a systematic classified prop-
erty tax which would have forced a closer examination of 
the uniformity clause. 
After 1936. The limited change in the uniformity re-
quired of property taxation which occurred in 1936 resulted 
from the introduction of a new section, Art. X, § 17, which 
provides that the legislature 
... may, in the administration of an income tax law, pro-
vide for special classified or limited taxation or the exemp-
tion of tangible and intangible personal property. 
The most important feature to note is that the new uniform-
ity limitation applicable to the taxation of "tangible and in-
tangible personal property" is conditional. Any special 
treatment of personal property based upon the authority of 
Art. X, § 1 7 must be coupled with "the administration of 
an income tax law." In fact, the legislature has made use of 
this provision only to the following extent: intangible per-
sonal property is now exempt from the general property 
tax.25 This exemption was upheld in City & County of Den-
ver v. Tax Research Bureau/6 decided in 1937. In that case 
the court characterized the income tax as an intended sub-
stitute tax for those taxes from which personal property 
might be relieved. 
Other than in the Denver case, the court has had no oc-
casion to interpret the effect of the personal property pro-
vision in Art. X, § 1 7. However, it would appear that unless 
personal property is dealt with in conjunction with the ad-
25 Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 84.1, §48. 
26 101 Colo. 140, 71 P. 2d 809 (1937). 
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ministration of an income tax the same uniformity limitation 
is applicable as that in force before the 18 3 6 amendment. 
Thus, in Gordon v. W heatridge Water Dist.,27 decided in 
1941, the court held that the imposition of a property tax 
(it was agreed that the exaction in question was not a special 
assessment) by a special district only upon real estate vio-
lated Art. X, §§3 and 6. The court said: 
For these reasons we must conclude that the exaction im-
posed was intended to be a general tax [i.e. not a special as-
sessment]. Being such, it must conform with the uniformity 
and exemption clauses of the Constitution. That it does not 
so comply is evident from the fact that in laying a tax on 
realty solely, the act excepts and exempts personalty. The 
act in so far as it attempts to authorize this result thus is 
void.28 
Thus, the only definite change wrought by the 1936 amend-
ment was the possibility of the exemption of personal prop-
erty, in part or in whole, if such an exemption was made in 
conjunction with an income tax. 
An intriguing question remains: What is the meaning or 
the implication of an amendment to the constitution which 
provides that, conditionally, the legislature might "provide 
for special classified or limited taxation" of personal prop-
erty? Does this mean that such classified treatment (other 
than exemption) was not permissible under Art. X, §3 pro-
viding that "all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class 
27 107 Colo. 128, 109 P. 2d 899 (1941). 
28 /d. at 137. Emphasis added. Also see Logan Irr. Dist. v. Holt, supra 
note 14, in which the court held that a statute was invalid insofar as it at-
tempted to exempt certain property used for irrigation purposes. It was 
said that the legislature could not expand the provision in Art. X, §3, pro-
viding for special treatment in the taxation of such property. In re Hover 
Motors, 121 Colo. 439, 217 P. 2d 863 (1950), involved an interpretation 
and application of the special motor vehicle tax and exemption proviso added 
in 1936 to Art. X, §6, and the relation of that section to the general pro-
hibition against exemption of property. 
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of subjects?" What of the cases which implied that some de-
gree of classification might be permitted under Art. X, §3? 
The answers are speculative, but under Art. X, §3 the legis-
lature was probably limited to the broad classification of 
property into no more than three classes: realty, tangible 
personalty, and intangible personalty. And, quaere as to the 
extent to which the court would have allowed even this sort 
of classification under a systematic classified general prop-
erty tax. The Colorado situation aptly illustrates how even 
under one of the apparently more liberal uniformity clauses 
it may be necessary in the end to amend that provision in 
order to classify property to any substantial degree for pur-
poses of taxation. The Colorado decisions indicate a judicial 
attitude which simply ignores the possibility that such a 
provision means what it says, and continues to lump all uni-
formity clauses together.29 
2. Delaware 
In the original Delaware Constitution of 1776 and the 
succeeding constitutions of 1792 and 1831 there were no 
provisions expressly dealing with uniformity of taxation. The 
present Delaware Constitution, effective in 1897, has a uni-
formity clause in Art. VIII, §1, which reads: 
All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects 
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, 
and shall be levied and collected under general laws, but the 
General Assembly may by general laws exempt from taxa-
tion such property as in the opinion of the General Assembly 
will best promote the public welfare. 
This brief provision contains substantially the entire uni-
formity structure of the present Delaware Constitution, 
although Art. X, §3, which requires the exemption of certain 
29 But see Gordon v. Wheatridge Water Dist., supra notes 15, 27 at l 37. 
360 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
property used for educational purposes, must also be con-
sidered.1 
It appears that in Delaware all taxes-nonproperty as 
well as property-are limited by the uniformity clause found 
in Art. VIII, § 1. In the single case concerning uniformity in 
nonproperty taxes, Conard v. State/ decided in 1940, the 
court reviewed a statute which imposed an occupation tax 
having a flat rate on the business of carrying fishing parties 
for hire with the purpose of fishing in designated waters. The 
statute exempted the use of boats propelled exclusively by 
oars. It was held that the tax did not violate either Art. VIII, 
§ 1, or the federal equal protection clause. 3 The exemption 
was challenged as being arbitrary. The court, in summing up 
the uniformity requirement, at least for nonproperty taxes, 
equated the uniformity clause in Art. VIII, § 1, with the 
federal equal protection clause in the fourteenth amendment 
to the United States Constitution. The court said: 
In either case [i.e., under the equal protection clause or 
under Art. VIII, § 1] the constitutionality of the act is to be 
determined by the reasonableness of the classification at-
tempted. The governing rules are largely the same, and 
generally a tax violating one of the provisions violates the 
other .... 
The question, therefore, is whether classifying separately 
1 See the Appendix for the provision. Also see Art. IX, §6, which pro-
vides that: 
Shares of the capital stock of corporations created under the laws of this 
State, when owned by persons or corporations without this State, shall 
not be subject to taxation by any law now existing or hereafter to be made. 
This section was added to the Delaware Constitution in 1903. 
2 41 Del. 107, 16 A. 2d 121 (1940). 
3 The tax also made a distinction between residents and nonresidents. 
The tax was $10 for residents, $50 for nonresidents. This classification was 
held to be a violation of the federal equal protection clause, but the act was 
invalid only to the extent that a greater burden was placed on the non-
resident. /d. at 116-120. 
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boats propelled exclusively by oars, and exempting them 
from the operation of the act, is a reasonable exercise of the 
legislative power of classification. 
It is generally agreed that a classification for the purposes 
of taxation, not purely arbitrary but based on reason, is 
entirely proper; and that uniformity as applied to occupation 
taxation simply means taxation that acts alike on all persons 
similarly situated. The differences upon which the classifica-
tion is based need not be great or conspicuous; nor is it 
necessary that the court perceive the precise legislative reason 
for the classification, for in any state of facts can reasonably be 
conceived that would sustain the classification, the existence 
of that state of facts at the time of the enactment of the law 
must be assumed.4 
That the same liberal interpretation is given to the uni-
formity clause when it is applied to property taxes is indi-
cated in State v. Pinder,5 decided in 1919. In that case, the 
court upheld the 1917 income tax law. It was argued by the 
defendant that the tax was a nonproperty tax, that the legis-
lature was limited to taxation of property, and, therefore, 
that the income tax was not within the power of the legis-
lature. The court rejected this construction of Art. VIII, § 1, 
but declared that, in any case, the income tax was a property 
tax. Its rationale was that the tax was upon income as prop-
erty. Having determined the nature of the tax, the exemp-
tions in question (certain exemptions according to sources of 
income, and a minimum exemption of $1000) were held 
to be reasonable classifications. 
There are only two other Delaware cases pertinent to the 
uniformity issue, and they concern the classification of realty 
for the local general property tax. In 1898, the legislature 
by 21 Del. Laws, c. 106 provided for the classification of 
realty in the City of Wilmington as follows: 
§1. It shall be the duty of the Board ... to classify the 
4 /d. at 114-115, emphasis added. 
11 30 Del. (7 Boyce) 416, 108 Atl. 43 (1919). 
362 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
real estate so assessed in such a manner as to discriminate 
between the rural or suburban, and the built up portion of 
said City; . . . and it shall be the duty of the Council [of 
said City] in determining the rate of taxation for each year 
to levy a tax upon said rural or suburban property equal to 
one-half of the highest rate of tax required to be levied for 
said year; so that upon the real estate assessed in said City 
there shall be two rates of taxation. 
In the case of Monaghan v. Lewis,O decided in 1905, the 
court did not directly pass upon the validity of this classifi-
cation but did, by implication, approve it as constitutional. A 
taxpayer had challenged the 1898 act on several counts, 
primarily attacking its validity under the state constitutional 
limitations on legislative procedure. The court found that 
the 1898 act was validly enacted, and that it repealed by 
implication an 1897 act which had provided that land in a 
specified area of the city was to be taxed at one fourth the 
rate applicable to other realty. The court asserted that the 
1897 act would have been a violation of that part of Art. 
VIII, § 1 requiring taxes to be "assessed and collected under 
general laws," because the 1897 act was special rather than 
general. No question was raised concerning the power to 
classify as illustrated by the 1898 act. 
However, in the very recent case of Philadelphia B. & 
W.R. Co. v. Mayor & Council of Wilmington/ the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery was directly faced with determining 
the validity of tax assessments under the 1898 8 act authoriz-
ing the above classification. A bill in equity was filed, its 
purpose being to remove the cloud of an alleged improper 
municipal tax lien on the plaintiff's property and to secure 
an injunction against the collection of the tax levied. For 
6 21 Del. 218, 59 Atl. 948 {1905). 
7 30 Del. Ch. 213,57 A. 2d 759 (1948). 
8 It was held, id. at 218-220, that the 1898 act was not repealed by im-
plication by 28 Del. Laws, c. 121 ( 1915). However, the 1898 act has since 
been expressly repealed by Del. Laws 1949, c. 328. 
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many years prior to 194 7, plaintiff's property located in the 
city of Wilmington had been classified as rural property, and 
had consequently been taxed at the lower general property 
tax rate. In 194 7, the proper authorities reclassified plain-
tiff's property and taxed it at the full rate as "built up" prop-
erty. One of the questions raised by the pleadings in this 
case was whether the 1898 law (21 Del. Laws, c. 106) 
violated Art. VIII, § 1 of the 1897 constitution.9 The court, 
in concluding that it did not, stated: 
Under the language of Section 1, Article VIII, it is, neces-
sarily, conceded that the Legislature has the right to classify 
property for the purpose of taxation, provided the classifica-
tion adopted is reasonable and not purely arbitrary.10 
The court concluded that lands used for agricultural pur-
poses might be classified and taxed at a lower rate than other 
realty within the territory of the taxing authority.11 
The above four cases are the only Delaware opinions con-
cerning the meaning of the uniformity clause in Art. VIII, 
§ 1 of the Delaware Constitution.12 However, they are 
sufficient to indicate the considerable discretion with which 
the Delaware legislature is vested. As a result of this inter-
pretation of the provision, such questions as the nature of an 
income tax become relatively unimportant. Moreover, 
though it has not been attempted, it seems clear that the 
Delaware legislature might enact a classified property tax 
if it so desired.13 
9 /d. at 218. 
lO !d. at 222, emphasis added. 
11 /d. at 222-22 5. 
12 But see the recent case, Brennan v. Black, 104 A. 2d 777 (1954), 
which was decided after the analysis in the text was written. The uniformity 
problem was simply one among many issues, and none of the conclusions in 
the text are contradicted in any manner. 
13 At present, there is no state general property-tax rate and the local 
tax is not classified, although all personal property is exempted. Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 30, §102. 
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3. Georgia 
a. The provisions; historical note 
Georgia has had several constitutions. In the first three, 
dated 1789, 1798, and 1865 respectively, there were no pro-
visions dealing expressly with uniformity of taxation. The 
first such provision was incorporated in the Bill of Rights of 
the constitution of 18 68, of which Art. I, §2 7 read: 
... and taxation on property shall be ad valorem only, and 
uniform on all species of property taxed. 
In the next constitution, dated 18 77, the uniformity struc-
ture became more complex. The uniformity clause was 
placed in Art. VII, §II, ~I, and phrased as follows: 
All taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of sub-
jects, and ad valorem on all property subject to be taxed 
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. 
This basic uniformity clause served during the period from 
1877 to 1937. In 1937, Art. VII, §II, ~1, of the 1877 con-
stitution was amended so that the part indicated by italics 
was omitted and certain new material added. The amended 
uniformity provision read: 
. . . All taxation shall be uniform upon the same class 
of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levy-
ing the tax. Classes of subjects for taxation of property shall 
consist of tangible property, and one or more classes of in-
tangible personal property including money. The General 
Assembly shall have the power to classify property including 
money for taxation, and to adopt different rates and different 
methods for different classes of such property. 
The present constitution of Georgia came into effect in 
1945. The uniformity clause, now found in Art. VII, § 1, 
~III, is identical to the amended clause of the 18 77 consti-
tution. In addition to this uniformity clause, the uniformity 
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structure of the 1945 constitution contains an exemption pro-
vision, Art. VII, §I, ~IV/ providing that the legislature may 
exempt designated classes of property, and concluding as 
follows: 
. . . All laws exempting property from taxation, other than 
the property herein enumerated, shall be void. 
The list of permissible exemptions is quite extensive. The 
exemption provisions of the prior 1877 constitution were 
substantially identical to the present Art. VII, §I, ~IV, ex-
cept that the several permissible exemptions were spread 
over a number of paragraphs, and the final sentence forbid-
ding other exemptions constituted a separate paragraph 
(Art. VII, §II, ~IV). 
It is clear that the new constitution of 1945 made no real 
change in the uniformity structure of the Georgia Constitu-
tion, so that the present uniformity limitation is in fact a 
continuation of that limitation established by the amended 
18 77 constitution. Three periods stand out in determining 
the meaning of these uniformity provisions. First, there is 
the effective uniformity limitation which governed from 
1868 to 1877. The years from 1877 to the present may be 
divided into two significant periods. First, there is the pe-
riod from 18 77 to 19 3 7 under the uniformity clause in the 
original constitution of 1877. Second, there is the period 
from 1937 to the present, under the uniformity clause in 
the 1877 constitution as amended in 1937 and carried over 
into the new constitution of 1945. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
The court has consistently ruled that the uniformity 
clause in Art. VII, §II, ~I of the 1877 constitution, carried 
over in Art. VII, §I, ~III of the present 1945 constitution, 
1 Also see Art. VII, §II, UIV, providing for special treatment, to a degree, 
for public utilities. For the text of that provision see the Appendix, infra. 
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limits all taxes, whether considered property or nonproperty 
taxes.2 However, for nonproperty taxes this has not re-
sulted in any different limitation from that ordinarily found 
in the other states. Such nonproperty taxes need only have 
reasonable classes as their objects/ and classifications for rate 
schedules are permitted.4 This includes a graduated rate 
schedule, upheld in Featherstone v. Norman5 when the va-
2 AleadingcaseisFeatherstonev. Norman, 170 Ga. 370,153 S.E. 58 
{1930), upholding the Georgia income tax. See note 31, infra. Also see the 
review of the cases in Wright v. Hirsch, 155 Ga. 229,234-235, 116 S.E. 
795 {1922). 
3 There are a large number of Georgia cases on this point, far too nu-
merous to analyze here, all concerned with the usual question of reasonable-
ness of classification. For example, see: City of Atlanta v. Georgia Milk 
Producers Confederation, 187 Ga. 117, 200 S.E. 712 {1938); Camp v. 
State, 171 Ga. 25, 154 S.E. 436 {1930); Coy v. Linder, 183 Ga. 583, 
189 S.E. 26 (1936); City of Douglas v. South Georgia Grocery Co., ISO 
Ga. 519, 179 S.E. 768 {1935), finding an arbitrary classification; Ewing 
v. Wright, 159 Ga. 303, 125 S.E. 445 (1924), finding an arbitrary classi-
fication; Forrester v. Edwards, 192 Ga. 5 29, 15 S.E. 2d 8 5 I { 1941) ; 
Guerry v. Harrison, 178 Ga. 669,173 S.E. 831 (1934); Head v. Ciga-
rette Sales Co., 188 Ga. 452, 4 S.E. 2d 203 (1939); Hoffman & Crowell 
v. Harrison, 171 Ga. 792, 156 S.E. 685 ( 1930); Lloyd v. Richardson, 15 8 
Ga. 633,124 S.E. 37 (1924); Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Au-
gusta, 109 Ga. 73, 35 S.E. 71 (1899), finding an arbitrary classification; 
Richardson v. Citizens Trust Co., 176 Ga. 553, 168 S.E. 306 (1932); 
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 97 Ga. 114,25 S.E. 249 (1895); Southern 
Transfer Co. v. Harrison, 171 Ga. 358, 155 S.E. 338 (1930); Weaver v. 
State, 89 Ga. 639, 15 S.E. 840 (1892); Wright v. Fulton County, 169 
Ga. 354, 150 S.E. 262 (1929). 
4 For example, see: Farkas v. Smith, 147 Ga. 503, 94 S.E. I 016 ( 1917) 
(inheritance tax). 
5 Supra note 2. However, in some earlier cases there was controversy 
concerning this question. In Johnston v. Macon, 62 Ga. 645 (1879) and 
O'Neal v. Siloan, 147 Ga. 420, 94 S.E. 238 (1917), certain local occupa-
tion taxes with bases of gross value were considered. The court held that the 
rate for such a tax had to be "ad valorem," that is, a proportional rate as 
contrasted with the flat rate graduated according to increasing amounts of 
gross sales. However, those two cases have been distinguished in numerous 
subsequent cases which have relied on a distinction between the bases of 
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lidity of an income tax was considered. However, the gradu-
ated rate schedule for the first Georgia chain store tax, dated 
1927, was held to be arbitrary for the reason that the rate 
increased only when more than five stores were owned or 
operated. 6 The court has upheld an inheritance tax as a non-
property tax, 7 and in a leading case among the state cases on 
the nature of income taxes, Featherstone v. Norman8, that 
the Georgia income tax was a nonproperty tax. The rationale 
of the court was that an income tax is not a tax upon property 
because income is not property within the meaning of the 
constitutional provisions relating to tax limitations. Conse-
quently, the income tax had only to conform to the uniform-
ity within classes limitation, and the graduated rate schedule 
and the numerous exemptions were upheld. 
( 1) Property taxation: 1868 to 1877 
Beginning with the words of Art. I, §27 of the 1868 
constitution-"taxation on property shall be ad valorem 
only, and uniform on all species of property taxed"-the 
court had no trouble in reaching the conclusions that specific 
property taxes were prohibited,9 but exemptions of property 
were permissible.10 Thus, there was no rule of universality. 
the taxes under consideration, Other taxes have been upheld in which the 
tax rate was similar to that struck down in the two cases cited above. For 
example, an occupation tax on barbershops, with the rate being graduated 
according to the number of chairs, was upheld in Price v. Richardson, 159 
Ga. 299, 125 S.E. 449 (1924). 
6 Woolworth Co. v. Harrison, 172 Ga. 179, 156 S.E. 904 ( 1931 ). 
7 Farkas v. Smith, supra note 4. 
8 Supra note 2. The court refused to overrule the Featherstone case in 
Green & Milam v. State Revenue Comm., 188 Ga. 442, 4 S.E. 2d 144 
( 1939). The Featherstone case is discussed in more detail in Part C of 
Chapter V. 
9 Livingston v. Albany, 41 Ga. 21 (1870). See the discussion of the tax 
in question in note 11, infra. 
10 Athens v. Long, 54 Ga. 330 (1875); Waring v. Savannah, 60 Ga. 93 
(1878). 
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To the contrary, there was considerable controversy con-
cerning the extent to which Art. I, §27 limited the effective 
rates applicable to that property actually selected for taxa-
tion. During the nine-year period in which the 1868 consti-
tution was in effect, the confusion which was apparent in the 
several pertinent opinions was never resolved. The issue 
turned on a proper construction of the clause "and uniform 
on all species of property taxed." The difficulty concerned 
the meaning of the words "species of." A brief chronological 
review of the decisions will aid in understanding later con-
stitutional development. In Livingston v. Albany11 there 
was dictum to the effect that property had to be uniformly 
taxed only as to "species" or "classes" of property. How-
ever, the statement was wholly unnecessary, the tax being 
held invalid because it was a specific, rather than an ad va-
lorem tax. 
In Augusta v. National Bank12 the plaintiff sought to en-
join the city from collecting a tax levied on shares of stock 
held and owned by the shareholders in the plaintiff bank on 
the ground that the tax was illegal. It was alleged that shares 
were taxed at one per cent, while bonds and notes and other 
moneyed capital were taxed at only one-fourth of one per 
cent. The trial court granted an injunction restraining the 
collection of the tax imposed in excess of one-fourth of one 
per cent. In affirming this judgment the Georgia Supreme 
Court clearly stated the view that an absolute uniformity in 
effective rates was required, saying: "The tax on all species 
of property must be the same, in order to make it uniform, 
11 Supra note 9. The city enacted an ordinance declaring that "the sum 
of one dollar be imposed on each and every horse or mule offered and sold 
within the city by or belonging to horse or mule drovers." The court ruled 
that the tax was a tax on property, and that it had to fall because it was 
specific rather than ad valorem. 
12 47 Ga. 563 (I 873). 
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as required by the Constitution.m3 This view was again ex-
pressed two years later in Athens v. Long,14 in which the 
court held that exemptions of property were permitted, but 
in so holding stated by way of dictum that "upon whatever 
property a tax is laid, the same shall be by one uniform rate, 
according to its value." 
In the final case on this problem under the 18 68 constitu-
tion, Waring v. Savannah, 1~ the court indicated its prefer-
ence for a construction of Art. I, §27, which would admit 
the power to classify property for effective rates. However, 
13 /d. at 564. The court stated: 
There can be no discrimination in favor of any one species of property 
which is taxed, over any other species of property taxed, but the tax 
imposed must be ad valorem and uniform on all species of property taxed. 
It necessarily follows, therefore, that the tax to be levied upon the shares 
of shareholders in the respective banks mentioned in the record by the 
City . . . must be the same as that levied upon other property-that is 
to say, the tax on all species of property must be the same, in order to 
make it uniform, as required by the Constitution. A tax of one per cent 
on the shares of the shareholders in the respective banks in the record 
mentioned, and a tax of one fourth of one per cent upon other capital, or 
other property taxed, is not a uniform tax, within the true intent and 
meaning of the Constitution .... Why should the honestly acquired 
earning of one man, when lawfully invested in bank stock, be taxed as 
property, at a higher rate of taxation than the honestly acquired earnings 
of another man, who has invested the proceeds of his labor in bonds, 
notes, land, or any species of taxable property? Equality is equity, and 
when all species of property shall be taxed according to its value, at a 
uniform rate, then the necessary burden of taxation . . . will operate 
equitably and justly on all. [Emphasis added.] 
See note 18, infra. 
14 Supra note 1 0 at 3 31. Also see Wayne v. Savannah, 56 Ga. 449 
(1876), refusing to disturb the injunction granted by a lower court which 
restrained the taxing of real estate by the city at a greater rate than that 
applicable to stocks, bonds, moneyed capital, etc. The rates in the ordinance 
were respectively 2~% and ~ of 1 %· The demurrer admitted that the 
variation in the rates was illegal, and the Supreme Court did not discuss the 
uniformity question. 
15 60 Ga. 93 (1878). 
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the court avoided making a decision on this point. The local 
general property tax rate was challenged as violating the 
uniformity clause because ( 1) it exempted certain property 
from taxation; ( 2) realty was taxed at two and one-fourth 
per cent while interest on bonds, notes, judgments and the 
like was taxed at only one per cent; and (3) gross earnings 
of banks and income from certain kinds of business were 
taxed at one per cent while realty was taxed at two and one-
fourth per cent. The court first noted that exemptions were 
clearly permissible.16 However, it was admitted that Art. I, 
§27 was ambiguous as to the uniformity required of rates, 
one possible construction being that all property should be 
taxed uniformly at the same rate, and the other that "each 
species" of property should bear the same rate. The court 
agreed that the language in Augusta v. National Bank and in 
Athens v. Long seemed to adopt the construction requiring 
absolute uniformity. However, the language in the Augusta 
case was set against its background and it was concluded that 
in the Augusta opinion: 
. . . the Chief Justice meant that each species of property 
should be taxed the same rate. And, by an examination of 
those cases, it will be seen that the tax complained of was 
all a tax on personal property-capital employed differently. 
So that the ruling in that case really is, that tax upon capital 
-strictly so called-invested in banks, cannot be greater 
than that invested in bonds, notes, etc.17 
Falling back on the words of Art. I, §27, the court asserted 
that, certainly, " [ t] he word 'species' must mean something 
in the constitution." Otherwise, it could have been omitted. 
Indicating how it would decide the question the court said: 
The true interpretation of the clause is doubtful, and in case 
16 /d. at 96. 
17 /d. at 97-98. The emphasis on the word "meant" is supplied by this 
writer. Compare note 13, supra. 
UNIFORMITY STRUCTURES 371 
of doubt it is, perhaps, best, as we cannot ascertain the precise 
inequality in this case, to give the benefit of the doubt to the 
taxing power. Especially, as the Chief Justice, who delivered 
the opinion in the Augusta Case, informs us that such was 
his construction and meaning in that case. . . .18 
As for the language of the Athens case, the court discounted 
it, commenting on the effect of the decision as follows: 
Indeed, the principle ruled in the Athens case breaks up the 
ad valorem and uniform system, if it be construed to be ap-
plicable to all property. For, if one species of property can 
be left out and not taxed at all, what reason can there be for 
it to be taxed less than another species. . . .19 
In the final analysis, the court turned the above discussion 
into dictum when it shifted the basis for the decision from 
an interpretation of the meaning of the uniformity clause to 
a decision on the nature of "income."20 The court concluded 
that gross earnings, interest, etc. are "income" rather than 
"property" in the sense of the constitution and for the pur-
pose at hand. Thus, the "true" question was: "Is income 
property, in the sense of the Constitution, and must it be 
taxed at the same rate as other property?" The court ruled 
negatively on each question, thus concluding that income was 
not property.21 Consequently, it was held that the lower 
court did not err in sustaining the ordinance of the city as 
being within the constitution. It was on this last point that 
the case gained its significance at a later date when the issue 
arose concerning the validity of an income tax. The Waring 
18 !d. at 98, emphasis added. But see the words of the Chief Justice, note 
13, supra. Note the words emphasized therein. 
19 !d. at 98. 
20 The court, id. at 99, also pointed out the difficult problem which 
would arise concerning an appropriate remedy if it should hold that abso-
lute uniformity should prevail. 
21 /d. at 99-100. 
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case set the course for the decision on that issue in Feather-
stone v. Norman22 in 1930. 
The situation never developed beyond the above discus-
sion under the 1868 uniformity provision. Consequently, it 
is clear why the Georgia court at a later date could only 
state that "possibly" taxable property could be classified for 
rates under the 1868 constitution.23 Also, this background 
of judicial conflict makes for better understanding of the 
opinions interpreting the uniformity clause under the subse-
quent constitution of 18 77. 
(2) Property taxation: 1877 to 1937 
An increased strictness in the effective uniformity limita-
tion governing the taxation of property was brought about 
by the 18 77 constitution. The uniformity clause of that con-
stitution was substantially different from the clause in the 
prior constitution of 1868. The "ad valorem" clause re-
mained, but the "uniform on all species of property taxed" 
clause was replaced with the words "All taxation shall be 
uniform upon the same class of subjects." 
As indicated above/4 the court held that the uniformity 
clause of the 18 77 constitution applied to all taxes. And 
two cases decided within a few years after the new constitu-
tion came into effect spelled out the uniformity required of 
property taxes. In Verdery v. Summerville/5 decided in 
1888, the court held that the imposition of a property tax 
reaching only real property would violate both the uniform-
ity clause and the clause expressly prohibiting exemptions. 
22 Supra notes 2, 8. 
23 Thus, in Verdery v. Summerville, 82 Ga. 138, 139, 8 S.E. 213 
{ 18 8 8), citing the Waring case, the court said: "There are, if not direct 
decisions, some intimations to that effect (that classification for rates was 
permissible]." 
24 See text at note 2, supra. 
25 Supra note 23. 
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As for the latter provision, the court asserted that the failure 
to tax personalty was, in fact, an exemption.26 In addition, 
distinguishing the 1877 clause from that found in the 1868 
constitution, the court began its opinion by expressing the 
view that the uniformity clause would not permit the classi-
fication of property for different rates. Property was a single 
class. Classification for omission from the tax amounted to 
no more than classification for a lower rate, namely, 
"zero."27 
In Savannah v. Weed/8 decided two years later, in 1890, 
the problem of classification for rates was directly faced. The 
city of Savannah had classified property under a tax ordi-
nance as follows: real property was to be taxed at two and 
one-eighth per cent; bank stock at three-tenths of one per 
cent; and all other personal property at one-half of one per 
cent. The court held that this system violated the uniformity 
clause, and in so ruling gave a restrictive interpretation to 
that constitutional provision. 29 First, it pointed out that the 
clause requiring a uniformity within classes of "subjects" 
was followed in the same sentence by the ad valorem re-
quirement as to "property subject to be taxed." Second, it 
was ruled that the uniformity clause (apart from the ad va-
lorem clause) applied to all taxes. This aided the court in 
its conclusion that within the meaning of the uniformity 
provision, property as a whole was to constitute but a single 
"subject." Thus, if property was to be taxed, all must be 
taxed except that designated as exemptible by the constitu-
tion; and, once taxed, the ad valorem method must be used 
and the same effective rate made applicable to all such prop-
erty taxed. 
26 I d. at 14-2. 
27 !d. at 139. 
28 84 Ga. 683, II S.E. 235 (1890). 
29 !d. at 685-686. 
374 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
Summarizing, the 1877 uniformity provision, apart from 
the complementary clause expressly prohibiting exemptions, 
was interpreted to require universality, 30 the use of the ad 
valorem method, and an absolute uniformity in effective 
rates.81 Having thus restrictively interpreted the uniformity 
provision of the 1877 constitution,32 the court set the stage 
for the amendment of 1937, the purpose of which was to 
negate to some degree the court's interpretation established 
in the above line of cases decided during the period from 
1 8 77 to 19 3 7. 
liO Also see: Georgia State Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Savannah, I 09 Ga. 63, 
35 S.E. 67 ( 1899) (holding invalid as contrary to both the uniformity and 
ad valorem clauses a statutory scheme providing that the taxation of shares 
to the holders thereof, as property, was to be in lieu of all other taxes as-
sessed against the associations); Brown v. Southern Ry. Co., 125 Ga. 772, 
54 S.E. 729 (1906); Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Wright, 125 Ga. 589, 
54 S.E. 52 ( 1906); Atlanta Nat. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Stewart, I 09 
Ga. 80, 3 5 S.E. 73 ( 1899). 
81 The court seemed to consider both the failure to tax some property 
(Brown case, supra note 30; Verdery case, supra note 23) and the exemp-
tion of property (Atlanta Nat. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Stewart, supra note 
3 0) as being, in effect, the classification of property for the lower rate of 
"zero." 
32 The scope of the uniformity requirement before the 19 3 7 amendment 
was rather neatly summed up in the income tax case, Featherstone v. Nor-
man, supra note 2 at 384, where the court said: 
By this provision the makers of the constitution put property in one class 
and clothed the legislature with ample and full power to classify the 
subjects of taxation other than property. The legislature cannot classify 
property, and impose upon one species thereof a different tax from that 
imposed on other species. Property subject to be taxed is treated as a 
single class, and there can be levied but one rate on all species of it. • . . 
But such uniformity does not require that a tax upon all classes of sub-
jects shall be the same or be uniform with the tax imposed upon property. 
In any class, the uniformity required is that a tax upon each member 
shall be the same. • . • The power of the legislature to classify the sub-
jects of taxation other than property is full, and is subject only to the 
limitation that the classification must be reasonable and not arbitrary. 
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(3) Property taxation: since 1937 
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It is important to notice the precise change in terminology 
made by the 1937 amendment to Art. VII, §II, ~I, of the 
1877 constitution. The "ad valorem" clause was deleted. 
Two sentences were added which provide that property is 
to constitute two or more classes: tangible property is a sin-
gle class, while intangible property (including money) is 
subject to further classification at the discretion of the legis-
lature. In addition, the specific difficulty of the earlier cases 
was met by providing that property may be classified and 
the legislature may "adopt different rates" for the different 
classes of property. Finally, note the final words, as italicized 
below: 
The General Assembly shall have the power to classify 
property including money for taxation, and to adopt differ-
ent rates and different methods for different classes of such 
property. 
The significance of the words concerning "methods" is yet 
to be determined. 
Since the amended provision of the 18 77 constitution was 
carried over verbatim into the new 1945 constitution as Art. 
VII, §I, ~III, the present effective uniformity limitation in 
Georgia dates from 1937. Briefly, this is the meaning of that 
limitation. The requirement of universality remains un-
changed. 33 The express prohibition against exemptions (Art. 
VII, §I, ~IV) is still a source of this requirement. However, 
under the prior constitution, the requirement of universality 
was derived from the uniformity clause as such, and it might 
be pertinent to note that, even in the absence of a clause ex-
pressly prohibiting exemptions, the amended uniformity 
33 For example, Sheffield v. State School Bldg. Authority, 208 Ga. 575, 
582,68 S.E. 2d 590 (1952). 
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clause expressly mentions the classification of property only 
for the purpose of using different "rates and methods." 
The obvious change made by the amended uniformity 
clause concerns effective rates. Clearly, an absolute uniform-
ity in effective rates is no longer required; the effective 
rates need only be uniform within classes of property. But 
the new requirement in reality makes only a rather limited 
change, because a large part of property, in general, remains 
a single minimum class, namely, tangible property. Thus, 
insofar as tangible property is concerned no change was 
made by the 1937 amendment. The only real effect of the 
change was to permit the classification of intangible prop-
erty for the purpose of applying different effective rates to 
the different classes. Thus, in Parke, Davis & Co. v. City 
of A tlanta,S4 decided in 1946, the court upheld a statutory 
scheme providing for the classification and taxation of intan-
gible property. The classification was held not to be unrea-
sonable. And the Georgia legislature has made use of the 
amended provision to provide for a classified intangibles 
tax. 311 
The question remains, must property still be taxed by the 
ad valorem method, or, does the amended uniformity clause 
sanction specific property taxes? There has been no interpre-
tation of the provision concerning this particular point. It 
may be pointed out that the ad valorem clause found in the 
constitutions of 1868 and 1877 (originally) was deleted by 
the 1937 amendment. That provision, was, of course, an ex-
press source of the ad valorem requirement. However, the 
deletion of that clause might well be explained by the classi-
fication-for-rates problem. In the early cases86 under the 
34 200 Ga. 296,36 S.E. 2d 773 (1946). 
85 Ga. Code Ann. §92.250. 
36 See Verdery v. Summerville, supra note 23, and Savannah v. Weed, 
supra note 28. 
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1877 constitution, the ad valorem clause had been the source 
of the rationale making property a minimum class. The 
manner in which the ad valorem clause followed the words 
of uniformity in the original 1 8 77 uniformity provision was 
relied on in one line of reasoning to support the conclusion 
that property was obviously intended to constitute a single 
class. Thus, the elimination of the prohibition against classi-
fication of property for rates might well explain to some ex-
tent the deletion of the ad valorem clause. 
However, this does not completely explain the new con-
stitutional uniformity provision. What of the words: "to 
adopt different methods for different classes of such prop-
erty?" Why include the phrase "different methods" as well 
as the phrase "different rates?" The express inclusion of 
reference to rates should indicate an intent for "different 
methods" to refer to other problems. It would not be un-
reasonable to conclude that the intent of the amended uni-
formity clause, as in force today, is that other than the ad 
valorem method may be used in the taxation of different 
classes of property. Some question might arise as to whether 
or not this last sentence concerning rates and methods re-
fers only to the classification of intangible property. In view 
of the fact that only intangible property may be further 
classified, it is not unlikely that the Supreme Court of Geor-
gia would take a dim view of a specific property tax on tan-
gible property. 37 
37 A case decided after the text was written contains dictum indicating 
that the ad valorem requirement remains for tangible property. See para-
graph 2 of Hutchins v. Howard, 211 Ga. 830, 89 S.E. 2d 183 (1955). 
There was no discussion, only a flat assertion which ignored the above-
described textual development of the constitution. As authority, the court 
simply cited the Verdery case, supra note 23. The uniformity issue was 
actually limited to applying the rule requiring absolute uniformity in the 
effective rate applicable to all tangible property taxed. Perhaps implicit is 
the idea that this rule of necessity requires the use of the ad valorem method. 
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4. Idaho 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The uniformity structure of the original and only consti-
tution of Idaho, dated 1890, is found primarily in Art. VII, 
§§2 and 5, and is rather redundant. There are two pro-
visions, both of which have served as basic uniformity clauses 
in other state constitutions. The uniformity clause which is 
used to classify Idaho is found in Art. VII, §5, which also 
contains both a provision expressly resolving the problem of 
exemptions of property, and a provision expressly concerning 
"duplicate taxation." Section 5 of Art. VII reads as follows: 
All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects 
within the territorial limits, of the authority levying the tax, 
and shall be levied and collected under general laws, which 
shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valua-
tion for taxation of all property, real and personal: provided, 
that the legislature may allow such exemptions from taxation 
from time to time as shall seem necessary and just ... : 
provided further, that duplicate taxation of property for the 
same purpose during the same year, is hereby prohibited. 
The "duplicate taxation" clause is the only such provision 
found in any of the state constitutions. Of equal importance 
to the uniformity structure is a "proportionality clause" 
found in Art. VII, §2, similar to the provision which serves 
as the sole uniformity clause in the states classified as having 
a Type II clause. Section 2 of Art. VII provides: 
The legislature shall provide such revenue as may be 
needful, by levying a tax by valuation, so that every person 
or corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of 
his, her, or its property, except as in this article hereinafter 
otherwise provided. . . .1 
1 The omitted part of Art. VII, §2 reads: 
The legislature may also impose a license tax, both upon natural persons 
and upon corporations, other than municipal, doing business in this 
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In addition to the general clause in Art. VII, §5 concerning 
the power of the legislature to exempt property from taxa-
tion, Art. VII, §4 provides for the mandatory exemption of 
certain classes of public property. Finally, playing an im-
portant part in the development of the meaning of the effec-
tive uniformity limitation is Art. VII, §3, which provides: 
"The word 'property' as herein used shall be defined and 
classified by law." This refers to Art. VII, which is entitled 
"Finance and Revenue." 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
It is clear that taxes in Idaho are classified, for purposes 
of uniformity of taxation, as either property or nonproperty 
taxes/ and that nonproperty taxes are required only to be 
uniform within classes. The objects of such taxes and exemp-
tions therefrom need only be reasonable classifications,3 and, 
in addition, there may be classification of the objects of such 
taxes for application of different rates.4 The court has ap-
proved a graduated rate schedule, both under the income 
state; also a per capita tax: provided, That the legislature may exempt a 
limited amount of improvements upon land from taxation. 
2 The Diefendorf v. Gallet, 51 Idaho 619, 633, 10 P. 2d 311 (1932), 
the court stated: 
In its modern sense an excise tax is any tax which does not fall within 
the classification of a poll tax or a property tax, and embraces every form 
of burden not laid directly upon persons of property. 
The Idaho court has used the term "excise tax" to designate the broad 
class of taxes called "nonproperty taxes" in this comparative study. 
3 See Diefendorf v. Gallet, supra note 2; Idaho Gold Dredging Co. v. 
Balderston, 58 Idaho 692, 78 P. 2d 105 (1938); Johnson v. Diefendorf, 
56 Idaho 620, 57 P. 2d I 068 ( 1936); ]. C. Penny Co. v. Diefendorf, 54 
Idaho 374,32 P. 2d 784 (1934); Smallwood v. Jeter, 42 Idaho 169,244 
Pac. 149 ( 1926). Finding an arbitrary classification: State v. Crosson, 33 
Idaho 140, 190 Pac. 922 (1920). 
4 See Garret Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pfost, 54 Idaho 576, 33 P. 2d 743 
( 19 34) and the cases in notes 5 and 6, infra. 
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tax~ and the chain store tax. 6 The precise source of the uni-
formity limitation applicable to nonproperty taxes has never 
been clearly stated. Although the court almost invariably 
states that the uniformity clauses in Art. VII, §§2 and 5 do 
not limit nonproperty taxes, nevertheless there is the occa-
sional, rather vague negative assertion that "the equality 
clause does not forbid reasonable classification."7 This prob-
lem is of trivial concern insofar as nonproperty taxes are 
concerned; however, it has important implications for the 
interpretation of the uniformity clause in Art. VII, §5 as it 
applies to property taxes. For, if the court has interpreted 
the uniformity clause in Art. VII, §5 as applicable to prop-
erty taxation alone-and that has probably been its intent-
then the phrase "uniform upon the same class of subjects" is 
limited to property. This, of course, would increase the 
probability of a decision favoring a classified property tax. 
Because of the stricter uniformity required of property 
taxes it is important to characterize a tax as either property 
or nonproperty.8 No clear test has been developed, but it is 
of interest to note that a graduated probate fee was held to 
be a tax on property9 and a violation of Art. VII, §5 for 
5 Diefendorf v. Gallet, mpra note 2. 
6 ]. C. Penny Co. v. Diefendorf, supra note 3. 
7 For example, examine the opinions in Diefendorf v. Gallet, supra note 
2, and J. C. Penny Co. v. Diefendorf, supra note 3. Note particularly at pp. 
626 and 642 in the Gallet case. 
8 There has also been a controversy as to whether the legislature is limited 
to the property taxes and license taxes enumerated in Art. VII, §2. See note 
I, supra. The court has rejected any restrictive view concerning the types 
of taxes available. See, for example, the income tax case (Diefendorf v. 
Gallet, supra note 2) and Idaho Gold Dredging Co. v. Balderston, supra 
note 3, upholding a mining occupation tax which had a base of the value of 
ore extracted. 
9 Chapman v. Ada County, 48 Idaho 632, 284 Pac. 259 (1930). See 
note 19, infra. The court has also held that a mining occupation tax with 
a base of the value of ore extracted was a nonproperty tax. Idaho Gold 
Dredging Co. v. Balderston, supra note 3. Idaho has an inheritance tax 
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reasons discussed under "Property taxation" below. In 
Diefendorf v. Gallett,10 the court held that an income tax 
was a nonproperty tax. Briefly, the court relied on two lines 
of argument to reach this conclusion. First, the court made 
an extensive review of authorities from the other states, and 
concluded that the weight of authority-with which it 
agreed-and that an income tax is not a tax on property. The 
Idaho court favorably viewed the notion that the tax was 
upon the privilege of producing, creating, and enjoying in-
come. Second, the alternate line of approach was based on 
Art. VII, §3 of the state constitution which provides that 
"The word 'property' as herein used shall be defined and 
classified by law." The income tax statute purported to 
"define" income, and defined it as not being property within 
Art. VII of the constitution. This, the court concluded, was 
a proper exercise of legislative discretion. But note that im-
plicit in this rationale based on Art. VII, §3 is the idea that 
the court is thinking in terms of the power of the legislature 
to define and classify that which is, and that which is not 
property. There is no reference here to the classification of 
property for different treatment of the several classes. Thus, 
the court reasoned, even if the first line of argument had 
not been available, the conclusion would still have been 
reached that the income tax was not a tax on property. 
( 1) Property taxation 
The meaning of the uniformity limitation has been rather 
clearly developed by the court, although cases on some 
points are rather meager; this is understandable in light of 
the rather prolix uniformity structure. Of course, the Idaho 
with a classified object and a graduated rate, but there has been no uni-
formity case arising thereunder. However, in State v. Dunlap, 28 Idaho 
784, 156 Pac. 1141 ( 1916), in relation to a problem of situs and j urisdic-
tion to tax, the court held that the inheritance tax was an excise tax. 
10 Supra note 2. 
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legislature may classify property for the purpose of ex-
emptions, the only limitation being that such exemptions 
must constitute reasonable classes of property.11 In all cases 
on this point the court has relied on the provision in Art. 
VII, §5, which expressly states that "the legislature may 
allow such exemptions from taxation from time to time as 
shall seem necessary and just." Thus, the court has not had 
any occasion to discuss the relation of the uniformity clause 
in Art. VII, §5 and the proportionality clause in Art. VII, 
§2 to the power of the legislature to exempt property. That 
is, can a rule of universality be derived from one or both of 
those provisions in the absence of the express exemption 
clauser 12 It is interesting to note that in a number of cases in 
which exemptions of property from the general property tax 
were upheld the exemptions were established by the use of 
an "in lieu" nonproperty tax.13 The court has had no occasion 
to rule on the obvious-that property must be taxed by the 
ad valorem method. 
Since the Idaho court has tended to restrict the application 
of the uniformity clause in Art. VII, §5 to property taxa-
tion, this might lead one to assume that there was a better 
chance that property could be classified for effective 
11 See Williams v. Baldridge, 48 Idaho 618, 284 Pac. 203 (1930), a 
leading case on the problem, in which the court upheld the exemption from 
property taxation of the property belonging to power companies used in 
developing or transmitting electrical energy for pumping water for irriga-
tion purposes. Also see State ex rei. Bank of Eagle v. Leonardson, 51 Idaho 
646,9 P. 2d 1028 (1932). 
12 Does the fact that the "proviso" which refers to the power to exempt 
is so placed as to be a proviso to the uniformity clause carry some implication 
that in its absence, exemptions would be prohibited? 
13 A leading case is Achenbach v. Kincaid, 25 Idaho 768, 140 Pac. 529 
( 1914), which upheld the motor vehicle registration tax and the provision 
therein which provided for the exemption from all other taxes of cars af-
fected by the tax. Also see John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 
68 Idaho 185, 191 P. 2d 359 (1948); Smallwood v. Jeter, supra note 3. 
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rates. However, in this respect, one would have to consider 
the proportionality clause in Art. VII, §2, which, on its face, 
probably indicates that absolute uniformity in effective rates is 
required. The court, in fact, has not seen any possible conflict 
between the two provisions and has simply cited both pro-
visions in stating its conclusion that there must be absolute 
uniformity in effective rates. 
The cases on the problem are scanty and, with one excep-
tion, concerned with the particular problem of the degree 
of uniformity required of the ratio of valuation. A recent 
case is Chastain's, Inc. v. State Tax Commission,14 decided 
in 1 9 52. In that case it was established as fact by the plead-
ings that the county board of equalization had equalized all 
property in the county at 23% of its full cash value; that 
the state board of equalization had raised the assessed valua-
tion of merchandise, machinery, and furniture and fixtures, 
but of no other taxable property in the county, from 23% 
of full cash value to 29.9%; and that the plaintiff and all 
those in the county similarly situated would be compelled by 
the acts of the state tax commission to pay a greater propor-
tion of the taxes than would other property owners owning 
items of property other than merchandise, machinery, and 
furniture and fixtures in the county.15 In an original proceed-
ing the Idaho Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition 
to arrest proceedings of the state tax commission on the 
ground that the action of the commission "as admitted by 
the pleadings offends the provisions of Article VII, Sections 
2 and 5 of the Constitution, requiring uniformity of taxa-
tion.m6 Never distinguishing between the two sections of the 
14 72 Idaho 344, 241 P. 2d 167 (1952). Also see Anderson's Red & 
White Store v. Kootenai County, 70 Idaho 260,215 P. 2d 815 (1950); 
Washington County v. First Nat. Bank, 35 Idaho 438, 206 Pac. 1054 
(1922). 
15 Chastain's, Inc. v. State Tax Comm., supra note 14 at 348. 
16 !d. at 348-349, emphasis added. 
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constitution, and never taking notice of the particular ter-
minology of Art. VII, §5 ("uniform upon the same class of 
subjects"), the court simply asserted: 
The Constitution requires that for tax purposes the ad 
valorem tax must be uniform and on the same basis of valua-
tion as other property within the county, and if this require-
ment of uniformity has not been attained, and retained, then 
the mandate of Article VII, Sections 2 and 5 of the Con-
stitution, has been violated .... Uniformity in taxing 
implies equality in the burden of taxation and this equality 
of burden cannot exist without uniformity in the mode of 
assessment as well as in the rate of tax . . . ; again, the re-
quirement that all property be assessed at its actual cash 
value [a statutory requirement] is secondary to the constitu-
tional mandate of equality of taxation.17 
Note the words of the court: "must be uniform," "require-
ment of uniformity," "uniformity in taxing," "constitutional 
mandate of equality of taxation." If Art. VIII, §5 is to be 
limited to property taxes, then what is the meaning of that 
phrase "upon the same class of subjects?" Does it not carry 
at least some implication that property may be classified? 
Certainly the requirement in Art. VII, §2 that "every person 
17 !d. at 348, emphasis added. However, in Washington County v. 
First Nat. Bank, supra note 14 at 444, the court refers only to the uni-
formity clause in Art. VII, §5 when faced with a similar problem, saying: 
The requirement that all property be assessed at its actual cash value is 
secondary to the constitutional mandate of equality of taxation. Where 
certain property is assessed at a higher valuation than all other property, 
the court will enforce the requirement of uniformity by a reduction of 
the taxes on the property assessed at the higher valuation, if it be shown 
that the difference is the result not of mere error in judgment, but of 
fraud or of intentional and systematic discrimination. 
In the Washington County case, even more than in the Chastain case dis-
cussed in the text, the court ignored the actual words of the uniformity 
clause, simply quoting Art. VII, §5, and then making the above statement. 
Somehow the words "uniform upon the same class of subjects" disappeared 
entirely. 
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or corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of 
his, her, or its property, except as in this article hereinafter 
otherwise provided" appears to imply a likely prohibition 
against classification of property. If that is so, how should 
the conflict be resolved? Which clause should control if there 
appears to be a conflict? Not bothered by such difficulties, the 
court has merely asserted that "the provisions of Article 
VII, Sections 2 and 5 of the Constitution, requir [ e] uni-
formity of taxation."18 
Other than the ratio of valuation cases, Chapman v. Ada 
County19 is of interest. In that case, the court held invalid a 
statute setting forth the schedule of probate court fees; fixing 
a minimum fee at five dollars; and providing for a graduated 
fee scale for estates, the value of which exceeded $5000, with 
the fee increasing as the value of the estate increased. The 
court held (I) that the statute imposed a "tax" "in guise of 
a fee," and (2) that the tax could not be held an inheritance 
tax but was 
. . . a property tax and as such, under the authorities, 
violates the uniformity provision of the Constitution. . . . 
We therefore conclude that the statute is unconstitutional 
in so far as it makes the amount of probate fees depend upon 
the value of the estate probated.20 
18 Chastain's, Inc. v. State Tax Comm., supra note 14 at 348-9. On a 
number of occasions in cases concerning nonproperty taxes the court has 
assumed that this requirement of absolute uniformity exists. For example, in 
Diefendorf v. Gallet, supra note 2 at 625, concerning the income tax, the 
court made its often repeated statement that: 
In substance the Constitution provides that all property, real and personal, 
must be taxed uniformly by value. (Canst., art. 7, sees. 2 and 5). 
19 48 Idaho 632, 284 Pac. 259 (1930). 
20 !d. at 63 5, emphasis added. The court cites as its authorities the fol-
lowing: Berryman v. Bowers, 31 Ariz. 56, 250 Pac. 361 (1926); Fatjo 
v. Pfister, 117 Cal. 83, 48 Pac. I 012 ( 1897); Malin v. Lamoure, 27 N.D. 
140, 145 N.W. 582 (1914); Cook County v. Fairbank, 222 Ill. 578, 78 
N.E. 895 {1906); State v. Mann, 76 Wis. 469, 45 N.W. 526 (1890); 
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This opinion certainly ruled out any classification of property 
according to quantity. But, quaere, does this mean that a 
proportional rate would be within "the uniformity provision 
of the Constitution" even though not correlated with the 
general property tax? Rather obviously, in light of the other 
opinions discussed above, such would not be the case, al-
though the court apparently conditioned its opinion by the 
use of the words "in so far." 
Finally, the provision, Art. VII, §5, which expressly pro-
hibits "duplicate taxation" should be noted. As pointed out 
in Chapter I, a requirement of absolute uniformity in effec-
tive rates would prohibit "double taxation." In a number of 
Idaho cases the "duplicate taxation" clause of Art. VII, §5 
has been interpreted as expressing the orthodox conception 
of "double taxation."21 Of course, if the court had not found 
that absolute uniformity was required of effective rates, then 
the "duplicate taxation" clause might have taken on some 
special significance. 
In conclusion, a consideration of the uniformity of taxation 
requirement under the Idaho Constitution illustrates again 
the manner in which the numerous types of uniformity pro-
State v. Gorman, 40 Minn. 232,41 N.W. 948 {1889). However, in each 
of the states named, with the exception of Arizona, when the case cited was 
decided the uniformity clause was of a type not having any words of classifi-
cation. 
21 In Winton Lumber Co. v. Shoshone County, 50 Idaho 130, 294 Pac. 
529 { 1930) the court said that to assess standing timber as realty and, after 
severance, to again assess in the same year the wood as sawlogs would be 
contrary to the duplicate taxation clause. Otherwise the cases have generally 
been concerned with the relation of an excise tax to the general property 
tax {State v. Jones, 9 Idaho 693, 7 5 Pac. 819 ( 1904)), or the relation of 
two excise taxes {Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 52 F. 2d 226 ( 1931)), 
or the relation between the general property tax and a local special assess-
ment for road purposes which was applicable to all property subject to the 
general property tax {Humbird Lumber Co. v. Kootenai County, 10 Idaho 
490, 79 Pac. 3 96 ( 1904)). 
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visions may be disposed of by a generalization failing to take 
account of the different wording which might actually have 
led to different results. 
5. Louisiana 
The present constitution of Louisiana came into force in 
1921, and contains one of the most complex tax structures to 
be found in a constitution. Indeed, typical of the Louisiana 
Constitution as a whole, the tax structure, at times, ap-
proaches a body of statutory law. Because of this lengthy 
"statutory" type constitutional structure, the general uni-
formity limitation has little operative effect. Consequently, it 
is sufficient for the purposes of this monograph to limit the 
Louisiana study to a mere description of the historical de-
velopment of uniformity in taxation in Louisiana. With nine 
constitutions during a period of one hundred and forty-four 
years, Louisiana has adopted a new constitution on the 
average of every sixteen years. Moreover, there has been 
prolific amendment of the present constitution of 1921. The 
almost yearly amendments are comparable to a compilation 
of the laws of a legislative session. 
In Louisiana's original constitution, dated 1812, there 
were no provisions dealing with uniformity in taxation. But 
the constitution of 1845 contained a basic uniformity clause, 
joined by a supplementary provision dealing with rates in 
property taxation, and a provision for other taxes. Article 
127 read: 
Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State. 
After the year 1848, all property on which taxes may be 
levied in this State shall be taxed in proportion to its value, 
to be ascertained as directed by law. No one species of 
property shall be taxed higher than another species of 
property of equal value, on which taxes shall be levied; the 
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legislature shall have power to levy an income tax, and to 
tax all persons pursuing any occupation, trade, or profession. 
Thus, the first Louisiana uniformity clause conformed to the 
potentially strict Type V clause, and was coupled with a 
proportionality clause of Type II. It is interesting to note 
that the 1845 constitution expressly provided for the power 
to impose an income tax. A third constitution was adopted in 
1852, and Art. 123 thereof was identical to Art. 127 of the 
1845 constitution. 
In a fourth constitution, adopted in 18 64, the steady ex-
pansion of the uniformity structure continued. Again there 
was but a single provision, substantially similar to the prior 
provision except for a clause now expressly dealing with the 
power to exempt property. Article 124 of the 18 64 constitu-
tion read: 
Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state. 
All property shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be 
ascertained as directed by law. The general assembly shall 
have power to exempt from taxation property actually used 
for church, school, or charitable purposes. The general as-
sembly shall levy an income-tax upon all persons pursuing 
any occupation, trade, or calling. . . . All tax on income 
shall be pro rata on the amount of income or business done. 
The italicized portions indicate essentially new material. 
Note the change in the income tax provision, which now pro-
vided that the legislature "shall levy" an income tax. A fifth 
constitution was adopted in 1868, and Art. 118 thereof was 
substantially identical to Art. 124 of the 18 64 constitution, 
except that the income tax clause now read: "The general 
assembly may levy. . .. " 
The sixth Louisiana Constitution, dated 18 78, brought a 
more elaborate structure. The same three basic provisions 
were included: a uniformity clause; provision for income and 
other taxes; and a limitation on the power to exempt prop-
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erty. However, each provision was now separately num-
bered and considerably lengthened. In addition, it is inter-
esting to note that the clause providing for the levy of "an 
income tax" was deleted. Article 203 contained the uniform-
ity clause, still a Type V clause, but elaborated as to uni-
formity in ratio of valuation: 
Taxation shall be equal and uniform through the terri-
torial limits of the authority levying the tax, and all prop-
erty shall be taxed in proportion to its value . . . ; pro-
vided, the assessment of all property shall never exceed the 
actual cash value thereof. . . . In order to arrive at this 
equality and uniformity the General Assembly shall ... 
provide a system of equality and uniformity in assessments, 
based upon the relative value of property in the different 
portions of the State. The valuation put upon property for 
the purposes of State taxation shall be taken as the proper 
valuation for purposes of local taxation in every subdivision 
of the State. 
Article 207, which prohibited all exemptions except those 
enumerated, read: "The following property shall be exempt 
from taxation, and no other, viz: .... " However, the ex-
tensive enumeration of classes to be exempt left little to be 
desired. Article 206 contained the provision as to "license 
taxes" and was somewhat similar to Art. X, § 8 of the pres-
ent 1921 constitution. 
A seventh constitution followed in 1898, but the structure 
was substantially the same as in the 18 78 constitution. Arti-
cle 225 was identical to Art. 203 of the 18 79 constitution; 
Article 229 identical to Art. 206. Article 230 was the same as 
Art. 207, except that more classes of exemptible property 
were enumerated. There were some changes in the eighth 
constitution, dated 1913, but the form of the 18 78 constitu-
tion was substantially followed. The uniformity clause, Art. 
225, was the same as Art. 203 in 1879, with the exception 
that an amendment in 1916 deleted everything after the 
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words "In order to arrive at .... " Article 229 contained 
the license tax provision, adding a clause as to a severance 
tax, and Art. 230 expanded even more the exemptible classes 
of property. 
In the 1921 constitution the basic uniformity clause, Art. 
X, § 1, was changed to a Type VII clause, and reads: 
. . . all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of 
subjects throughout the territorial limits of the authority 
levying the tax .... No property shall be assessed for 
more than its actual cash value. . . . The valuation and 
classification fixed for State purposes shall be the valuation 
and classification for local purposes; but the taxing authori-
ties of the local sub-division may adopt a different percentage 
of such valuation for purposes of local taxation. 
The second paragraph of Art. X, § 1 added, again, the pro-
vision dealing with income taxes, now providing: 
After May 1, 1924, equal and uniform tax, not to exceed 
three per cent and for state purposes only, may be levied 
upon net incomes. . . . Reasonable exemptions may be al-
lowed. 
In 19 34 this paragraph was amended to read as follows: 
Equal and uniform taxes may be levied upon net incomes, 
and such taxes may be graduated according to the amount of 
the net income. . . . Reasonable exemptions may be al-
lowed. 
The third paragraph of Art. X, § 1 dealt with reforestation 
and provided expressly for a severance tax. That paragraph 
has been amended several times, so that today it reaches 
several paragraphs in length and spells out the imposition of 
such a severance tax. 
Article X, §4 of the 1921 constitution now contains the 
"no exemption" clause, providing that "The following 
property, and no other, shall be exempt from taxation. . . ." 
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However, not only was the list of exemptibles expanded in 
the original 1921 version, but it is almost yearly amended 
to add classes, so that to date it covers five pages of an an-
notated volume. Other provisions of the constitution deal 
with special exemptions, too numerous to mention. 
The "other tax" provision is now in Art. X, §8, and reads 
as follows: 
License taxes may be levied on such classes or persons, 
associations of persons and corporations pursuing any trade, 
business, occupation, vocation or profession, as the Legisla-
ture may deem proper, except clerks, laborers, ministers of 
religion, school teachers, graduated trained nurses, those 
engaged in mechanical, agricultural or horticultural pursuits 
or in operating saw mills. Such license taxes may be classified, 
graduated or progressive. . . . 
However, in addition to this general clause, Art. X, §7 
provides expressly for "Taxes upon inheritances, legacies and 
donations, or gifts made in contemplation of death, [which] 
may be graduated, classified or progressive. . . ." More-
over, for example, Art. VI, §22, and Art. VI-A are, in effect, 
"statutes" imposing motor vehicle and motor fuel taxes, 
covering some thirty-five pages of the constitution. An "in 
lieu" bank tax is provided for in Art. X, §9, and other pro-
visions deal with special exemptions, for example, Art. X, 
§§9 and 22, and Art. X, § 16.2. 
6. Minnesota 
a. The provisions; historical note 
Minnesota has had but a single constitution, that of 1857. 
However, a radical change was made in the uniformity 
structure in 1906 by extensive amendment. Thus, a discus-
sion of the uniformity limitation in Minnesota may be di-
vided into two periods: that before 1906 and that subsequent 
392 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
to 1906. There were several amendments before 1906, and 
there have been several amendments since that time which 
are pertinent to a study of the uniformity limitation. How-
ever, the basic nature of the uniformity limitation remained 
constant in both periods. The period from 1857 to 1906 may 
be characterized as the period of the strictest possible uni-
formity limitation for all taxes. To the contrary, since 1906 
the Minnesota uniformity limitation has been one of the most 
liberal limitations, requiring little more than is required 
under the federal equal protection clause. 
In the original constitution the uniformity structure was 
found in sections 1, 3, and 4 of Art. IX. Article IX, § 1 con-
tained the basic uniformity clause and read: 
All taxes to be raised in this State shall be as nearly equal 
as may be, and all property on which taxes are to be levied 
shall have a cash valuation and be equalized and uniform 
throughout the State. 
Accompanying this uniformity clause was what might be 
called a "universality" clause, found in Art. IX, §3: 
Laws shall be passed taxing all moneys, credits, invest-
ments in bonds, stocks, joint stock companies, or otherwise, 
and also all real and personal property, according to its true 
value in money .... 
The remainder of Art. IX, §3 contained a proviso requiring 
the exemption of designated classes of property-the usual 
classes of public and quasi-public property, plus "personal 
property to an amount not exceeding in value two hundred 
dollars for each individual." Finally, Art. IX, §4 dealt with 
the specific problem concerning "all property employed in 
banking," and required that such property should "always be 
subject to a taxation equal to that imposed on the property 
of individuals." 
In an effort to break these rigid limitations, several 
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amendments were introduced before the radical renovation 
in 1906. In 1869 a proviso was added to Art. IX, §1 ex-
pressly providing that special assessments were to be with-
drawn from the scope of the uniformity provisions/ Next 
in order was the amendment of 18 71, adding a section to the 
legislative articles (Art. IV, §32(a)) which made possible 
the taxation of railroads on a gross-earnings basis. In 18 94, 
a further proviso was added to the section containing the 
basic uniformity clause, Art. IX, §1, this time expressly 
sanctioning an inheritance tax and apparently stating the 
degree of uniformity to govern that particular tax.2 Finally, 
in 1896 an unnumbered section was added to Art. IX. This 
unnumbered section provided for graded or progressive taxes 
on enumerated industries and businesses, with the bases of 
such taxes left to the discretion of the legislature. 3 This sec-
tion was never effective because of its poorly drafted and 
therefore confusing text. 
Then came the so-called "Wide Open Tax Amendment" 
of 1906, establishing the basic uniformity structure which 
governs in Minnesota today. Article IX, §§ 1, 3, and 4 and 
the unnumbered section to Art. IX were repealed and sup-
1 The proviso added in 1869 read: 
Prooided, that the legislature may, by general law or special act, authorize 
municipal corporations to levy assessments for local improvements upon 
the property fronting upon such improvements, or upon the property to 
be benefited by such improvements, or both, without regard to a cash 
valuation, and in such manner as the legislature may prescribe. 
This proviso was supplemented by an additional proviso in 1881. 
2 That proviso read: 
And, prooided further, that there may be by law levied and collected a 
tax upon all inheritances, devises, bequests, legacies and gifts of every 
kind and description above a fixed and specified sum, of any and all nat-
ural persons and corporations. Such tax above such exempted sum may 
be uniform, or it may be graded or progressive, but shall not exceed a 
maximum tax of five per cent. 
8 For the text of that provision, see 2 Minn. Stat. Ann. at 272. 
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planted by a single section, Art. IX, § 1. That section contains 
the uniformity clause and three provisos. The first proviso 
requires the exemption of certain classes of property, the 
second concerns special assessments and is substantially 
identical to that added in 18 69 to the original Art. IX, § 1, 
and the third ensures the continued taxation, by existing laws, 
of the gross earnings of railroads.4 The basic uniformity 
clause in section 1 now reads (with the uniformity clause 
italicized) : 
• . . Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of sub-
jects ... , but public burying grounds, public school houses, 
public hospitals, academies, colleges, universities, and all 
seminaries of learning, all churches, church property and 
houses of worship, institutions of purely public charity, pub-
lic property used exclusively for any public purpose, shall be 
exempt from taxation, [and there may be exempted from 
taxation personal property not exceeding in value $200, for 
each household, individual or head of a family, and house-
hold goods and farm machinery, as the legislature may de-
termme ... • ] li 
Since 1906 several new sections have been added to the 
Minnesota constitution, all relating to uniformity of taxation, 
but none of which alter the fundamental principle expressed 
in Art. IX, § 1-indeed, some are thought merely to make 
express what the legislature might have done without consti-
tutional objection in any case. In 1922, Art. IX, §1A was 
added. That section provides for a mandatory mining occupa-
tion tax with a base consisting of the value of ores produced 
or min~d. The tax is to be "in addition" to all other taxes pro-
vided by law. Article XVI, §3, added in 1920 (with a clari-
4 Also, Art. IV, §32a, referred to in the text, supra, is still in effect. 
11 The clause in brackets was added by amendment in 1934. The provisos 
concerning special assessments and the railroad gross earnings tax are 
omitted. 
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fying amendment in 1932), expressly provides for the 
"taxation of motor vehicles . . . on a more onerous basis 
than other personal property. . . ." The tax is to be "in 
lieu" of all other taxes on such property, except local "wheel-
age taxes." In 1926 Art. XVIII, § 1 was added. That section 
expressly provides for limited taxation, including a yield tax, 
of forest lands. Finally, there are Art. XIX, §§3 and 4, 
added in 1944, which provide, respectively, for a state excise 
tax on aircraft fuel and for the "taxation of aircraft using the 
air space overlying the State of Minnesota and the airports 
thereof." The latter tax is "in lieu" of all other taxation 
thereon. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
The Minnesota court has developed the doctrine, under 
both the pre-1906 uniformity clause and the post-1906 
provision, that all taxes are limited by such clauses. Thus, 
during both periods the determination of the nature of any 
given tax has often been avoided as simply being unnecessary. 
Because of the rather peculiar development of the Minnesota 
material on this problem of uniformity it is convenient to dis-
cuss the limitation as to all taxes according to the periods 
involved. 
(1) Taxation, generally: 1857 to 1906 
The restriction during this period constituted the most 
rigid uniformity limitation theoretically possible. As for the 
taxation of property, the court ruled that the uniformity 
clause in the original Art. IX, §1, taken in conjunction with 
the provisions in the original Art. IX, §§3 and 4, required 
universality,6 prohibited the taxation of property by other 
6 Le Due v. Hastings, 39 Minn. 110,38 N.W. 803 (1888); State v. 
Pioneer Savings & Loan Co., 63 Minn. 80, 65 N.W. 138 (1896); State 
v. Twin City Tel. Co., 104 Minn. 270, 116 N.W. 835 (1908). 
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than the ad valorem method/ and required absolute um-
formity in effective rates.8 
The uniformity clause was said to apply to all taxes; thus 
the imposition of special assessments by local units was im-
possible because they had to conform to the uniformity 
limitation rather than to the ordinary "benefit" theory.9 One 
of the earliest efforts to avoid some of the rigidity of the 
original uniformity limitation was the addition of a proviso 
to the uniformity provision, Art. IX, § 1, which expressly 
sanctioned the levying of local special assessments according 
to the "benefits" theory.10 Very important to the develop-
ment of the doctrine that the uniformity clause limited all 
taxes were the cases concerning a graduated "probate fee" 
and several attempted inheritance taxes. State ex rel. David-
son v. Gorman11 centered on the validity of a statute requir-
ing the payment of a fee as a condition precedent to probate 
proceedings. The fee was graduated on a specific rate for-
mula, all estates being divided into classes according to 
amount, with the increased rate being applied to the entire 
amount. In addition, there was an exemption of estates of 
less than $2000. The court held that the statute imposed a 
7 State ex rei. Davidson v. Gorman, 4-0 Minn. 232, 4-1 N.W. 94-8 
( 1889), discussed infra text at note 11; State v. Lakeside Land Co., 71 
Minn. 283,73 N.W. 970 (1898). 
8 State v. Canada Cattle Car. Co., 85 Minn. 4-57, 89 N.W. 66 (1902). 
9 Bidwell v. Coleman, 11 Minn. 4-5 (1865); Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn. 
273 (1864-); Sperry v. Flygare, 80 Minn. 325, 83 N.W. 177 (1900); 
Stinson v. Smith, 8 Minn. 326 ( 1863). Cf. the development in Arkansas 
and Tennessee (Part A of this chapter, supra). 
10 This provision was carried over in the new Art. IX, § 1 after 1906. 
See note 5, supra. See In Re Improvements of Third Street, St. Paul, 185 
Minn. 170, 24-0 N.W. 355 (1932), to the effect that this provision only 
relieved such special assessments from the "cash valuation" requirement, and 
that they were still subject to the uniformity clause and had to be uniform 
within classes. However, this limitation was interpreted so as to accord with 
the "benefit" theory. 
11 Supra note 7. 
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tax and that as such it violated the uniformity clause because 
the rate was not uniform and the tax was not proportional to 
value. It was not quite clear whether the tax was being 
characterized as being on the property or on a privilege. Sub-
sequent to this case, the 18 94 proviso was added to the 
original Art. IX, § 1, which expressly provided for the im-
position of a graduated inheritance tax.12 However, when a 
tax was imposed pursuant to that provision the court held in 
Drew v. Tijjl3 that the tax was still subject to the uniformity 
clause in Art. IX, § 1, and also held the tax invalid because of 
certain exemptions. The Drew case squarely stated the 
proposition that nonproperty taxes were limited by the 
original Art. IX, § 1 ; consequently the discretion of the 
legislature was severely limited since at that time the clause 
was not framed in words of "uniform within classes." In 
1905 the legislature did pass an inheritance tax statute which 
was upheld in State ex rel. Foote v. Bazille.14 
It appears that during this period there were few other 
taxes imposed which might have tested the view that all 
taxes were subject to the strict uniformity clause with its re-
sulting rigidity.15 However, the need for a judicial departure 
from the court's earlier views, which would have in all likeli-
hood occurred, never developed because of the radical change 
made in the uniformity structure by the 1906 amendment. 
(2) Taxation, generally: since 1906 
The uniformity clause adopted in 1906, requiring only 
that "Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of sub-
12 See note 2, supra. 
13 79 Minn. 175, 81 N.W. 839 (1900). Also see State ex rei. Frye 
v. Bazille, 87 Minn. 500, 92 N.W. 415 (1902). 
14 97 Minn. 11,106 N.W. 93 (1906). 
111 See Faribault v. Misener, 20 Minn. 396 (1874), in which the court 
demonstrated a way to avoid the strictness of the interpretation given the 
uniformity clause in this respect. 
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jects," has been held to apply to all taxes.16 The attitude of 
the Minnesota court in spelling out the meaning of this 
uniformity limitation is well illustrated by the leading case, 
Reed v. Bjornson,17 in which the court upheld a graduated 
general net income tax and gave a definitive interpretation of 
the new uniformity clause in Art. IX, § 1. The court said: 
The history of the times indicates clearly that the people, 
in adopting the 1906 amendment, were liberating the legis-
lature from most of the previous constitutional restraints in 
regard to taxation. The fair adjustment of tax burdens under 
rapidly changing social conditions demanded more compre-
hensive powers in the legislature; and the people, relying 
upon the responsibility of that body to its constituents, re-
laxed the restraints theretofore existing. They were enlarg-
ing, not curtailing, the legislative power .... In common 
parlance throughout the state the proposal was known and 
characterized as the "wide open tax amendment.m8 
A result of this approach was to give the fullest possible dis-
cretion to the legislature in the matter of classification of 
subjects for taxation, whether the subject be property or 
privilege. Thus the court could truly assert that the uni-
formity clause of Art. IX, § 1, and the equal protection clause 
of the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution are 
substantially equivalent, and that, in effect, the only limita-
tion of uniformity, regardless of the nature of the tax, is that 
classifications be reasonable. In Apartment Operators' Ass'n 
v. City of Minneapolis, 19 in which the court upheld a gradu-
ated property tax rate, the court stated: 
16 For example, Reed v. Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254, 260, 253 N.W. 
102 (1934). 
17 /hid. 
18 /d. at 259, emphasis added. 
19 191 Minn. 365, 254 N.W. 443 (1934). Other leading cases in which 
the court has equated the uniformity clause with the equal protection clause 
of the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution are: Reed v. 
Bjornson, supra note 16; Thomas Stores Sales System v. Spaeth, 209 
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It is established that the provision in Art. 9, § 1 of the 
state constitution providing that "taxes shall be uniform upon 
the same class of subjects" is no more restrictive upon legis-
lative power to tax or classify than is the equal protection 
clause in the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the 
United States .... If [a tax] ... does not violate the 
one it does not violate the other.20 
Even though there is in fact no real difference in the uni-
formity applicable to property and nonproperty taxes in 
Minnesota, for comparative purposes it will be convenient to 
review the classifications considered by the court according 
to the nature of the tax in question. 
As for taxes dearly held to be nonproperty taxes, the usual 
requirement of reasonable classifications is illustrated by the 
cases ruling on the reasonableness of the object of a given 
nonproperty tax, 21 or on the reasonableness of the classifica-
tion for rates. In this latter category, the court has clearly 
approved the principle of graduated rates.22 
Because of the flexibility allowed in the imposition of taxes 
Minn. 504,514,297 N.W. 9 (1941); Lyons v. Spaeth, 220 Minn. 563, 
20 N.W. 2d 481 (1945). 
20 /d. at 366. 
21 Dohs v. Holm, 152 Minn. 529, 189 N.W. 418 ( 1922); Hassler v. 
Engberg, 233 Minn. 487,48 N.W. 2d 343 (1951); McReavy v. Holm, 
166 Minn. 22, 206 N.W. 942 (1926); Thomas Stores Sales System v. 
Spaeth, supra note 19. 
22 A leading case is Reed v. Bjornson, supra note 16, in which the income 
tax graduated rates were upheld. See note 3 2, infra. In State ex rei. Graff 
v. Probate Court, 128 Minn. 371, 150 N.W. 1094 (1913), the court up-
held the graduated rate schedule under the inheritance tax. At present 
Minnesota has no chain store tax. However, such a tax was imposed by 
Minn. Laws 1933, c. 213, the tax having two rate schedules. The first was 
a specific rate graduated according to the number of stores owned or 
operated. The second was a specific rate graduated according to the volume 
of gross sales, stores being classified into eleven classes based on amount of 
gross sales. The graduated gross sales rate was held to be a violation of both 
the uniformity clause in Art. IX, § 1 and the federal equal protection clause. 
National Tea Co. v. State, 205 Minn. 443, 286 N.W. 360 (1939). How-
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on property there has not been such a compelling necessity 
for characterizing any particular tax. However, the court has 
had occasion to rule that an inheritance tax was a non-
property tax.23 To the contrary, the court has ruled that a 
mortgage registry tax was a tax upon property,24 and a like 
result was reached as to a tax upon the gross earnings of cer-
tain public utilities.25 No decision has been made as to the 
nature of a general net income tax,26 although a later de-
velopment as to the tax reaching income from corporations is 
of interest on this point, as discussed infra. 
(a) Income tax 
The first Minnesota income tax law, enacted in 1933, im-
posed a general net income tax. This original act was entitled, 
"An act raising revenues, imposing income taxes and fran-
chises or privilege taxes measured by income. . • . " Section 
2 of the act, concerning corporate income, provided: 
There is hereby imposed on every domestic and foreign 
corporation an annual tax for the privilege of existing as a 
corporation or of transacting any local business within this 
state during any part of its taxable year, measured by its 
ever, the rate graduated according to the number of stores operated was 
upheld as a reasonable classification. Also see National Tea Co. Y. State, 208 
Minn. 607, 294 N.W. 230 (1940). 
28 Drew v. Tifft, supra note 13. Also see State ex rei. Graff v. Probate 
Court, supra note 22. 
24 Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, I 04 Minn. 179, 116 N.W. 
572 ( 1908), discussed note 37, infra. 
25 State v. Wells Fargo & Co., 146 Minn. 444, 179 N.W. 221 (1920), 
and cases cited in note 55, infra. 
26 Similarly the Motor Vehicle Tax at various times has been held to be 
both property and privilege tax. See the following cases: Dohs v. Holm, 
supra note 21; Railway Express Agency v. Holm, 180 Minn. 268, 230 
N.W. 815 (1930); City of Minneapolis v. Armson, 188 Minn. 167, 246 
N.W. 660 (1933); Raymond v. Holm, 165 Minn. 216, 206 N.W. 166 
( 1 92 5) ; McReavy v. Holm, supra note 21. 
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taxable net income for such year, computed in the manner 
and at the rates hereinafter provided. 
Section 3 of the act reached other income and provided: 
There is hereby imposed an annual tax for each taxable 
year upon the taxable net income for such year of [indi-
viduals; estates and trusts; and domestic and foreign corpo-
rations whose business within the state consisted exclusively 
of interstate commerce] . . . computed in the manner and 
at the rates hereinafter provided. 27 
The same graduated rate schedule was applicable to all in-
come, as provided by section 6 of the act. 
In Reed v. Bjornson28 the validity of the tax under Art. 
IX, §1 was sustained, the principal constitutional objections 
being that the graduated rates and exemptions violated the 
uniformity clause, as well as the federal equal protection 
clause. The court treated the act as a whole throughout the 
opinion, making no distinction between the "income tax'' and 
the "corporate privilege tax." 
The court, in its opinion, first noted that much argument 
in the briefs had been devoted to the nature of the tax.29 The 
court refused to pass definitively on that issue for the im-
portant reason that under the Minnesota uniformity clause 
it would make no difference in result because the limitations 
of the uniformity clause are the same for either property or 
nonproperty taxes. 
Whether or not income is property and a tax thereon a tax on 
property, art. 9, § 1, of our constitution requires all taxes to 
be uniform on the same class of subjects, not merely on the 
same class of property as in some state constitutions. Ob-
viously incomes constitute a subject of taxation, and the uni-
27 Minn. Laws 1933, c. 405. 
28 191 Minn. 254-,253 N.W. 102 (1934-). 
29 /d. at 259. 
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formity clause applies regardless of whether or not the tax 
is upon property as such.80 
In any case, if the issue had been forced it seemed clear that 
the court looked favorably on the view that "In many ways 
such a tax is sui generis."81 
Facing the specific issues, the court held ( 1 ) that the 
graduated rates were not arbitrary classifications; (2) that 
the exemptions were not arbitrary classifications; and ( 3) 
that there was no offensive "double taxation" because income 
from property was taxed. A great amount of space was de-
voted to the justification of graduated rates, the court con-
cluding that in the light of its interpretation of the uni-
formity clause in Art. IX, § 1, the weight of authority as 
well as sound logic justified the classification of income taxes 
so !d. at 260. On this point the court relied to a considerable degree on 
a similar ruling by the Oregon court under the Oregon constitution which 
contained an identical uniformity provision. Standard Lumber Co. v. 
Pierce, 112 Ore. 314, 228 Pac. 812 ( 1924), and Portland Van & Storage 
Co. v. Ross, 139 Ore. 434, 9 P. 2d 122 {1932)./d at 260, 264, 267. See 
the discussion of Oregon, infra. 
stu. at 259-260, saying (emphasis added): 
While income as it is received is necessarily property, a tax upon it has 
many characteristics which differ quite radically from those of a tax 
levied upon real or invested personal property. Income is a more fleeting 
or transitory benefit which comes according to present efforts or the 
wisdom or luck of past accumulations. Many people who own little or no 
tangible or intangible property have large incomes and enjoy great benefit 
from the protection which organized society affords. They have not only 
ability to pay a tax jor that protection but get value received in liberal 
measure for what they may be required to pay. So do those who receive 
large incomes from property. An income tax is calculated to take toll from 
the flow of this property to the individual through the arteries of or-
ganized social life and to cause it to bear a share of the burden of govern-
ment. In many ways such a tax is sui generis, It imposes a tax on the net 
income or revenue which passes into or through a man's hands within a 
prescribed period, a large share of which never finds permanent invest-
ment. 
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according to amounts received.82 The contention that "un-
equal double taxation" resulted from the imposition of the 
tax upon income from property because that amounted to 
a tax upon the property itself was briefly disposed of, 33 the 
court simply saying that it did not follow those authorities 
like Massachusetts which reasoned to the contrary. In any 
case, if income could be considered property, this court 
probably would hold that it is property distinct from the 
property which is the source of the income. 
Later development has found the court in State v. Duluth, 
Missabe & Northern Railway Co.34 and in Pullman Co. v. 
Commissioner of Taxation35 ruling that the tax was a tax 
upon property insofar as it reached corporate income. This 
development will be considered in the context of the property 
tax development, infra. 
(b) Property taxation 
The Minnesota legislature first utilized its discretion 
under the amended uniformity structure in 1907, at which 
time it enacted a mortgage registry tax law36 limited to real 
estate mortgages. A tax was imposed at the rate of fifty cents 
per hundred dollars of the principal amount secured by any 
real estate mortgage. The tax was payable on or before regis-
tration, and apportioned to the amount of real estate covered 
and within the state. 
In Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Martin,37 decided in 
1908, the court held that the registry tax was compatible with 
the uniformity clause, Art. IX, § 1. The court held that the 
tax was a property tax the property taxed being the security, 
82 /d. at 262-267. 
83 See the discussion infra in note 73. 
84 207 Minn. 618,292 N.W. 411 (1939). See note 57, infra. 
811 223 Minn. 96, 25 N.W. 2d 838 (1947). See note 66, infra. 
88 Minn. Laws 1907, c. 328. 
87I04Minn.179, 116N.W. 572 {1908). 
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not the debt secured. 38 Facing the uniformity issue, the court 
held that Art. IX, § 1 does not prohibit the reasonable classi-
fications of property for purposes of taxation, and that the 
classification of real estate mortgages was a reasonable classi-
fication on the facts presented. 
Several statements of the court in the case had far-reaching 
implications, as was borne out subsequently by the upholding 
of a graduated property tax rate. In describing the purpose of 
the 1906 "wide open tax amendment," the court stated: 
Whatever is of value to a person may be made the subject 
of taxation. It may be real estate or personal property, securi-
ties or privileges, and the tax should be imposed upon the 
possessors of such property in proportion to their ability to aid 
in bearing the burdens which result from the existence of 
organized society.39 
Note the use of the "ability to pay" rationale, which was later 
used in sustaining the graduated property tax rates.40 Direct-
ing its attention specifically to the particular rules of uni-
formity required of property taxation, the court stated: 
Under this provision all property belonging to the same class 
must be treated alike. . . . The same means and methods 
88 Jd. at 181-182, the court saying: 
This mortgage registry tax statute declares that mortgages upon real 
estate shall constitute a class, and provides for the taxation of the security 
thus provided through the payment of a stated fee when the mortgage is 
recorded. The subject of the taxation is the security and not the debt 
which it secures. Whatever is of value to a person may be made the sub-
ject of taxation. 
so !d. at 182, emphasis added. 
40 But see State ex rei. Hildebrandt v. Fitzgerald, 117 Minn. 192, 134 
N.W. 728 (1912). In that case the court held that the minimum class for 
such a mortgage registry tax should be all real estate mortgages. Conse-
quently, it was said that the tax would be a violation of the uniformity 
clause as an arbitrary classification if it were construed as not taxing mort-
gages securing $50 or less. The court construed the act so that it would be 
constitutional. 
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must be applied impartially to all the constituent elements of 
the class. 41 
Thus, the court concluded, the amount of the debt secured 
was the natural standard for measuring the amount of the tax 
to be paid. The value of the property which was the subject 
of the tax, i.e., the security as such, need not necessarily be 
the base of the tax. In the court's view an attempt to make 
the actual value of the security the basis for estimating the 
tax would be "utterly impracticable." One would certainly 
seem warranted in concluding that the court was here ap-
proving other than the ad valorem method for the taxation 
of property. 
In the second of three steps taken to convert the Minne-
sota general property tax into a comprehensive classified 
system, the legislature in 1911 imposed a money and credits 
tax42 which provided for a low rate of three mills on such in-
tangible property. This tax was upheld in State ex rel. Wi-
nona Motor Co. v. Minnesota Tax Commission/3 decided in 
1912. The court simply relied upon the Mutual Benefit Life 
Ins. Co. case and, without extended discussion, concluded 
that the separate classification of money and credits was 
reasonable. 
The third and final step taken by the legislature to revise 
the general property tax structure following the amendment 
of the uniformity structure in 1906 was to enact in 1913 a 
classified general property tax, which established numerous 
classes of property each to be taxed by a different effective 
rate. The method used by the legislature was to classify 
property for the purpose of applying a different ratio of val-
uation to each class, while applying a single percentage rate 
41 Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, supra note 37 at 183, emphasis 
added. 
42 Minn. Laws 1911, c. 285. 
48117 Minn.159, 134-N.W. 643 (1912). 
406 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
to all property taxed.44 The general scheme of classification 
in this tax, as it first appeared, was upheld in State ex rel. St. 
Paul City Railway Co. v. Minnesota Tax Commission/5 de-
cided in 1915. 
Of more importance is a second case directed to a particu-
lar classification found in the classified general property tax. 
In Apartment Operators' Association v. City of Minneapo-
lis,'6 decided in 1934, the court, in effect, upheld the 
principle of graduated property-tax rates. In 1934 the fol-
lowing classification of homestead property was used: rural 
homesteads were to be assessed at twenty per cent of actual 
value, except where the actual value was more than $4000, 
then the excess of that sum was to be assessed at thirty-three 
and one-third per cent of actual value; other homesteads 
44 The principal classification now in effect is found in Minn. Stat. Ann. 
§273.13, which provides for the following classes: (1) iron ore, 50% of 
full value; ( Ia) direct products of blast and open hearth furnaces, 15% ; 
(2) household goods, 25%; (3) agricultural products, merchandise, ma-
chinery, and rural real estate, 337';3%; (3a) agricultural products in the 
hands of the producer, 10%; (3b) rural homesteads, 20%, except where 
the actual value is more than $4000, then the excess of that sum at 3 3 ?1%; 
however the first $4000 of actual value of rural homesteads is exempt from 
taxation for state purposes; (3c) other homesteads, 25%, except where the 
actual value is more than $4000, then the excess of that sum at 40%, how-
ever the first $4000 of actual value of urban homesteads is exempt from 
taxation for state purposes; (3d) livestock and agricultural tools, 20%; ( 4) 
all property not included in the preceding classes, at 40%. However, real 
and personal property of refineries used for processing of petroleum, is to 
be valued at 27% of the true value. The distribution lines and appliances 
of power and light companies (except rural electrical cooperatives, which 
are subject to an in lieu tax), used primarily for supplying electricity to 
farmers at retail, is to be assessed at 5% of actual value. Minn. Stat. Ann. 
§273.38. Also, unmined taconite on unproductive tracts is assessed at a 
maximum of $1.00 per acre. Minn. Stat. Ann. §298.26. 
45 128 Minn. 384, 150 N.W. 1087 (1915). The classification scheme 
under the original act, Minn. Laws 1913, c. 483, was substantially similar 
to that found at the present time and described in note 44, supra. 
46 191 Minn. 365, 254 N.W. 443 (1934). 
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were to be assessed in the same manner, except that the ratios 
of twenty-five per cent and forty per cent, respectively, were 
used.47 In the Apartment Operators' Association case the 
court held that this classification did not violate the uniform-
ity clause in Art. IX, § 1, and therefore a request for an in-
junction to restrain the city from enforcing the homestead 
provision was denied. 
The rationale of the opinion is quite important. Pointing 
out that the legislature might classify property for tax pur-
poses; that the only concern of the court was the reasonable-
ness of the classification; and, further, that the uniformity 
clause was to be equated with the federal equal protection 
clause/8 the court then approved both "use" and "quantity" 
as bases for reasonable classifications. The court stated: 
The classification . . . in so far as it is based upon use, is 
in line with the policy of both the state and nation as evi-
denced by previous legislation enacted for the benefit andre-
lief of occupant owners of homes. . . . The difference in 
use of the property has a fair and substantial relation to that 
object of the legislature, and there is no discrimination be-
tween persons in similar circumstances; it operates equally 
upon all coming within the respective classes. 
The classification based upon value is not an innovation. 
The iron ore tax ... was based upon value, as were also 
the classifications in the income tax law (wherein $1,000 and 
more exemptions were allowed and a graduated rate im-
posed), the inheritance tax, and the automobile tax laws. 
Such classifications have been upheld. Reed v. Bjurnson [In-
come Tax] ..• ; State ex rei. Graff v. Probate Court 
[Inheritance Tax] ... ; Dohs v. Holmes [Motor Vehi-
cle Tax] .... 
41 The graduated rate is no longer in effect for purposes of the state gen-
eral property tax rate, the first $4-000 of actual value being exempt from 
state taxation. See note 4-4-, supra. However, this graduated rate is still 
effective insofar as the local property tax rates are concerned. 
48 Apartment Operators' Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, supra note 46 at 
366-367, and see the text at note 19, supra. 
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Protection and benefits received by the taxpayer and abil-
ity to pay may properly be taken into consideration lJy the 
legislature in classifying property for the purpose of taxa-
tion .... 
Placing homesteads in two classes on the basis of valttation 
was within the scope of the broad power of the legislature to 
classify property for the purpose of taxation.49 
The importance of the case lies in the fact that the second 
classification effects a progressively graduated ad valorem 
property tax. 50 Although the case has been criticized as up-
holding the principle "without discussion,"51 the italicized 
parts of the quoted text seem to indicate that the court was 
discussing such a rate, even though "progressively graduated 
ad valorem property tax rates" were not spelled out in so 
many words. Furthermore, the court has not retreated from 
the substance of the Apartment Operators' Association case, 
but as late as 19 51 has approved the implications of the rea-
soning in that case. 52 
"In lieu" utilities gross-earnings taxes: corporate privilege 
tax with a base of net income. Apart from the general prop-
erty-tax structure, of considerable interest are the several 
special taxes in Minnesota which have been designated as 
property taxes. Utilities in Minnesota are classified for the 
purpose of special gross-earnings taxes as: railroads; tele-
phone and telegraph companies; freight line companies; 
sleeping car companies; and express companies. A gross 
earnings tax is imposed upon each class, each tax having a 
flat proportional rate different for each of the classes, and 
each tax is in lieu of all taxes on the property of such utili-
49 !d. at 369-370, emphasis added, 
110 See the note, "Taxation-Classification-Requirements for Consti-
tutionality in Case of a Classified Ad Valorem Property Tax," 18 Minn. L. 
Rev. 751 (1934). 
111 Ibid. 
112 See Hassler v. Engberg, supra note 21 at 508. 
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ties.53 As discussed below, these in lieu provisions have been 
amended so that they now refer to all ad valorem property 
taxes on the property of such utilities. 
These taxes were originated before the 1906 amendment 
to the uniformity structure of the Minnesota Constitution, 
but it was necessary that special constitutional amendments 
be introduced before such taxes could be held valid. The 
reasons were that the first taxes of this type were not ad va-
lorem nor were they correlated with the general property-tax 
rate. A special provision (Art. IV, §32a) was inserted in the 
constitution in 18 71 with the purpose of validating the rail-
road earnings tax, and the unnumbered section added to Art. 
IX in 1896 validated the taxes as to other utilities. 54 
For this study it is sufficient to point out that the court, as 
for example in State v. Wells Fargo & Co.,rn; has held that 
these taxes are not upon gross earnings as such, nor are they 
levied upon a "privilege" with the gross earnings simply be-
ing the base. Influenced, it seems, by the "in lieu" provision 
in each of the taxes, as elaborated below, the court has held 
that these taxes are property taxes, with the object of such 
taxes being all the property located within the state, includ-
ing the franchise, which belongs to such utilities. The base 
of the tax is gross earnings. Or, as stated by the court, the 
tax is upon all the property of such a utility, and is "meas-
ured by" the gross earnings, which are a convenient substi-
tute for "value" because of the peculiar nature of the prop-
erty of such utilities. 
The in lieu provisions in the gross-earnings taxes have 
been the source of two interesting problems. First, they have 
113 Minn. Stat. Ann. cc. 294, 295. 
114 For a survey of the problems faced under the constitution before the 
1906 amendment, see Montague, "The Development and Present Form of 
the Minnesota Tax System," Minn. Stat. Ann., c. 18, p. 53, at pp. 75-80. 
115 Supra note 25. And see the cases cited in notes 57, 66, and 77, infra. 
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furnished a basis for a characterization of the corporate privi-
lege tax with a base of net income, and, second, they have 
been the source of a misleading statement as to "double taxa-
tion" which apparently departs from the judicial develop-
ment of the meaning of the Minnesota uniformity clause. 
In 1939, the court ruled on the nature of that part of the 
original 1933 income tax act56 which was concerned with 
corporate income. The pertinent provision stated: 
There is hereby imposed on every domestic and foreign 
corporation an annual tax for the privilege of existing as a 
corporation or of transacting any local business within this 
state during any part of its taxable year, measured by its 
taxable net income for such year. . . . 
In State v. Duluth, Missabe & Northern Railway Co.rn ac-
tion was brought to recover income taxes for the year 1933 
claimed to be due from defendants under the above-quoted 
section. The defendants were subject to the railroad gross-
earnings tax which was "in lieu of all other taxes upon the 
property and franchises so taxed."58 This statutory in lieu 
provision simply conformed to the requirement of Art. IV, 
§32a, added to the constitution in 18 71, which also pro-
vides that the gross-earnings tax on railroads shall not be 
repealed or amended without submission of the same to a 
vote of the people. 59 Thus, the court reasoned, 60 the issue 
was whether the application of the "income tax" to the rail-
roads was contrary to Art. IV, §32a which, in turn, depended 
on whether it amounted to an amendment of the gross-earn-
ings tax law (the in lieu provision) without the submission 
of the issue to the voters. 
56 See text supra at note 27. 
57 Supra note 34. 
5S 1 Mason Minn. Stats. 1927, §2246. 
59 For text of the provision, see the Appendix A, infra. 
60 State v. Duluth, M. & N. R. Co., supra note 34 at 621. 
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In resolving the issue, the court :first reiterated the propo-
sition that the gross-earnings tax was a property tax levied 
upon all railroad property owned or operated for railroad 
purposes measured by-that is, with a base of-gross earn-
ings of such property taken as a whole, intangible as well as 
tangible property. 61 It was further held that the "franchise 
to exist and to operate is a vital part of the railroad's prop-
erty .... " 62 Turning to the "income tax," the court held 
that such tax was a property tax upon the franchise as prop-
erty, and, therefore, a tax upon a subject covered by the 
gross-earnings tax and invalid without a vote of the people 
to approve it. 63 
It is quite important to emphasize that this was the only 
rationale used by the court-there was no suggestion that the 
"income tax" was invalidly applied because of some theory 
of unconstitutional "double taxation." Indeed, the court 
went further and stated that the railroads might be subject to 
the "franchise tax imposed by c. 405" insofar as the franchise 
was exercised for other than railroad purposes. 64 Thus, it ap-
pears to be without foundation to assert that the rationale of 
the Duluth, Missabe & Northern Railway Co. case was that 
the two taxes were on the same property consequently "re-
sulting in double taxation of railroad companies ... in vio-
lation of the uniformity provision of the Minnesota Consti-
tution."611 
However, in a subsequent case, Pullman Company v. 
Commissioner of Taxation,66 the court construed the same 
provision of the 1933 "income tax" and a similar in lieu 
61 !d. at 621-622. 
62 /d. at 622. 
63 /d. at 623-624. 
64 !d. at 624. And see !d. at 628, where the court emphasized that the 
constitutional objection was based on Art. IV, §32a. 
611 CCH Minnesota Tax Reporter, ~I 0-026. 
66 223 Minn. 96,25 N.W. 2d 838 {1947). 
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provision of the sleeping car companies gross-earnings tax. 
And it appears that the court injected a misleading statement 
concerning "double taxation." In the Pullman Company case 
the situation was similar to that in the Duluth, Missabe & 
Northern Railway Co. case, except that there was no consti-
tutional provision relating to the particular gross-earnings 
tax. The taxes in question were for the years 1934, 1936, and 
1937. The statute providing for the sleeping car companies 
gross-earnings tax had an in lieu provision which originally 
provided that such tax was to be "in lieu of all taxes and as-
sessments upon all taxable property .... " 67 However, in 
1937 the in lieu provision was amended to read: "in lieu of 
all ad valorem taxes upon all taxable property .... " 68 
Thus, the contention of the taxpayer in the Pullman Com-
pany case was that the "income tax" was not only a tax upon 
property, but was also an "ad valorem" property tax, and, 
therefore, the company should be refunded the "income 
tax" paid for the year 1937 as well as such taxes paid for the 
prior years in question. 
In a 4-3 decision, with a very strong dissenting opinion, it 
was held that the taxpayer should recover for the following 
reasons. The majority first pointed out that the Duluth, 
Missabe & Northern Railway Co. case had already deter-
mined that the "franchise" on "income" tax was a tax upon 
property, the property being the franchise. 69 The important 
question concerned the kind of property tax which the "fran-
chise" tax might be called. The court concluded that it might 
properly be called an ad valorem property tax, reasoning 
that the fact that the tax was "measured by" net income was 
"persuasively indicative" to the majority that there was a 
"legislative intent" to base such a tax "upon the value of the 
67 Minn. Laws 1913, c. 480, §2. 
68 Minn. Laws 1937, Ex. Sess., c, 3, §2. 
69 Pullman Co. v. Com'r of Taxation, supra note 66 at 98-99. 
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franchise, thereby making it an ad valorem tax, for it is ob-
vious that the value of a franchise is largely determined by 
the profitableness of the use of such franchise.mo The legis-
lature was only choosing "one of the most dependable meth-
ods of measuring the value of the franchise." Having so de-
termined, it followed that the gross-earnings tax was in lieu 
of the "franchise" tax as stipulated by the statutory in lieu 
provision. 71 
Summarizing its decision that the "franchise" tax was an 
ad valorem tax, that the franchise of the company was taxed 
as property under the gross-earnings tax, and that such gross-
earnings tax was in lieu of all ad valorem taxes, the court 
declared: 
. . . we must and do hold that the tax imposed upon relator 
through the franchise tax act is invalid as double taxation, 
and that the imposition of such franchise tax is also objec-
tionable as being in contravention of Minn. Const. art. 9, § 1, 
that "Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects, 
,72 
This is a most dubious conclusion. Nowhere in the opinion, 
until this final sentence, was either the uniformity clause or 
any theory of double taxation mentioned. The issue was 
raised under the in lieu provision of the gross-earnings tax 
law. Indeed, the use of the words "double taxation" in the 
quoted conclusion only makes sense if such words are a short-
hand way of referring to the in lieu provision, rather than 
being used in relation to the unformity concept. 73 The words 
70 !d. at 100-101. 
71 /d. at 101-104-. 
72 /d. at 108, emphasis added. 
73 Compare the opinion in Reed v. Bjornson, 1upra note 16, in which 
the income tax was upheld. The court rejected a contention that unequal 
"double taxation" resulted from the imposition of the tax upon income 
from property. As for "double taxation," the court said, at 270: 
Double taxation is not forbidden by either the state or the national con-
.f.l.f. UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
are divorced from the statement concerning the uniformity 
clause found in the constitution. And, certainly, the alterna-
tive conclusion based on the uniformity clause in Art. IX, 
§ 1 was quite unnecessary. A strong dissent attacked the con-
clusion that the corporate "franchise" tax with a base of net in-
come was a tax upon property and would have overruled the 
Duluth, Missabe & Northern Railway Co. case on this 
point.74 The dissent would have held the franchise tax an 
excise tax or privilege tax rather than a tax upon the fran-
chise as property. 
Subsequently, the legislature apparently concerned itself 
with the rationale of the Pullman Company case and inserted 
the word "excise" tax in the statutory provision imposing the 
tax relative to corporate net income/5 so that it now reads: 
An annual excise tax is hereby imposed upon every domes-
tic corporation . . . for the privilege of existing as a corpo-
ration during any part of its taxable year, and upon every 
foreign corporation . . . for the grant to it of the privilege 
of transacting or for the actual transaction by it of any local 
business within this state during any part of the taxable year. 
Tl . 
stitution. It may result in lack of uniformity and hence be illegal. It may 
offend the equal protection clause, but we do not see that this tax does 
either. We believe that all of our cases which hold double taxation illegal 
are based upon one or the other of these grounds, or, as in Railway Ex-
press Agency v. Holm, 180 Minn. 268, 272 .•• upon a direct con-
stitutional inhibition, art. 16. 
74 Pullman Co. v. Com'r of Taxation, supra note 66 at 112-120. 
75 The decision was rendered a "few weeks" before the session of the 
legislature. Note, "Current Legislation-Minnesota, 1947," 33 Minn. L. 
Rev. 27, 52 (1948). 
76 Minn. Laws 1947, c. 635, §2. It might be well to point out that by 
Minn. Laws 19 3 7, Ex. Sess., c. 49, alterations were made in sections 2 and 3 
of the original act (see text to note 27, supra) so that section 2, concerning 
corporate income, was amended to read as it is quoted in the text to this 
note, except that the word "excise" did not appear. The 19 3 7 amendments 
were related to other problems, and, while re-arranging the phraseology 
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While it is not certain just what the effect of this amend-
ment will be insofar as the nature of the "franchise" tax is 
concerned, a 1950 case, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. 
Spaeth,77 is a strong indication that the legislative intent will 
be followed and that such tax will henceforth be character-
ized as a nonproperty tax. It is pertinent to note that the en-
tire discussion in the Western Union case revolved about the 
statutory in lieu provision of one of the gross earnings taxes, 
with no mention being made of any double taxation theory 
or the uniformity clause, although the same fact situation was 
present which gave rise to the prior Duluth, Missabe & 
Northern Railway Co. and Pullman Company cases. 
Summary: property taxation. The preceding discussion 
should sufficiently illustrate the discretion allowed the legis-
lature under the amended uniformity structure of the Min-
nesota Constitution. Property may not only be classified for 
different effective rates, but this apparently includes classifi-
cation for graduated rates. There is no rule of universality; 
exemptions of property need to conform only to the require-
ment of reasonable classes. 78 Furthermore, it seems clear 
somewhat, did not substantially alter the substance of sections 2 and 3. An 
important change, however, was made as to the rates. Since 19 3 7 the gradu-
ated schedule has not applied to corporate income, such income being 
taxed at a rate of 6%. 
7 7 232 Minn. 128, 44 N.W. 2d 440 (1950). 
78 There are no clear-cut decisions upholding the several exemptions from 
the general property tax. In one case there is dictum to the effect that ex-
emptions other than those enumerated "might" be prohibited. City of 
Minneapolis v. Armson, supra note 26 at 170. However, note that in Reed 
v. Bjornson, supra note 16 at 269, upholding the income tax, the court 
pointed out that in the Armson case the above proposition was not decided, 
the court then finding in fact that there was no exemption under the statute 
in question. Though the court did not determine the nature of the income 
tax, exemptions therefrom were upheld, the court saying, "We hold that 
the enumeration of exemptions in our constitution does not forbid making 
others which do not offend the uniformity clause or the federal constitu-
tion.'' 
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that specific property taxes, as opposed to ad valorem prop-
erty taxes, may be imposed.79 
7. Missouri 
a. Uniformity in taxation prior to 19451 
The uniformity structure of the new Missouri Constitu-
tion of 1945 is best understood in light of the uniformity 
structures of the preceding constitutions of 1820, 1865 and 
1875. The absence in the present constitution of a key provi-
sion appearing in all of the prior constitutions, and the addi-
tion of rather explicit provisions classifying property are ex-
plained by the development of the meaning of those prior 
uniformity structures. 
( 1) The provisions and meaning of the uniformity 
limitation: 1820 to 187 5 
1820 to 1865. In the original Missouri Constitution, dated 
1820, there was but a single provision dealing expressly with 
problems of uniformity of taxation. Article XIII, the Decla-
79 In this respect note the following special taxes concerning which no 
cases have arisen. There is a grain handling tax provided for in Minn. 
Stat. Ann., §286.02, imposing "In lieu of all taxes on grain as property of 
any person handling grain, an annual excise tax • . . on the handling of 
grain. . . ." The rate is ~ and 7:l mill per bushel, depending on the 
kind of grain. Although the statute purports to impose an excise tax, note 
that in Minn. Stat. Ann. the tax is found under the heading: "Special 
Property Taxes." In Minn. Stat. Ann., §289.0 1 it is provided that owners 
of described vessels "may pay into the state treasury a sum equal to five cents 
per net ton of such registered tonnage," and "Such payments shall be re-
ceived in lieu of other taxes on such craft. • • ." Cf. Montague, supra note 
54 at 81. 
1 See Garden, "Uniformity of Taxation in Missouri," 24 Wash. U.L.Q. 
242 ( 1939) for one of the few articles attempting to determine the mean-
ing of the entire uniformity limitation within a single jurisdiction. 
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ration of Rights, contained a proportionality clause in section 
19, which read: 
... all property, subject to taxation in this State, shall 
be taxed in proportion to its value. 
This provision applied only to property taxation, and the 
court interpreted it to require an absolute uniformity in the 
effective rate applied to all property taxed by any one taxing 
authority,2 and, obviously, specific property taxes were pro-
hibited. 3 The otherwise strict uniformity limitation was re-
laxed so that there was no rule of universality, that is, the 
determination of what property was to be taxed was left to 
legislative discretion.4 
1865 to 1875. The second Missouri Constitution, dated 
1865, also had a very brief uniformity structure. The pro-
portionality clause of the 1820 constitution was carried over 
in a somewhat altered form. This clause was still located in 
the Declaration of Rights, Art. I, §30, and read as follows 
after 1865: 
... all property subject to taxation ought to be taxed in 
proportion to its value. 
This was potentially, of course, a substantial change. A sec-
ond provision of interest was added to the constitution. Arti-
cle XI, § 16 dealt with exemption of property and provided 
that 
No property, real or personal, shall be exempt from taxation, 
except such as may be used exclusively for public schools, 
and such as may belong to the United States, to this State, to 
counties, or to municipal corporations within this State. 
No change was wrought in the application of the propor-
2 See, for example, the discussion in State v. North & Scott, 27 Mo. 464, 
483 (1858). 
8JbiJ. 
4 /biJ., and see note 8, infra. 
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tionality clause; it still limited only property taxes.11 Nor did 
the substitution of the words "ought to be" for "shall be" 
have any effect upon the uniformity required of property 
taxes, although some argued to the contrary.6 The only 
change in the uniformity required of property taxes was the 
addition of a universality requirement. 7 Thus the uniformity 
limitation was tightened up in that respect. In finding a re-
quirement of universality the court could rely upon the new 
Art. XI, § 16. For example, in Life Association of America v. 
Board of Assessors,8 the court pointed out that the provision 
expressly prohibited the exemption of any property, and it 
indicated that under the former constitution the proportion-
ality clause standing alone was not interpreted as containing 
such a limitation. However, despite this, the tenor of the 
entire opinion of the Life Association of America case leads 
one to believe that the court would, if necessary, have relied 
upon the proportionality clause in Art. I, §30 to find a re-
quirement of universality.9 
(2) The provisions and meaning of the uniformity 
limitation: 187 5 to 19 45 
The third constitution of Missouri, dated 18 7 5, served for 
a substantial period of time. In that constitution, there ap-
peared for the first time a Revenue Article, Art. X. The sig-
11 See, for example, Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479 {1869). See note 17, 
infra. Cf. Garden, supra note 1 at 243-244. 
6 In Life Association of America v. Board of Assessors, 49 Mo. 512 
{1872) it was said at 518: "The old constitution used the word 'shall,' but 
it is evident from a survey of the whole instrument that the substitution of 
the one word for the other was not intended to produce any change in the 
construction or the duties enjoined. The word designated is expressive of a 
duty and equivalent to a prohibition against proceeding in any other way." 
7 See, for example, Life Ass'n of America v. Board of Assessors, supra 
note 6; State v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. Co., 75 Mo. 208 (1881). 
8 Supra note 6 at 519. 
9 /J. at 518-521. See State v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. Co., supra note 7. 
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nificant change from the prior constitutions lay in the addi-
tion of a new uniformity clause, found in Art. X, §3, which 
read: 
Taxes . . . shall be uniform upon the same class of sub-
jects within the territorial limits of the authority levying 
the tax .•.• 
The insertion of this new provision might have meant a radi-
cal change in the meaning of the uniformity limitation. How-
ever, any such possibility soon faded away. 
The remainder of the uniformity structure10 closely re-
sembled those provisions in the prior constitution of 18 65. 
The proportionality clause was carried over, with the verb 
reverting back to "shall be," and it was placed in Art. X, §4, 
which read: 
All property subject to taxation shall be taxed in propor-
tion to its value. 
Article X, §6 provided for both mandatory and permissible 
exemptions of enumerated classes of property, while Art. X, 
§7, spelled out a requirement of universality, reading as fol-
lows: "All laws exempting property from taxation, other 
than the property above enumerated, shall be void." This 
uniformity structure served until 1945 without any substan-
tial amendment. A survey of the court's interpretation of its 
meaning will lend some understanding of the uniformity 
structure of the present constitution of 1945. 
The court held that nonproperty taxes were limited by 
the new uniformity clause found in Art. X, §3,11 but in sub-
stance this only meant that such nonproperty taxes must con-
10 There was also a minor provision in Art. X, §5 identical to the present 
Art. X, § 5. See note 35, infra. 
11 A leading case is Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, 275 Mo. 
339, 205 s.w. 196 (1918). 
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form to the usual requirement that their objects and exemp-
tion therefrom must constitute reasonable classes.12 Further, 
the requirement of reasonable classifications has been held 
to permit graduated rate schedules, as for example under the 
income tax18 and inheritance tax.14 
Because of the stricter uniformity limitation applicable to 
property taxes, the determination of the nature of any given 
tax was of considerable importance under the 18 7 5 constitu-
tion. Thus, the Secured Debts Tax Act of 191 7, discussed 
below, was held to be a property tax, and, consequently, was 
held unconstitutional because it could not conform to the 
stricter uniformity requirement.15 Also of interest for com-
parative purposes are the decisions on this point concerning 
an income tax and an inheritance tax, briefly discussed be-
low.16 
Income tax. In one of the more important state cases con-
cerning an income tax, Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Woll-
12 From among the numerous cases, see, for example: American Express 
Co. v. St. Joseph, 66 Mo. 675 {1878); American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 
270 Mo. 40, 192 S.W. 402 {1916); Aurora v. McGannon, 138 Mo. 38, 
39 S.W. 469 ( 1897); City of Cape Giradeau v. Groves Motor Co., 346 
Mo. 762, 142 S.W. 2d 1040 {1940), finding an arbitrary classification; 
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Chorn, 274 Mo. 15, 201 S.W. 1122 
( 1918); St. Louis v. Spiegel, 7 5 Mo. 145 ( 1881); State ex rei. McClung 
v. Becker, 288 Mo. 607, 233 S.W. 54 {1921); State ex rei. Missouri Pac. 
R. Co. v. Danuser, 319 Mo. 799, 6 S.W. 2d 907 ( 1928); Viquesney v. 
Kansas City, 305 Mo. 488, 266 S.W. 700 (1924); City of Washington 
v. Washington Oil Co., 346 Mo. 1183, 145 S.W. 2d 366 {1940), finding 
an arbitrary classification. And see the discussion in Garden, supra note 1, 
at 249-252. 
13 Bacon v. Ranson, 331 Mo. 985, 56 S.W. 2d 786 (1932). 
14 State ex rei. McClintock v. Guinotte, 27 5 Mo. 298, 204 S.W. 806 
{1918). 
15 State ex rei. Tompkins v. Shipman, 290 Mo. 65, 234 S.W. 60 ( 1921). 
16 Also of interest is the decision that a corporate franchise tax with a 
base of capital stock was a nonproperty tax. State ex rel. Missouri Pac. R. 
Co. v. Danuser, supra note 12. 
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brinck,17 the Missouri income tax act of 1917 was upheld. 
The court first held that the tax was not a tax upon property, 
neither as a tax on income as property nor as a tax on the 
property from which the income was derived. In a 4-3 opin-
ion, with a strong dissent, the court upheld the tax and its 
exemptions and the classifications of persons and corporations 
into two basic classes for application of a different flat propor-
tional rate to each class. Subsequently, in Bacon v. Ranson18 
the court re-affirmed the Ludlow-Saylor rationale and up-
held the amended income tax which now had a graduated 
rate schedule. In approving this classification the court relied 
on the ability-to-pay rationale, saying: 
The basic principle underlying all such classifications is the 
ability of the taxpayer to pay. Many economists and students 
of government regard a progressive tax as more just and 
equal in point of sacrifice than a proportional one, since per-
sons with large incomes can more readily spare a fixed pro-
portion of their income than those who have difficulty in 
sustaining themselves upon what they receive each year.19 
Inheritance tax. In the earlier case on this problem, State 
ex rel. Garth v. Switzler,20 decided in 18 97, the court held 
that the inheritance tax of 1895, as amended in 1897, was a 
tax upon property, and a violation of the uniformity limita-
tion for reasons discussed under "Property taxation," infra. 
The opinion in that case also indicated that the principle of 
graduated rates was an "arbitrary classification without 
rhyme or reason."21 The legislature took its cue from the 
Switzler opinion and in State ex rel. Fath v. Henderson,22 
11 Supra note II. The court relied in part on a similar holding under the 
1865 constitution. See Glasgow v. Rowse, supra note 5. 
18 331 Mo. 985, 56 S.W. 2d 786 (1932). 
19 /d. at 995. 
2o 14-3 Mo. 287,45 S.W. 285 (1897). 
21 /d. at 332. 
22 160 Mo. 190,60 S.W. 1093 (1900). 
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decided in 1900, the court upheld the collateral inheritance 
tax of 1899, which, however, did not have a graduated rate. 
The court held that the tax was upon a privilege rather than 
upon the property transmitted, the legislature having 
changed a few words in the operative part of the tax statute. 
Then in State ex rel. McClintock v. Guinotte23 the inherit-
ance tax act of 1917 was upheld as a nonproperty tax. The 
1917 tax had a graduated rate schedule which was approved. 
(a) Property taxation 
Whatever the source, the court left no doubt that the new 
constitution of 18 7 5 was to make no change in the uniformity 
required of property taxes. There was still a requirement of 
absolute uniformity in effective rates,24 only the ad valorem 
method could be used to tax property,25 and the requirement 
of universality remained.26 A leading case was State ex rel. 
Tompkins v. Shipman,21 decided in 1921, in which the court 
considered the validity of the Secured Debts Tax Act of 
191 7. The Missouri legislature had provided that "bonds, 
debentures, or obligations for the payment of money" were 
23 Supra note 14. 
24 State ex rei. Tompkins v. Shipman, supra note 15, discussed in the 
text, infra note 27. Also see: Brookfield v. Tooly, 141 Mo. 619, 43 S.W. 
387 (1897); Booneville Nat. Bank v. Scholtzhauer, 317 Mo. 1298,298 
S.W. 732 ( 1927); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schramm, 269 Mo. 489, 190 
S.W. 886 {1916). Also see State ex rei. Garth v. Switzler, supra note 20; 
State ex rei. Johnson v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 195 Mo. 228, 93 S.W. 
784 (1906); State ex rei. Aull v. Field, 119 Mo. 593, 24 S.W. 752 
(1894). 
211 For example, the Shipman and the Switzler cases, discussed in the 
text. 
26 For example, Copeland v. St. Joseph, 126 Mo. 417, 29 S.W. 281 
( 1895); State ex rei. Musser v. Birch, 186 Mo. 20 5, 85 S.W. 361 ( 190 5); 
State ex rei. Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 320 Mo. 691, 8 S.W. 
2d 1068 (1926); State ex rei. Morgan v. Hemenway, 272 Mo. 187, 198 
s.w. 825 {1917). 
27 Supra note 15. 
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to constitute a separate class of property for purposes of taxa-
tion. Such securities could be recorded and a tax paid, the 
rate being so many cents on each $100 or fraction thereof of 
the face value. The size of the rate depended upon the time 
in which the debt should mature, increasing with the length 
of the maturity period. The tax was held unconstitutional, 
both because it did not conform to the requirement of abso-
lute uniformity in effective rates and because it was not ad 
valorem. Not only was the rate for the tax itself classified, 
but it was different from that applied to all other property 
taxed by the state. Similarly, in State ex rel. Garth v. Switz-
ler/8 in which the court reviewed the Inheritance Tax of 
1895, it was held that the tax violated the property-tax uni-
formity limitation because it subjected such estates "to an 
additional property tax to that levied upon all other like 
property in the State for the same year, and is not levied in 
proportion to its value."29 
As for the source of these limitations, there was no possi-
bility of conflict concerning the ad valorem and universality 
requirements. The proportionality clause remained in Art. 
X, §4; and Art. X, §7 spelled out a prohibition against ex-
emptions. However, on the introduction of the new constitu-
tion some controversy arose at once concerning the degree of 
uniformity required of effective rates. 
What was to be the effect of the new uniformity clause 
found in Art. X, §3? Could property now be classified for 
the purpose of applying different effective rates? Article X, 
§3 only required that "Taxes ... shall be uniform upon 
the same class of subjects ...• " How did the introduction 
28 Supra note 20. 
29 !d. at 33 I. The words "all other like property" might be construed to 
mean that the court was thinking in terms of uniformity within claues of 
property. For a similar inference, see the discussion in that opinion con-
cerning the invalidity of the tax under Art. X, §3. 
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of this new uniformity clause, framed potentially in terms of 
classification, affect the proportionality clause in Art. X, §4, 
which was carried over from the old constitutions and which 
was the source of an absolute uniformity requirement when 
standing alone? 
For example, in the Shipman case it was argued that Art. 
X, §3 authorized the classification of property for rates so 
that the secured debts tax could be upheld. There has been 
some confusion as to whether the court ruled that the uni-
formity clause in Art. X, §3 refers only to nonproperty 
taxes.80 It is a rather moot question, but to this writer the 
better view would seem to be that the court has simply ruled 
that property was a single subject of taxation, not subject to 
further subclassification. Therefore, the requirement of ab-
solute uniformity in rates could be derived from either Art. 
X, §3 or Art. X, §4. Thus, in the Shipman case, when faced 
with the proposition stated above, the court replied: 
. . . the whole question is solved by Section 4 of Article X, 
of the Constitution, because it puts all property subject to 
taxes into a single class, and fixed the rule of taxation 
thereon.31 
* * * 
We rule that the General Assembly ... cannot reclassify 
property, for to do so would violate section 4 of Article X. 
It cannot violate the rule of uniformity, for such would vio-
late Section 3 of Article X. 82 
Perhaps indicative of the difficulty facing a contrary interpre-
tation of these provisions is the rather heated personal view 
of the opinion-writer concerning the tax under considera-
3° Cf. Garden, supra note I at 244 et seq. 
31 State ex rei. Tompkins v. Shipman, 290 Mo. 65, 76, 234 S.W. 60 
{1921). 
32 /d, at 8 I. 
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tion. 83 In any case, one is not warranted in blaming the strict 
interpretation solely on the retention of the proportionality 
clause in Art. X, §4, because a similar result has been reached 
in other states having a uniformity clause of this type, but 
not having such a proportionality clause.34 
(b) Uniformity in taxation since 1945 
The new constitution of 1945 introduced some definite 
changes into the uniformity structure. The uniformity clause 
remains the same and is still numbered Art. X, §3: "Taxes 
... shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within 
the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. . . ." 
However, the proportionality clause found in the old Art. 
X, §4 has been deleted, and in its place is a detailed section 
which spells out the degree of uniformity required of prop-
erty taxation; provides for the classification of property but 
stipulates the minimum classes; and provides for the method 
by which property may be taxed. Article X, §4 now reads: 
(A) All taxable property shall be classified for tax pur-
poses as follows: class 1, real property; class 2, tangible per-
sonal property; class 3, intangible personal property. The 
general assembly, by general law, may provide for further 
classification within classes 2 and 3, based solely on the na-
33 !d. at 83, where the court said: 
The whole act is but a bungling attempt to exempt these securities from 
the taxes that they should pay. 
But it is urged, that with this insignificant tax, this class of property 
will emerge from its hiding place, and the State will be benefited thereby. 
If the penal laws were strengthened, and then enforced, it would re-
quire but a few penitentiary sentences to bring to light all such property 
for the payment of the taxes at the same rate as other property is re-
quired to pay. The act is wrong in principle, and against good morals, 
and a fair sense of justice. All property should bear its proportionate part 
of the State's necessities. The Constitution so declares, and such declara-
tion voids this law. 
34 See Part G ( 4) of this chapter. 
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ture and characteristics of the property, and not on the na-
ture, residence or business of the owner, or the amount 
owned. Nothing in this section shall prevent the taxing of 
franchises, privileges or incomes, or the levying of excise or 
motor vehicle license taxes, or any other taxes of the same or 
different types. 
(B) Property in classes 1 and 2 and subclasses of class 2, 
shall be assessed for tax purposes at its value or such per-
centage of its value as may be fixed by law for each class and 
for each subclass of class 2. Property in class 3 and its sub-
classes shall be taxed only to the extent authorized and at 
the rate fixed by law for each class and subclass, and the tax 
shall be based on the annual yield and shall not exceed eight 
per cent thereof. 
There has been no substantive change in the exemption sec-
tion, except that the former Art. X, §§6 and 7 have been 
brought together into a single provision, Art. X, § 6, so that 
the prohibition against exemptions now constitutes the last 
sentence of section 6. 35 
Of course, any changes in the uniformity limitation would 
relate only to property taxation. 36 There has been no system-
atic development by the court as to the current meaning of 
the uniformity limitation applicable to property taxes. How-
ever, certain conclusions appear obvious. Certainly the re-
811 Another provision dealing with a special problem is Art. X, §7 which 
provides for special treatment and taxation of forest lands. For the text, 
see the Appendix, infra. Article X, §5 provides: 
All railroad corporations in this state, or doing business therein, shall be 
subject to taxation for state, county, school, municipal, and other purposes, 
on the real and personal property owned or used by them, and on their 
gross earnings, their net earnings, their franchises and their capital stock. 
86 A recent nonproperty tax case is State ex rei. Transport Mfg. & Equip-
ment Co. v. Bates, 359 Mo. 1002, 224 S.W. 2d 996 (1949), in which the 
court held that the exemption of motor vehicles having seating capacities 
of ten passengers or more from the use tax where a sales tax was paid in 
another state was an arbitrary exemption and therefore contrary to the uni-
formity clause in Art. X, §3. Also see Walters v. City of St. Louis, 259 
s.w. 2d 377 (1952). 
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quirement of universality remains, 87 since the clause prohibit-
ing exemptions is retained in the new constitution. 
The key change was in the deletion of the proportionality 
clause-which was the basis for ruling that property was a 
single class-and the addition of a new section, Art. X, §4, 
expressly providing that property might be classified. Of 
course, the legislative discretion is limited by Art. X, §4, in 
that the minimum classes of property are set. Real property 
may not be further classified. And in subclassifying the basic 
classes of tangible and intangible personalty the legislature 
is limited by the standard of classification set out in Art. X, 
§4(A), which rules out, for example, a graduated property-
tax rate. These classifications of property may be made for 
the purpose of applying different effective rates.38 However, 
pursuant to Art. X, §4(B), in taxing tangible property, re-
alty or personalty, the legislature is still limited by a re-
quirement that such taxes be ad valorem. 
In summary, the uniformity clause in Art. X, §3 remains 
superfluous insofar as taxation of property is concerned. The 
particular requirements of uniformity are spelled out in Art. 
X, §§4 and 6. The effect of the new constitutional uniformity 
structure of 1945 is to permit a more flexible means of taxing 
intangible property, and to allow some classification of tangi-
ble personal property. In fact, all tangible property is still 
subject to the single rate general property tax,39 while in-
tangibles are subject to a yield tax which is not classified.40 
37 See General American Life Ins. Co. v. Bates, 363 Mo. 143, 249 S.W. 
2d 458 (1952). An insurance companies gross premiums tax was imposed 
which purported to be in lieu of any taxes on the intangibles of companies 
taxed thereby. The court held the premiums tax to be a nonproperty tax 
and the in lieu provision to be an exemption of property contrary to Art. 
X, §6. 
88 The uniformity requirement is still territorial. See State v. Metr<>-
politan St. Louis Sewer District, 275 S.W. 2d 225 (1955). 
89 Mo. Rev. Stat. c. 13 7. Forest lands are separately classified pursuant 
to Art. X, §7, supra note 35. 
40 Mo. Rev. Stat. §146.020. 
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8. Montana 
a. The provisions; historical note 
Montana has had but one constitution, dated 1889, and 
there have been no significant amendments to the uniformity 
structure found in Art. XII. In the introductory chapters to 
this study it was pointed out that the term uniformity clauses 
would be used to designate those basic provisions from which 
have been derived the particular rules of uniformity for taxa-
tion. However, it was noted that in some cases several of the 
basic types of clauses were phrased in terms of "according to 
value" and "in proportion to value" rather than "uniform 
and equal." Not infrequently it is shown that a state may 
have two, or even three, of these basic types of clauses classi-
fied according to substantial differences in phraseology. 
However, the Montana Constitution is one of the very few 
constitutions having two provisions, either of which might 
serve as a basic uniformity clause, and both of which are 
framed in terms of "uniformity." These two Montana pro-
visions are different types which on their face might well lead 
to conflicting results. 
Article XII, § 1 of the Montana Constitution contains a 
Type VI uniformity clause which reads (with the uniform-
ity clause italicized) : 
... the Legislative Assembly ... shall levy a uniform 
rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe such reg-
ulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all 
property, except that especially provided for in this article. 
The Legislative Assembly may also impose a license tax, 
both upon persons and upon corporations doing business in 
the State. 
Note that the uniformity clause is combined with a "just 
valuation" clause, as was the case with all but one of the 
states having a Type VI clause as the basic provision. To be 
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reconciled with Art. XII, §1, is the uniformity clause found 
in Art. XII, § 11. That section reads: 
Taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws and 
for public purposes only. They shall be uniform upon the 
same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the au-
thority levying the tax. 
Two other provisions in Art. XII are of interest in de-
termining the meaning of the uniformity limitation in Mon-
tana.1 Art. XII, §2 is an exemption provision, stating that 
certain named classes of public property "shall be exempt 
from taxation," while other named classes of property "may 
be exempt from taxation." By an amendment in 1918 the 
following was added to this last category: "evidences of debt 
secured by mortgages of record upon real or personal prop-
erty in the state of Montana." Thus, a particular problem of 
"double taxation" was dealt with by constitutional amend-
ment. The other important provision is Art. XII, § 1 7, which 
purports to define property as follows: 
The word property as used in this article is hereby de-
clared to include moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, franchises 
and all matters and things (real, personal and mixed) capa-
ble of private ownership, but this shall not be construed so 
as to authorize the taxation of the stocks of any company or 
corporation when the property of such company or corpora-
tion represented by such stocks is within the State and has 
been taxed. 
Again, a particular problem of "double taxation" is dealt 
with in the proviso. 
Finally, Art. XII, §1a, which was added to the constitu-
1 Of minor interest are Art. XII, §3, providing for special treatment of 
mines and mining claims, and Art. XII, §7, which requires that all corpora-
tions shall be subject to taxation for state and local purposes on real and 
personal property owned or used by them and not by the constitution ex-
empted. 
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tion by amendment in 1934, expressly authorizes the imposi-
tion of an income tax: 
The legislative assembly may levy and collect taxes upon 
incomes of persons, firms and corporations for the purpose of 
replacing property taxes. These income taxes may be gradu-
ated and progressive and shall be distributed to the public 
schools and to the state government. 
As will be explained below, such an authorization was un-
necessary insofar as the uniformity limitation might have 
been an insurmountable barrier. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
The Montana court has taken the position that nonprop-
erty taxes2 are not limited by either of the uniformity clauses 
found in the Montana Constitution,8 although that clause in 
Art. XII, § 11 which requires "Taxes [to] be uniform upon 
2 In spite of some intimation to the effect that the Montana tax structure 
is limited to property and "license" taxes conforming to the second sentence 
of Art. XII,§ 1 (for example, Fruit Growers' Express Co. v. Brett, 94 Mont. 
281,292-293,22 P. 2d 171 (1933)), it seems clear that taxes other than 
"license" taxes within the meaning of Art. XII, § 1 are permissible (for 
example, O'Connell v. State Board of Equalization, 95 Mont. 91, 25 P. 2d 
114 ( 1933); State v. Driscoll, 101 Mont. 348, 54 P. 2d 571 ( 1936) ). 
8 The early case usually cited as establishing this doctrine is State ex rei. 
Sam Toi v. French, 17 Mont. 54,41 Pac. 1078 (1895). Subsequent cases 
simply cite the French case as authority for the proposition without a dis-
cussion of the merits. However, the same result could have been reached in 
the French case without such a rationale. In that case, the court simply 
lumped the uniformity clause in Art. XII, § 11 with all such types of clauses 
without noticing the difference in words, and then proceeded to reason that 
such limitations could apply only to the taxation of property. Of course, 
applying the clause in section 11 would achieve the same result because it 
is in terms of uniformity within classes. However, the rationale of this 
court did partially pave the way for the liberal decision as to property taxes. 
See text to note 16, infra. As for the proposition that the application of Art. 
XII, § 11 would have made no difference in the French case, compare the 
implications of Gelsthorpe v. Purnell, 20 Mont. 299, 51 Pac. 267 ( 1898). 
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the same class of subjects" could reasonably be held the 
source of the requirement that nonproperty taxes must be 
uniform within classes.4 Under this limitation the court has 
approved the principle of progressively graduated rates as 
being a reasonable classifi.cation.11 
Because of the more restrictive uniformity limitation ap-
plicable to property taxes, as discussed below, it is often cru-
cial to determine the nature of a tax. This is so even though 
the property-tax uniformity limitation is not nearly so re-
strictive as in many other states. It is of interest to note that 
the court has ruled that an inheritance tax was not a property 
tax, 6 and a similar result was reached as to an income tax. 
However, in Hauser v. Miller1 the court held that a gradu-
ated probate fee was a tax on property and invalid because 
the rate schedule was contrary to the property-tax uniformity 
requirement. 
Income tax. In O'Connell v. State Board of Equalization,8 
decided in 1933, the Montana court upheld the graduated 
personal net income tax law enacted in 1933.9 The act had 
been copied from the Idaho income tax law,10 and a constitu-
4 For example, Gelsthorpe v. Furnell, supra note 3 (inheritance tax, a 
minimum exemption of $7500 held to be a reasonable classification); 
O'Connell v. State Board of Equalization, supra note 2 (income tax, several 
exemptions, all held to be reasonable classifications). Also see Hale v. County 
Treasurer of Mineral County, 82 Mont. 98, 265 Pac. 6 ( 1928); State ex 
rei. Griffin v. Greene, 104 Mont. 460,67 P. 2d 995 (1937); State v. 
Hennessy Co., 71 Mont. 301, 230 Pac. 64 (1925). 
11 O'Connell v. State Board of Equalization, supra note 2; State v. Hen-
nessy County, supra note 4. 
6 Gelsthorpe v. Furnell, supra note 3. 
7 37 Mont. 22, 94 Pac. 197 (1908). See text at note 24, infra. 
8 Supra note 2. Also see Mills v. State Board of Equalization, 97 Mont. 
13, 33 P. 2d 563 (1934), following in principle the O'Connell case. The 
Mills case is discussed in the comparative study of the income tax, infra 
Chapter V. 
9 Mont. Laws 193 3, c. 181. 
10 O'Connell v. State Board of Equalization, supra note 2. 
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tiona! amendment11 was contemporaneously proposed which 
would have expressly authorized the imposition of such a 
tax. However, the validity of the tax was determined in the 
O'Connell case before the amendment became effective. 
Thus, in effect, that amendment when adopted was only a 
mere approval of power already existing. Of course, a part of 
that provision is still important for the diversion of the reve-
nue from an income tax. In any case, it was the conclusion of 
the Montana court in the O'Connell case that the income tax 
was not a property tax, and, therefore, not subject to any of 
the stricter property-tax uniformity requirements. Conse-
quently, exemptions were permissible, as were graduated 
rates. The court relied to a considerable degree on the Idaho 
act and the interpretation placed by the Idaho court on that 
act as it related to the Idaho uniformity limitation in the 
Diefendorf case.12 While clearly holding that the tax was 
not a property tax, the court never squarely held that it was 
an "excise" tax, although it concluded that the tax was "in 
the nature" of an excise tax. The majority in the 3-2 decision 
looked favorably on the view that such a tax is sui generis.13 
It may be noted that the two dissenting justices vigorously 
opposed calling the tax other than a property tax, and they 
would have held the graduated rates to be arbitrary classifi-
cations. 
( 1 ) Property taxation 
The two possibly conflicting uniformity clauses found in 
the Montana Constitution have caused no problem insofar 
as two of the particular rules of uniformity are concerned. 
Thus, there is a requirement of universality.14 In locating 
11 Art. XII, §I a, quoted in the text, supra. 
12 See Part G ( 4) of this chapter, supra. 
13 O'Connell v. State Board of Equalization, supra note 2 at 112-113. 
14 See Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lewis & Clark County, 28 
Mont. 484,72 Pac. 982 (1903}, in which the court considered the validity 
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the source of this requirement, the court has generally relied 
on both the "just valuation for taxation of all property" 
clause in Art. XII, § 1 and the enumeration of both permis-
sible and mandatory exemptions of property in Art. XII, §2. 
In the latter case, applying the maxim of construction ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius, the court found authority 
to prohibit exemption of property other than that enumer-
ated in Art. XII, §2. Also, the court has clearly ruled that 
property may only be taxed by the ad valorem method, thus 
excluding the possibility of using "gross earnings" as the 
base in taxing property.11; The court referred to the "just 
of section 681 of the Civil Code of 1895 which required that each insurance 
company transacting business in the state should be taxed upon the excess 
of premiums received over losses and ordinary expenses incurred within the 
state, the rate being the same as that applied to all other personal property, 
and further providing that insurance companies subject to the tax were to 
be subject to "no other taxation under the laws of the state, except taxes on 
real estate and fees imposed by laws." The court held that the part of sec-
tion 681 providing for a tax was valid, saying at 49 3: "Whether ••• re-
garded as a tax upon the value of the franchise right of the company to do 
business in this state, measured by the net income, or as a tax on the busi-
ness established and done, regarded as property separate from money re-
ceived as premiums, the value of which is measured by the same standard, is 
immaterial." Thus, the act simply provided for the taxation of a class of 
property within the definition of Art. XII, § 17. However, the in lieu pro-
rJision was held unconstitutional as amounting to an exemption of personal 
property contrary to Art. XII, §I. Also, Art. XII, §7 was referred to. (See 
note 1, supra.) The court further held that the Act of March 4, 1897, 
which enacted the present license fee applicable to all domestic and foreign 
insurance companies (a graduated flat rate, with a base of gross premiums) 
did not repeal tl.e "property" tax in question. [Note: the tax upheld in the 
Northwestern case was repealed by an Act of Mar. 2, 1911.] 
Also see Daly Bank & Trust Co. v. Silver Bow, 33 Mont. 101, 81 Pac. 
950 (1905), and Stonerv. Timmons, 59 Mont. 158, 196 Pac. 519 (1921). 
The Stoner case expressly overruled State ex rei. Lyman v. Stewart, 58 
Mont. 1, 190 Pac. 129 (1920), and held invalid Mont. Laws 1919, c. 89, 
which provided for the levy of a local property tax on real property only. 
15 Fruit Growers Express Co. v. Brett, supra note 2, discussed, infra note 
27. But see Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lewis & Clark, supra 
note 14. 
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valuation" clause in Art. XII, § 1 in indicating the source of 
this limitation. 
The court has also held, in Hilger v. Moore/6 decided in 
1919, that property may be classified for the purpose of ap-
plying different effective rates. Thus, the comprehensive 
classified general property tax enacted by the Montana legis-
lature in 1919 was upheld. The system used by the legisla-
ture was a classification of property for the application of 
different ratios of valuation, with a single percentage rate 
being used. Property was grouped into seven classes, with 
the ratio of valuation to be used on the respective classes 
varying from 7% to 100% of the full value.17 In approving 
the act, the court indicated that property might be classified 
according to its nature and character, its productivity or want 
of it, its utility, the difficulty of reaching some of it under the 
nonclassified system, as well as on the basis of "other reasons 
equally cogent.ms 
In reaching the conclusion that property might be classi-
fied for the purpose of applying different effective rates, the 
16 56 Mont. 147, 182 Pac. 477 (1919), a 4-1 decision. 
17 The classes of property with the respective ratios of valuation appli-
cable thereto were: Class ( 1), net proceeds of mines, mineral rights, and 
royalties, 100% of full value; Class (2), household goods, agricultural and 
commercial machines, motor vehicles and boats, 20%; Class ( 3), livestock, 
poultry and unprocessed produces of both, merchandise, and furniture and 
fixtures in stores, offices and hotels, 33 1/3% of full value; Class ( 4), real 
estate, improvements, manufacturing and mining machinery, 307o of full 
value; Class (5), moneys and credits, 7% of full value; Class (6) shares of 
stock in banking corporation, 40% of full value; Class (7) all other prop-
erty, 40% of full value. !d. at 162-163, 176. The present system is sub-
stantially the same. Mont. Rev. Code, §§84-30 1, 84-302. 
18 Hilger v. Moore, supra note 16 at 176. The court considered the rea-
sonableness of the classifications at 17 4-1 77. It is interesting to note that 
once having established the possibility of classification under the state con-
stitutional uniformity clauses, the court considered the contention that the 
classifications were arbitrary under the federal equal protection clause. /d. at 
174. 
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court faced the difficulty of reconciling the apparently con-
flicting uniformity clauses found in Art. XII, § 1 and Art. 
XII, § 11. The difficulty is well illustrated by the following 
quotation found at the end of the opinion: 
In conclusion we may say that, from the similarity of the 
language employed, it is reasonably certain that sections 1 
and 11 of Article XII of our Constitution were borrowed 
from other states. As no other state Constitution contains 
both sections, it follows that section 1 was taken from a Con-
stitution which did not contain provisions similar to those in 
section 11, and likewise that section 11 was borrowed from a 
Constitution which did not contain a section similar to our 
section 1. The two provisions are not altogether harmonious, 
and the construction of them intended by the framers, is not 
very clear. If we have correctly interpreted their meaning, 
the validity of House Bill No. 30 is placed beyond the range 
of controversy. In reaching our conclusion, however, it is 
not necessary for us to say that we are entirely free from 
doubt. As said by this court . . . "In the case of a statute 
assailed as unconstitutional, we stand committed to the rule 
that no such enactment will be pronounced invalid unless its 
nullity is made manifest beyond a reasonable doubt."19 
The rationale of the court was that the provisions in the 
revenue article, Art. XII, must be read in pari materia.20 
Thus, the argument that the classified property tax violated 
the principle "of a uniform rate of taxation" required by Art. 
XII, § 1 would have been "persuasive, if not convincing" if 
Art. XII, § 1 were to be construed independently of any 
other provision. But Art. XII, § 1 does not stand alone. The 
division of the constitution into chapters and sections is a 
mere matter of convenience for the purpose of reference, 
with no significance in applying rules of construction and in-
l9 !d. at 177, emphasis added. 
20 !d. at 164-1 7 3. The arguments of counsel are set out at 148-162. Of 
course, each gave predominant consideration to the uniformity clause most 
favorable to the viewpoint being urged. 
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terpretation. What of Art. XII, § 11? The opinion anticipates 
its conclusion: "No where is the legislature prohibited from 
classifying property for the purpose of taxation [Query: 
but what of Art. XII, § 1, if it stood alone?] ; but, in the con-
trary, section 11 contains\ a distinct recognition of the right 
to do so." Here, the earlier doctrine that nonproperty taxes 
are not limited by the requirement in Art. XII, § 11 that 
"Taxes ... shall be uniform upon the same class of sub-
jects" came to the support of the view that classification of 
property was permissible. Thus, "subjects" of taxation did 
not necessarily include property as a single subject. Remov-
ing all taxes other than property taxes from the operative 
scope of the uniformity clause in Art. XII, § 11, ". . . it 
[was] practically certain that the term subjects in section 11 
was used [by the framers of the constitution] in its then 
popular sense to denote the different kinds of property liable 
to taxation." The court concluded: 
Construing the first sentence of section 1 with section 11 
the meaning is reasonably clear: The taxes levied shall be 
uniform upon the same class of property within the same 
taxing district. . . . Or, stating the principle of sections 1 
and 11 in different form, the mandatory injunction to the 
legislature is that it shall prescribe such uniform mode of 
assessment as shall secure a just valuation of all taxable 
property . . . and that [all taxes] shall be uniform upon 
the same class of property within the territorial limits of the 
authority levying the tax. This is the rule of uniformity de-
clared by our Constitution, if we are able to determine the 
intention of its framers aright.21 
21 /d. at 170. The dissent, at 178, with "due deference to the learning 
and maturity of judgment of [his] distinguished colleagues," stated that 
in his opinion the classification system "defies the letter, scorns the spirit, 
and seeks to override the equality clauses of the Constitution and the design 
of its authors to insure the adoption of some system of uniformity and im-
partiality making for the fust apportionment of the burdens of taxation." 
(Emphasis added.) 
UNIFORMITY STRUCTURES 437 
The case of Hilger v. Moore is extremely valuable for 
comparative purposes, and the entire opinion illustrates the 
differences which might flow from the use of different phra-
seology in the uniformity clauses and the possible arguments 
for mustering support in the form of interpretations by other 
state courts of uniformity clauses of both similar and varying 
phraseology. Most of all, it illustrates the difficulty faced 
when patently conflicting uniformity clauses are included in 
a single constitution. When it is viewed against the history 
of a similar situation such as is found, for example, in Mis-
souri, 22 one finds diametrically opposed results being reached 
-results predicated, it seems, on an underlying judicial 
predeliction as to what should be permitted. 
In summary, it is now clear that property may be classified 
in Montana for the purpose of applying different effective 
rates.23 Indeed, as illustrated by the general property tax, 
classification for rates may approach "zero" but cannot reach 
it because that would be an unconstitutional "exemption!" 
However, at least one case indicates that the legislature has 
less discretion in classifying property than in classifying the 
subjects of nonproperty taxes. Hauser v. Miller indicates 
that a graduated property tax rate is not permissible/4 al-
though such a classification founded on quantity alone was 
allowed for nonproperty taxes. 
22 See Part G (7) of this chapter, supra. 
23 Besides Hilger v. Moore, supra note 16, see Bank of Miles City v. 
Custer County, 93 Mont. 291, 19 P. 2d 885 (1933), in which the classifi-
cation of money and credits was upheld as reasonable. The most recent case 
is New Silver Bell Min. Co. v. County of Lewis & Clark, 284 P. 2d 1012 
(1955). For cases finding unreasonable classifications: Hayes v. Smith, 58 
Mont. 306, 192 Pac. 615 (1920); State v. North Amer. Car Corp., 118 
Mont. 183, 164 P. 2d 161 (1945), discussed infra note 30. Also see an 
Op. Atty. Gen. Feb. 29, 1952, reported in the CCH Montana Tax Re-
porter, U24-002. 
24 Supra note 7 and text at note 7. 
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Property of "freight line companies." The struggles of 
the Montana legislature to tax the property of freight line 
companies is an apt illustration of the application of the gen-
eral rules already listed. The original scheme for the taxation 
of the cars of such freight line companies (defined as those 
engaged in furnishing, operating or leasing cars, not other-
wise listed for taxation in Montana, for the transportation of 
freight over any railway lines not owned, leased, or operated 
by such company) was that for purposes of taxation all cars 
used exclusively or partially within the state were declared 
to have a situs in the state.25 The gross earnings of such com-
panies were "deemed and considered as the assessed value" 
for taxation of all cars operated, furnished, or leased by such 
companies, and there was to be "levied and assessed" against 
"such property" a tax of five per cent of such "valuation."26 
In Fruit Growers Express Co. v. Brett,21 decided in 1933, 
the court held that the tax was a property tax and therefore 
invalid because it was not based on value as required by Art. 
XII, § 1. That is, the arbitrary fixing of the value of the 
property (the cars) was held to violate the requirement that 
property be taxed by the ad valorem method. 
Thereafter, in 1935, the above-described statute was par-
tially amended so as to avoid the results of the Brett case. 
Now the official, when valuing the cars, was simply to take 
into consideration, among other things, the "gross earnings" 
of the company, and the rate levied against such property 
was to be equal, as nearly as possible, to the average rate of 
all state and local general property-tax rates for the preced-
ing year, with such rate being "levied against the property 
211 Mont. Rev. Code (1921) §§2097, 2098; Mont. Laws 1919, Ex. Sess., 
c. 5. 
26 Mont. Rev. Code (1921) §2101, as amended by Mont. Laws 1925, c. 
185, §2, and Mont. Laws 1931, c. 75, §I. 
27 Supra note 2. 
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of such companies."28 It was further provided that "in lieu 
of the foregoing tax and in place thereof," such companies 
could, in the discretion of the board, "be required to pay a 
tax of five per cent of its total gross earnings ... , which 
tax shall be in lieu of all other taxes upon its property within 
this state.m9 
In State v. North American Car Corporation,S0 decided 
in 1945, the court held that the average rate provision vio-
lated the uniformity clauses in Art. XII, §§1 and 11, because 
there was no reasonable classification. The court said: 
... [I]t will be admitted that any tax against the same 
kind of property used for identical purposes is not uniform 
when a different valuation and a different rate is applied to 
two distinct taxpayers, separately distinguishable only in 
name, and the tax being imposed by the same taxing dis-
trict.81 
The specific classification in question was as follows: similar 
property of companies not within the definition of the freight 
line companies (e.g., common carriers) was taxed only ac-
cording to actual physical presence in and use in a taxing 
district, with the rate of that district being applied. 
Thereafter, in 1949, the present tax relative to freight 
line companies became effective. It is obviously a result of 
the North American Car Corporation decision. It is now 
simply provided that such freight line companies "shall pay 
annually . . . a sum in the nature of a tax in the amount of 
five per cent of the total gross earnings received from all 
sources by reason of the use or operation of such cars within" 
28 Mont. Laws 1935, c. 26, §§3 and 5; Mont. Rev. Code §§84-4803 
and 84-4805. 
29 Mont. Laws 193 5, c. 26, §6; Mont. Rev. Code §48-4806. 
30 Supra note 23. The decision was 3-2, with the two dissenting judges 
believing there was suflicien t basis for classification. 
31 /d. at 193. 
440 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
the state, and the tax "shall be in lieu of all other taxes upon 
such property of any freight line company so paying the 
same ..•. " 82 It is further provided that such companies 
shall be liable for the payment of any additional taxes which 
the board might find due under its authority to raise or lower 
the rate to conform to "the taxes which would be payable if 
the cars were taxed on an ad valorem basis."33 It is the inten-
tion of the legislature "that the tax herein imposed be not 
greater than the amount of tax such freight line company 
would pay if its cars were taxed on an ad valorem basis. No 
tax other than as in this act imposed shall be assessed against 
the business or income of any such freight line company."3' 
The provisions of this tax statute have not yet been chal-
lenged. In light of the Fruit Growers Express Company 
case, supra, it would seem clear that the tax cannot be upheld 
as a property tax. If it is held a nonproperty tax with a base 
of gross earnings, query whether the "in lieu" provision is 
not a violation of the rule of universality? 311 
9. New Mexico 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The original and only constitution of New Mexico is 
dated 1911; however, the present uniformity structure of 
that constitution dates from 1914. By an amendment at that 
time the entire Revenue Article, Art. VIII, was radically 
changed. The original uniformity structure was quite de-
tailed, and rather repetitive. The uniformity clause would 
82 Mont. Rev. Code §84-4819. Fonner Mont. Rev. Code §§84-480 1 to 
84-4817 was superseded by §§84-4818 to 84-4826. 
83 /d. at §84-4820. 
M !d. at §84-4822. 
811 See Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lewis & Clark County, supra 
note 14. 
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have been classified as Type V, and constituted the entire 
Art. VIII, §1: 
The rates of taxation shall be equal and uniform upon all 
subjects of taxation. 
This provision was followed by a section purporting to au-
thorize enumerated types of taxes, including certain "gradu-
ated" taxes, and in addition spelled out a prohibition against 
"double taxation." Article VIII, §2 read: 
The legislature shall have power to provide for the levy 
and collection of license, franchise, excise, income, collateral 
and direct inheritance, legacy and succession taxes; also 
graduated income taxes, graduated collateral and succession 
taxes, and other specific taxes, including taxes upon the pro-
duction and output of mines, oil lands and forest; but no 
double taxation shall be permitted. 
If this were not sufficient, Art. VIII, §3 provided that the 
above enumerations of subjects of taxation should not de-
prive the legislature of the power to tax other subjects "in 
such manner as may be consistent with the principles of taxa-
tion fixed in this constitution." Other important provisions 
were placed in Art. VIII, §§7 and 11, which provide for 
both mandatory and permissive exemptions of enumerated 
classes of property from taxation. In addition, there was a 
universality provision in Art. VIII, §9, which read: 
All property within the territorial limits of the authority 
levying the tax, and subject to taxation, shall be taxed 
therein for state, county municipal and other purposes. . . . 
The original Art. VIII, §8 dealt specifically with the taxa-
tion of corporate property, including the enumeration of cer-
tain permissible exemptions. 
The amended Revenue Article presents a more simplified 
uniformity structure. Article VIII, § 1 continues to contain 
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only the basic uniformity clause, which has been radically 
altered in phraseology: 
Taxes levied upon tangible property shall be in propor-
tional to the value thereof, and taxes shall be equal and uni-
form upon subjects of taxation of the same class. 
For purposes of analysis, it is evident that Art. VIII, § 1 may 
be broken down into two parts. First, there is what might be 
the "proportionality" clause referring specifically to the taxa-
tion of tangible property. Second, there is the more general 
uniformity clause which has reference simply to "taxes." The 
only other provisions in the amended constitution which are 
pertinent to problems of uniformity are Art. VIII, §§3 and 
5 concerning the exemption of property. Those sections are 
substantially similar to the former sections 7 and 11 of Art. 
VIII. Article VIII, §3 provides that enumerated classes of 
property "shall be exempt from taxation." Article VIII, §5 
provides that the legislature "may exempt from taxation" 
certain enumerated classes of property. Thus, the uniformity 
structure, as amended, consists of Art. VIII, § 1 (a limited 
proportionality clause, and a more general uniformity 
clause), and Art. VIII, §§3 and 5. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
As expected, and whatever might be the source of the 
limitation/ nonproperty taxes are only required to be uni-
1 The not unusual vacillation is found in the decisions as to whether the 
uniformity within classes requirement for nonproperty taxes is derived from 
the uniformity clause in Art. VIII, § 1, which stipulates that "taxes" are to 
be uniform within classes. Those cases stating that Art. VIII, § 1 does not 
limit nonproperty taxes usually simply refer to the uniformity clause therein 
without reference to the specific language. Compare State v. Gomez, 34 
N.M. 250, 280 Pac. 251 ( 1929); Amarillo-Pecos Valley Truck Lines v. 
Gallegos, 44 N.M. 120,99 P. 2d 447 (1940), with State ex rei. Taylor v. 
Mirabal, 33 N.M. 553,273 Pac. 928 (1928); Veterans of Foreign Wars 
v, Hull, 51 N.M. 478, 188 P. 2d 334 (1947). 
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form within classes, so that the objects of such taxes and ex-
emptions therefrom need only be reasonable classes; 2 also, 
classifications may be made for application of different 
rates.3 There has been no occasion either to approve or disap-
prove a graduated rate schedule.4 
Because of the more severe uniformity limitation applica-
ble to property taxes, it is always important for purposes of 
uniformity in taxation to determine the nature of any given 
tax. An inheritance tax has been held to be a nonproperty 
tax/ but there has been no decision as to the nature or gen-
eral validity of the New Mexico net income tax which has a 
graduated rate schedule.6 However, the New Mexico gross 
income (occupation) tax is considered a non property tax. 7 A 
severance tax applicable to the production of oil was upheld 
after being characterized as a nonproperty tax.8 
( 1 ) Property taxation 
There has been no extensive judicial development of the 
meaning of the uniformity limitation applicable to property 
2 For example, Breece Lumber Co. v. Mirabal, 34- N.M. 64-3, 287 Pac. 
699 ( 1930) (fuel use tax, selection of the commodity a reasonable classifica-
tion); Lougee v. New Mexico Bureau of Revenue Com'r, 4-2 N.M. 115, 
76 P. 2d 6 (1938) (gross income tax, holding reasonable the exclusion of 
gross income consisting of salaries). Also see State v. Gomez, supra note 1; 
State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Tittmann, 42 N.M. 76, 75 P. 2d 701 (1938); 
Veterans of Foreign Wars v. Hull, supra note 1. In Safeway Stores v. Vigil, 
40 N. M. 190, 57 P. 2d 287 (1936), the court held a merchant's license 
tax invalid on the ground that the statutory definition of "retail dealer'' 
created an arbitrary class. 
3 For example, Amarillo-Pecos Valley Truck Lines v. Gallegos, supra note 
1; Breece Lumber Co. v. Mirabal, supra note 2. 
4 But see the dictum in Safeway Stores v. Vigil, supra note 2. 
5 State v. Gomez, supra note 1. 
6 New Mex. Stat. Ann. §§76-1201 et seq. 
7 For example, Lougee v. New Mexico Bureau of Revenue Com'r, supra 
note 2. 
8 Flynn, Welch & Yates v. State Tax Comm., 38 N.M. 131, 28 P; 2d 
889 (1934), discussed infra at note 12. 
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taxes. However, the court has made it clear that there is a 
rule of universality.9 In establishing this limitation, the court 
has made no reference either to the proportionality clause 
(applicable to tangible property taxation) or to the general 
uniformity clause. The rationale has simply been that the 
enumeration of exemptions in Art. VIII, §§3 and 5, and 
particularly the enumerations of permissive exemptions in 
section 5, indicates an intent that other exemptions of prop-
erty are not to be permitted.10 This prohibition may not be 
avoided by the use of "in lieu" nonproperty taxes.11 
O For example, Albuquerque Alumnae Ass'n of Kappa Kappa Gamma 
Fraternity v. Tierney, 37 N.M. 156, 20 P. 2d 267 (1933); Dillard v. 
New Mexico State Tax Comm., 53 N.M. 12, 201 P. 2d 345 (1949). In 
the Dillard case the court held that the exemption of soldier's property in 
Art. VIII, §5 did not extend to the community property of the wife, and 
therefore the exemption of such property would contravene Art. VIII, §§3 
and 5. Article VIII, §5 was amended in 1949 to provide specifically for the 
exemption prohibited theretofore by the Dillard decision. Also see Sims v. 
Vosburg, 43 N.M. 255, 91 P. 2d 434 (1939). 
10 For example, the Albuquerque Alumnae Ass'n case, supra note 9 at 1 58. 
11 See, for example, Oden Buick, Inc. v. Roehl, 36 N.M. 293, 13 P. 2d 
1093 (1932); State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. State Tax Comm., 40 N.M. 299, 
58 P. 2d 1204 (1936). The Oden Buick case provides an interesting study. 
That case involved the validity of the in lieu provision of the motor vehicle 
registration tax. Provision was made for the valuation and assessment of 
motor vehicles under the general property tax. However, it was provided 
that the taxes paid under the motor vehicle registration tax should be in lieu 
of all other taxes on such cars: "No vehicle upon which the registration fees 
herein provided to be paid shall be assessed or taxed upon any property 
assessment rolls in this state for the period for which such fees are paid." 
New Mex. Stat. Ann., §68-234. In the Oden Buick case the issue was 
raised whether motor vehicles in possession of an automobile dealer for sale, 
trade, or exchange were to be subject to the general property tax. The 
decision was resolved as a matter of statutory construction, it being decided 
that such vehicles were not intended to come within the in lieu proviso. 
That proviso was limited to vehicles upon which individual licenses had been 
purchased. Thus, the validity of the in lieu provision was not determined. 
However, in dictum, the court indicated that it might uphold the tax and 
proviso as being a combined license and ad valorem tax, thus creating no 
exemption. The court implied that the license fee for such vehicles was 
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As for the method by which property may be taxed, it 
seems clear that because of the proportionality clause in Art. 
VIII, § 1, tangible property may only be taxed by the ad va-
lorem method.12 The big question is, may specific property 
taxes be imposed upon intangible property? If there is an ad 
valorem requirement for the taxation of intangible property, 
it would apparently have to be derived from the general uni-
formity clause, which simply requires that "taxes shall be 
equal and uniform upon subjects of taxation of the same 
class." There has been no decision indicating just how the 
court would rule on this issue.13 In fact, intangible property 
is subject to the general property tax.14 
Also, there has been no clear ruling concerning the degree 
of uniformity required of the effective rates applicable to all 
property taxed by any one taxing authority. The problem is 
twofold because of the "dual" nature of Art. VIII, § 1. As 
to tangible property, the probability is greater that an abso-
lute uniformity is required in the effective rate applicable to 
all such property taxed. For example, does the requirement 
that taxation of such tangible property be "in proportion to 
somewhat larger than any sum which would be required if such vehicles were 
taxed under the general property tax. Thus, the in lieu provision might be 
upheld by assuming, as stated by the court at 299, that: 
• • • the Legislature by the act in question decided as a matter of policy 
to embrace the property tax on an individually owned motor vehicle in 
the total registration fee charged, and make such fee in lieu of all other 
property taxes on same. • • • 
12 See State ex rei. Taylor v. Mirabal, supra note I ; Flynn, Welch & Yates 
v. State Tax Comm., supra note 8. 
13 But see the statement made in Flynn, Welch & Yates v. State Tax 
Comm., supra note 8, at 135-136, which might well imply that intangible 
property need not be taxed ad valorem. 
14 New Mex. Stat. Ann., §76-101 provides that "All property, real, per-
sonal and intangible shall be subject to taxation, except as in the constitution 
and existing law otherwise provided." No constitutional or statutory pro-
vision provides for the exemption of intangibles. 
446 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
value" establish all tangible property as a minimum class 
even though the uniformity clause in Art. VIII, § 1 might 
carry the implication that property in general is less than a 
single subject and consequently classifiable? Such has been 
the result in other states having a somewhat similar situation; 
for example, Missouri.15 To the contrary, it might be argued 
that the scope of the proportionality clause in Art. VIII, § 1 
is limited because of the inclusion of the uniformity clause re-
ferring to classification. It may be argued that the propor-
tionality clause merely ensures that tangible property will 
be taxed by the ad valorem method, and that the uniformity 
clause carries with it the implication that tangible property 
may be subclassified for the application of different effective 
rates when taxed by the ad valorem method. The .latter ap-
proach would emphasize, as did the Montana court/6 the 
uniformity clause which is framed in terms of classification. 
In any case, the question is an ,open one in New Mexico.17 
15 See Part G (7} of this chapter. 
16 See Part G (8} of this chapter. 
17 The only dictum found which has any relevancy is in Love v. Duna-
way, 28 N.M. 557, 215 Pac. 822 (1923}. The precise issue in that case 
concerned the territoriality of the uniformity limitation. It had been con-
tended (at 5 64) that the act in question violated Art. VIII, §I (note: no 
distinction was made in the opinion between the two clauses contained 
therein) because the rate of taxation was higher in a particular county than 
in other counties of the state having the same total valuation of property. In 
upholding the act in question, and noting the territorial nature of the uni-
formity limitation (whatever might have been the requirement within a 
county), the court said (at 5 64) : 
It will be noted, however, that the tax is equal and uniform throughout 
the county, which is all that is guaranteed by the provision of the Con-
stitution relied upon. • • . This provision does not require that the levy 
for payment of county salaries shall be the same in every county in the 
state, but only that it shall be equal and uniform throughout the county. 
[Emphasis supplied.] 
This was, of course, dictum and it ignores the "classification" language of 
the uniformity clause. 
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As for the degree of uniformity required of the effective 
rate applicable to intangible property, an easier case can be 
made out for permissible classification. As already pointed 
out, it is likely that intangible property may be taxed by the 
specific method. If so, it would seem to follow that at least 
there is no requirement of absolute uniformity in rate as be-
tween intangible and tangible property (if absolute uniform-
ity should be required as to the latter). The question would 
remain, could intangible property be further classified for 
different rates? If not, it would be because intangible prop-
erty is held to be a minimum class, or "subject" of taxation. 
Again, there is little on which one might base a prediction. 
As pointed out above, the legislature has left intangible 
property subject, at least in theory, to the general property 
tax. 
10. Oklahoma 
a. The provisions; historical note 
Oklahoma has had but one constitution, dated 1907, and 
its uniformity structure has remained unchanged. The basic 
uniformity clause is found in Art. X, §5, and reads as fol-
lows: 
. . . Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of sub-
jects. Three other provisions are of primary importance in 
determining the effective uniformity limitation in Oklahoma. 
Article X, §22 provides: 
Nothing in this Constitution shall be held, or construed, to 
prevent the classification of property for purposes of taxa-
tion; and the valuation of different classes by different means 
or methods. 
Article V, §50 (a part of the Legislative Article) is directed 
to a specific problem of property taxation. It reads: 
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The Legislature shall pass no law exempting any property 
within this State from taxation, except as otherwise provided 
in this Constitution. 
Also of major importance in the development of the uni-
formity limitation is Art. X, §12, which provides that certain 
types of taxes may be imposed. 
The Legislature shall have power to provide for the levy 
and collection of license, franchise, gross revenue, excise, in-
come, collateral and direct inheritance, legacy, and succession 
taxes; also graduated income taxes, graduated collateral and 
direct inheritance taxes, graduated legacy and succession 
taxes; also stamp, registration, production or other specific 
taxes. 
Other provisions to be considered include Art. X, §8, which 
provides: 
All property which may be taxed ad valorem shall be as-
sessed for taxation at its fair cash value, estimated at the 
price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale. . . . 
Finally, Art. X, §6 and Art. XII-A provide for the manda-
tory exemption of enumerated classes of property. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
Whatever the source of the limitation might be, 1 non prop-
erty taxes2 are only required to be uniform within classes, 
1 As in other states having this type of basic uniformity clause the Okla-
homa court has ruled both pro and con on the issue of whether the uniform-
ity clause in Art. X, §5 is the source of the uniformity limitation applicable 
to non property taxes. Compare Ex parte Shaw, 53 Okla. 654, 157 Pac .. 900 
(1916); McGannon v. State, 33 Okla. 145, 124 Pac. 1063 (1912); Trus-
tees, Executors' & Securities Ins. Corp. v. Hooton, 53 Okla. 530, 157 Pac. 
293 (1915); and In reAssessment of Sales Tax against Knapp, 185 Okla. 
584,95 P. 2d 92 (1939). 
2 Note the lengthy enumeration of "permissible" taxes found in Art. X, 
§12 quoted in the text, supra. As indicated in Daube v. Oklahoma Tax 
Comm., 194 Okla. 487, 152 P. 2d 687 (1944) the enumeration is not 
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whether the classification is for the object of such a tax or ex-
emptions therefrom,8 or whether the classification is for the 
purpose of applying different rates.4 Within this last rule, 
the court has approved the principle of graduated rates. 5 
Because of the liberal uniformity limitation applicable to 
property taxes, as described below, it is not of too much con-
sequence, for purposes of uniformity of taxation, to deter-
mine the nature of any given tax in Oklahoma. For example, 
the mineral production tax has been held first a privilege 
tax, then a property tax,O and in neither case did it violate the 
uniformity limitations. There have been no decisions con-
cerning an income tax, but this is not unexpected since a 
graduated income tax is expressly provided for in Art. X, 
§12. Similarly, a graduated inheritance tax is provided for; 
however, such a tax has been held to be a nonproperty tax.7 
Also, the court has held that a mortgage registration tax to 
be a nonproperty tax.8 
(I) Property taxation 
Universality; "in lieu" taxes. Article V, §50 of the consti-
tution expressly prohibits the exemption of property from 
taxation. Consequently, in State v. Pioneer Mills,0 a statute10 
exclusive, nor is the express permission to impose graduated inheritance and 
income taxes an implied limitation upon graduated rates for other taxes. 
3 For example: Daube v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., supra note 2 {selection of 
object for gift tax valid); In re Assessment of Sales Tax against Knapp, 
supra note I ; Ex parte Shaw, supra note I ; Trustees, Exec. & Sec. Ins. Corp. 
v. Hooton, supra note 1; Walde v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 188 Okla. 142, 
106 P. 2d 821 {1940). 
4 For example, In re Harkness' Estate, 83 Okla. 107, 204 Pac. 911 
{ 1922); McGannon v. State, supra note 1. 
5 See Trustees, Exec. & Sec. Ins. Corp. v. Hooton, supra note 1, and 
Daube v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., supra note 2. 
6 See notes 11 and 14, infra. 
7 McGannon v. State, supra note 1. 
8 See note 1 5, infra. 
9 122 Okla. 6, 25 0 Pac. 120 ( 1926). Also see County Assessor, Oklahoma 
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providing that all property, both real and personal, used ex-
clusively for the manufacturing of cotton products and all 
monies used in the operation of such a business were to be 
exempt from taxation by the state for a period of ten years 
was held to be a violation of Art. V, §50. 
However, this restriction is not such a barrier as it might 
at first appear. In other jurisdictions if the exemption of 
property from taxation is prohibited, the courts have usually 
held that an "in lieu" nonproperty tax, that is, a nonproperty 
tax purporting to be in lieu of a tax upon certain property 
indirectly reached by the nonproperty tax, is, in effect, an 
exemption and therefore a violation of the prohibition against 
exemptions. ·This is not the case in Oklahoma, as will be 
shown. The earliest, and leading case on the "in lieu" prob-
lem in Oklahoma is In Re Gross Production Tax of W olver-
ine Oil Co.,11 decided in 1915. That case dealt with the 
validity of the early mineral production tax.12 Ruling that 
the tax was an occupation tax/3 the court also held that the 
in lieu provision (stating that the production tax was to be in 
lieu of all ad valorem and other taxes on both the property 
used in the production and the minerals) was authorized by 
Art. X, § 12 and was not an "exemption" within the meaning 
of Art. V, §50.14 
County v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 
329,202 Okla. 162, 211 P. 2d 790 (1949); Gibson v. Phillips University, 
195 Okla. 456, 158 P. 2d 901 (1945); Lowden v. Excise Board of Texas 
County, 185 Okla. 143,90 P. 2d 923 (1939). 
10 Okla. Laws 1915, c. 195, §1. 
11 53 Okla. 24, 154 Pac. 362 (1915). 
12 0kla.Laws1915,c.107. 
18 The tax was said to be upon the privilege of producing the named 
minerals (ores and oil), with the base being gross value of mineral produced. 
A different percentage rate was applicable to the two basic classes: ore and 
oil. 
u Insofar as the Wolverine case held that the mineral production tax 
was an occupation tax, it was reversed in In re Skelton Lead & Zinc Co.'s 
Gross Production Tax for 1919, 81 Okla. 134, 197 Pac. 495 {1921), and 
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During the same term in Trustees, Executors' & Securities 
Insurance Corporation v. Hooton15 the court upheld the real 
estate mortgage registration tax/6 which imposed a gradu-
ated registration tax "in lieu" of all other taxes, including ad 
valorem property taxes, upon the notes secured. The court 
held that the tax was upon the privilege of registering, and 
that "in lieu" taxes were authorized by Art. X, §12.17 A 
similar result was reached in Ex parte Shaw18 concerning the 
in lieu provision of the motor vehicle registration fee law. 
In that case the court said that"· .. this was not an exemp-
tion of property, but a substitution of one form of taxation 
for another, as held in" the Wolverine Oil Co. case. 
Then in In re Diehr/9 decided in 1935, the money and 
credits tax (subsequently repealed in 1939) was sustained. 
The court held that money, as defined, was a valid class of 
property which could be segregated for purposes of taxation, 
and that the tax thereon (one fifth of one per cent) in lieu 
of all other taxes was not a violation of Art. V, §50. Thera-
tionale of the court was that the class of property was taxed, 
and therefore there was no exemption from taxation within 
the meaning of section 50.20 
Bergin Oil & Gas Co. v. Howard, 82 Okla. 176, I99 Pac. 209 (I92I). In 
those cases the gross production tax, as amended, but substantially the same 
tax, was held to be upon the property. However, other than the decision as 
to the nature of the tax, the opinion in the Wolverine case was reaffirmed, 
including the "in lieu" rationale therein. The reason for the decision con-
cerning the nature of the tax related to issues other than uniformity of taxa-
tion. 
15 Supra note 1. And see In re Oklahoma Nat. Life Ins. Co., 68 Okla. 
2I9, 17 3 Pac. 3 76 (I 9I8) ; In re Assessment of Conservative Loan Co., 6 7 
Okla. 307, 173 Pac. 654 (1918). 
l6 Okla. Laws 19I3, c. 246. 
17 Trustees, Executors' & Securities Ins. Corp. v. Hooton, supra note I at 
534-536. 
18 Supra note I at 664. 
19 I74 Okla. 300,50 P. 2d 725 (1935). 
20 ld. at 302. 
452 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
However, In reAssessment of Chickasha Cotton Oil Co.,21 
decided in 1921, illustrates a limit to the availability of in 
lieu nonproperty taxes. In that case, the issue concerned the 
validity of a statute purporting to relieve raw farm products 
from ad valorem taxation, but stated that such should be 
"subject to an income tax." The court held that the statute 
violated Art. V, §50 because it operated to exempt this class 
of property in the hands of some persons who would not be 
subject to payment of an income tax. Consequently, reasoned 
the court, the statute in fact exempted that property in the 
hands of those not paying an income tax. 
In summary, while property may not be made the subject 
of an "outright" exemption from property taxation, there 
may be, in effect, an exemption when such exemption is cou-
pled with a nonproperty tax indirectly reaching the property. 
In addition, the legislature may exempt property from the 
ad valorem general property tax when such property is taxed 
by a selective specific property tax. Apparently in these cases 
the court relies to some extent on the enumeration of permis-
sible taxes in Art. X, § 12, especially the enumeration of 
"specific taxes" in the last phrase of that section. Conse-
quently, either a nonproperty tax or a specific property tax 
may be "substituted" for the ad valorem general property 
tax, and there will be no exemption contrary to Art. V, §50. 
However, if the tax is a nonproperty tax, the property ex-
empted must be indirectly reached by the substituted tax. 
Method used. While there are no really clear-cut cases 
holding a tax to be a specific property tax, the court clearly 
seems to accept the proposition that there is no ad valorem 
requirement in the Oklahoma Constitution, i.e., that prop-
erty may be taxed by the specific method.22 
Effective rates. The court has clearly held that absolute 
21 80 Okla. 101, 194 Pac. 215 (1921). 
22 See In re Skelton Lead and Zinc Co., supra note 14; In re Diehr, supra 
note 19. In In re Oklahoma National Life Ins. Co., supra note 15, in which 
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uniformity is not required of effective rates in the taxation of 
property.23 Of course, Art. X, §22 expressly states that 
property may be classified, and Art. X, §5 requires only a 
uniformity upon the same class "of subjects." One of the 
leading cases for the general proposition is In re Diehr/4 in 
which the court upheld the Money and Credit Tax of 1927 
(repealed in 1937). The court held that money as classified 
was a proper subject for taxation, and that the rates applica-
ble thereto could vary from the rates applicable to other 
property. The court said "· .. the only constitutional re-
quirement to be observed as to uniformity applies to the dif-
ferent properties of the same class and does not apply as be-
the court held that the mortgage registration tax was a nonproperty tax and 
valid, the court did say, at 225, that as to property taxation: 
While many states have constitutional provisions requiring that property 
shall be taxed ad valorem, this state has none unless • . . [Art. X, § 8] 
should be so construed. That such is not the meaning of that section is 
quite clear to us. It is simply a prohibition against undervaluation of 
property when it is taxed ad valorem, and is not a requirement that it 
shall be taxed by that method. Property may be valued as a means of 
measuring the amount of the tax thereon, but the tax may be measured 
by other means; for example, by the income from the property. Specific 
taxes may be imposed on property by the head, number, weight, or other 
measurement. 
Also concerning the e1rect of Art. X, §8 (requiring that all property which 
may be taxed ad valorem shaU be assessed for taxation at its fair cash value), 
see Comanche County v. American National Bank, 122 Okla. 34, 252 Pac. 
408 (1927), in which the court apparently approves the principle that the 
ratio of valuation used under an ad valorem general property tax need not 
necessarily be 100% if the ratio is uniform for all property of a certain 
class. See also In reAssessment of Property of Western Light & Power Corp., 
169 Okla. 53, 35 P. 2d 946 (1934). 
23 Besides the cases discussed in the text, see Love v. Silverthorn, 187 Okla. 
114, 101 P. 2d 254 (1940), upholding the intangible property tax. Nor 
would Art. X, §8 prevent classification for the purpose of varying the effec-
tive rate by application of different ratios of valuation (rather than different 
percentage rates) to the different classes. See Comanche County v. American 
Nat. Bank, supra note 22. 
24 174 Okla. 300, 50 P. 2d 725 ( 1935). Followed in State v. Chickasha 
Milling Co., 180 Okla. 611,71 P. 2d 981 {1937). 
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tween the several classes. This is expressed in section 5, article 
10 .... " 211 However, as recently as 1949, in Custer County 
Excise Board v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, 
the court ruled that a classification of real property into ru-
ral and urban (rural realty was taxed at ten mills, urban at 
eight and one-half mills) was arbitrary. It stated: 
Obviously, there is no difference between rural property and 
urban property in its relation to an ad valorem tax or a tax 
based on values so that one property may be distinguished 
from the other as an object of taxation. Location alone is not 
a basis for the classification of the property for purposes of 
taxation on a basis of value. 26 
As a postscript, the writer would point to the very interest-
ing "Graduated Land Tax"27 which the legislature at-
25 /d. at 301-302. 
26 201 Okla. 528, 530,207 P. 2d 774 (1949). 
27 Okla. Laws 1913, c. 240, p. 651; Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 68, c. 19, 
§§751-759. Section 751 reads: 
Except real estate of common carriers authorized to be held by them by 
the Constitution of this state, the owner, whether legal or equitable, 
whether a person, firm, association, joint stock association, or corporation, 
and whether resident or not of this state, of any land in the state, in excess 
of an aggregate of 640 acres, shall upon such excess, pay the following 
annual license tax for the purposes of the gener~l expenses of state gov-
ernment, which is hereby levied, to wit: 
For each dollar of valuation as assessed for taxation ad valorem in the 
preceding year the following schedule: 
1 mill where such excess does not exceed 640 acres; 
2 mills on such excess exceeding 640 acres and not exceeding 1,280 
acres; 
3 mills on such excess exceeding 1,280 acres and not exceeding 1,920 
acres; 
5 mills on such excess exceeding 1,920 acres and not exceeding 2,560 
acres; 
10 mills on such excess exceeding 2,560 acres and not exceeding 3,200 
acres; 
15 mills on such excess exceeding 3,200 acres. 
Provided that lands of the assessed value of 10,000 Dollars may be 
exempted to any person in lieu of the 640 acres exempted as herein 
provided. 
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tempted to impose in 1913. The statute is still on the books. 
The tax is an ad valorem tax on realty, with the rate gradu-
ated according to value. There has been serious doubt 
whether the law was a valid enactment under the constitu-
tional limitations upon legislative procedure/8 and the tax 
has never been enforced. Consequently, the Oklahoma court 
has had no occasion to rule on the validity of a graduated 
property-tax rate under an ad valorem type tax. 
11. Oregon 
a. Uniformity in taxation: 1859 to 1917 
Oregon has had but a single constitution, that of 1859. 
However, the original uniformity structure underwent sig-
nificant amendment in 1917. Both before and after 1917 the 
uniformity structure has been relatively brief, the two perti-
nent provisions being Art. I, §32 and Art. IX, § 1. The 
change made in 1 91 7 relates to the wording of these two 
provtstons. 
In the original uniformity structure there were two basic 
uniformity clauses which would have been classified in this 
study as Types V and VI, respectively. The uniformity 
clause in Art. I [Bill of Rights], §33 read as follows: " ... 
and all taxation shall be equal and uniform." The other uni-
formity clause was found in Art. IX [Finance], § 1 which 
read: 
The legislative assembly shall provide by law for a uni-
form and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall 
prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for 
taxation of all property, both real and personal, excepting 
such only for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, re-
ligious, or charitable purposes as may be specially exempted 
by law. 
28 See the Historical Note to Okla. Stat. Ann., §751. 
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In the pertinent opinions of the court, Art. IX, § 1 was di-
vided into two basic clauses, each having different significant 
results. A division was made between the uniformity clause 
and the second clause with its exemption proviso. 
During this first period under the Oregon Constitution 
the strictest degree of uniformity was required of property 
taxes.1 A leading case was Crawford v. Linn County,2 de-
cided in 1884, in which the court analyzed the pertinent con-
stitutional provisions and related a particular phrase to each 
rule of the property-tax uniformity limitation. This precise-
ness is seldom found in the other jurisdictions. There usually 
is nothing more than a blanket referral to a constitutional 
provision. Much of the discussion in the Crawford case 
might be called dictum, since the issue was the degree of uni-
formity required of effective rates; however, the other rules 
stated therein are supported by decisions in other cases. 
First, there was a strict rule of universality, the source of 
this limitation being the second clause of Art. IX, §1.8 The 
court further reasoned that in the absence of this clause there 
would have been no such limitation on the power of the leg-
islature to select and exempt property for purposes of taxa-
tion because the two uniformity clauses did not contain such 
a prohibition. Those clauses were said to relate solely to the 
uniformity required of effective rates and the method of 
taxation of property.4 
Second, property could be taxed only by the ad valorem 
method, the source of this rule being the uniformity clauses 
1 As for nonproperty taxes, see note 11, infra. 
2 11 Ore. 482,5 Pac. 738 (1884). 
8 !d. at 494. 
4 /d. at 492-493. However, in Wallace v. Board of Equalization, 47 Ore. 
583, 86 Pac. 365 (1906), in which the court held that an exemption of 
$300 of household personal property was void, the court apparently derived 
the exemptions limitation from the uniformity clause in Art. X, § 1. The 
court asserted that there would be an imposition of an unequal rate of taxa-
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in Art. IX, § 1 and Art. I, §32.'1 Third, an absolute uniform-
ity was required of the effective rate applied to all property 
taxed by any one taxing authority, and the source was again 
the uniformity clauses. 6 
In the Crawford case the court stated that the effective 
limitations derived from both of the uniformity clauses (Art. 
I, §32 and Art. IX, § 1) were identical, the clauses being the 
equivalent of each other.7 Consequently, there was a super-
fluity of provisions. 
b. Uniformity in taxation since 1917 
The amendment of the uniformity structure in 1917 re-
tained the two uniformity clauses in the separate provisions, 
but made important changes in phraseology. As will be 
shown, the two clauses continue to be the equivalent of one 
another. The uniformity clause found in Art. I, §32 now 
reads: 
all taxation shall be uniform on the same class of 
subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying 
the tax. 
The significant change was the switch from "equal and uni-
form" to "uniform on the same class of subjects." 
tion because of the exemption. However, it might be noted that this was 
the argument presented in the pleadings, and therefore the rationale of the 
Crawford case was ignored. Also see Hogg v. Mackay, 23 Ore. 339, 31 
Pac. 779 {1893). 
11 /d. at 484-485, 492-493. Also see: Ellis v. Frazier, 38 Ore. 462, 63 
Pac. 642 {1900); Portland v. Portland Ry., L. & P. Co., 80 Ore. 271, 156 
Pac. 1058 {1916); Reser v. Umatilla County, 48 Ore. 326, 86 Pac. 595 
(1906). 
6 !d. at 492-493. Also see: Ellis v. Frazier, supra note 5; Lake County v. 
Schroder, 47 Ore. 136, 81 Pac. 942 {1905). Smith v. Kelly, 24 Ore. 464, 
33 Pac. 642 {1893) does not hold to the contrary, despite some misleading 
annotations. 
7 /d. at 484-485, 493. 
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The second uniformity clause, still found in Art. IX, § 1, 
now reads: 
The Legislative Assembly shall . . . provide by law uni-
form rules of assessment and taxation. . . . 
The change here is quite significant in view of the interpreta-
tion given the several parts of the original Art. IX, § 1. 
First, the basic words of the uniformity clause were changed 
from "a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation" 
to "uniform rules of assessment and taxation." Second, and 
more important, was the deletion of the second clause found 
in the original Art. IX, § 1. Thus, as borne out by the cases, 
radical changes were made in the effective uniformity limita-
tion. 
Meaning of the uniformity limitation. The court has said 
that under the amended uniformity structure the nature of 
any tax is no longer of importance for purposes of uniformity 
of taxation; indeed, the court has equated the two amended 
uniformity clauses to the federal equal protection clause, say-
ing in the leading case of Standard Lumber Company v. 
Pierce that: 
. . . it is manifest that the only limitation imposed upon the 
taxing power of the several states by the 14th Amendment 
is this,-all taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of 
subjects. For all practical purposes the limitation mentioned 
is identical with the restrictions imposed by the Oregon Con-
stitution [found in Art. I, §32 and Art. IX, § 1] upon the 
f t t . 8 power o axa wn. . . . 
Reviewing the restrictive limitation upon property taxation 
found in the original constitutional provisions, the court 
pointed out that 
. • • the conviction became general, that the limitations of 
the Constitution which confined the legislature in the taxa-
8112 Ore. 314,333,228 Pac. 812 (1924). 
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tion of property to a proportional tax thereon were no longer 
adapted to the needs of the state. Demand was made for re-
moval of those constitutional restrictions, which prevented 
the classification of property in respect to its nature, condi-
tion or class, and the imposition thereon of different rates of 
taxation upon different classes of property; and which ex-
cluded considerations of faculty or ability to pay, equality of 
sacrifice or governmental advantages provided to the tax-
payer: See Voter's Pamphlet, Special Election, June 4, 1914, 
p. 14 ...• 9 
To remedy this situation, Art. I, §32 and Art. IX, §1 were 
amended with the result above indicated.10 The issue in 
Standard Lumber Company v. Pierce was the validity of a 
personal net income tax which had a graduated rate schedule 
and minimum exemptions. Because of its analysis of the uni-
formity clauses, the court did not find it necessary to deter-
mine the nature of the tax-i.e., whether imposed on prop-
erty or privilege-and held that the classifications in question 
were valid. 
Because of what the court has said, it might not be neces-
sary in stating the uniformity limitation to make a distinction 
as between property and nonproperty taxes. However, at 
least for comparative purposes the distinction may be useful. 
Nonproperty taxes, of course, still have to be uniform only 
within classes, 11 and the court has found graduated rates to 
9 /d. at 335. Emphasis added. 
10 As the court stated, id. at 335-336: 
As above indicated, the Constitution as amended places no restraint upon 
the power of the legislature in the matter of taxation which was not al-
ready enforced upon it by the 14-th Amendment to the federal Constitu-
tion, with this qualification, if it be a qualification, that among the mem-
bers or objects included in a class selected by the legislature, inherent 
uniformity as well as territorial uniformity is required. 
11 Before the 1917 amendment see: Kellaher v. Portland, 57 Ore. 575, 
112 Pac. 1076 (1911). Subsequent to the 1917 amendment see: In re 
Heck's Estate, 120 Ore. 80, 250 Pac. 735 (1926); Portland Van & Storage 
Co. v. Hoss, 139 Ore. 434, 9 P. 2d 122 (1932). 
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be reasonable classifications in other than the above income 
tax case.12 
As for property taxation, there is no longer a rule of uni-
versality/8 and it seems clear that Standard Lumber Com-
pany v. Pierce is authority for the proposition that property 
may be classified for the purpose of applying different ef-
fective rates to the different classes.14 Indeed, in that case the 
court approved a graduated rate without determining the 
nature of the tax. However, one should be cautious in draw-
ing any conclusion that a graduated rate could be applied un-
der a general, or even selective property tax which is clearly 
imposed upon property. And apparently, there is no longer 
any requirement that property must be taxed by the ad va-
lorem method. No cases on the point have arisen; however, 
if the Pierce case is to be taken at its face value, since the 
fourteenth amendment does not demand that property be 
taxed only ad valorem/5 it would follow that neither of the 
uniformity clauses (Art. I, §32 and Art. IX, § 1) so require. 
12 In Safeway Store v. City of Portland, 149 Ore. 581, 42 P. 2d 162 
( 193 5), the court upheld a local chain store tax and the graduated rate 
thereunder. 
13 Apart from the Pierce case in the text, see Methodist Book Concern v. 
State Tax Comm., 186 Ore. 585, 208 P. 2d 319 (1949), and Corporation 
of Sisters of Mercy v. Lane County, 123 Ore. 144, 261 Pac. 694 ( 1927). 
14 Also see Redfield v. Fisher, 135 Ore. 180, 292 Pac. 813 (1931), in 
which the court struck down a tax of 5% upon the gross income from cer-
tain intangibles held by individuals. The income from such intangibles 
going to corporations was exempt. This classification was held arbitrary. The 
court held that the tax was in fact a property tax. On rehearing, the court 
distinguished the Pierce case, expressly not overruling it but pointing out 
that in the tax under consideration the tax was on gross, not net income. In 
McPherson v. Fisher, 143 Ore. 615,23 P. 2d 913 (1933), the court up-
held the subsequent 19 31 tax upon the net income from intangibles so 
drafted as to overcome the objections in the Redfield case. 
15 See Chapter IV, infra. 
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12. Pennsylvania 
a. The provisions :method of analysis to be used 
The Pennsylvania Constitutions of 1776, 1790, and 1838 
contained no provisions expressly concerned with problems of 
uniformity of taxation. The present constitution of Pennsyl-
vania came into force in 18 7 4, and in comparison with most 
other state constitutions its uniformity structure is quite 
short. Nor have the provisions been amended in any substan-
tial manner. The basic uniformity clause is found in Art. IX, 
§ 1 and is coupled with a clause which permits the exemption 
of certain property from taxation. Article IX, § 1 reads: 
All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, 
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, 
. . . but the General Assembly may, by general laws, ex-
empt from taxation public property used for public purposes, 
actual places of religious worship, places of burial not used 
or held for private or corporate profit, institutions of purely 
public charity, [and real and personal property owned, oc-
cupied, and used by any branch, post, or camp of honorably 
discharged soldiers, sailors, and marines] . 
The last named class of exemptible property, enclosed in 
brackets, was added by amendment in 1923. The other im-
portant provision is Art. IX, §2, which provides that: 
All laws exempting property from taxation, other than the 
property above enumerated shall be void. 
In contrast to these two comparatively brief provisions 
constituting the source of the effective uniformity limitation 
in Pennsylvania, there have been a multitude of decisions 
relevant to a determination of its meaning. Indeed, one 
writer has ventured to say: 
It would be futile to attempt to reconcile all of the decisions 
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania subsequent to the 
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adoption of the Constitution of 18 7 3 [regarding the meaning 
of these provisions], and particularly the dicta expressed in 
many of the opinions.1 
After reviewing what he considered the most pertinent cases, 
the same writer asserted that: 
The conclusion is obvious, from a review of these decisions, 
that the constitutional requirement of uniformity in taxation 
was not adopted for an idle purpose, and was intended to 
mean something, although there has been some lack of uni-
formity of judicial expression as to what uniformity of taxa-
tion does actually mean. Terminology may be in part re-
sponsible. 2 
The purpose of the present analysis is to determine the 
meaning of the effective uniformity limitation in Pennsyl-
vania, notwithstanding conflicting statements. 
Any generalizations on the meaning of this limitation must 
be preceded by a "tax by tax" analysis. Using this approach 
for the difficult and complex situation in Pennsylvania makes 
possible some conclusions as to the actual status of each of 
the particular rules of uniformity, and thereby a distinction 
between apparent and real inconsistencies. Predictability will 
be more certain if internal consistency can be shown to have 
developed as to particular taxes, if not as to the tax structure 
as a whole. 
b. General property taxation 
Strictly speaking, there is no single general property tax 
in Pennsylvania; nor has there been one since the inception 
1 Tanner, "Constitutional Limitations of the Taxing Power in Pennsyl-
vania," 7 Univ. of Pitt. L. Rev. 98, 1 00, 112 ( 1941), See also the Note, 
"The Pennsylvania Constitutional Requirement of Uniformity in Taxa-
tion," 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 219 ( 1938), 
2 Tanner, supra note 1 at 112. 
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of the present constitution or for some time before. How-
ever, the combination of several separate taxes constitutes, in 
effect, a general property tax system. First, the Real Prop-
erty Tax,3 which is purely local, reaches all real property ex-
cept that which is specifically exempt. The act providing for 
the real property tax also provides for the taxation of "occu-
pations"4-a tax similar to the "faculty tax" known in the 
time of the Colonies. 
Second, there is the more complex tax structure reaching 
personal property. Pennsylvania has no comprehensive per-
sonal property tax system comparable to the real property 
tax. In fact, at the present time only intangible personal 
property is taxed. The Personal Property Tax5 is presently a 
local tax, and reaches intangibles (other than "corporate 
loans" as defined) in the hands of individuals. Those intan-
gibles defined as "corporate loans" which are in the hands of 
individuals are reached by a Corporate Loans Tax,S which is 
a state tax.7 The Pennsylvania court has stated that the 
equivalent of a tax on intangible personal property in the 
3 Infra, text at notes 13-31. 
4 Infra, text at notes 32-47. 
5 Infra, text at notes 48-83. 
6 /nfra, text at notes 84-107. 
7 The situation as it existed shortly after the adoption of the present 
constitution of 1874 may be described as follows. A single act contained both 
a personal property tax and a corporate loans tax. Both of these were con-
sidered state taxes; however, a certain portion of the revenue derived 
therefrom was returned to the counties which collected the taxes. In 1913 
the personal property tax became a county tax exclusively, while the cor-
porate loans tax remained a state tax. The taxes were framed to reach 
enumerated classes of intangibles, some being reached by the counties, 
others by the state. For a few years before and after 1940 the state revived 
the state personal property tax, so that intangibles not taxed by the state 
under the corporate loans tax were taxed by botk a state and a county per-
sonal property tax. However, the state personal property tax has since ex-
pired, so that the present situation is as described in the text. 
464 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
hands of corporations is found in the combination of the 
Capital Stock Tax (domestic corporations) and the Fran-
chise Tax (foreign corporations),8 supplemented by certain 
other miscellaneous taxes. 9 
At an early time certain enumerated types of tangible 
personal property (e.g., livestock) were listed as taxable un-
der the personal property tax along with the enumerated in-
tangible property. However, even those classes of tangible 
personal property which were at one time subject to the per-
sonal property tax have since been removed from its scope 
by exemption.10 But from time to time there have been both 
state and local selective tangible personal property taxes, 
such as the state tax on anthracite coa1.11 
In summary, under what might loosely be called the gen-
eral property tax system, real property is taxed locally; in-
tangible personal property is taxed either by local units or by 
8 /nfra, text at notes 108-130. 
9 The miscellaneous taxes are designed to reach certain financial institu-
tions (national and state banks and savings institutions having capital stock; 
title insurance and trust companies; private bankers; and savings institutions 
without capital stock). See the discussion at 1f29-00 1 et seq., CCH Penna. 
Tax Reporter. 
1° For example, see Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, §4782 (Act of 1887, May 13, 
P.L. 114, §1), which reads: 
All taxes, for whatsoever purpose, laid upon watches, household furniture 
and pleasure carriages, by and under the revenue laws of this common-
wealth, be and the same are hereby abolished, and the laws under which 
said taxes are levied and collected, so far as they relate to the property 
herein mentioned, are hereby repealed. 
Also see Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, §3251 (Act of 1873, March 21, P.L. 46, 
§I), which provides that any state taxes imposed on horses, mules, and cattle 
are to be abolished. 
11 /nfra, text at notes 131-140. There also has been a state "floor tax" on 
alcoholic beverages, and local severance taxes and billboard taxes. See infra, 
text at notes 141-149. 
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the state, not by both; and tangible personal property is taxed 
at neither level unless by a selective tax.12 
(1) Real property tax 
For purposes of local taxation it is provided that "all 
. . . real estate . . . not exempt . . • from taxation" shall 
be subject to taxation by local governmental units at" an an-
nual rate" determined in each unit by the annual revenue 
requirements.13 This tax represents the closest approach to a 
"general property tax" in Pennsylvania. Strictly speaking, one 
should say "taxes," since there are separate acts for the vari-
ous classes of local governmental units. However, the op-
erative provisions of all the acts are phrased in substantially 
the same words. 
Two early decisions, although not definitive, are of in-
terest in determining the degree of uniformity required of 
the effective rate applicable to real property. The first is 
Roup's Case/4 decided in 1874. That case is evidently the 
first concerning uniformity of taxation to be decided under 
12 This may be visualized as follows: 
Intangible Personal Property 
Tangible 
In hands of individuals 
Real Personal except "cor- "corporate 
Property Property porate loans" loans" 
State • (see note Corporate 
taxes: ?,supra) Loans Tax 
Local Real • Personal 
taxes: Property Property 
Tax Tax 
* Selective taxes from time to time. 
18 See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, §§5020.201, 5453.201. 
1481~Pa.211 {1874}. 
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the present constitution. It is somewhat indecisive, but stands 
substantially for the proposition that real property may be 
classified into rural and urban for the purpose of applying 
different rates to each class.15 Some fifteen years later one of 
the most important of the Pennsylvania uniformity cases was 
decided. In Commonwealth v. Delaware Division Canal 
Company the court upheld the corporate loans tax, and in so 
doing made the following significant statement, albeit dic-
tum: "Real estate, for taxation, has been classified as seated 
and unseated, and for municipal purpose may, perhaps, ad-
mit of further classification.m6 
Then in 1905 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania clearly 
faced the issue and, in Jermyn v. Scranton/1 held that the 
city of Scranton could constitutionally classify real estate for 
purposes of taxation into three classes and apply different 
rates to each class. The opinion is rather brief and does not 
describe the nature of the three approved subclasses of real 
111 A statute provided that certain property in the city of Pittsburgh was 
to be classed as "rural," and that taxes thereon were to be assessed and col-
lected at 2/3 of the rate of city taxation. The lower court held that the 
statute did not violate the uniformity clause, Art. IX, § 1. It said that the 
clause was merely declaratory of the law as it stood prior to the adoption of 
the constitution. The lower court's opinion was affirmed on appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania by a per curiam opinion, in which it was 
said that the majority united in affirming the decision below, although not 
all for the same reasons. No mention was made of the points about which 
there might be disagreement. However, the per curiam opinion did state, 
id. at 216: "Hence no opinion is given, except that we all agree that the 
power to classify the subjects of taxation is not taken away by the new con-
stitution." [Emphasis added.] There is good reason to believe that the disa-
greement went to the "special" nature of the statute, i.e., its applicability 
to Pittsburgh alone and by name. 
16 123 Pa. 594, 621, 16 Atl. 584 (1889). That case is discussed infra, 
text at notes 8 7 et seq. 
17 212 Pa. 598, 62 Atl. 29 (1905). There was only a per curiam opin-
ion, which, however, affirmed the decree on the opinion below, which was 
set out in the Reporter. 
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estate. In any case, the court upheld the ordinance, and the 
following conclusion is found: 
It is too late in the day in Pennsylvania to question the power 
of the legislature to classify subjects of taxation on broad 
lines and within certain limitations .... We shall cite only 
one case to show that the question before us is definitely and 
authoritatively settled: Commonwealth v. Delaware Divi-
sion Canal Co. . . .18 
Thus, it appears to be settled that the classification of real 
estate for the purpose of applying different effective rates is 
permissible.19 Other cases have illustrated the territorial na-
ture of the limitation which requires same classes of real es-
tate to be subject to the same rate.20 
On the other hand, real property may not be classified for 
the purpose of exemptions. This is the result of Art. IX, §2, 
which expressly prohibits exemptions.21 Consequently, any 
18 !d. at 602. It might be significant to point out that the party attacking 
the validity of the ordinance which made the classification evidently ad-
mitted the right of the legislature to classify realty for purposes of taxation, 
but denied the right of a municipality to levy different rates on each class 
of such property. The court, at 601, termed this admission as admitting 
the "principle, but deny[ing] the propriety of applying it so as to produce 
practical results." The position of the court was that unless there could be 
different rates of levy on the several classes of realty, why should property 
be classified at all. 
19 See, for example, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, §8772, 8774. 
20 See Moore v. Pittsburgh School District, 33 8 Pa. 466, 12 A. 2d 29 
( 1940), holding it immaterial that a different rate might apply to property 
of the same class, located, however, in different school districts. The facts 
of the case presented a peculiarly interesting problem in the determination 
of just what particular taxing authorities were involved. Also see Poor Dis-
trict Case (No.1), 329 Pa. 390, 197 Atl. 334 (1938). 
21 The statements to this effect are usually found to be dictum in cases 
which were actually decided on a basis of statutory interpretation, that is, a 
determination of whether the contested property was factually within the 
class of property exempted by the statute. For example, White v. Smith, 189 
Pa. 222, 226-227, 42 Atl. 125 (1899); Commonwealth v. Dauphin 
County, 335 Pa.177, 179-180, 6A. 2d 870 (1939); Ogontz School Tax 
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statutory provisions providing for the outright exemption of 
a class of real property will be held invalid if such class is 
not designated as exemptible in Art. I X, § 1. 
Legislative attempts to classify forest lands for special 
treatment have been uniformly unsuccessful,22 notwithstand-
ing the liberal interpretation given to the uniformity clause 
in Art. IX, § 1. In 1940 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in 
Clearfield Bituminous Coal Corporation v. T homas/3 con-
ExemptionCase, 36I Pa. 284, 29I, 3I3, 65 A. 2d ISO (I949); Hill 
School Tax Exemption Case, 370 Pa. 2I, 23,87 A. 2d 259 (1952). There 
is a lower-court opinion which actually ruled on the proposition: Pittsburgh 
v. Phelan (Pa.), II Dist. Ct. 572 (1901), holding the Act of June 4, 
1879, P.L. 90 to be a violation of Art. IX, §§ 1 and 2. The act purported 
to exempt churches while in the process of being erected. It was held that 
such a church was not a place of actual religious worship within the meaning 
of Art. IX, § 1 and that therefore such property could not be exempted from 
taxation. The act was repealed in 1933. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, §4721. 
22 The first such attempt was by an Act of April 20, 190 5, P.L. 246 (Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 72, §§5583-5589) which provided that owners of forest 
lands, maintaining a growth of not less than three hundred to the acre, were 
to receive a rebate of taxes thereon, to the amount of eighty per cent of such 
taxes, provided that the rebate was not to amount to more than 45¢ per 
acre. A further proviso stipulated that "the provisions of this act shall not 
be construed so as to exempt from taxation more than five hundred acres, 
owned by any one person .••• " The act was entitled "An Act to en-
courage the planting and maintaining of sprout forest and timber-trees, and 
providing that those who thus aid shall be exempt from taxation. . • ." 
[Emphasis added.] A lower court, in Christley v. Butler County, 37 Pa. 
Super. 32 ( 1908), held that the act violated both the exemption prohibition 
and the uniformity clause, Art. IX, §§I and 2. The primary reason for 
this ruling was that the act was held to be, at 36, " ••• an attempt by the 
legislature to exempt to class of real estate from taxation in the teeth of the 
constitutional mandate withholding from the legislature any such power." 
In any case, the act could not be upheld as a "classification act, because it 
[was] not based on any sustainable ground on that theory." Evidently the 
case was not appealed. 
23 336 Pa. 572, 9 A. 2d 727 (1940). The plaintiff was owner of un-
seated surface land. Pursuant to an Act of June 5, I913, P.L. 405, plaintiff 
had caused that land to be classified as auxiliary forest reserve so that it 
might receive the special treatment provided by statute. A court of common 
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sidered the validity of a 1935 act24 which provided that sur-
face land classified and set apart as auxiliary forest should 
be valued for the purpose of taxation at an amount not to ex-
ceed one dollar per acre. A ten per cent stumpage tax was to 
be paid when and if the trees were harvested. The act was 
held to be unconstitutional for alternate reasons. First, and 
foremost, the act was held to be in fact an exemption statute 
which ipso facto violated both Art. IX, § 1 and the express 
prohibition against exemptions in Art. IX, §2.25 Concerning 
the relevancy of Art. IX, §1 the court said it was" ... well 
settled that when the Constitution enumerates the kind of 
property that may be exempted from taxation, it by implica-
tion excludes all other taxable property."26 
Plaintiff contended that because of the assessed valuation 
of one dollar per acre the forest lands would be taxed at 
least to some degree. In reply, the court asserted that it was 
immaterial if the exemption was only "partial." The differ-
ence between a 100% and, for example, a 50% exemption 
is only a "difference in degree." All are odious to the "con-
pleas, however, declared the 1913 act unconstitutional. Borough of Lang-
horne Manor etc. v. Harvey et al., Ct. of C.P., Bucks County (Feb., 1931). 
No appeal was taken. Acting on advice of the attorney general, an adminis-
trative officer in 1934- notified the owners of all land classified pursuant to 
the 1913 statute that contracts thereunder were cancelled. Subsequently the 
Act of 193 5 (described in the text at note 24-) was passed, and plaintiff 
brought action to compel the reduction on the records of the assessment of 
the land to an amount of not more than one dollar per acre pursuant to 
said 1 9 35 act. 
24 Act of July 18, 1935, P.L. 1196. 
25 Clearfield Bituminous Coal Corp. v. Thomas, supra note 23 at 576-
580. On this point the court relied on In re Cope's Estate, 191 Pa. I, 43 
Atl. 79 (1899) (discussed infra, text at note 192) which held unconstitu-
tional an act exempting personal property to the amount of $5,000 from 
the inheritance tax. Significantly, the tax was held to be a tax upon the 
property transmitted. The Cristley case, supra note 22, was also quoted at 
length. 
26 U. at 577. 
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stitutional principle of equality and uniformity."21 Stressing 
this rationale, the court concluded: 
The framers of the Constitution, recognizing the fact that 
every dollar of normal tax burden arbitrarily subtracted 
from the land of one citizen means a commensurate tax bur-
den added to the property of all other citizens, restricted 
the legislature's power to exempt taxes to a few classes and 
then declared all other attempted exemptions "void."28 
The alternate reason for declaring the act unconstitutional 
was that even if the act could be considered nothing more 
than a statute classifying property for rate purposes, the 
classification in question was arbitrary.29 Evidently the court 
viewed the classification as one based solely on the owners' 
use of the land, and such a basis was arbitrary, at least in this 
particular situation. 30 The opinion concluded with a violent 
diatribe against what it considered to be the imposition of un-
equal tax burdens contrary to the spirit of the uniformity 
clause in Art. IX, § 1. In doing so, the spectre of possible 
classification was pushed to an unwarranted extreme.31 
21 !d. at 579. 
28 /d. at 580. 
29 For this proposition the court relied to some extent on Commonwealth 
v. Alden Coal Co., 251 Pa. 134,96 Atl. 246 (1915), cited as ruling that a 
classification consisting of hard coal was arbitrary. !d. at 580. However, the 
court failed to cite Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 27 4 Pa. 448, 118 Atl. 
394 (1922), in which the classification of hard coal was held to be reason-
able. These cases are discussed infra, text at notes 1 3 2, 13 7. 
30 The court reasoned that the act created inequalities of tax burden since 
a person holding adjoining property might be taxed on the actual value, 
which might be $1 00 or more, while a person cultivating trees might, with 
consent of the secretary, escape all taxation on the land (until the distant 
date when the trees are harvested) except a nominal tax on a valuation of 
$1 per acre. Cf. a similar rationale found in Murray v. Philadelphia, 364 
Pa. 157, 71 A. 2d 280 (1950), concerning a local wage tax on income 
from rented houses, infra note 190. But see Knisely v. Cotterel, 196 Pa. 
614,46Atl. 861 (1900),infranote 166. 
81 Clearfield Bituminous Coal Corp. v. Thomas, supra note 23 at 581. 
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Summarizing, it seems clear that real property is not a 
minimum class (or subject) of taxation. Consequently, such 
property may be further classified for the application of dif-
ferent rates. However, realty can not be subclassified for the 
purpose of exempting such subclasses. The source of this rule 
is the express prohibition against exemptions, although at 
times some reliance is placed on the "principles of uniform-
ity." The prohibition includes "partial" as well as "total" 
exemptions of subclasses of realty. 
(a) Taxation of "occupations" 
In Pennsylvania "occupations" are taxed in much the 
same way as real property. An arbitrary valuation is placed 
on each type of occupation, and the applicable tax rate is the 
same as that applied to real property. The statutory authority 
for the taxation of occupations is the act providing for the 
real property tax. It reads as follows: 
The court asserted that if the act were sustained the legislature could enact 
laws whereby half or some other fraction of all property in a local taxing 
unit would have to bear the whole burden of governmental costs therein. 
Such an act, it was said, would give the state government unlimited power 
"to take from one individual and not from another, as it will." Then, 
quoting from Professor Burgess' condemnation of the 16th Amendment to 
the federal Constitution and the principle of graduated income tax rates, 
the court expressed its philosophy on the whole matter, at 583, note 1: 
••• a government representing either the property class, or the prop-
ertyless class, especially a government representing the propertyless or 
small-property class, a government representing the modern democracy 
under universal suffrage, a government representing the class to be 
benefited by the confiscation and redistribution of wealth through gov-
ernmental force, cannot be safely trusted with such power .... 
The court also felt that the power to classify property would be a " ••. 
despotism, which would destroy property, use up accumulated wealth, make 
enterprise impossible, discourage intelligence and thrift, encourage idleness 
and sloth, and pauperize and barbarize the whole people." As will be ob-
vious from a survey of the entire Pennsylvania problem, these particular 
views--or prejudices-have not prevailed to a great extent beyond Clear-
field Bituminous Coal Corporation v. Thomas, supra note 23. 
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The following subjects and property shall, as hereinafter 
provided, be valued and assessed, and subject to taxation 
for all county, city, borough, town, township, school and 
poor purposes at the annual rate: 
(a) All real estate. . . . 
(b) All salaries and emoluments of office, all offices, and 
posts of profit, professions, trades and occupations, except 
the occupation of farmer, and all persons over the age of 
twenty-one years who do not follow any occupation or call-
ing. . . . The provisions of this clause shall not apply to 
counties of the second and third class, or to any other county, 
the county commissioners of which shall by resolution de-
termine not to levy a tax on trades, occupations, professions 
and persons who follow no occupation or calling, nor shall 
the provisions of this clause apply to cities of the second and 
second A class, or to school districts. 
(c) All other things and persons now taxable by the laws 
of this Commonwealth for county, city and school purposes.32 
Provision for the taxation of "occupations" antedates the 
present constitution of 1874.33 
Two cases concerning the taxation of "occupations" also 
shed some light on the meaning of the uniformity limitation. 
They will be given considerable attention, not because of this 
quite insignificant part of the Pennsylvania tax structure, but 
because of the role one case has played in relation to other 
more important taxes and because of the very important 
doctrinal implications of the second case. 
A local ordinance34 enacted by the City of Williamsport 
and purporting to tax "occupations" was challenged as to its 
82 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, §§5020-201, 5453.201, emphasis added. 
33 Apart from the antecedents of the provision quoted in the text, an Act 
of Mar. 18, 1875, P.L. 15, §1 provided that cities of the third class might 
assess and collect taxes not exceeding 1 ro per annum upon "all persons, 
real and personal property, and also all other matters and things within 
said cities taxable for state and county purposes." 
34 The ordinance was enacted pursuant to the 187 5 authorizing statute, 
mpra note 33. 
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validity under the uniformity clause, Art. IX, § 1, in Ranger's 
Appeal,85 decided in 1885. This is a leading and often cited 
case on the meaning of the uniformity of taxation limitation 
in Pennsylvania. However, as will be pointed out below in 
discussing other taxes, much of the use made of this opinion 
has in fact been "misuse." 
The Williamsport ordinance provided that a tax was to be 
assessed on "all personal property, and all objects and things 
assessed as unclassified." Under this general provision, as-
sessors were directed to "assess all offices and posts of profits, 
professions, trades and occupations."36 The plaintiff's bill in 
Ranger's Appeal averred, and the answer of the city ad-
mitted, that the tax upon occupations was "based upon the 
income from said occupations."37 Testimony tended to show 
that no systematic effort was made to assess the various oc-
cupations uniformly. Different assessors used substantially 
different estimates of income for specific occupations. Ap-
parently, the valuation of occupations by use of income de-
rived therefrom was not based on reported income. Rather, 
as one assessor testified, it was based on what "he considered 
a man's occupation to be worth." For merchants and business-
men a most unusual method was used. Such occupations were 
assessed at what it would take to hire a clerk to do such a 
man's work. From the report of the opinion it is clear that 
this tax was intended to be a property tax, under which oc-
cupations were to be valued according to income received. 
And the rate applicable to other property taxed pursuant to 
the authorizing statute was to be applied to such values of 
occupations. 
The court decided that the city had the power to tax "oc-
811 109 Pa. 79 (1885). 
86 /d. at 79. 
87 /d. at 81. 
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cupations,"38 but that this particular tax was invalid because 
of the inequality found in the method of valuation. Such 
"flagrant inequality" was held to be a violation of that de-
gree of uniformity required by Art. IX, § 1. 39 This was the 
most obvious reason for striking down the tax ordinance. In-
deed, no one could quarrel with that decision in light of the 
extraordinary testimony of the various assessors concerning 
their "divining rod" approach to determining the value of oc-
cupations.40 
However, the court offered an alternate reason for find-
ing the tax invalid, and here was sown the trouble to be 
reaped in later cases. The court stated that "under the guise 
of an 'occupation tax,' the city of Williamsport has levied, 
and is seeking to collect, an income tax." But, it was ruled, 
the city did not have statutory authority to levy an income 
tax. "The power to levy an occupation tax gave the city no 
right to levy an income tax."41 At this point, the court in-
dulged in a general condemnation of income taxes, saying: 
"Of all forms of taxation this is the most odious to the Amer-
ican people." Nevertheless, it is quite important to point out 
that this often quoted dictum had absolutely no relevancy 
whatsoever to the issue before the court, namely, that the 
city had not been authorized by the legislature to impose an 
income tax. Finally, the court expressed an opinion as to 
what kind of a tax on occupations would be constitutional un-
der the uniformity clause. Such a tax might be arranged so 
88 This ruling concerned the authority of the city pursuant to the 18 7 5 
authorizing statute, supra note 33. 
89 Ranger's Appeal, supra note 3 5 at 93. 
40 Ibid. As the court described the situation, each assessor appeared to 
have had his own crude notions of his duty, and to have made his assessments 
according to his own idea of equity. No fixed rule prevailed among them. 
Such an assessment upon "occupations" was "hopelessly, incurably vicious," 
and a direct violation of Art. IX, § I. 
41 ld. at 94. 
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that it classified the several occupations, with all the members 
of a single class being taxed at an identical rate. 42 
The most important point to remember concerning the 
opinion in Banger's Appeal is the precise scope of the issue 
which was to be resolved. And in considering the validity 
of an income tax under the uniformity limitation one should 
be most careful to distinguish between the holding of that 
case and the unwarranted dictum found in the opinion. 43 
The second of the two cases concerning the uniformity 
limitation and the taxation of occupations is a lower-court 
decision, Thompson v. Indiana County,44 from which there 
was apparently no appeal. That case concerned the validity 
of the present statute's45 antecedent insofar as it excluded the 
occupation of farmer. The Act of 1834, Public Law 509, had 
made no exceptions. By an Act of April 29, 1844, Public 
42 /d. at 94-95, the court saying: 
But what uniformity is there in laying an "occupation" tax of $1 00 upon 
A and a like levy of $200 upon B, the occupation of each being similar? 
The answer, and the only one that can be urged is, that B earns double 
the amount that A does. This brings us at once to a vice underlying the 
whole case. Under the guise of an "occupation" tax, the city •.. has 
levied . . . an income tax. 
The hint concerning a proper method was as follows: 
The proper result may possibly be reached by classification. Thus it may 
be that physicians, lawyers [etc. J may be classified, and a uniform oc-
cupation tax assessed upon each class. 
The court also indicated that an occupation tax, though similar, was in no 
way an income tax. There might have been some implication that the tax 
was not a "property" tax. But see In re Brown's Appeal, Ill Pa. 72, 2 Atl. 
77 (1885) in which the court held that occupations were property within 
the meaning of Art. IX, § 8 (concerning the constitutional limitation on 
debt), and therefore to be included in the aggregate valuation of taxable 
property upon which a percentage of indebtedness was to be calculated. 
43 See the discussion under "Income Taxes," infra, text at notes 181-191. 
44 83 Pa. Super. 248 (1924). 
45 See text at note 32, supra. 
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Law 486, the provision was amended to read substantially 
as the present statutory provision reads, including the fol-
lowing proviso after the enumeration of taxable occupations: 
"except the occupation of farmer." The tax authorities 
claimed that this exception of farmers was an exemption, 
and as such prohibited by Art. IX, §2. Rejecting this ap-
proach, the court characterized the statute as "not including" 
the occupation of farmers. That is, not all property must be 
"selected" for taxation. The only limitation on the selective 
power is that when a class is selected, then all of that class 
must be taxed. The statute in question was characterized as 
simply defining "occupations" as a subject of taxation to be 
less than all possible occupations. 
[T] he Act of 1844 is an act providing for assessments on 
certain classes of property therein indicated. . . . The leg-
islature had authority to select the classes of subjects of taxa-
tion and they did not select a class including farmers.46 
Consequently, the "exclusion of" or "failure to select" the 
occupation of farmer did not contravene Art. IX, §2 pro-
hibiting "exemptions. " 47 
46 Thompson v. Indiana County, supra note 44 at 251, emphasis added. 
The court explained in detail, as follows: 
••• the Act of 1844 makes six classifications of subjects which may 
properly come within the general denomination of occupations: They 
are, salaries, offices, posts of profit, professions, trades and occupations 
except farmers. That is, the class of persons known as farmers are not 
included within the subjects of taxation and there is reason for the 
distinction. [Emphasis added.] 
47 This case apparently overruled Mulberger v. Indiana County (Pa.), 
71 Pitts. L. J. 964 (1923), wherein the court ruled that the 1844 act was 
in effect an "exemption" act and therefore invalid under Art. IX, §§ 1 and 
2, and that the 1834 act was therefore revived and consequently the levy 
was validated as to farmers. 
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(2) Personal property taxation: intangibles 
(a) The personal property tax (intangibles in the 
hands of individuals) 
Several very important cases concerning uniformity were 
decided under the personal property taxes (the state and 
county taxes will be discussed together). Most of them con-
cern the perplexing problem of "exemptions"-perplexing, 
that is, in light of the meaning which the court has given 
Art. IX, §§ 1 and 2. The method used to impose the personal 
property tax has continued substantially unchanged. The 
pertinent statutes provide that the enumerated classes of 
property (in fact intangibles in general are covered by the 
enumeration of several classes) shall be subject to a [county] 
[state] tax at a specified [presently four mills] rate.48 To 
this extent it differs from the real property tax, the annual 
rate of which is fixed to meet the revenue needs of the par-
ticular taxing unit. Also, it is pertinent to point out that the 
base of the various personal property taxes, in force from 
time to time, has consistently been "the value" of such 
property. 
Analysis of Fox's Appeal. One of the most important of all 
the uniformity cases in Pennsylvania is In re Fox's Appeal,49 
decided in 18 8 6. In that case the court upheld the state per-
sonal property tax then embodied in an 1885 act.w Section 1 
of that act provided: 
That all mortgages, money owing by solvent debtors, 
... ; also all articles of agreement and accounts bearing 
interest, owned or possessed by any person or persons what-
48 For example, as to the county personal property tax, see: Act of June 
17, 1913, P.L. 507, §1, as amended; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, §4821. Also 
see Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, §3244; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, §581.2, 581.32. 
49 112 Pa. 337, 4'Atl. 149 (1886). 
w Act of June 30, 1885, P.L. 193. 
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soever (except notes or bills for work or labor ·done, and all 
obligations given to banks for money loaned and bank notes), 
and all public loans or stocks whatsoever (except [state or 
federal]), and all moneys loaned or invested in any other 
State, and all other moneyed capital in the hands of indi-
vidual citizens of the State, . . . are hereby taxable for 
State purposes, at the rate of three mills on the dollar of the 
value thereof annually; Provided, That the same shall ... 
be exempt from all taxation except for State purposes; Pro-
vided, The provisions of this Act shall not apply to building 
and loan associations. [Emphasis added.] 
Section 20 of the 18 85 act repealed or abolished all taxes 
laid upon manufacturing corporations by the revenue laws of 
the Commonwealth, except that the exemption was not to 
apply to corporations engaged in the distilling business or the 
manufacture of gas. 
The plaintiffs in In re Fox's Appeal challenged the va-
lidity of this tax under Art. IX, §§ 1 and 2 on several spe-
cific grounds. First, the tax reached only such enumerated 
intangibles in the hands of individuals (i.e., "owned or pos-
sessed by any person or persons," in the words of section 1 ) , 
and thereby in effect it exempted such property in the hands 
of corporations. Second, the act exempted such property in 
the hands of building and loan associations. Third, and last, 
it was contended that section 20 of the act exempted manu-
facturing corporations from taxation. The plaintiffs' argu-
ment was based on this proposition: 
The provisions of the constitution [i.e., Art. IX, §§ 1, 2] 
are violated when the legislature taxes property in the hands 
of one class of persons and omits to tax property in the hands 
of other classes. A law may exempt persons from taxation by 
omitting to provide for their taxation as completely as by an 
express provision exempting them. 51 
51 In re Fox's Appeal, supra note 49 at 342, emphasis added. Plaintiff-
taxpayer contended that success on any one of the grounds would be suf-
UNIFORMITY STRUCTURES 479 
Thus, plaintiffs were clearly equating the processes of "se~ 
lection" and "exemption." 
The court rejected each of the above contentions and held 
that the act did not violate Art. IX, §§ 1 and 2, except in a 
respect not questioned by plaintiffs. The court held that the 
constitutional provisions in question were violated by the ex-
ception in section 1 of the act concerning "notes or bills for 
work or labor done, and all obligations given to banks for 
money loaned and bank notes." This latter ruling has been 
quite important in the development of the meaning of the 
Pennsylvania uniformity limitation. 
Justice Paxson (who, incidentally, wrote the opinion in 
Ranger's Appeal) spoke for the court and agreed with plain-
tiffs' interpretation of the statute's operation, saying: 
It is clear, from the language of the Act, that it does 
exempt building and loan associations from taxation under 
its provisions; that it does repeal all taxes upon manufactur-
ing corporations with the exceptions therein named and that 
it does exempt from taxation "notes or bills for work and 
labor done." We are also of the opinion that mortgages and 
other moneyed securities held and owned by corporations are 
not, and were not intended to be taxed by the Act in ques-
tion. 52 
By interpreting the statute in this manner, the court rejected 
the construction offered by the taxing officials, namely, that 
the phrase "any person or persons whatsoever" found in 
section 1 of the act should be taken to include all owners, 
including corporations, of such property as was enumerated. 53 
On the basis of this construction the constitutional issue was 
formed: conceding that the act did not extend the tax to 
property in the hands of corporations, did it follow that the 
ficient to invalidate the entire tax and support the bill to restrain officials 
from requiring plaintiffs to make returns for the personal property tax. 
112 /d. at 350. 
113 /d. at 350-352. 
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act conflicted with the uniformity clause in Art. IX, § 1 ? The 
court dealt quite thoroughly with this basic issue114 and de-
scribed the constitutional power of the legislature with these 
important words: 
The power of the state is conceded to select its subjects of 
taxation. It may tax mortgages or it may omit to tax them. 
It may tax horses or it may omit to tax them. 
But this tax, upon whatever laid, must be uniform. Thus it 
must be laid upon all taxpayers alike. It cannot tax A on his 
mortgages or his horses, and exempt B from a like tax. Nor 
do I see any distinction here between persons and artificial 
persons, commonly called corporations. Each must bear its 
due share of the public burdens. This is because the constitu-
tion declares that "all taxes shall be uniform."1111 
Applying this general proposition to the facts at hand, the 
court reasoned that although the first section of the Act of 
1885 did not extend the tax on intangibles to such intangibles 
as were held by corporations, nevertheless, this did not 
necessarily mean that the Act of 1 8 8 5 was for that reason a 
violation of . the constitution. Why not? Because, it was 
pointed out, the Act of 18 8 5 which plaintiffs challenged was 
supplemental to an Act of June 7, 1879, Public Law 112. 
Section four of the 1879 act imposed a capital stock tax. For 
corporations declaring either no dividends or dividends of 
less than six per cent, the rate was three mills on the dollar 
of the appraised value of the capital stock of such corpora-
tions. For those corporations declaring more than six per cent 
dividends, the rate was one-half mill on the dollar of the 
appraised value of the capital stock of such corporations for 
each one per cent of dividend declared. 56 The 18 79 act also 
contained other provisions for the taxation of banks, insurance 
114 /d. at 353-35 5. 
1111 ld. at 353, emphasis added. 
116 See the discussion infra, text at notes 108, et seq., for the later changes 
in the base-rate of the capital stock tax. 
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companies, limited partnerships, and others which it was not 
necessary to refer to specifically. 
Thus, pursuant to the 1879 act there was a tax on the 
capital stock of corporations equal to a minimum of three 
mills on the dollar of appraised value, which the court noted 
was "the exact amount which the Act of 18 8 5 imposes on 
mortgages, moneys at interest and moneyed capital in the 
hands of individuals." One step more was needed to reach a 
conclusion. Taking it, the court said: 
It has been repeatedly decided in this state and is settled law, 
that a tax upon the capital stock of a corporation is a tax upon 
its property and assets ..•. The Act of 1885 being a sup-
plement to the Act of 1879, the two Acts must be read to-
gether, and thus we have in the one a tax of three mills on 
mortgages, etc., in the hands of individual citizens, and what 
is practically and legally, although not in name, a similar tax 
upon the same class of subjects in the hands of corporations. 57 
Having thus prepared in advance an answer, Justice Paxson 
could ask his rhetorical question: "Wherein then is the lack 
of uniformity, and wherein has the legislature made a dis-
crimination in favor of corporations as against individual 
citizens? " 58 
One other observation, important for our delineation of 
the uniformity limitation, was made: 
While a different mode of assessing taxation is adopted in 
dealing with the tax on corporations from that of taxing 
money in the hands of individuals, the result is substantially 
the same. Were the tax of 18 8 5 on mortgages extended to 
57 In re Fox's Appeal, supra note 49 at 353-354, emphasis added. 
58 /d. at 354. Indeed, thought Justice Paxson, if discrimination existed 
at all, it was against corporations because the tax thereon could amount to 
six mills or more depending upon the amount of dividends declared. He 
pointed out that section 17 of the 1879 act had taxed intangibles at the 
rate of four mills, and that the principal object of the Act of 1885 was to 
reduce the rate to three mills and as well to provide more efficient enforce-
ment machinery. 
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corporations, the result would be double taxation, which, 
while not beyond the powers of the legislature, is not to be 
presumed in the absence of a clear intent to impose it. 59 
"Double taxation" would have resulted because, as the court 
had asserted above, "a tax upon the capital stock of a corpora-
tion is a tax upon its property and assets." 
Having decided that the Act of 1885 was not unconstitu-
tional even though it failed to extend the tax to "mortgages 
of corporations," the opinion rather summarily rejected the 
remaining two contentions made by plaintiffs-not, however, 
without indicating that the exemption of building and loan 
associations and manufacturing corporations would be 
seriously questioned if the issue of its validity was properly 
raised.60 
The court did rule that a part of the Act of 1885 was un-
constitutional. The exception concerning "notes or bills for 
work or labor done" was "clearly a violation of the IXth 
Article of the Constitution." Nevertheless, the court was not 
required to declare the act as a whole void because it was 
severable. In so holding, the court referred to the second 
section of Art. IX of the Constitution, and said: 
59Jd. at 354, emphasis added. 
60 As for the proviso in section I of the act which exempted building as-
sociations from the operation of the act, the court, id. at 3 55, felt that it 
was 
• . • harmless, because said section does not, and was not intended to 
apply to corporations of any description. If there really was an exemption 
of such corporations, it would be void under the constitution, for the 
legislature can only exempt from taxation such property as that instru-
ment authorizes it to exempt. 
As for section 20 of the act which repealed taxes theretofore laid on 
manufacturing corporations by the revenue laws, the case at hand was not 
affected by the section because the act was severable and because, even if the 
section "amounted to any unlawful exemption from taxation, . . . the 
exemption would fall, and leave the balance of the Act in full force." 
Therefore, the court did "not propose to discuss the effect of the repeal of 
the tax on this class of corporations." 
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The exception of "notes or bills for work or labor done" is 
void, under this provision, and drops out of the Act of 18 8 5. 
The exception falls, but the Act stands. It will be the duty 
of the assessors to assess and return such bills or notes the 
same as other moneyed securities in the hands of indi-
viduals.61 
At this point it will be helpful to state as precisely as pos-
sible what In re Fox's Appeal held and just what it implied 
by either its decision or its dictum, since later cases may be 
better understood in light of doctrine which might be 
founded on the rationale underlying the decision in In re 
Fox's Appeal. 
First, the opinion seems to accept the distinction between 
"selection" and "exemption" as one which is valid and quite 
significant. In making its decision concerning the validity of 
the 18 8 5 act insofar as the legislature had only selected in-
tangibles held by individuals, the court seemed to accept the 
proposition that a rule of universality does not govern the 
selection of the object of a property tax. However, once a 
given class of property is actually selected for taxation, all of 
that class must be taxed-that is, subclassifications, however 
reasonable, cannot be made for the purpose of exemptions. 
A fair implication to be drawn from the opinion is that 
neither personal property nor even intangible personal prop-
erty is a minimum class for purposes of uniformity in taxa-
tion. More narrow classifications may be made for selection 
purposes. However, such classifications of personal property 
may not be made on the basis of who owns or possesses such 
property if the purpose of the classification is to select less 
than all for taxation. Thus, the opinion clearly implied that 
the uniformity clause in section one of Art. IX would have 
been violated, since only intangibles in the hands of indi-
viduals were selected under the 18 8 5 Act, had not the same 
61 !d. at 35 5, emphasis added. 
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type of intangibles held by corporations been subject to a 
"substantially similar" tax. The legislature "may tax 
mortgages, or it may omit to tax them. . . . [But] [i]t 
cannot tax A on his mortgages . . . , and exempt B from a 
like tax."62 To the contrary, personal property may be 
classified on the basis of who owns or possesses such property 
if the classification is made for the purpose of using different 
methods of taxation-with the possible qualification that 
"substantially similar" results must be had.63 
The second important feature of the opinion in In re Fox's 
Appeal is found in that part concerning the "exception" as to 
"bills or notes for work or labor done" in section 1 of the 
1885 Act. That "exception" was held to be an "exemption" 
and a violation of the second section of Art. IX of the con-
stitution.64 It is important to remember that the first part of 
the opinion had laid down the proposition that the legislature 
was not limited by any rule of universality in exercising its 
power to select property for taxation. If the court intended 
to rule that "bills or notes for work or labor done" was an 
arbitrary classification (that is, they could not reasonably be 
separated from a larger class consisting of "moneyed securi-
ties"),05 then the "exception" clause in section 1 of the 1885 
Act could have been held to be a violation of the uniformity 
clause in section one of Art. IX of the constitution. Indeed, 
the limitation derived from the section one uniformity clause 
was the basis of the discussion concerning the validity of the 
object of the 1885 tax. That is, was "intangibles in the hands 
of individuals" too narrow a class? To the contrary, in de-
termining the validity of the "exception" as to "bills or notes 
62 See the quotation at note 55, supra. 
63 See the text at note 59, supra. 
64 See the quotation at note 61, supra. 
611 Note the statement in the quotation at note 61, supra, to the effect that 
that such bills and notes must be assessed and returned "the same as other 
moneyed securities in the hands of individuals." 
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for work or labor done" the court shifted its ground for 
decision to section two of Art. IX, and held that the "excep-
tion" violated the express prohibition against "exemptions" 
found in that section. It should be remembered that the 
plaintiffs in the case had contended that the narrowness of the 
object of the tax itself was a violation of section two of Art. 
IX-that is, it was argued that an "exemption" in contra-
vention of Art. IX, §2 could be found in a negative "omis-
sion" as well as in a positive "exemption." The court chose 
to ignore this suggested rationale insofar as the validity of 
the object of the 1885 tax act was concerned, resting its de-
cision on the uniformity clause in Art. IX, § 1, as noted above. 
Yet, the court shifted to section two of Art. IX to invalidate 
the "exception" of "bills and notes for work or labor done." 
It is submitted that one is not unwarranted in drawing the 
following implication from the mannner in which In re Fox's 
Appeal dealt with the tax under consideration. Article IX, 
§2, which prohibits the "exemption" of property other than 
that classified as exemptible by Art. IX, §1, will prevent the 
legislature from separating a subclass from a larger class 
actually selected for taxation for the purpose of positively 
"exempting" the subclass. However, it appears that the same 
result might be reached without violating either section 1 or 
2 of Art. IX by simply phrasing the object of the tax so as 
not to include the subclass in question.66 If this is a fair 
implication, as this writer contends it is, we certainly have a 
rather dubious system of "shadow" limitations. 
A third feature of importance in In re Fox's Appeal was 
the court's intimation that the exemption of certain classes of 
corporations (building associations) would have been a 
violation of Art. IX, §2 if the exemption had in fact been 
effective instead of "harmless." Also, in light of its state-
66 Cf. Thompson v. Indiana County, supra note 44, and the text at notes 
44 to 47, supra. 
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ments concerning building associations the court obviously 
wished to avoid ruling upon the validity of the exemption of 
manufacturing corporations. 
It becomes clear upon the examination of later opinions, 
decided under both the personal property tax and other taxes, 
that much of the restrictiveness apparent in In re Fox's Ap-
peal has been relaxed considerably, if not expressly, then at 
least by what has been actually decided. Within a few years 
after the decision in In re Fox's Appeal, several cases, all 
having important implications for the rationale of In re 
Fox's Appeal, were decided under the capital stock and 
corporate loans taxes. In Commonwealth v. Germania Brew-
ing Company,61 the manufacturing corporations' exemption 
from the capital stock tax was held not to violate Art. IX, 
§§1, 2. In Commonwealth v. Fall Brook Coal Company,68 
the close relationship between the personal property tax and 
the capital stock tax was reaffirmed as the court upheld the ex-
emption from the personal property tax of shares in corpora-
tions subject to or exempt from the capital stock tax. In the 
leading case of Commonwealth v. Delaware Division Canal 
Company69 the court held that the taxation by the corporate 
loans tax of certain classes of intangibles (i.e., "corporate 
loans" as defined) at a different rate from that applicable to 
other intangibles did not violate the uniformity clause in Art. 
IX, §1. 
Other cases. Continuing with the personal property tax 
cases, some consideration must be given to Dupuy v. Johns/0 
which involved the County Personal Property Tax Act of 
1913.71 With the 1913 act the personal property tax was 
made exclusively a county tax and the corporate loans tax was 
61 14-5 Pa. 83,22 Atl. 24-0 (1891), infra note 112. 
68 156 Pa. 4-88,26 Atl. 1071 (1893), infra note 111. 
69 123 Pa. 594-, 16 Atl. 584- (1889), infra note 86. 
10 261 Pa. 4-0, 104- Atl. 565 (1918). 
71 Act of June 17, 1913, P.L. 507, § 1. 
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left exclusively a state tax; theretofore the personal property 
tax had been a state tax collected by local agencies, with a 
part of the revenue being pro-rated to the counties. As in In 
re Fox's Appeal, the issue in the Dupuy case concerned "ex-
emptions." Section 1 of the 1913 act, in effect, exempted 
from the personal property tax those shares of stock in 
corporations either subject to, or exempt from, the capital 
stock tax. 
The plaintiff in the Dupuy case was a taxpayer, resi-
dent of Pennsylvania, who failed to include in his personal 
property tax return for 1 916 certain shares of stock of a New 
Jersey corporation engaged in business, in part, in Pennsyl-
vania. The corporation had paid the capital stock tax for the 
year 1916. Tax officials assessed the plaintiff's shares in the 
corporation under the personal property tax, although plain-
tiff claimed that such shares were exempt pursuant to the 
terms of the exception proviso in section 1 of the 1913 act. 
The following method of assessment was used. Officials 
assessed that proportion of the shares which represented the 
percent of capital stock not employed in Pennsylvania, upon 
which there was no liability at that time for the capital stock 
tax because of the method of computing the base thereunder. 
Thus, the taxing officials interpreted the exception proviso 
in section 1 of the 1913 act so that only the following prop-
erty was exempt: ( 1) the proportion of the value of a share 
representing the proportion of capital stock actually taxed 
under the capital stock tax; and (2) shares of stock in corpo-
rations entirely exempted under the capital stock tax act. 
The taxing officials contended that it was necessary to inter-
pret the provision of the 1913 act to r~quire the method pro-
posed by them because the taxpayer's proposed interpretation 
would result in a violation of Art. IX, § 1, since it exempted 
some shares from all taxation.72 In other words, the taxing 
72 Supra note 70 at 44. 
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officials argued that the exception provision of the 1913 act 
was designed solely to prevent "double taxation." 
The court rejected both the taxing officials' interpretation 
of the 1913 statute and its contention that plaintiff's interpre-
tation would result in a violation of Art. IX, § 1. It stated 
that the attack on the constitutionality of the act of 1913 had 
"no merit, since the fundamental validity of tax immunities 
such as those therein provided for is now beyond question,"73 
·citing Commonwealth v. Germania Brewing Company/4 in 
which the court upheld the exemption of manufacturing 
corporations from the capital stock tax. Relying on the 
analysis in the Germania case, the court concluded: 
As to the indirect classifying effect of these immunity pro-
visions, the selection and classification of subjects for taxation 
are, generally speaking, exclusively within control of the 
legislature, the only restriction being that there must be no 
discrimination between members of the same class. . . . 7c; 
Supported by this underlying rationale, the exception clause 
in the 1913 act was interpreted in the following manner. For 
the purpose of taxing shares of corporate stock in the hands 
of the shareholder, the clause, in effect, divided "corpora-
tions" into two classes: ( 1 ) those doing no business, making 
no official reports, and paying no capital stock tax in Penn-
sylvania; and (2) those engaged in business in the state and 
either taxable under the state capital stock tax or relieved 
therefrom by law. Upon the stock of the first class the resi-
dent shareholder had to pay a personal property tax. To the 
contrary, the stock of the second class was exempt from the 
personal property tax when in the hands of resident share-
holders. It was said that, on the facts, the classification was 
not "unwarranted"; and since there was no want of uni-
73/d. at 48. 
74 Supra note 67. 
7Ci Supra note 70 at 48-49. 
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formity within the respective classes the exception proviso in 
the first section of the 1913 County Personal Property Tax 
Act was not unconstitutional. 
The nature of the classification which was approved in the 
Dupuy case is of considerable interest. The court referred to 
a classification of "corporations," with the shares of stock in 
such corporations being subject to the tax or exempt there-
from according to the class into which the corporation fell. 
As the present study will make clear, throughout all of its 
pertinent decisions the court has characterized the personal 
property tax as a tax upon property. Thus, property (in this 
particular case, shares of stock) is the thing which must be 
classified for selection or exemption. Therefore, we must 
conclude that in the Dupuy case shares of stock were classified 
according to certain characteristics of the corporations which 
they represented-namely, whether or not the corporation 
had paid, or was exempted by law from the capital stock tax. 
The Dupuy case, then, approved an "exemption" of property 
from the personal property tax when it could not be said that 
such property was subject to a "substantially similar'' tax.76 
In addition, the exemption proviso, the general validity of 
which the court avoided passing on in Fox's Appeal, was now 
upheld in its particular relationship to the personal property 
tax.77 
A more recent case, decided in 1940, in which an exemp-
76 It might be argued that the part of the exemption clause of the capital 
stock tax which referred to shares on corporations was not necessarily within 
the scope of the decision by the court because the corporation in question 
had paid the capital stock tax for the year in question. However, the court 
treated the exemption provision as a whole throughout its opinion. Further-
more, the contention of the taxing official that the statute could be validly 
interpreted only so as to exempt that part of shares subject to "double 
taxation" certainly brings the entire provision into the issue. In its opinion 
the court evidently meant to consider the entire exemption provision. 
77 Also see Commonwealth v. Gerrnania Brewing Company, supra note 
67, and text at note 112, infra. 
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tion clause was upheld as a reasonable classification, affirms 
the rationale of the Dupuy case. In Commonwealth v. Penn-
sylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mutual Casualty In-
surance Company18 the validity of the state personal property 
tax, embodied at that time in an Act of June 22, 1935, Public 
Law 414, was challenged because of the following exemption 
provision found in section 3 of that act: 
All personal property of the classes hereinafter enumer-
ated, owned, held or possessed by any resident . . . is 
hereby made taxable, annually, for State purposes, at the rate 
of four mills on each dollar of the value thereof. . . . And 
provided further, That the provisions of this act shall not 
apply to ... life or fire insurance corporations having no 
capital stock . ... [Emphasis added.] 
Thus, life and fire insurance companies having no capital 
stock were treated differently from casualty insurance com-
panies having no capital stock. The court held that this was 
not an unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional classifica-
tion contrary to the uniformity clause in Art. IX, § 1.79 The 
taxpayer in the case was a Pennsylvania mutual casualty in-
surance company, against which a tax under the state personal 
property tax had been assessed for 1936 on personal property 
of the kind enumerated in the act and owned by the taxpayer. 
The taxpayer had claimed an exemption from the levy on 
the ground that the statute made an unreasonable classifica-
tion.80 
78 339 Pa. 62, 14 A. 2d 295 (1940). 
79 /d. at 64-. 
80 It might detract somewhat from the strength of the decision to point 
out the significant statement by the court to the effect that even if the 
provision exempting mutual life and fire insurance companies was uncon-
stitutional, this would not help the taxpayer. The result of holding the 
classification arbitrary would simply be that the exemption provision would 
fall and the tax be imposed alike upon all mutual companies. By an amend-
ment, both to the expired state and present county personal property taxes, 
casualty insurance companies without capital stock were included within 
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The tax was upon intangible personal property, and the 
property exempted by the proviso in the above-quoted section 
of the act was such intangible property "owned, held or 
possessed" by mutual life or fire insurance corporations hav-
ing no capital stock. Thus, again a classification based on who 
owned, held or possessed the property was approved.81 As in 
the Dupuy case, there was no discussion of the effect of sec-
tion two of Art. IX. The validity of the exemption depended 
only on its reasonableness as a classification under the uni-
formity clause, Art. IX, §I. 
Last to be considered is a 1914 decision, Provident Life 
and Trust Co. v. McCaughn,S2 concerning the degree of uni-
formity required in the rates applicable to that property 
which is taxed. The case involved the personal property-
corporate loan tax structure, and the court, while recognizing 
the exemption. Act of July 11, 1941, P.L. 361; Act of July 29, 1941, P.L. 
548. 
81 Another example in which the court approved a classification according 
to who owned the intangibles was in In re Pennsylvania Co. for Granting 
Insurances on Lives & Granting Annuities, 345 Pa. 130, 27 A. 2d 57 
(1942). The court upheld the amendment of an Act of May 5, 1939, P.L. 
76, which expressly withdrew the exemption formerly found under the 
state personal property tax as to foreign insurance companies paying the 
insurance companies gross premium tax, imposed by Act of June 1, 1889, 
P.L. 420, §24. In brief, the issue concerned the reasonableness of a class 
selected for additional taxation, selected because of the withdrawal of a part 
of an exemption theretofore in force. The court held, at 13 5, that the plac-
ing of "owners of shares of foreign insurance companies in a different class 
from owners of shares in domestic companies" was a reasonable exercise of 
the power to classify. (Emphasis supplied.) As in other cases the court 
referred to a classification of "owners," although in fact it is property which 
is the subject of the tax, and therefore property is classified for exemption 
or selection. The cases leading up to this decision (all concerning questions 
of statutory interpretation) are: Girard Trust Co., Trustee's Appeal, 333 
Pa. 129, 3 A. 2d 252 (1937); In re Miller's Estate, 330 Pa. 477, 199 Atl. 
148 ( 1938). Cf. the language as to classification in In re Arrott's Estate, 322 
Pa. 367, 185 Ad. 697 (1936). 
82 246 Pa. 370,91 Atl. 672 (1914). 
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that the close relationship of these two taxes to the capital 
stock tax was such as to make, in effect, a single intangibles 
tax structure, nevertheless affirmed the power of the legisla-
ture to classify property for different rates without violating 
the uniformity clause in Art. IX, § 1. The personal property 
and the corporate loans taxes had been amended by the Act 
of June 7, 1911, Public Law 673. The 1911 act altered the 
exemption structure of the personal property tax which there-
tofore had provided that corporations liable to the capital 
stock tax were not required to pay any further tax on mort-
gages and other securities owned by them. Thus, as described 
in In re Fox's Appeal, "double taxation" was avoided because 
the capital stock tax would have been in substance, a tax upon 
property already taxed by either the personal property tax 
or the corporate loans tax. The 1911 act added an "excep-
tion" to the above "exception," so that securities held by 
corporations were not relieved from the personal property or 
corporate loans taxes if such securities were held in any 
other manner than for "the whole body of shareholders or 
members, as such .... " Such securities were to be taxed 
under either the personal property tax or corporate loans tax 
even though the corporations owning them also paid the 
capital stock tax. 
In the Provident Life and Trust Company case the court 
held that the 1911 amendment did not violate the uniformity 
clause of Art. IX, § 1. 83 That provision merely requires a uni-
formity within classes, and the classification made by the 
1911 amendment was not arbitrary. Consequently, it was 
irrelevant to compare the tax burden imposed upon different 
classes of property. The classification which the court ap-
proved may be analyzed as follows: ( 1) mortgages and other 
securities ( 2) owned by corporations ( 3) which held them 
in any other manner than for the whole body of shareholders 
83 /d. at 374-375. 
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or members, as such. Generally, the classification was of 
selected kinds of intangibles further classified on the basis of 
who owned them. Again, we find judicial approval of classifi-
cation on the basis of ownership. It should be pointed out 
that, in effect, the decision actually followed the prior dictum 
of the court that "double taxation" is permissible but not to 
be presumed. As the problem illustrates, the basic question 
underlying "double taxation" is always simply one of classifi-
cation of property for rates. 
(b) The Corporate Loans Tax {intangibles in the 
hands of individuals) 
The present corporate loans tax is imposed by the Act of 
June 22, 1935, Public Law 414, §17, as amended. It reads, 
in part: 
All scrip, bonds, certificates, and evidences of indebtedness 
issued, and all scrip, bonds, certificates and evidences of in-
debtedness assumed, or on which interest shall be paid by any 
and every private corporation, incorporated or created 
under the laws of this Commonwealth, or the laws of any 
other state or of the United States and doing business in this 
Commonwealth and having a resident corporate treasurer 
therein . . . are hereby made taxable for State purposes at 
the rate of . . . four mills on each dollar of the nominal 
value thereof ..•• 
The remainder of the section contains several exemptions sub-
stantially the same as those in the personal property tax. In 
addition, the following important proviso is found: 
And provided further, That none of the classes of property 
made taxable by this section for state purposes shall be taxed 
or taxable for county, school, or other local purposes. . • . 
A brief description of the intangibles taxes and their his-
tory will facilitate an understanding of the uniformity cases. 
The personal property tax is a county tax; the corporate loans 
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tax is a state tax which takes precedence over the personal 
property tax. In theory the intent of the system as a whole is 
to levy a tax on all taxable intangibles in the hands of indi-
viduals and to divide the tax between the counties and the 
state. The rate for both taxes is four mills. However, the base 
of the personal property tax (discussed supra) is actual value, 
whereas the corporate loans tax has a base of nominal or face 
value. 
This system, which takes a subclass (i.e., corporate loans 
as defined) out of the larger class (i.e., intangibles in the 
hands of individuals) and provides a different base, and at 
times a different percentage rate, for the taxation of that 
subclass, was first effectively established by an Act of June 
30, 1885, Public Law 193, §4. The first General Revenue 
Act of Pennsylvania, the Act of April 29, 1844, Public Law 
48 6 (50 1), had provided for, among other taxes, a three mill 
tax on the "actual value" of intangibles in the hands of in-
dividuals. Thus, "corporate loans" were to be taxed the same 
as other intangibles. 84 The base of the tax was "actual value," 
and collection was to be by local officials. By an Act of June 
7, 1879, Public Law 112, the General Revenue Act was 
revised and re-enacted. In this 1879 act an attempt was made 
to change the method of taxing corporate loans. After ex-
empting such property from all taxation except for state 
purposes, the act provided that all corporations paying 
interest on corporate loans were to deduct the tax on such 
property from the interest paid and pay the tax to the state 
treasurer. However, this revision remained ineffective be-
cause of the decision in Commonwealth v. Lehigh Valley 
Railroad Company.85 In that case the 1879 statutory struc-
84 But note that by section 42 of the 1844 Act provision was made for 
the separate taxation of municipal loans. The method used was collection at 
the source. 
85 104 Pa. 89 (1883). 
UNIFORMITY STRUCTURES 495 
ture was held to be deficient because it made no provision 
for the "assessment and valuation" of corporate loans. Such 
property was to be taxed on the "value thereof," and the 
court found that the legislative intent was to retain a base of 
"actual value." Thus, the statute was incomplete even though 
it did provide for a tax collector, i.e., the corporation, because 
there was no provision for "assessment and valuation." Con-
sequently, corporate loans continued to be assessed and levied 
upon by local collectors using a base of "actual value."86 To 
correct this situation the legislature passed the aforemen-
tioned Act of June 30, 1885, Public Law 193, §4. Officers of 
corporations were thereby required to assess the tax upon the 
"nominal value" of corporate loans as defined. 
In Commonwealth v. Delaware Division Canal Com-
pany,S7 decided in 1889, the method provided by the 1885 
act for the taxation of corporate loans was challenged as a 
violation of the uniformity clause, Art. IX, § 1. The opinion 
in that case has played an important role in giving meaning 
to the uniformity clause. Its significance is increased by the 
manner in which opposite views were so clearly delineated 
in the opinions by the lower court and the Supreme Court. 
The Delaware Division Canal Company had issued bonds 
secured by mortgages to the amount of $800,000. Part of the 
bonds were held by nonresidents of Pennsylvania, part were 
held by resident individuals of Pennsylvania, and the re-
mainder were held by Pennsylvania corporations. State 
officials made a settlement of taxes with the Canal Company 
(on a return made under protest) against the nominal value 
of all the bonds held both by individual residents of Pennsyl-
vania and domestic corporations of Pennsylvania. The Canal 
86 For a historical survey of these problems, see the lower-court opinion 
set forth in Commonwealth v. Delaware Division Canal Company, infra 
note 87 at 598-599. 
87 123 Pa. 594, 16 Atl. 584 (1889). 
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Company appealed the settlement to a lower court.88 Two of 
the several issues concerned uniformity in taxation. First, it 
was contended that "an arbitrary valuation at par [was] 
not a valid assessment as the foundation of an ad valorem 
tax." Second, the Canal Company argued that because of 
the discriminatory methods used for the assessment of 
"different subjects of the same class [i.e., nominal value was 
used as the base in taxing corporate loans, while actual value 
was used for other intangibles], and of the fact that in taxing 
corporate loans at par some [were] taxed at very much above 
and others at very much below their actual values," the re-
sulting taxes were not uniform as required by Art. IX, § 189 
The lower court concluded that the position of the Canal 
Company was sound and held that the corporate loans tax 
violated Art. IX, § 1. The lower court found as a "fact" that 
"nominal value" of corporate loans was not "a certain 
measure" of their actual value. The court also stated that 
since the tax was on property, it could not be levied without 
an assessment. Following the Lehigh Valley case, supra, the 
court found that the "intent" of the act was to tax corporate 
loans on their "actual value." Taking notice of the subse-
quent introduction of "nominal value" as a base by the 1885 
act, the lower court held that one might well question 
whether an assessment of the corporate loans tax upon 
"nominal value" was such an application of a rate to "value" 
of property as would amount to a valid tax, 
•.. especially when such assessment is not in any respect 
the result of the exercise of the judgment of the person mak-
ing it, but merely an arithmetical calculation made in 
obedience to the mandate of the law.90 
88 The opinion of that court is set forth in the report of the Supreme 
Court opinion, supra note 87 at 596-606. 
89 Commonwealth v. Delaware Div. Canal Co., supra note 87 at 596. 
90 !d. at 601. Compare the problem in Michigan of distinguishing be-
tween ad valorem and specific taxes. Supra, Part D ( 1) of this chapter. 
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The lower court considered the two sections of the 1885 act 
(section 1 imposing the personal property tax; section 4, the 
corporate loans tax) to be a whole, imposing a tax on a single 
class of property, namely, intangibles. 
In order to consider the uniformity issue in its entirety, the 
lower court assumed that assessment at nominal value would 
be a valid "assessment." If this were allowed, the result 
would be as follows: 
All mortgages and loans, are by § 1 of the act, taxable at the 
rate of three mills on the dollar of their actual cash value, 
and all of them, except corporate mortgages and loans, are 
in practice so taxed; while corporate mortgages and loans 
. . . are in practice taxed at the rate of three mills on their 
nominal value, which often differs by one hundred per cent 
from their actual value, so that the tax is in many cases 
doubled and in others not more than one half the amount 
it would be if the tax were upon the actual value; with the 
result that of two persons owning taxable property, of exactly 
the same value, one is taxed twice as much as the other . . . 
as a necessary result of [the law's] provisions.91 
If this analysis was correct, then the lower court was of the 
opinion that the method used violated the uniformity clause, 
Art. IX, § 1. The reason was: 
The mandate in favor of uniformity in § 1, article IX, . . . 
is not satisfied until the taxes, which are imposed upon all the 
subjects of a given class, are so imposed that each person 
owning the same species of property, shall pay the same 
amount of tax, upon the same value, when that has been 
ascertained by the proper authority. 92 
Consequently, 
. . . if in one case the value to which the rate is applied is 
the expression of the judgment of the proper official, and in 
91 /bid. 
82 U. at 602. 
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another a mere arbitrary nominal value, it is in the very 
nature of the case that the resulting taxes cannot be uniform. 93 
Viewing the personal property tax and corporate loans tax 
as an integral whole, the enforcement of section 4 of the act 
of 18 8 5 would result in a violation of "the constitutional 
mandate in favor of uniformity." Furthermore, even if 
corporate loans could be considered a reasonable class apart 
from those intangibles taxed at actual value under the 
personal property tax, the uniformity clause would still be 
violated because the use of "a mere arbitrary nominal value" 
would result in a lack of uniformity within the class consisting 
of corporate loans. 94 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania the 
opinion of the lower court was reversed,95 the Supreme Court 
holding that section 4 of the 1885 act made a valid classifica-
tion when it established corporate loans as a separate class for 
purposes of taxation, and also holding that the use of 
"nominal value" for a base was valid. The court first dis-
tinguished the Lehigh Valley case, supra, relied on by the 
lower court, asserting that the prior case had simply held that 
no machinery for assessment had been supplied in the 1879 
act and its supplement of 1881. To the contrary, it was held 
that the 1885 act, which was under review, did provide such 
machinery. Moreover, the court held that the legislature 
98 /d. at 603. 
94 /d. at 603. 
95 The court reversed the judgment of the lower court in part only, 
although it entirely disagreed with its interpretation of the uniformity 
clause. The judgment of the Supreme Court, id. at 625, was that the Com-
pany was bound to make the assessment and deduct the tax from the interest 
paid as to those bonds held by resident individuals, which was "all that 
would appear to be subject to the tax." This is the sole reference to the 
statutory interrelation of the tax with the capital stock tax which reaches 
intangibles in the hands of corporations. See text at notes 108-130, infra. 
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could legitimately impose the duty of collection upon 
corporations, both public and private.116 
In facing the uniformity issue, the court took notice of the 
manner in which the two taxing sections of the 18 8 5 act were 
phrased. Section 1 provided for the taxing of uall" mort-
gages, etc., on their "actual value." Section 4, however, 
described "corporate loans" and stated that corporate officials 
were "to assess" the tax upon the "nominal value" of such 
"corporate loans." The uniformity issue was then resolved 
to this: 
... [It] is argued [by the company] that as by the first 
section of the act of 1885 individual and corporate obligations 
constitute a single class of subjects for taxation, the act un-
justly discriminates between them in the fourth section, and 
that therefore the taxes imposed cannot be said to be uniform 
upon the same class of subjects.117 
The court rejected this approach, taking a more liberal view 
of the power of the legislature to classify property for pur-
poses of taxation. The statute was construed in the following 
manner: 
The first section of the act does indicate certain subjects for 
taxation, at a certain rate, and these may in some sense be 
said to constitute a general class; but the classification of 
these subjects is extended by the fourth section; one class, 
consisting of the securities of private corporations, is to be 
taxed at their nominal value, and the residue (excepting the 
securities of municipal corporations, which are still taxable 
under the 42d section of the act of April 29, 1844) constitute 
another class, taxable at the same rate, but upon their value 
to be ascertained under the ordinary processes of assessment 
by the local assessor. 118 
116fd. at 616-617,618. 
97 /d. at 619. 
118 !d. at 619-620, emphasis added. 
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The court then made a few general observations on the 
meaning of the uniformity clause in Art. IX, § 1. It was con-
ceded that classification should be made according to "some 
reasonable, practical rule, drawn from experience, which 
would prevent a gross inequality in the burden of taxation." 
But more directly concerning the issue at hand: 
A mere diversity in the methods of assessment and collection, 
... if these methods are provided by general laws, violates 
no rule of right, if when these methods are applied the results 
are practically uniform. If there is a substantial uniformity, 
however different the procedure, there is a compliance with 
the constitutional provisions: Fox's Appeal. 99 
Becoming more specific, the court said: 
Nor is classification necessarily based upon any essential 
differences in the nature or, indeed, the condition of the 
various subjects; it may be based as well upon the want of 
adaptability to the same methods of taxation, or upon the 
impracticability of applying to the various subjects the same 
methods, so as to produce just and reasonably uniform re-
sults, or it may be based upon well-grounded considerations 
of public policy.100 
The court then described the fact situation existing under the 
1885 act: 
Corporate obligations [by §4 of the 1885 act] ... are 
taken out of the general designation of subjects contained in 
the first, and as a distinct class are subject to a different 
standard of valuation, and the tax to a different method of 
collection. 
The court concluded that the reasons for this classification 
rested, perhaps, not wholly on any essential difference in the 
physical nature of the class, but on the "want of adaptation 
in our general tax laws to reach them, in the ordinary 
89 IJ. at 620. 
lOO !d. at 621, emphasis added. 
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methods of taxation.m01 Also, the ease with which such 
property could be concealed was referred to. 
As for the use of a different standard of value, the 
Supreme Court was of the opinion that "Well-informed men 
must differ greatly in their estimate of the value of such 
property," and in any case 
Presumptively . . . the nominal value is the true value of 
securities yielding and paying interest, and the legislature has 
therefore fixed the nominal value, or the par value, for the 
purpose of taxation.102 
Furthermore, reasoned the court, once the power to classify 
was conceded, the question of uniformity is disposed of, for 
then all that is required is that taxes shall be uniform within 
the same class. To the court it was "plain that the act of 
1885, having constituted corporate loans in the hands of 
resident holders a distinct class, [did] not discriminate 
against any member of that class.mos Further, it was held 
that there was no doubt as to the power of the legislature, 
under such circumstances, to fix the face value of the obliga-
tions as the value for taxing purposes.104 
There were a number of cases on appeal at this time, all 
concerning the validity of the corporate loans tax under Art. 
IX, § 1. Each of these cases105 was disposed of by simply citing 
without any discussion the Delaware Division Cancl Com-
101 !d. at 622, emphasis added. 
102 /d. at 623. 
103Jbid. 
104 /d. at 623-624. Also see Commonwealth v. Mortgage Trust Co., 227 
Pa. 163, 76 Atl. 5 ( 191 0}. 
105 Commonwealth v. Chester, 123 Pa. 626, 16 Atl. 591 {1889}; Coal 
Ridge Improvement Co. v. Jennings, 127 Pa. 397, 17 Atl. 986 (1889}; 
Commonwealth v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 129 Pa. 429, 18 Atl. 406 {1889}. 
In Commonwealth v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 150 Pa. 245, 24 Atl. 
599 ( 1892} the position in the principle case was reaffirmed as to the suc-
cessor of the 1885 act, the Act of June 1, 1889, P.L. 420, §4. 
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pany case. However, the description of the corporate loans 
tax found in one of those cases, Commonwealth v. Lehigh 
Valley Railroad Company/06 is of some interest for the gen-
eral problem of uniformity. After citing the Canal Company 
case as authoritatively establishing the validity of the tax, 
the court said: 
In the opinion filed in that case, it was our purpose to show 
that the tax was in the nature of a specific tax, not a tax upon 
actual value; that the legislature having fixed the nominal 
value of the bonds as the basis of taxation, no further assess-
ment, properly so called, was required. . . . 
... Specific taxes for a long series of years have been 
imposed within this state, not only upon particular classes 
of property, but upon classes of persons, and we have never 
known the power, when properly exercised, to have been 
called in question. 
Taxes are generally classified as specific, ad valorem, 
and for public benefit. The last two classes are necessarily 
based upon an assessment of the actual values; whereas, in 
the first class the valuation is either fixed by statute, or the 
tax is intended to subserve some supposed public interest or 
policy.101 
This analysis will be of considerable importance in summariz-
ing the meaning of the Pennsylvania general uniformity 
limitation. 
(c) The Capital Stock and Franchise Taxes {in-
tangibles in the hands of corporations) 
By the Act of June 11, 1840, Public Law 612, domestic 
corporations and banks were required to pay one half of one 
mill upon each dollar of their capital stock for each one per cent 
of dividend or profit made or declared annually for the ensu-
ing five-year period. The tax, at this early date, even though 
106 Supra note 1 0 5, 
107 !d. at 45 5-456, emphasis added. 
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closely linked to dividends, was construed by the court as 
being a tax upon capital stock rather than upon dividends.108 
The first General Revenue Act of .Pennsylvania was the 
Act of April29, 1844, Public Law 486 (501), §33 of which 
revised the "capital stock tax" of 1840 by providing for a 
dual base-rate structure. For corporations making and de-
claring no dividend or profit, or making and declaring a 
profit of less than six per cent, the appropriate officers of the 
corporation were required to appraise the capital stock of that 
corporation at its "actual value in cash," and to pay a tax of 
three mills on each dollar of such "actual" value. For other 
corporations, the arrangement of the 1840 act continued-
the base was par value of capital stock, and the rate was 
graduated depending on the amount of dividends. This dual 
base-rate structure was retained substantially unchanged 
until abolished by an act of 18 91. The system of appraisal 
introduced in the 1844 act is still used in substance today. 
By the Act of May 1, 1868, Public Law 108, the prior 
enactments were codified and the taxation of foreign corpora-
tions, as well as domestic corporations, was provided for by 
the same tax. The first change to be made after the new con-
stitution of 18 7 4 came into effect was by the Act of June 7, 
1879, Public Law 112, which re-enacted the earlier acts into 
a General Revenue Act and first provided for the taxation of 
limited partnerships, as well as corporations, by the capital 
stock tax. The "manufacturing corporation" exemption was 
also first introduced in a limited manner by the 1 8 79 act. 
Subsequently, by the Act of June 30, 1885, Public Law 193, 
§20, the "manufacturing corporation" exemption was fully 
established. 
The statutory form of the present capital stock tax stems 
from the Act of June 1, 1889, Public Law 420, §§20 and 21, 
a General Revenue Act and still known as the Capital Stock 
108 See Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 13 Pa. 165 ( 1850). 
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Tax Act. However, the Act of June 8, 1891, Public Law 229, 
§21, abolished the dual base-rate structure and substituted a 
flat rate of five mills on the actual value of the capital stock. 
This is substantially the present system (i.e., considering the 
capital stock tax and franchise tax in combination). The Act 
of July 15, 1897, Public Law 292, §2, introduced the present 
system of excepting distilling companies from the capital 
stock tax and imposing on such companies a special rate of ten 
mills instead of the five mills generally imposed. 
In 1935, the present "split" system was introduced. The 
Act of May 16, 1935, Public Law 184, imposed a franchise 
tax upon foreign corporations. Domestic corporations remain 
subject to the capital stock tax, with the exception that both 
foreign and domestic distilling companies are taxed by a 
special capital stock tax. Incidently, the "manufacturing 
corporation" exemption has been subject to frequent amend-
ment. 
This brief review of the highlights of the history of the 
capital stock tax will enable us to examine several uniformity 
cases in a better perspective. As described above under the 
discussion of the personal property tax, 109 the court in the 
leading case of In re Fox's Appeal, decided in 1886, ruled 
that the capital stock tax was in fact a tax upon the assets of 
the corporations, 110 and, as such, "substantially similar" to 
the personal property tax. Thus, intangibles in the hands of 
individuals were reached by the personal property tax, while 
109 Supra text to notes 48-83. 
110 An early case on the nature of the capital stock tax is Commonwealth 
v. Standard Oil Co., 101 Pa. 119 (1882), in which the court analyzed at 
some length the distinction between property and nonproperty taxes, and 
held that the capital stock tax was upon the property of the corporation, not 
the shareholders, and that it was not a franchise or privilege tax. However, 
caution should be observed in using that case for purposes of uniformity, 
because the issue in the case was limited to a problem of territorial j urisdic-
tion under the due process clause. 
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intangibles in the hands of corporations were reached by the 
capital stock tax.111 We saw further that the court in In re 
Fox's Appeal avoided passing upon the manufacturing ex-
emption contained in the 1885 Act in its relation to the capital 
stock tax. There was some indication of serious doubt as to the 
validity of such an exemption provision. 
The validity of such exemptions was passed upon in Com-
monwealth v. Germania Brewing Co.,112 decided in 1891, in 
which the court, notwithstanding the doubt theretofore ex-
pressed, held that the exemption of manufacturing corpora-
tions was valid. Therefore, the Germania Brewing Company 
case is another of the more important cases in the develop-
ment of the meaning of the uniformity limitation in Pennsyl-
vania, and the opinion deserves careful examination. In that 
case the "manufacturing exemption" proviso in section 20 of 
the Act of June 30, 1885, Public Law 192 (later revised and 
placed in section 21 of the Act of June 1, 18 8 9, Public Law 
420), was challenged as being a violation of Art. IX, §§1 
and 2 of the constitution. The "exemption" purported to 
relieve all manufacturing corporations "except distilling cor-
porations" from the capital stock tax. Defendant, a distilling 
company "excepted" from the "exemption," argued that by 
section 20 of the 18 8 5 Act all manufacturing companies were 
put into a single class; therefore, the proviso excepting 
distilling companies from the exemption was void for want of 
uniformity.113 The Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion 
111 On the relation of the capital stock tax to the personal property tax, 
also see Commonwealth v. Fall Brook Coal Co., 156 Pa. 4-88, 26 Atl. I 071 
(1893), in which the court stated that a tax on capital stock in the hand of 
the corporation, and, concurrently, a tax on shares to the shareholder would 
be "double taxation," not to be supported except by express enactment. The 
court interpreted the capital stock and personal property taxes to be mutually 
exclusive. Followed in Commonwealth v. Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co., 
162 Pa. 603,29 Atl. 664- (1894-). 
112 14-5 Pa. 83, 22 Atl. 24-0 (1891). 
113 U. at 85. 
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of a single sentence simply affirmed upon the opinion of the 
court below the judgment upholding the exception from the 
exemption. However, since the case is quite frequently cited 
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the reasoning of the 
lower-court opinion (set forth in the report of the Supreme 
Court decision) is of controlling importance. 
In describing section 20114 of the 18 8 5 Act, the lower court 
made the following important analysis: 
This relief from taxation is sometimes called an exemption, 
and the designation is correct, in the ordinary sense of that 
word. But, when it was attacked as an exemption, in the sense 
attached to the words by §§1, 2, Art. IX, ... the Supreme 
Court declared in Hawes Mfg. Co.'s Appeal, 1 Mona. 35 3, 
that it did not offend against this provision, because manufac-
turing corporations were not thereby relieved from all taxa-
tion, such as county and other local taxes upon their real 
estate, but only from taxation directly by the state.115 
It followed, since "[t]his relief from state taxation [was not] 
an unconstitutional exemption," that the only question re-
maining concerned the validity of the classification. 
Was [the exemption] uniform upon the same class of sub-
jects? For if it relieved from taxation certain members of a 
class, and left other members of that class still subject 
thereto, the tax would not be uniform, and the exemption 
which caused this want of uniformity, would fall. 116 
The defendant argued that all manufacturing companies 
were put into a single class, and that by excepting the dis-
tilling companies from such class there was a lack of uniform-
ity. In the opinion of the lower court this analysis could not 
114 The decision of the lower court involved section 20 of the 1885 act, 
and it was concluded that on the basis of that ruling no discussion of Section 
21 of the 1889 act was needed. 
115 Commonwealth v. Germania Brewing Co., supra note 112 at 84-85, 
emphasis added. 
116 !d. at 85, emphasis added. 
UNIFORMITY STRUCTURES 507 
stand. To the contrary, both the exemption (manufacturing 
companies) and the exception therefrom (distilling com-
panies) were sustainable as valid examples of the legislative 
power to classify the subjects of taxation.117 
A second problem is dealt with by other cases decided 
under the capital stock tax. Such cases affirm the power of 
the legislature to classify property for the purpose of apply-
ing different effective rates to the several classes without 
violating the uniformity clause of Art. IX, § 1. For example, 
in Commonwealth v. Sharon Coal Company,118 appellant 
contended that the Act of 1891, then embodying the capital 
stock tax, was a violation of the uniformity clause in Art. IX, 
§ 1, because it discriminated between property owned by 
appellant and property owned by natural persons and other 
corporations. More specifically, the taxpayer contended that 
a tax of 5 mills was imposed on its capital stock, while stock 
of other corporations was taxed at only 3 mills, and other 
property of the same class was taxed at only 4 mills.119 In 
answering this argument, the court stated: 
. . . [I] t has been settled that the legislature can, without 
making the revenue statute obnoxious to the constitution, 
117 As explained by the lower court, the defendant misconstrued the 
nature of the classification in the exemption, saying, id. at 86: 
In fact, the legislature did not make, and evidently did not intend to 
make a single class of all manufacturing corporations. The whole section 
must be taken together; and, thus considered, two classes are plainly 
visible; one, including corporations which manufacture liquor or gas, and 
the other, including all other manufacturing corporations. The latter 
class is severed from the much larger class, or group of classes formed by 
§4 of the act of 1879 [i.e., corporations generally, taxed by the Capital 
Stock Tax, except for insurance companies, banks and savings institu-
tions], and is relieved from taxation; the former is left just where it was. 
See Dupuy v. Johns, discussed under "personal property tax," supra note 70. 
118 164 Pa. 284,30 Atl. 127, 128 (1894). 
119 Appellant had been assessed under the capital stock tax, then em-
bodied in the Act of June 8, 1891, P .L. 229, §4, and contested the validity 
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classify corporations for purposes of taxation; may sever a 
small class from a larger one; might subject one class to taxa-
tion, and leave other untaxed: Commonwealth v. [Germania] 
Brewing Co. . . . and the cases there cited. And in Com-
monwealth v. Delaware Division Canal Co. . . . it was 
decided that a different basis of taxation might be adopted 
on mortgages and loans held by individuals, and those held 
by corporations. 
All properties, however, in the same class, must be taxed 
without discrimination in the rate of tax imposed .... 120 
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Hannis Distilling Com-
pany121 the system of singling out distilling companies for a 
ten mill capital stock tax rate was upheld under Art. IX, § 1. 
The next problem of interest concerns the extent, if any, to 
which the effective uniformity limitation determines the 
"method (or, standard) of valuation" which may be used. As 
stated above, the capital stock tax has been characterized as 
a property tax. More specifically, it has, in fact, been con-
sidered a part of an integral intangibles tax structure-being 
a tax upon intangible personal property in the hands of 
corporations. In addition, it has apparently been characterized 
as an ad valorem property tax. As a result of these character-
izations several cases concerning the capital stock tax are use-
ful in determining the relation of the uniformity limitation 
to "method of valuation." 
As described above, a dual base-rate structure was used 
of the assessment. The opinion did not make clear just what taxes were 
referred to as imposing three and four mill rates. The capital stock tax had 
a rate of 5 mills. The four mill rate probably referred to the personal prop-
erty tax rate. 
12° Commonwealth v. Sharon Coal Co., supra note 118 at 304-. 
121 265 Pa. 376, 108 At!. 822 {1919). Also on classification of property 
for effective rates, see: Provident Life & Trust Co. v. McCaughn, supra note 
82, discussed under personal property tax. Cf. Commonwealth v. National 
Oil Company, 157 Pa. 516, 27 Ad. 374- {1893), followed in Common-
wealth v. Mill Creek Coal Co., 157 Pa. 524-, 27 Ad. 375 ( 1893). 
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under the early form of the capital stock tax. For corpora-
tions making or declaring no dividend or profit, or making 
and declaring a profit of less than 6%, the officers of the 
corporation were required to "appraise" the capital stock at 
its "actual value in cash" and pay a tax of three mills upon 
each dollar of such "actual" value. For those corporations 
making or declaring a profit of six per cent or more, the tax 
was computed at the rate of one half of one mill upon each 
dollar of the par value of the capital stock for each one per 
cent of dividends or profit made or declared. This method 
(as found in the Act of June 7, 18 79, Public Law 112) was 
challenged in Commonwealth v. Brush Electric Light 
Company122 and held not to violate Art. IX, § 1 of the 
constitution. Preceding its statement of the governing rule 
by an evaluation of the uniformity limitation itself, the court 
said: 
Tax-laws have not yet been devised that will work out 
absolute equality of burden. If the constitution requires this, 
we have no tax-laws .... [W]here the measure of value 
and the rate are uniform and applicable to all the members of 
the given class, the incidental hardships and inequalities must 
be borne. 
The object of the tax was the capital stock of corporations. 
Necessarily, then, some method had to be used to determine 
the value of such property, i.e., capital stock. Examining and 
evaluating the dual base-rate structure actually used, the 
court concluded: 
The act looks properly at the earning capacity of the stock 
or the business it represents, as affording the best measure of 
its value.123 
By best "measure" the court referred to the fact that earning 
122 145 Pa. 147,22 Atl. 844 (1891). 
123 !d. at 154, emphasis added. 
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capacity of the corporation was used to determine whether 
the "value" of the stock was to be taken as "par value" or 
"appraised value." If dividends amounted to six per cent or 
more, then the base of the tax (i.e., the "value" of the capital 
stock) was par value. However, if dividends were below six 
per cent, then it was assumed that the capital stock was worth 
less than par value and provision was made for an appraise-
ment of its value. For such capital stock the base of the tax 
(i.e., the "value" of capital stock) was its "actual cash value." 
It was not for the court to inquire whether some other 
method (for example, net earnings) might better have been 
used, "The standard [was] applied impartially." Conse-
quently, there was no constitutional objection.124 
What the case seems to say is that a class of property 
(capital stock) may be further classified, and the subclassifi-
cation may be based upon the earning capacity of the corpora-
tion which such property represents. Thus, the court has 
again approved a classification of property based upon 
characteristics of the owner, rather than characteristics of the 
property itself. The uniformity limitation is satisfied if the 
same "standard of value" is used for the base as to all mem-
bers of each subclass. In this particular instance, the base of 
124 Compare the dictum in Commonwealth v. Sharon Coal Co., supra note 
118 at 304-305, decided under the revised capital stock tax as embodied 
in the Act of June 8, 1891, P.L. 229, §4, which established a single base of 
actual value and a single rate of five mills. The court said, at 3 0 5: 
All properties, however, in the same class, must be taxed without dis-
crimination in the rate of tax imposed; and the rule for ascertaining the 
oalue of the property must be the same; the actual cash oalue of one 
capital stock in the same class cannot be ascertained from net earnings, 
another from profit, another from surplus and another from dividends, 
for each method will produce a different oaluation, and result in in-
equality. But each may be taxed on the actual cash valuation from any 
relative evidence tending to establish the fact. (Emphasis added.] 
See the companion case Commonwealth v. Edgerton Coal Co., 164 Pa. 284, 
299-303, 30 Atl. 125, 129 (1894). 
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"value" for one subclass was equivalent to "par value." For 
the other subclass, the base of "value" was equivalent to 
''actual cash value." 
The validity of the above method of "self-assessment" was 
affirmed in Commonwealth v. Southern Pennsylvania Bus 
Company.125 By the time of that case, .the base of the tax 
for all capital stock was the appraised "actual cash value." 
The method was challenged on two grounds. First, it was 
contended that the method was not a constitutional method 
of "assessment" of an ad valorem property tax; and, second, 
it was contended that such a method violated the uniformity 
clause in Art. IX, § 1. While conceding that "an assessment 
[was] necessary to create and define the liability of the tax-
payer, inasmuch as the capital stock tax [was] a property 
tax,m26 the court ruled that, nevertheless, the assessment 
made by the taxpayer satisfied that requirement. The fact 
that the capital stock tax is an 
... ad valorem tax upon property, as distinguished from a 
franchise or privilege tax, does not affect the validity of this 
method of assessment. The cases relied upon [to the con-
trary] . . . hold merely that some method of assessment 
must be provided for an ad valorem property tax; or if none 
is prescribed, that it must be followed. 127 
It was also held that the argument based on Art. IX, 
§ 1 was devoid of merit. Uniformity of taxation did not re-
quire that the statute establish a single agency for the assess-
ment of all property within a single class. It was sufficient if 
such property was assessed in the "same manner and on the 
same standards of valuation.m28 
To conclude the discussion of the capital stock taxation 
125 339 Pa. 521,15 A. 2d 375 (1940). 
126 !d. at 5 26. 
127 /d. at 528. 
128 /d. at 529. 
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system, some comment should be made concerning the estab-
lishment in 1935 of a dual structure consisting of the capital 
stock tax and the franchise tax. By the Act of May 16, 1935, 
Public Law 292, §2, a franchise tax was imposed upon 
foreign corporations. The object of this new tax was the 
privilege of doing business in the state, and the base was the 
value of the franchise to do business as determined by the 
application of allocation factors to the actual value of the 
capital stock. Domestic corporations remained subject to the 
capital stock tax. Thus, while one might say in a general 
sense that all corporations are still subject to a "capital stock" 
tax, it should be noted that domestic corporations are reached 
by a "property tax" upon the "capital stock" as property, and 
foreign corporations are reached by a "privilege or franchise" 
tax upon the privilege of doing business-but the value of 
the privilege is established by reference to the value of the 
capital stock. 
The reason for the change stems from the "jurisdiction to 
tax" limitation, derived from the due process clause in the 
fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution. For the 
purpose of conforming to this limitation upon state taxes, 
Pennsylvania found it desirable to reach foreign corporations 
by a tax characterized as a "franchise" tax, instead of a 
"property" tax. The change had nothing to do with the uni-
formity in taxation limitation as derived from the state 
constitution. There was no intention to alter the basic tax 
structure. 
One of the earliest Pennsylvania cases construing this 
change in facade was In re Arrott's Estate.129 The court took 
note of the basic "similarity" of the two taxes and ruled that 
for the purpose of applying the personal property tax, the 
exemption therefrom of shares of stock in corporations paying 
a tax upon their capital stock was intended to include shares 
129 322 Pa. 367, 185 Atl. 697 (1936). 
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in foreign corporations paying the franchise tax, even though 
the latter tax ostensibly was not imposed on property (i.e., 
capital stock) but on a privilege. A "close identity" between 
the capital stock tax and the franchise tax was found. In 
1939 in Commonwealth v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corpo-
ration the court held that the newly designed "method" of 
taxing foreign corporations did not discriminate in favor of 
domestic corporations. Different methods might be used 
where there was no substantial difference in tax burden. In 
addition, the court squarely ruled that the tax was not upon 
the property of foreign corporations.130 
Thus, the cases concerning this structural split are apt 
illustrations of how different constitutional tax limitations 
(e.g., uniformity and equality in taxation; and limitations 
on the jurisdiction to tax) are often dependent for their ap-
plication or meaning upon the characterization of a given tax 
as property or nonproperty. Moreover, the characterization 
of a given tax for the purposes of one limitation is not neces-
sarily controlling for the other. These cases, along with other 
material in this monograph, should serve as warning of the 
danger in indiscriminately citing cases ruling upon the nature 
130 336 Pa. 209, 8 Atl. 2d 404 (1939). This is probably the leading 
case on the franchise tax. See the subsequent cases: Commonwealth v. Ford 
Motor Co., 350 Pa. 236, 38 A. 2d 329 (1944); Commonwealth v. Quaker 
Oats Co., 350 Pa. 253, 38 A. 2d 825 (1944); Commonwealth v. Monessen 
Amusement Co., 352 Pa. 120,42 A. 2d 158 (1945); Commonwealth v. 
American Gas Co., 3 52 Pa. 113, 42 A. 2d 161 ( 1945). In interpreting the 
franchise tax it was held that there was no intention to permit foreign cor-
porations, in computing the value of their capital stock, to deduct the shares 
held in other corporations paying the capital stock tax, even though such a 
deduction was allowed for domestic corporations under the capital stock tax. 
It was held that this difference in "method" did not violate either the uni-
formity clause in Art. IX, §I, or the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the federal Constitution. The Arrott case, supra note 
129, was distinguished on the ground that it was interpreting the exemp-
tion provisions embodied in the personal property tax. However, the "close 
identity'' between the capital stock tax and the franchise tax was admitted. 
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of a given tax without carefully considering the particular 
constitutional limitation which was in issue in the cases. 
(3) Personal property taxation: tangibles 
(a) cc Hard" coal tax 
An excellent illustration of the extent to which property 
may be classified in Pennsylvania for purposes of direct prop-
erty taxation is found in the treatment accorded the hard 
coal tax, discontinued since 1931.131 The tax was imposed 
upon coal as property, and the amount of the tax was com-
puted at a stated per cent of the vahle of coal when prepared 
for market. The first such tax~ ~mr,osed in 1 913, was held to 
violate the uniformity clause. Substantially the same tax was 
held constitutional in 1922. The two opinions are interesting 
illustrations of how different results may be reached as to 
similar facts under the identical uniformity provision. 
By the Act of June 27, 1913, Public Law 639, entitled 
"An Act levying a tax on anthracite coal and providing for 
the collection and distribution of the same," every ton of 
anthracite coal prepared for market within the state was 
made subject to a state tax of two and one-half per cent of 
the value thereof. In Commonwealth v. Alden Coal Com-
pany,132 the court, in a 5-2 decision, held that the act created 
an arbitrary classification and consequently violated the uni-
formity clause in Art. IX, § 1. The opinion was written by 
Justice Stewart, who noted that the act was challenged on 
one ground, namely, that it violated the uniformity clause 
inasmuch as it made "artificial and arbitrary distinction and 
discrimination between anthracite and bituminous coal, sub-
jecting the former to tax ... and not the latter."133 Refer-
131 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, § 2 50 1. 
182 251 Pa. 134, 96 Atl. 24-6 (1915). Followed in the companion case 
of Commonwealth v. St. Clair Coal Co., 251 Pa. 159, 96 Ad. 254 ( 1915). 
188 /d. at 13 7. 
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ring to the uniformity clause, Justice Stewart stated: "It is 
constantly to be borne in mind that the right of classification 
is allowed in order to avoid or correct inequalities, never to 
create them."134 Turning to the facts at hand, a majority of 
the court was convinced that the single basis offered to sup-
port the classification was "market price or value"-hard 
coal selling at from four to eight dollars per ton, while soft 
coal sold at from one to two dollars per ton. In the view of 
the majority: "The one reason expressed is so wholly in-
adequate as a basis of differentiation that we need not take 
time in discussing it."135 That being so, the act was held to 
violate the uniformity clause in Art. IX, § 1 of the constitu-
tion. 
Evidently not convinced by the majority opinion in the 
Alden Coal Company case, the legislature passed an act in 
1 921 phrased in substantially identical words (except that 
the rate was lower).136 In Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Com-
pany, 137 by a 5-2 vote, the 1921 act was held to have created 
a reasonable classification. Therefore, it did not violate the 
uniformity clause in Art. IX, § 1. The majority attempted to 
avoid an outright overruling of the Alden Coal case by stat-
ing that certain facts which justified the classification were 
not before the court in that case; consequently it could be 
"distinguished." However, the Heisler opinion leaves little 
of the Alden Coal case rationale undisturbed. The majority 
opinion viewed the argument against the validity of the tax 
as being in substance an argument that 
. . . "coal is coal, and all must be taxed or none may be 
taxed"; to which we may answer "land is land," "ice is ice," 
and "gas is gas," but no one doubts the legislative power to 
134 /d. at 14-0. 
135 /d. at 14-1. 
136 Act of May II, 1921, P.L. 479, §I. 
137 274 Pa. 448, 118 Atl. 394 ( 1922). 
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differently tax seated and unseated land, natural ice and 
artificial ice, and natural gas and manufactured gas.138 
The court concluded that it had before it findings "of undis-
puted facts, showing a wide difference in the character of 
these coals and the use to which they are put. . • .mas Such 
facts were sufficient to support a legislative classification for 
purposes of taxation.140 
(b) Other tangible personal property taxes 
Alcoholic Beverage Floor Tax. By the Act of Nov. 22, 
1933 (Sp. Sess.), Public Law 5, the legislature attempted to 
impose a tax upon alcoholic beverages lodged or stored in 
the state between the date the act became effective and the 
date that the twenty-first amendment to the constitution of 
the United States should become effective. The tax was im-
posed at a rate of two dollars a gallon. In Commonwealth v. 
A. Overholt and Company/41 the court held that the tax 
violated the uniformity clause of Art. IX, § 1, since it was a 
specific property tax, and the uniformity clause required that 
property, if taxed, be taxed ad valorem.142 The opinion 
demonstrated that as a consequence of the tax rate which the 
188 /d. at 455. 
139 /d. at 459-461. 
14° Followed in Commonwealth v. Hudson Coal Co., 287 Pa. 64, 134 
Atl. 413 ( 1926) and Commonwealth v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & 
Iron Co., 278 Pa. 338, 123 Atl. 315 (1924). 
141 331 Pa. 182, 200 Atl. 849 (1938). 
142 Compare Folcroft Borough v. General Outdoor Adv. Co., 72 D. & C. 
(Pa.) 539,42 Mun. 9 (1950), an inferior-court decision which stated that 
an ordinance imposing a tax of fifty cents per square foot of surface upon 
billboards was a violation of the uniformity clause, Art. IX, § 1. The Court 
of Common Pleas first ruled that the tax was a property tax and therefore 
not within the power of the borough to impose. However, the court offered 
the further reason that in any case the tax would violate Art. IX, § 1, stating 
{at 543): "The principle of uniformity requires that property taxes be 
imposed on an ad valorem basis." Cited as authority were the cases dis-
cussed infrtJ under "local severance taxes." 
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tax would have imposed, the ratio of the tax to the value 
of the property in the hands of the several defendants would 
vary from 12~% on whiskey valued at sixteen dollars a 
gallon, to 500% on alcohol valued at forty cents a gallon. 
The court reasoned that when property in the form of a 
gallon of liquid was valued at forty cents and taxed at two 
dollars, five times its value, while a gallon of liquid valued 
at sixteen dollars was also taxed at two dollars, or one-eighth 
of its value, then the uniformity clause was violated as 
• . • precisely as it would be violated if in imposing taxes on 
two properties of exactly the same value, the legislature 
imposed on one a tax of forty cents and on the other a tax 
of sixteen dollars. If the owner of land worth $40 0 is taxed 
exactly the same as the owner of land worth $16,000, the 
former's constitutional right to uniformity of taxation is 
breached. 
The nature of the property involved was said to be im-
material: 
The burden of a property tax rests upon the property on 
which it is imposed and if the same tax is laid on two prop-
erties of unequal supporting economic power, the burdens are 
unequal . ... Uniformity of taxation means equality of 
burden.148 
Unquestionably the Overholt case represents an outright con-
demnation of specific property taxes. 
Local severance taxes. Several decisions concerning certain 
local "severance" taxes imposed in recent years are relevant 
to the problem of uniformity in taxation. In Dunkard Town-
ship School Tax Case,144 the court considered the validity of 
a tax imposed by the school district upon the "privilege, 
transaction or occupation of mining, processing and marketing 
143 Commonwealth v. A. Overholt & Co., supra note 141 at 191. 
144 359 Pa. 605, 608, 60 A. 2d 39 (1948). 
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of bituminous coal mined by strip mining methods at the 
time of its severance from the realty within the boundaries" 
of the township. The rate was ten cents per ton of bituminous 
coal "so mined, processed and marketed from and within the 
township." The court upheld the tax as "an excise tax on the 
privilege or occupation of strip mining coal," consequently 
there was no "double taxation" since the tax on the coal in 
place was a property tax and the object was a reasonable 
class.145 
In subsequent cases this type of local tax became involved 
with a problem wholly different from uniformity of taxation, 
but it continued to raise certain questions of uniformity as 
well. The statute authorizing school districts to levy taxes 
also prohibited the imposition of local taxes on personal 
property subject to a state tax or license fee. 146 In Lawrence 
Township School District Tax Case/47 the court ruled that a 
tax similar to that involved in the Dunkard case was, in fact, 
a tax upon the property involved. Consequently, since the 
corporations paid the capital stock tax (among others) to 
the state and that tax was upon all property and assets of the 
companies, then such local taxes were prohibited. The 
Dunkard case was distinguished on the basis of the words 
found in the different tax laws. 
Subsequently, as to a similar local tax the rationale of the 
Lawrence case was avoided in Hampton Township School 
District Tax Case148 by giving effect to an additional phrase 
145 /d. at 610. The court relied here on Dufour v. Maize, 358 Pa. 309, 
56 A. 2d 675 {194-8), which, however, upheld an act more in the nature 
of a police regulation. 
146 ActofJune25, 1947,P.L.1145. 
147 3 62 Pa. 3 77, 6 7 A. 2d 3 72 ( 194-9) ; followed in Jamison Coal & 
Coke Co. v. Unity Twp. Sch. Dist., 362 Pa. 3 89, 66 A. 2d 7 59 ( 194-9)'. 
148 362 Pa. 395, 397, 67 A. 2d 376 {194-9); controlling in Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp. Appeal, 362 Pa. 400, 67 A. 2d 378 ( 194-9). 
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in the authorizing statute which prohibited any such local tax 
being imposed "on the privilege of employing such tangible 
property as is now or does hereafter become subject to a 
State tax." Thus, it was ruled that even if such a tax was a 
"privilege" tax it was still prohibited by the authorizing 
statute. Then on reargument of the Lawrence Township case, 
the court took cognizance of the Hampton Towns hip case 
rationale by simply stating that the "grounds" upon which 
it had made its decision in the original hearing did not have 
to be reviewed, since by the Hampton Township rationale the 
tax would be invalid even if it were held to be an excise and 
not a property tax. 
The preceding discussion has no intrinsic value for a study 
of the uniformity problem. However, there is considerable 
language in the opinions concerning "double taxation" which 
is, in fact, a reference to the statutory prohibition against 
"double taxation." In addition, the sequence of cases also 
gives perspective to an alternative ruling found in the 
Lawrence Township case which is relevant to the uniformity 
limitation. The resolution reviewed in the Lawrence Town-
ship case provided that the township was to levy a tax "of 
Five Cents per net ton of 2,000 pounds on all coal mined 
from property located in Lawrence Township .... " That 
case concerned both a corporation which paid the state capital 
stock tax, referred to above, and an individual taxpayer en-
gaged in the mining operation. After ruling on the statutory 
"double taxation" issue, which really would have affected the 
tax only as to the corporation, the court continued: 
Since, in our opinion, the tax imposed by the Resolution 
under consideration is a property tax, and since according 
to a stipulation filed by the parties, the value of coal mined 
in Lawrence Township varies from $4.25 per ton to $5.25 
per ton, it is also invalid as violating the constitutional re-
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quirement of uniformity in that, being a property tax, it is 
imposed on a quantity and not an ad valorem basis . .•. 140 
The Overholt case concerning the state alcoholic beverage 
floor tax was cited as authority for this proposition. 
c. Transfer taxes 
ByanActofDec. 27,1951 (No. 467),PublicLaw 1742, 
the legislature imposed a realty transfer tax amounting to 
1 % of the "value" of real property or any interest therein 
transferred by "document." In Sablosky v. Messner150 the 
tax was brought under attack for several reasons, two of 
which concerned uniformity of taxation. The definition of the 
term "document," found in section 2 of the act, included a 
proviso which excluded "wills, mortgages, transfers between 
husband and wife, transfers between parent and child or the 
spouse of such child, and leases." The court rejected the 
contention that this exclusion violated either section 1 or 2 of 
Art. IX.1111 
d. Corporation taxes 
The Pennsylvania corporate net income tax was first im-
posed in 19 3 5.152 Section 3 of the act imposing the tax 
provided: 
Every corporation shall be subject to, and shall pay for the 
privilege of doing business in this Commonwealth, or having 
capital or property employed or used in this Commonwealth 
149 Lawrence Township School District Tax Case, supra note 147 at 383. 
Also see Dick Contracting Co. v. School Dist. of Hazel Twp., 362 Pa. 387, 
6S A. 2d 381 ( 1949) for a similar statement and alternate reason for 
striking down a local tax upon strip mining equipment at the rate of $1.50 
per horsepower. 
150372Pa.47,92A.2d411 (1952). 
151 U. at 57. 
152 Act of May 16, 1935, P.L. 208. The discussion of the Individual 
Income Tax Act of 1935 is found infra, text to notes 181-190. 
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• . • a State excise tax at the rate of six per centum per 
annum upon each dollar of net income of such corporation 
received by, and accruing to, such corporation during the 
calendar year ..•. 
The tax hereby imposed shall be in addition to all taxes 
now imposed on any corporation under the provisions of 
existing laws . . 
In defining "corporation," section 2 of the act provided for 
the following exclusions: 
The word "corporation" shall not include building and 
loan associations, banks, bank and trust companies, national 
banks, savings institutions, trust companies, title insurance 
companies, beneficial life and limited life insurance companies, 
mutual fire, mutual casualty and mutual life insurance com-
panies, and foreign stock companies registered in this Com-
monwealth and therein engaged in doing business as life, fire, 
and casualty insurance companies, and surety companies. 
The validity of the corporate net income tax was chal-
lenged on several grounds in Turco Paint & Varnish Com-
pany v. Kalodnor.158 The court did not consider the tax to 
be an "income" tax, but throughout its opinion dealt with the 
tax as "a tax on the privilege of doing business measured by 
income accumulated within the state .... m54 First the court 
153 320 Pa. 421, 184Atl. 37 (1936). 
1114 /d. at 429, 423. But see Roy Stone Transfer Corp. v. Messner, 377 
Pa. 234,103 A. 2d 700 (1954), for an example of the usual confusion on 
the point when the separate constitutional limitations of uniformity in 
taxation (state) and the prohibition against state taxation of interstate com-
merce (federal) get tangled. By the Act of Aug. 24, 1951, P.L. 345, the 
Pennsylvania legislature imposed the so-called "Corporation Income Tax 
Law." The purpose of the 1951 law was to avoid restrictions imposed by 
the "commerce clause," Art. I, §8 of the federal Constitution. The act, in 
short, purported to tax the income, as property, of certain corporations 
which it could not reach with the corporate net income tax because of the 
commerce clause restriction. The attempt was unsuccessful. The court, in 
Roy Stone Transfer Corp. v. Messner, supra, held that the act violated the 
federal commerce clause. But of interest to this particular study of uniform-
522 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
rejected the contention that the act imposed a "graduated" 
income tax in violation of Art. IX, § 1 of the constitution. It 
pointed out that the rate ( 6%) was the same for all corpora-
tions, and that the tax base (net income attributable to Penn-
sylvania) was also identical for all corporations. "Where 
different rates are legislatively imposed on varying amounts 
or quantities of the same tax base, then you have a graduated · 
tax that lacks uniformity under our Constitution."155 Refer-
ity in taxation is the manner in which the court treated the corporate net 
income tax. After quoting the taxing provisions from both the Corporate 
Net Income Tax Act of 19 3 5 and the 19 51 Corporation Income Tax Law, 
the court made this statement, at 238; 
The Corporate Net Income Tax Act of 19 3 5 imposing a tax on the net 
income of a corporation based upon its tangible property in Pennsylvania 
and the wages paid to its employees in Pennsylvania, and that part of its 
gross receipts attributable to business carried on within Pennsylvania, was 
declared to be a property tax in spite of the declaration in the Act that it 
was an excise tax; and as such, its Constitutionality was sustained .••. 
The emphasis is by the court. The several cases then cited for authority that 
the Corporate Net Income Tax Act of 19 3 5 was a "property tax" were all 
concerned with the individual income taxes imposed by certain cities and 
the state, all of which have received a very different treatment in Pennsyl-
vania from the corporate net income tax. See text at notes 181-190, infro. 
Those cases had nothing to do with the corporate net income tax, and the 
cases actually decided under that tax (e.g., the Turco Paint & Varnish case, 
supra) were not mentioned. The court, moreover, after reviewing the gen-
eral principles controlling in the "state taxation of interstate commerce" 
field, then indicated that its decisions are "not harmonious" on the nature 
of the corporate net income tax, citing not only the cases dealing with the 
individual income taxes but also the corporate net income tax cases. The 
point was felt to be of some importance by both sides in the Roy Stone case, 
each certain that by labeling the 1951 Corporation Income Tax property or 
privilege the commerce clause limitation of the federal Constitution could 
either be avoided or used to invalidate the tax. 
l55Turco Paint & Varnish Co. v. Kalodner, supra note 153 at 426. Also 
see Commonwealth v. Warner Bros. Theaters, 345 Pa. 270, 27 A. 2d 62 
( 1942), although the principal issue in that case was a problem of incor-
poration by reference, and the graduated rate problem was dealt with only 
slightly. 
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ence was made to the individual income tax case, Kelley v. 
Kalodner.156 
The taxpayer next contended that the act, in excluding 
from its operation building and loan associations, banks, etc., 
violated Art. IX, §2 of the constitution, which prohibits the 
exemption of property from taxation. In addition, because of 
this exclusion of certain corporations, it was contended that 
the tax was not uniformly applied to- the same class of taxable 
objects. Rejecting this argument based on the exclusion 
proviso, the court said: "An exemption contemplated by .•. 
Art. IX, §2, is an exemption from all taxation in any 
form."151 The legislature under Art. IX, §1 has full power 
to classify corporations into subclasses, the only limitation 
being that such classifications cannot be arbitrary.158 The 
156 320 Pa. 180, 181 Atl. 598 (1935), discussed infra, note 181. 
157 Turco Paint & Varnish Co. v. Kaloduer, supra note 153 at 432-435, 
emphasis added. 
158 On the power of the legislature to classify corporations, see the follow-
ing cases: Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. 513 {1877), 
in which the court held that Art. IX, § 1 did not prevent the classification of 
insurance companies into foreign and domestic, domestic companies being 
subject to the capital stock tax (with a rate of 3% of the value of capital 
stock), and foreign companies subject to a 3% gross premiums tax; Com-
monwealth v. Girard Life Ins. Co., 305 Pa. 558, 158 Atl. 262 {1932), in 
which it was held that the uniformity clause in Art. IX, § 1 was not 
violated by the classification of life insurance companies into stock com-
panies and mutual companies, the first being subject to a tax upon gross 
premiums and the second being exempted from such tax. Also see Common-
wealth v. Lukens, 312 Pa. 220, 167 Atl. 167 {1933), upholding the classi-
fication and exemption of "taxicabs, motor buses and motor omnibuses" 
from an act imposing a tax of 8 mills on the gross receipts of motor carriers. 
Also see Kittanning Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 79 Pa. 100 (1875), 
one of the first cases interpreting the uniformity clause incorporated in Art. 
IX, § 1 of the 1874 constitution. That case concerned the validity of section 
7 of an Act of April 24, 1874, P.L. 68, which provided that 
••• every company ••• which possesses the corporate right or privi-
lege to mine, or to purchase or sell coal, • • • shall pay • • • an ad-
ditional tax upon its corporate franchises, created by or used within this 
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classification at hand was held to be reasonable, and the use of 
the generic term "corporations" did not estop the legislature 
from narrowing this class by excluding certain types of asso-
ciations. 
e. cc Business'' taxes 
Mercantile License Taxes. An historic form of taxation 
in Pennsylvania has been the "Mercantile License Tax," 
both on state and local levels. The tax in its narrowest 
form (e.g., the former state tax) has been limited to whole-
salers and retailers. However, at times a more general busi-
ness tax has been imposed (e.g., the tax recently imposed by 
the Philadelphia School District). A number of cases con-
cerning problems of uniformity in taxation have arisen under 
these taxes. 
In Williamsport v. Wenner/59 decided in 1896, an 
Commonwealth at the rate of three cents upon each and every ton ••• 
of coal so mined or purchased as aforesaid • • • ; And provided further, 
That said tax shall not be payable more than once in respect to the same 
ton of coal. 
In an appeal from the settlement of the tax against the Kittanning Coal 
Company the court held that the tax did not violate the uniformity clause 
of the new constitution. The court rejected the argument that the tax was 
upon coal as property, saying at 104-: 
• • • the tax • • • is upon the corporate franchise of this company 
measured by its business, to wit: by the number of tons of coal mined or 
purchased and sold by it, and is not upon the coal itself .••• The tax 
thus imposed upon the franchise is uniform, it being at the rate of three 
cents upon every gross ton mined or purchased and sold. 
Referring to the power of the legislature to classify subjects of taxation 
(noting that "no change was made in the power to classify" that had existed 
before the 1874- constitution) the court stated, at 1 OS: 
The whole argument on this question of uniformity rests on this right 
of the citizen to be exempt from unequal burthens in supporting govern-
ment. That he who has more to be protected by gooernment, should pay 
more for its support, is a plain rule. [Emphasis supplied.] 
l59 172 Pa. 17 3, 33 Ad. 54-4- ( 1896). 
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ordinance imposing the more general form of business tax 
was challenged under the uniformity clause, Art. IX, § 1. 
The ordinance purported to impose "an annual license tax" 
on enumerated businesses, few, if any, being omitted.160 
Section 2 of the ordinance set up the rate schedule. Eighteen 
classes of businesses were enumerated, with a different rate 
schedule provided for each class. The eighteenth class con-
sisted of "merchants." This class was further subdivided into 
nine classes, according to the amount of annual gross sales, 
with each subclass paying a flat sum, or license fee. In fact, 
the schedule amounted to a very rough sort of proportional 
rate amounting to one tenth of one per cent. For each class 
except the ninth, the flat sum amounted to one tenth of one 
per cent of the maximum amount of gross sales in each class 
(the several classes for the most part were formed in $1 0,000 
brackets). The defendant in the W ilUamsport case was a 
merchant whose annual sales put him into class four, so that 
he was subject to a $20 fee or tax. Defendant failed to pay, 
suit was brought to enforce payment, and the defense was 
offered that the ordinance violated the uniformity clause in 
Art. IX, § 1 in that the classification of merchants according 
to amount of sales was arbitrary. In a per curiam opinion the 
Supreme Court affirmed and approved the opinion of the 
court below holding that the tax was constitutional. In its 
ruling the lower court had found it necessary to distinguish 
Ranger's Appeal/61 in which a tax upon ('occupations" as 
property had been held invalid, saying: 
That was an attempt to classify the same occupation according 
to the earnings of individuals. It was very properly ruled 
that such a tax would be an income tax, measured by the 
earnings of the party, but even in that case the right to 
classify the tax upon property is, at least impliedly, recog-
160 U. at 174-176. 
161 Supra note 35. 
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nized. The tax in controversy is clearly not an income tax in 
any sense, but it is a tax of the defendant's property estimated 
by the volume of his annual sales.162 
Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Clark,168 another per 
curiam opinion affirming and approving a lower-court opin-
ion, the court considered the license tax imposed by the city 
of Titusville. The ordinance classified merchants into retail-
ers and wholesalers, with each of the two subclasses being 
subject to the same sort of rate schedule as that used under 
the Williamsport ordinance. By a further classification in the 
ordinance it was provided that "contractors whose business 
and real estate agents whose sales exceed $1,000 per annum, 
shall be classified and rated" in the same manner as mer-
chants, and pay a fee according to that scale. The classifica-
tions of "merchants" into retailers and wholesalers, with 
different rate schedules applicable to each class, and the rate 
scales themselves were upheld as valid classifications under 
Art. IX, §1.164 However, the validity of the exemptions 
found in the ordinance was another question. The lower 
court pointed out: 
By section 3 [classifying merchants] no exemption is allowed 
to persons doing an annual business of less than $1,000, and 
as contractors and real estate agents are otherwise classified 
with the persons making and effecting sales, to thus exempt a 
part of the class doing business of less than $1,000, and im-
pose a tax upon others belonging to the same class is clearly 
violative of sections 1 and 2, article 9 .... m 
162 Williamsport v. Wenner, supra note 15 9 at 181. The lower court 
relied on similar holdings in the previous cases of Allentown v. Gross, 132 
Pa. 319, 19 Ad. 269 ( 1890), and Hadtner v. Williamsport, 15 Wkly. Notes 
Cas. (Pa.) 138 ( 1883). 
168195 Pa. 634, 46Atl. 286 (1900). 
164 /d. at 638-639. 
1611 /d. at 635, emphasis added. 
UNIFORMITY STRUCTURES 527 
Note that the invalidity was not based on a rationale which 
would void all classifications based solely on quantity. 
These per curiam opinions were subsequently approved by 
the Supreme Court, with some limitations, in Knisely v. Cot-
terel.166 In that case the court considered the now abolished 
state mercantile license tax, imposed by Act of May 2, 1899, 
Public Law 184. The court upheld the classifications of re-
tailers (who were to pay a tax of one mill on each dollar of 
gross receipts), wholesalers (one half of one mill) and deal-
ers at any board of trade or any exchange (twenty five cents 
on each $1,000 worth of goods sold). Taxpayer alleged that 
the tax was on property, and the classification invalid. The 
court answered that even assuming the tax was upon prop-
erty it would not follow that the classifications were uncon-
stitutional. "The purpose for which property is kept or used 
has long been a recognized and to some extent a favorite 
basis for distinction in taxation.m67 However, the court went 
on to hold that the tax was "upon the business of vending 
merchandise,m68 and it suggested that any indication to the 
contrary in the Allentown case was "not upon the decisions 
themselves, but upon language supposed to indicate the ratio 
decidendi."169 
The mercantile license taxes are still quite frequently used 
by the local tax units. For ~xample, in the Philadelphia 
School District a "General Business Tax" is imposed by an 
Act of May 23, 1949, Public Law 1669, as amended. The 
term "business" is defined by § 1 ( 2) of that act as follows: 
Carrying on, or exercising for gain or profit within a school 
district of the first class, any trade, business, including finan-
cial business as hereinafter defined, profession, vocation, or 
166196 Pa. 614-, 4-6Atl. 861 (1900). 
1117 /d. at 628. 
168 /d. at 630. 
169 JJ. at 628. 
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commercial activity, or making sales to persons within such 
school district of the first class. 'Business' shall not include 
the following: Any business conducted by a non-profit corpo-
ration or association organized for religious, charitable, or 
educational purposes. . • . [Emphasis added.] 
The validity of the exclusion was challenged in Board of 
Christian Education v. Philadelphia School District,170 de-
cided by a Pennsylvania Superior Court, with allocatur being 
refused by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The Su-
perior Court asserted that the exclusion would: ( 1) violate 
Art. IX, §2, if considered an "exemption"; and (2) violate 
Art. IX, § 1, as being an arbitrary classification if considered 
"an immunity conferred by legislative classification of the 
subject of taxation." However, a decision on the constitu-
tionality of the section was avoided since it was construed 
not to include the business conducted by the Board. But some 
very interesting language was used by the Superior Court 
concerning both the force of Art. IX, §2 and exemptions. 
Quoting both Art. IX, §§ 1 and 2, the court said: 
The two sections, read together, impose limitations upon the 
power of the legislature to exempt property from taxation. 
It is beyond legislative competence to exempt more than the 
property used as a place of public worship or for purely 
charitable activities.171 
Consequently, the court asserted, "It follows that the expres-
sion 'Any business,' if intended by the legislature to exempt 
the Board's rental receipts from taxation, is void under the 
express limitation provided by Art. IX, §2. . . .m72 Then 
the court made a significant extension of the language al-
170 171 Pa. Super. 610, 91 A. 2d 372 (1952), allocatur refused by the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 171 Pa. Super. xxv, 172 Pa. Super. xxvi. 
171 /d. at 616. 
172 /Did. 
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ready used and spelled out its view concerning the scope of 
the second section of Art. IX, saying: 
Nor can the nature of the tax enlarge the legislature's power 
or diminish the limitation under which it acts. Whether the 
tax in question be regarded as a tax upon property or an ex-
cise upon the privilege of doing business, the result is the 
same, the General Assembly can exempt only the property 
which is used as a purely public charity. • . . Engagement 
in a business enterprise or commercial activities is not a pri-
mary function of a public charity, and any provision which 
relieves it from the payment of taxes imposed upon such en-
terprise or activities is an invalid exemption.118 
However, the actual decision was limited to a problem of 
statutory construction in order to avoid the constitutional 
issue. Thus, in all probability, the language quoted may be 
relegated to the status of some rather peculiar dicta of a 
lower court. 
Chain Store Tax. By an Act of June 5, 1937, Public Law 
165 6, the Pennsylvania legislature imposed a chain store and 
theater tax which contained the usual type of graduated rate 
schedule found in such taxes. The tax was immediately chal-
lenged in American Stores Company v. Boardman,174 in 
which the court held that the act imposed a graduated rate 
in violation of the uniformity clause, Art. IX, § 1. As in the 
individual income tax case, Kelley v. Kalodner,171> the court 
condemned the classification as being one based solely upon a 
difference in quantity of precisely the same tax base; and it 
asserted that there was no basis for classification according to 
differences in control and operation.178 The court ruled that 
it was immaterial whether the tax was considered to be an 
178 /d. at 617, emphasis added. 
174 336 Pa. 36,6 A. 2d 174 (1939). 
1711 Infra, text at note 181. 
176 American Stores Co. v. Boardman, supra note 174 at 40-41. 
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excise or a property tax, both being subject to Art. IX, §1, 
and stated: 
This court has long held and it is now weii established in 
this Commonwealth that a progressively graduated tax is 
lacking in uniformity and violates Art. IX, section 1 of our 
Constitution. From Banger's Appeal ... -the first in-
stance such a tax came before this court for consideration after 
the adoption of our present Constitution-down to Butcher 
v. Philadelphia . . • , we have consistently and unalterably 
held that a graded tax cannot be sustained.177 
The Butcher case178 concerned a local wage tax, and query 
whether Banger's Appeatl79 may be correctly cited for this 
proposition. However, the court also relied on In re Cope's 
Estate, 180 which did declare a minimum exemption under the 
inheritance tax to be invalid for the same reason, i.e., classifi-
cation based on quantity alone is not permissible. 
f. Individual income taxes 
By an Act of July 12, 1935, Public Law 970, the Penn-
sylvania Legislature enacted an individual net income tax, 
section 201 of which provided that 
A tax is hereby . . . imposed upon every resident taxpayer 
•.. which tax shaii be levied .•. annually, with respect 
to his entire net income as herein defined. 
A like tax is hereby imposed, and shaii be levied . . • upon 
and with respect to the entire net income as herein defined, 
from all property owned and from every business, trade; oc-
cupation, or profession carried on in this Commonwealth by 
natural persons not residents of the Commonwealth. 
177 /d. at 41. 
178 See note 186, infra. 
179 Supra note 35. 
180 Infra text at notes 192 et seq. 
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The act provided for a graduated rate, and certain minimum 
personal exemptions were allowed. Entire net income, as de-
fined, included income from all sources, both earned and un-
earned. Thus, income derived from property, as well as in-
come derived from an occupation or business, was to be 
taxed. 
Immediately after the passage of the act, it was challenged 
in Kelley v. Kalodnd81 and held to violate the uniformity 
clause in Art. IX, § 1 of the constitution. It was argued that 
while Art. IX, §§ 1 and 2 applied undisputedly to property 
taxes, the provision had no application to non property taxes; 
consequently the tax in question did not have to conform to 
the uniformity clause. Thus, the first inquiry of the court 
was in "ascertaining the nature of a graduated income tax." 
The court concluded that, insofar as the tax in question at-
tempted to levy a tax on income "from real estate or from 
stocks, bonds and similar securities in the hands of the owner 
thereof, it [was] a property tax [upon the property from 
which the income was derived] and subject to the constitu-
tional requirement of uniformity.m82 The court limited its 
decision to precisely that part of the tax, stating: "We pass 
no opinion upon the question of whether a tax upon the in-
come from trades, occupations or professions is a tax on prop-
erty, although respectable judicial opinion has indicated that 
181320 Pa. 180, 181 Atl. 598 (1935). 
182 !d. at 18 7. In reaching its conclusion as to the nature of an income 
tax, the court noted that the question was a controversial one, and that the 
courts of other jurisdictions were clearly split on the issue. Therefore, since 
there were no former decisions in Pennsylvania, the court felt 
• • • at liberty to determine the question along normal, natural lines. 
In doing so we are inevitably impelled to the conclusion that an income 
tax is a property tax. This result seems particularly clear in so far as a 
tax upon the income from real and personal property is concerned (p. 
186). 
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it is not.msa A determination as to the nature of a tax upon 
such income was unnecessary because the two parts of the act 
were not severable, and that reaching income from property 
was definitely a violation of the uniformity clause. 
Having determined that the act was at least in part subject 
to the "uniformity prescribed by the Constitution," the court 
held that the minimum exemption provisions were a viola-
tion of that constitutional prescription.184 Secondly, the 
court held that the graduated rate feature also violated the 
uniformity clause in Art. IX, §1, saying that it had "pre-
viously ruled that a tax which is imposed at different rates 
upon the same kind of property, solely on the basis of the 
quantity involved, offends the uniformity clause.m85 
The well-known Philadelphia "income" tax has resulted 
in several cases that clarify to some extent the nature of an 
income tax which might constitutionally be imposed in Penn-
sylvania. The City of Philadelphia enacted an ordinance in 
1938 which imposed a tax on the earned income of individ-
uals. The ordinance taxed salaries, rates, commissions, and 
other compensations of residents, and the net profits of busi-
ness or other activities conducted by such residents. Nonresi-
dents were subject to the tax on an apportioned part of their 
earned income derived from Philadelphia. The tax had a 
:Bat proportional rate of 1,0 %. Provisions stipulated that 
domestic servants, farm laborers, or farmers selling their 
own products were not within the meaning of "taxpayer" as 
used in the ordinance. A credit of $15 was allowed for the 
prompt making and filing of returns. For all practical pur-
poses, such a credit may be considered a form of minimum 
personal deduction. The constitutionality of the ordinance 
was immediately challenged in Butcher v. Philadelphia, in 
183 /d. at 187. 
184 /d. at 189. 
185 I bid. See note 196, infra. 
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which the court issued a very brief per curiam opinion, say-
ing: 
Under the severability clause in the income tax ordinance 
... the majority, one Justice disagreeing, hold that the in-
come tax ordinance is constitutional, with all exemptions 
stricken out, including the credit for making and filing the 
return .••• 186 
The tax was never enforced, and the ordinance was repealed 
on January 7, 1939.187 
The present Philadelphia income tax was first imposed by 
an ordinance enacted December 13, 1939. The features of 
the prior act which had been held to be objectionable were 
eliminated. The rate continued to be a flat rate of 10 %. In 
Dole v. Philadelphia,188 on the basis of the opinion below, 
the Supreme Court affirmed a decree dismissing the bill chal-
lenging the validity of the tax under Art. IX, § 1 of the con-
stitution. There was no discussion of the nature of an income 
tax on earned income; however, we may assume that these 
opinions implicitly establish that income generally may be 
validly classified as earned and unearned for purposes of 
taxation, and the subject of a tax may be limited to earned 
income.189 However, the Butcher case would seem to indicate 
that further classification of income according to who earns 
such income is forbidden, at least, for purposes of exemp-
tions. 
In Kelley v. Kalodner, the court gave no indication of the 
validity of a flat proportional rate levied upon income de-
rived from property. However, action under the Philadel-
phia tax possibly throws some light on the problem. In 1949 
186 33 3 Pa. 497, 6 A. 2d 298 ( 19 3 8), emphasis added. 
187 /d. at 497, a note by the reporter. 
188 337 Pa. 375, 11 A. 2d 163 (1940). 
189 This classification was approved in Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives 
& Granting Annuities v. Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 406, 31 A. 2d 137 {1943). 
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the city of Philadelphia tried to extend its "wage and net 
profit tax'' to cover income from all sources, thus converting 
the tax into a general income tax. The validity of the amend-
ment was challenged in Murray v. Philadelphia.190 The basic 
issue was one of statutory authority. The court held that the 
amendment was not authorized by the enabling act; thus no 
constitutional issue had to be faced. However, the court did 
comment by way of dictum upon the constitutional validity 
of the amendment insofar as it would have reached rent re-
ceived from real estate. It was necessary for the court to hold 
that the tax upon income from property was upon the prop-
erty itself (the Kelley case being cited as authority for the 
proposition) in order to reach its decision under the statutory 
issue. However, the court went on to say, assuming that such 
a tax (i.e., one reaching income derived from property) was 
authorized by the statute, it would nevertheless violate the 
uniformity clause in Art. IX, § 1 of the constitution. The ba-
sis of this conclusion was that such a tax would create an in-
equality of burden among land owners, some of whom 
rented and some of whom did not. In addition it was said 
that the classification of realty owners into two classes (those 
who occupy their dwelling houses and those who let them to 
tenants) would not be such a reasonable classification as 
would avoid an unconstitutional inequality of tax burden. 
g. Inheritance tax 
In 1897 the Pennsylvania legislature attempted to impose 
a "Direct Inheritance Law,m91 section 1 of which provided 
190 364- Pa. 157, 71 A. 2d 280 (1950). 
191 Act of May 12, 1897, P.L. 56. Pennsylvania was one of the first 
states to levy an inheritance tax. By an act of April 7, 1826, it was pro-
vided that all real and personal estates passing to other than "direct" heirs 
was "made subject to a tax or duty of" $2.50 on every $100 of the clear 
value of such estates. Subsequent amendments were made, and in 1887 the 
prior laws were then codified without substantial change, except that estates 
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that "all personal property . . . which shall pass by will, or 
by the intestate law of this State ... shall be ... subject 
to a tax of two dollars on every one hundred dollars of the 
clear value of such personal property .... " A proviso to 
section 1 of the act stipulated that "personal property to the 
amount of five thousand dollars shall be exempt from the 
payment of this tax in all estates. . . ." This act was chal-
lenged in In re Cope's Estate/92 the court holding that it 
violated the uniformity clause in Art. IX, § 1. First, the tax 
was characterized as a tax upon personal property.193 Then 
the court ruled that the exemption proviso in the act violated 
the uniformity clause. The fair implication of the decision is 
not that exemptions would never be permitted, but that the 
exemption made, namely, a classification based on quantity 
alone, was arbitrary. The court said: 
These limitations on the power of the legislature . . . are 
of under $2 50 in value were exempted. In 191 7 a direct inheritance tax 
was imposed, and two years later in 1919 the two acts were repealed and 
the present tax was imposed by Act of June 20, 1919, P.L. 521, reaching 
the property going to both collateral and direct heirs. The minimum ex-
emption of $250 was not carried over for collateral heirs; however, a 
minimum exemption was added for widows. Section 1 of the 1919 act is 
framed in terms of being "upon the transfer of" property. 
192 191 Pa. 1, 43 Atl. 79 {1899). 
193 /d. at 19-20. However, in characterizing the tax a property tax the 
court was responding to the contention that the measure was not a "tax" 
law but an act simply regulating the disposition of property. It might be 
pointed out that the early collateral act which was framed in similar words 
was held, in In re Finnen's Estate, 196 Pa. 72, 46 Ad. 269 ( 1900), to be 
a tax upon the privilege of succession. The issue in the Finnen case did not, 
however, concern uniformity. Also see Commonwealth v. Randall, 225 Pa. 
197, 73 Atl. 1109 ( 1909), in which an amendment (Act of April 22, 
1905, P.L. 258) excluding "stepchildren" from the definition of collateral 
heirs under the collateral tax was upheld. The court, in a brief opinion, 
without referring to the nature of the tax, and simply assuming it was 
subject to Art. IX, §1, said at 198: "The power of the legislature to classify 
subjects for purposes of taxation has long ceased to be a matter of contro-
versy." The classification in question was held to be reasonable. 
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plainly intended to secure, as far as possible, uniformity and 
relative equality of taxation, by prohibiting generally the ex-
emption of a certain part of any recognized class of property, 
and subjecting the residue to a tax that should be borne uni-
formly by the entire class . ••. 
The court concluded that the proviso attempted to exempt a 
part of "the same class of property," the reason being: 
A pretended classification that is based solely on a difference 
in quantity of precisely the same kind of property is neces-
sarily unjust, arbitrary and illegal.194 
In stating this rule the court used a hypothetical in which it 
said that graduated rates upon property illustrated the for-
bidden type of classification.195 It was this dictum which was 
later quoted in striking down the graduated rate under the 
individual income tax.196 
h. A summary of the meaning of the uniformity limi-
tation 
The preceding tax-by-tax analysis affords some basis for a 
summary statement of the meaning of the general effective 
uniformity limitation. It should be clear that the Pennsylvania 
court has made no substantial distinction between "property" 
and "nonproperty" taxes for the purpose of determining the 
applicability of the uniformity clause in Art. IX, § 1 of the con-
194 In re Cope's Estate, supra note 192 at 22, emphasis added. 
195 The court stated, id. at 22: 
For example, a division of personal property into three classes with the 
view of imposing a different tax rate on each,-dass 1, consisting of 
personal property exceeding in value of the sum of one hundred thousand 
dollars • • • , class 2, consisting of personal property exceeding in value 
twenty thousand dollars • • • and not exceeding one hundred thousand 
dollars ••• , and class 3, consisting of personal property not exceeding 
in value twenty thousand dollars ••. -would be so manifestly arbitrary 
and illegal that no one would attempt to justify it. 
196 Supra, text at note 185. 
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stitution. All taxes are limited by that clause. Any doubt 
concerning this proposition was dispelled in the chain store 
tax case, 197 in which the court held that the graduated rate 
schedule embodied in that tax violated the above provision. 
For comparative purposes it will be helpful to discuss 
separately the particular rules of uniformity applicable to 
nonproperty and property taxes, respectively. It is apparent 
that substantially the same particular rules which are found 
in other states govern nonproperty taxes. Thus, the objects 
of such taxes, and exemptions therefrom, need only be rea-
sonable classes. Such objects may be further classified for the 
application of different rates to the different classes. How-
ever, a restrictive interpretation is found concerning pro-
gressively graduate rates. Such a classification is held to be by 
nature arbitrary. Classifications based on quantity alone are 
said to be unreasonable. Thus, the graduated rate in the chain 
store tax was held invalid.198 
( 1) Property taxation 
The importance of the Pennsylvania study stems from the 
interesting results which were found in developing the mean-
ing of the uniformity limitation when applied to property 
taxes. First, to what degree, if any, does the uniformity limi-
tation govern the method of taxation? The Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania has seldom had occasion to consider the 
question whether property might be taxed by other than the 
ad valorem method. In the one case in which the court was 
squarely faced with the issue, it held that the state alcoholic 
beverage floor tax was a specific property tax and therefore a 
violation of the uniformity clause in Art. IX, § 1.199 How-
197 American Stores Co. v. Boardman, supra note 174. 
198 But see Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 332 Pa. 465, 3 A. 2d 267 
(1938). 
199 Commonwealth v. A. Overholt & Co., supra note 141. 
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ever, it should be pointed out that the tax was an almost un-
disguised regulatory measure and insignificant as a revenue 
producer. It was of doubtful validity even as a regulatory 
measure, although the court preferred to deal with it as a 
tax. A lower court has also ruled on the precise issue, holding 
that a specific property tax was unconstitutionaP00 The opin-
ion was not appealed. In addition, there is the dictum of the 
Supreme Court in the local severance tax cases201 which 
agrees with the rationale of the Floor Tax case. But this must 
be contrasted with the language in the Southern Pennsylvania 
Bus Company case202 which concerned the capital stock tax. 
As a result of this meager precedent one must conclude that 
in Pennsylvania property must be taxed ad valorem in order 
for the tax to be "uniform upon the same class." However, 
that conclusion must be read in light of the fact that the 
court has expressly approved the use of "nominal" value as 
the base for certain taxes characterized as property taxes. 208 
In addition, the description of the corporate loans tax in 
Commonwealth v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Company204 is of 
interest because it clearly described that tax as a specific 
rather than an ad valorem tax. The statement in that case has 
not been considered in subsequent cases. 
The second question concerns the degree of uniformity re-
quired of the object of property taxes. Is there a rule of 
universality? Some of the most conflicting, or at least ap-
parently conflicting, statements on the meaning of the effec-
tive uniformity limitation are found in those cases concerning 
this particular problem of uniformity in taxation. It is be-
lieved that the only case which cannot be reconciled with the 
200 Folcroft Borough v. General Outdoor Adv. Co., supra note 142. 
201 Supra, text at notes 144-149. 
202 Supra note 125. 
208 For example, Commonwealth v. Delaware Division Canal Co., supra 
note 87, concerning the corporate loan tax. 
204 Supra note 1 0 5. 
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other decisions on the problem is the early case In re Fox's 
A ppeal/05 which dealt with the personal property tax. Inci-
dentally, this was the first case involving the problem. It is 
suggested that a coherent pattern of decisions can be estab-
lished which refutes the rather sweeping language condemn-
ing the "exemption" of property. The numerous cases on the 
problem may be synthesized as follows. There is no require-
ment of universality. Only a "class" of property need be 
selected for taxation. And, since absolute uniformity is not 
required of the effective rates applicable to that property 
actually taxed, there may be separate property taxes with 
different effective rates, each tax having a different class of 
property as its object. In effect, then, property may be "ex-
empted" from a particular tax by the simple process of 
"omission," that is, the failure to select such property. 
However, once a "class" of property is selected as the ob-
ject of a particular property tax, an additional problem arises. 
It is true that the opinions contain language which suggests 
that the exemption of property, other than the kind desig-
nated as exemptible by Art. IX, § 1, is prohibited by Art. IX, 
§2. However, the court has, in fact, considered the express 
prohibition against exemption found in Art. IX, §2 and the 
uniformity clause in Art. IX, § 1 as laws .in pari materia, so 
to speak, with the result that once a "class" of property has 
been "selected" as the object of a tax, the legislature is sub-
ject to only one limitation in "exempting" reasonable "sub-
classes" of that object from the tax. That single limitation 
provides that if the "class" of property "selected" for the 
tax is considered a minimum class, the legislature may 
"exempt" a part of that "class" only if the part is one of the 
kinds of property designated as exemptible by Art. IX, § 1. 
This rather abstract generalization is made more meaningful 
by answering the following important question. Just what 
205 Supra note 49. 
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minimum classes of property has the court established for 
purposes of uniformity in the object of property taxes? The 
tax-by-tax analysis indicates that only real property is con-
sidered a minimum class. Thus, once real property is selected 
as the object of a property tax, none may be exempted there-
from unless it is a kind of property enumerated in Art. IX, 
§ 1. An example would be public property used for public 
purposes, or, real property owned, occupied, and used by a 
post of honorably discharged marines. It should be pointed 
out, by way of contrast, that real property may be subclassi-
fied for the application of different effective rates to the 
different classes. 
Summarizing, Art. IX, §2, which prohibits the exemption 
of property other than that enumerated in Art. IX, § 1, is 
actually effective only as a restriction upon the taxation of 
real property. There is no set minimum class insofar as the 
taxation of tangible and intangible personal property is con-
cerned. Various classifications of personal property have been 
allowed, both for purposes of selection and exemption. For 
example, hard coal has been approved as a valid class of 
property for the object of a special tax. Exemptions from the 
several "intangibles" taxes have been approved, and, inci-
dentally, such classifications were based upon characteristics 
of the owner of the property. The only limitation on classifi-
cation of property, other than real property, for the purpose 
of exemption is that such classes be reasonable. 
Third, the tax-by-tax analysis shows that property may be 
classified for the purpose of applying different effective rates 
to the several classes. For example, the court has expressly 
sanctioned the classification of real property into urban and 
rural for the application of different rates to each class. 206 
But a subclassification of realty consisting of forest lands was 
206 Supra, text at notes 13-31. 
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condemned as arbitrary.207 Another restrictive interpretation 
was found in the income tax case, Kelley v. Kalodner,208 
which held that graduated rates were. arbitrary classifications. 
Evidently, for the same reason minimum exemptions are 
likely to be closely examined because they are classifications 
based solely on quantity.209 The final point to be noted is that 
the court has approved another method of varying the 
effective rates applicable to property; namely, it approved 
the use of different standards of valuation for different 
classes of property.210 
In conclusion, the only restrictive particular rules con-
tained in the effective uniformity limitation for property tax-
ation are: ( 1) property must be taxed ad valorem; ( 2) classi-
fication may not be based solely on differences in quantity of 
precisely the same thing; thus graduated rates and minimum 
exemptions are prohibited; and (3) while real property may 
be classified for the application of different effective rates, it 
may not be classified for exemptions, either total or partial. 
13. Virginia 
a. The provisions; historical note 
Virginia, one of the original states, has had six constitu-
tions, dated respectively 1776, 1830, 1850, 1864, 1870, and 
the present constitution of 1902. In the first two constitutions 
(1776 and 1830) there were no provisions dealing expressly 
with uniformity in taxation. The first uniformity clause made 
its appearance in the constitution of 1850, Art. IV, §22 of 
which provided: 
207 /hid. 
208 Supra note 181. 
209 See In re Cope's Estate, supra note 192. 
21° For example, Commonwealth v. Delaware Division Canal Co., supra 
note 86; Commonwealth v. Brush Electric Co., supra note 122. 
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Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the Com-
monwealth, and all property other than slaves shall be taxed 
in proportion to its value, which shall be ascertained in such 
manner as may be prescribed by law. 
Article IV, §25 of the 1850 constitution also provided that 
the legislature might "levy a tax on incomes, salaries, and 
licenses; but no tax shall be levied on property from which 
any income so taxed is derived, or on the capital invested in 
the trade or business in respect to which the license so taxed 
is issued." In the succeeding constitution of 1864 both the 
above uniformity clause and Art. IV, §25 of the 1850 con-
stitution were incorporated substantially without change into 
a single provision, Art. IV, §23. The next constitution, dated 
1870, retained this "equal and uniform" type uniformity 
clause, numbering it Art. X, § 1. A new clause was added 
providing that "No one species of property, from which a tax 
may be collected, shall be taxed higher than any other species 
of property of equal value." The provision as to incomes, etc., 
was carried over into Art. X, §4 with some additional details. 
Another new provision was added, Art. X, §3, which pro-
vided that the legislature "might" exempt certain classes of 
property. 
In the present constitution of 1902 a different type of uni-
formity clause was introduced in Art. XIII, § 168, which 
reads: 
All property, except as hereinafter provided, shall be 
taxed; all taxes, whether State, local or municipal, shall be 
uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial 
limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied 
and collected under generalla w. . . . 
The new uniformity clause, as the quotation indicates, is 
accompanied by a clause which on its face requires universal-
ity. The provision in the prior constitutions concerning 
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specific types of taxes has been carried over, and Art. XIII, 
§ 170 now reads: 
The General Assembly may levy a tax on incomes in excess 
of six hundred dollars per annum; may levy a license tax 
upon any business which cannot be reached by the ad valorem 
system; and may impose State franchise taxes, and imposing 
a franchise tax may, in its discretion, make the same in lieu 
of taxes upon other property, in whole or in part, of a trans-
portation, industrial, or commercial corporation .... 1 
Article XIII, § 1 71, amended in 192 8, provides: "No State 
property tax for State purposes shall be levied on real estate 
or tangible personal property, except the rolling stock of pub-
lic service corporations .... " Article XIII, § 183 provides: 
"Unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, the follow-
ing property and no other shall be exempt from taxation, 
State and local, including inheritance taxes. . • ." There 
follows a lengthy enumeration of exemptible property. 
Special exemptions are provided for in Art. XIII, § 18 9. 
Article XIII, § 169, as amended in 1928, provides: "Except 
as hereafter provided, all assessments of real estate and 
tangible personal property shall be at their fair market value, 
to be ascertained as prescribed by law .... " Section 169 also 
deals with a special problem and makes an exception to 
uniformity required by Section 170 in that it provides: 
. . . The General assembly may allow a lower rate of taxa-
tion to be imposed for a period of years by a city or town 
upon land added to its corporate limits, than is imposed on 
similar property within its limits at the time such land is 
added. 
1 The omitted part of section 170 provides: 
Whenever a franchise tax shall be imposed upon a corporation doing 
business, in this State, or whenever all the capital, however invested, of 
a corporation chartered under the laws of the State, shall be taxed, the 
shares of stock issued by any such corporation shall not be further 
taxed .•.• 
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b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
There has been very little judicial development concern-
ing the meaning of the present Virginia uniformity limitation. 
In part, this would seem to be a result of the rather detailed 
constitutional structure. As for nonproperty taxes, it is clear 
that only a uniformity within classes is required.2 Apparently, 
this limitation permits progressively graduated rates.8 The 
express words of section 170 of the constitution have fore-
closed any controversy on the nature and validity of an in-
come tax. However, under the prior uniformity provisions 
the court held that an inheritance tax was a nonproperty tax.4 
As for property taxation, the words of the constitution 
(Art. XIII, §168 and §183) leave little doubt that there is 
a requirement of universality.11 This is complicated somewhat 
by the system of separating classes of property for either local 
or state taxation, as provided for in section 168. In any case, 
it would seem that all property not enumerated as exemptible 
in section 183 must be taxed--either by state or local authori-
ties. The express ad valorem requirement in the prior con-
stitutions has been deleted, and there has been no court 
decision which would indicate that specific taxes may not be 
levied upon property. 
While Virginia at one time had a comprehensive classified 
2 For example, Pocahontas Consol. Collieries Co. v. Commonwealth, 
113 Va.108, 73 S.E. 446 {1912). 
8 See City of Fredericksburg v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 168 Va. 57, 190 
S.E. 318 {1937), upholding the classification embodied in a local chain 
store tax. 
4 See Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Gratt. {55 Va.) 422, 73 Am. Dec, 367 (1858). 
Also see Pocahontas Consol. Collieries Co. v. Commonwealth, supra note 2, 
on the nature of a recordation tax. 
11 For example, Woolfolk v. Driver, 186 Va. 174, 41 S.E. 2d 463 
{1947). Cf. Atlantic & Danville Ry. Co. v. Lyons, 101 Va. 1, 42 S.E. 
932 {1902). Under the prior uniformity limitations the court held that 
there was no rule of universality--exemptions were permissible. Williamson 
v. Massey, 33 Gratt. {74 Va.) 237 {1880). 
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property tax, 8 at the present time all tangibles are taxed by 
the local rates without classification. The comprehensive 
system was apparently never challenged under the uni-
formity clause of the constitution. However, at the present 
time intangibles (the only property taxable by the state) are 
classified for the application of different percentage rates, and 
the court has said that there can be no question concerning the 
power of the state to tax different classes of intangible prop-
erty at different rates. 1 
H. ANALYSES OF STATES WITH TYPE VIII CLAUSES 
1. Arizona 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The basic uniformity clause of the Arizona Constitution of 
1912 is found in Art. IX, § 1, which reads: 
. . . All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of prop-
erty within the territorial limits of the authority levying the 
tax .••. 
Accompanying this provision is Art. IX, §2, as amended, 
which contains an enumeration of both mandatory and per-
missive exemptions of designated classes of property, and 
concludes with this limitation: 
All property in the state not exempt under the laws of the 
United States or under this constitution, or exempt by law 
under the provisions of this section shall be subject to taxation 
to be ascertained as provided by law. 
8 Leland, The Classified Property Tax in the United States, 228 et seq. 
(1928). . 
7 See City of Richmond v. Drewry-Hughes Co., 122 Va. 178, 90 S.E. 
635 (1918). 
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Article IX, § 12, which refers to types of taxes which the 
legislature may impose, provides: 
The law-making power shall have authority to provide for 
the levy and collection of license, franchise, gross revenue, 
excise, income, collateral and direct inheritance, legacy, and 
succession taxes, also graduated income taxes, graduated 
collateral and direct inheritance taxes, graduated legacy and 
succession taxes, stamp, registration, production, or other 
specific taxes. 
Rounding out the uniformity structure of the Arizona Con-
stitution is a provision added in 1940, Art. IX, § 11, 1f2, 
which provides in detail for a "license tax" to be "imposed on 
vehicles," "which license tax shall be in lieu of all ad valorem 
property taxes on any vehicle subject to such license tax." In 
fact, the constitutional provision itself imposes the tax. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
As expected, the uniformity clause in Art. IX, § 1 is limited 
in its application to property taxation.1 Non property taxes2 
need only be uniform within classes. 8 There has been no 
occasion for the Arizona court to approve or disapprove the 
principle of graduated rates. Nor has there been any occasion 
1 See, for example, Stults Eagle Drug Co. v. Luke, 48 Ariz. 467, 475, 
62 P. 2d II26 (I936). 
2 In Arizona nonproperty taxes have been generally grouped under the 
heading of "excise" taxes. See, for example, the Stults Eagle Drug Co. case, 
supra note I at 475, to the effect that excise has come to include every form 
of taxation which is not a burden laid directly on persons or property. 
8 For example: Gila Meat Company v. State, 35 Ariz. I94, 276 Pac. I 
( I929) (finding an arbitrary classification based on location of business) ; 
City of Phoenix v. State ex rei. Conway, 53 Ariz. 28, 85 P. 2d 56 (I938); 
Statev. Williams, 53 Ariz. 3I9, 89 P. 2d 34 {I939) (finding an arbitrary 
classification based on location of business). In White v. Moore, 46 Ariz. 
48, 46 P. 2d I 0 77 ( I9 3 5) the court upheld the Arizona business and oc-
cupation (gross income) tax and the classifications thereunder based on 
source of income. 
UNIFORMITY STRUCTURES 547 
to pass on the nature of the graduated net income tax which 
has been imposed, since such a tax is expressly sanctioned in 
Art. IX, § 12. Indeed, the extensive nature of section 12, Art. 
IX, leaves little to be decided concerning the validity of 
many of the more commonly used taxes. However, the court 
has held that a graduated "probate fee" was a tax upon 
property and a violation of the property-tax uniformity 
limitation.4 
There is no requirement of absolute uniformity governing 
the effective rates applicable to that property which is taxed. 
Consequently, as the court has stated in a leading case, 
. . . there is no constitutional prohibition against classifying 
property for taxation purposes into tangibles and intangibles 
and levying a different rate upon tangibles than upon in-
tangibles. Nor is there any against subdividing intangibles 
into classes . . . and imposing a different rate on each class, 
provided the same tax is imposed on all members of the class 
and the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.11 
However, the several attempts made by the Arizona legis-
lature to utilize this power of classification have, as often as 
not, met with adverse results at the hands of the Arizona 
Supreme Court. In fact, few attempts have been made to 
utilize this power fully. When minor classifications have been 
made, they have been upheld. For example, the classification 
and separate taxation of the property belonging to private car 
line companies has been held valid.6 In fact, however, there 
was an ultimate equality in tax burden between the property 
of this class and all other property.7 
4 Berryman v. Bowers, 31 Ariz. 56,250 Pac. 361 (1926). 
11 State Tax Comm. v. Shattuck, 44Ariz. 379,394, 38 P. 2d 631 (1934). 
6 Pacific Fruit Express Co. v. City of Yuma, 32 Ariz. 601, 261 Pac. 49 
( 1927); also see People's Finance & Thrift Co. v. Pima County, 44 Ariz. 
440,38 P. 2d 643 (1934); Brophyv. Powell, 58 Ariz. 543,121 P. 2d 647 
(1942). 
7 Pacific Fruit Express Co. v. City of Yuma, supra note 6, at 605. 
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Indeed, only two attempts have been made by the legisla-
ture to establish classifications which would result in the 
classified property being subjected to rates substantially 
different from the rate applicable to all other property. In 
State Tax Commission v. Shattuck8 the court struck down an 
attempt to impose an intangibles property tax. The decision 
was based on the proposition that there was a denial of due 
process because of a lack of notice and hearing in determining 
the value of the intangibles. However, in making its decision, 
the court, while acknowledging the power of the legislature 
to classify intangibles, nevertheless considered most of the 
classifications embodied in the act to be arbitrary. 
In Powell v. Gleason,9 a statute providing that motor 
vehicles were to constitute a single class of property subject to 
a special ad valorem tax, the same to be in lieu of all other 
property taxes, encountered similar difficulties. While the 
court said that such vehicles could constitute a valid class of 
property,10 the act was held invalid because its parts were not 
severable and certain classifications resulted in exemptions or 
partial exemptions contrary to Art. IX, §2. Furthermore, in 
Berryman v. Bowers11 the court held that a graduated pro-
bate "fee" was an ad valorem tax on property, and the 
graduated rate was held to be a violation of "uniformity." 
While property may be classified for purposes of applying 
different rates, a stricter limitation governs exemptions be-
cause of Art. IX, §2. The court has held that Art. IX, §2 
embodies a rule of universality, and that this includes a pro-
hibition of "partial" exemptions.12 Thus, in Powell v. 
8 Supra note 5. 
9 50 Ariz. 542,74 P. 2d47 (1937). 
10 /d. at 551-552. 
11 Supra note 4. 
12 Powell v. Gleason, supra note 9; Miners & Merchants Bank v. Board 
of Sup'rs of Cochise County, 55 Ariz. 3 57, 101 P. 2d 461 ( 1940) ; Weller 
v. City of Phoenix, 39 Ariz. 148, 4 P. 2d 665 (1931). But see Maricopa 
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Gleason, a statutory provision which would have taxed motor 
vehicles under the special motor vehicle property tax pro-
portionally for that part of the year for which such vehicles 
were registered was construed to be an exemption contrary 
to Art. IX, §2. 
However, the restriction in Art. IX, §2 does not prevent 
an "in lieu" property tax; that is, a tax upon a class of prop-
erty may be in lieu of all other property taxes.13 This does not 
permit the substitution of an indirect tax by way of an in 
lieu excise tax. Such a substitution has been held to violate 
the exemption restriction.14 
2. Kentucky 
a. The provisions; historical note 
In the first three constitutions of Kentucky, dated 1792, 
1799, and 1850, respectively, there were no provisions deal-
ing expressly with uniformity of taxation. The uniformity 
structure of the present 18 91 constitution was altered by the 
addition of a significant phrase to the uniformity clause in 
1915. The uniformity clause is found in section 171, and 
reads as follows, with the phrase added in 1915 italicized: 
County v. Trustees Arizona Lodge No. 2, F. & A. M., 52 Ariz. 329, ,80 
P. 2d 955 (1938), in which the court was concerned with the fact that the 
legislature had failed to provide means for the assessment of intangibles 
under the general property tax, although the statute in question provided 
that "all" property was to be subject to the tax. The court, while saying that 
Art. IX, §2 requires such intangibles to be taxed, did not find a violation 
of Art. IX, §2. The issue was really limited to one of statutory construction, 
and no question was raised as to whether this failure effectively to tax 
intangibles would invalidate the tax upon the remainder of property. 
18 Pacific Fruit Express Co. v. City of Yuma, supra note 6; Powell v. 
Gleason, supra note 9. 
14 Miners & Merchants Bank v. Board of Sup'rs of Cochise County, supra 
note 12. 
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Taxes shall be levied and collected for public purposes 
only and shall be uniform upon all property of the same class 
subject to taxation within the territorial limits of the au-
thority levying the tax. . . . 
A second paragraph of section 171 is of interest. It reads: 
The General Assembly shall have power to divide property 
into classes and to determine what class or classes of property 
shall be subject to local taxation .•.. 
Three other provisions (sections 3, 170, and 174) deal with 
the uniformity required of the selective and exclusionary 
processes. Section 174 contains an express rule of universality, 
as well as certain other pertinent clauses: 
All property, whether owned by natural persons or corpo-
rations, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, unless ex-
empted by this Constitution; and all corporate property shall 
pay the same rate of taxation paid by individual property. 
Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to prevent 
the General Assembly from providing for taxation based on 
income, licenses or franchises. 
Section 3 provides: 
. . . no property shall be exempt from taxation except as 
provided in this Constitution. . . . 
Section 170, after listing certain mandatory and permissible 
exemptions of designated classes of property, provides: 
. . • all laws exempting or commuting property from taxa-
tion other than the property above mentioned shall be void. 
Section 181 should also be considered. It states that the 
legislature may provide for the "payment of license fees on 
franchises, stock used for breeding purposes, the various 
trades, occupations and professions, or a special or excise tax. 
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• . ." A proviso added to section 181 in 1902 reads as 
follows: 
And the General Assembly may, by general laws only, 
authorize cities or towns of any class to provide for taxation 
for municipal purposes on personal property, tangible and 
intangible, based on income, licenses or franchises, in lieu of 
an ad valorem tax thereon. • . . 
There are certain exceptions for cities of the first class. 
Finally, section 172 requires that "All property, not ex-
empted from taxation by this Constitution, shall be assessed 
for taxation at its fair cash value. . . ." The Kentucky Con-
stitution does not lack quantity, at least, in its provisions con-
cerning uniformity of taxation. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
In direct conflict, it would seem, with the words of section 
171, the Kentucky court has ruled that non property taxes are 
limited by the uniformity clause therein, which, however, is 
interpreted to require only a uniformity within classes.1 That 
conclusion was reached even before the amendment of section 
171 in 1915. The result is that after having made what was 
probably an unnecessary decision as to the application of the 
uniformity clause, the court by interpolation then had to state 
that the uniformity clause will apply in its "fullness" only to 
the "direct" taxation of property.2 Articles by Trimble8 and 
Matthew4 have quite thoroughly explored the ramifications 
and difficulties brought about by the acrobatics of the Ken-
1 For example, Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Kentucky Tax Comm., 
278 Ky. 367, 128 S.W. 2d 581 (1939). See the articles cited in notes 3 
and 4, infra. 
2Jd. at 378-379. 
1 Trimble, "Excise Taxes and the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution 
of Kentucky," 25 Ky. L. J. 342 (1937). 
4 Matthews, "Constitutional Uniformity as a Rule for the Validity of 
License Taxes in Kentucky," 36 Ky. L. J. 357 (1948). 
552 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
tucky court, and they adequately support the conclusion that 
the limitation of section 1 71, insofar as non property taxes are 
concerned, is substantially equivalent to the limitation of 
the equal protection clause in the federal Constitution, 
fourteenth amendment.C1 However, it might be pointed out 
that while the Kentucky court has approved the principle of 
graduated rates, such as used in the income tax6 and the 
inheritance tax, 7 it has nevertheless held that the chain store 
type of graduated rate (the rate increasing according to num-
ber of stores owned or operated) is without rational basis and 
therefore an arbitrary classification.8 
Because of certain more restrictive property-tax uniformity 
requirements, a Kentucky tax will face less obstacles if it can 
be characterized as a nonproperty tax. In addition, for the 
comparative purposes in this study, it is of interest to note 
that the court has held that the following taxes are not prop-
erty taxes: an income tax,9 an inheritance tax/0 a mortgage 
recording tax, 11 and an oil production tax with a base of value 
of oil produced.12 
11 /d. at 378. 
6 Reynolds Metals Co. v. Martin, 269 Ky. 378, 107 S.W. 2d 251 
(1937). 
7 Booth's Exr. v. Commonwealth, 130 Ky. 88, 113 S.W. 61 (1908), 
also upholding a minimum exemption. 
8 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Kentucky Tax Comm., supra note 
1; principle reaffirmed in Reeves v. Adam Hat Stores, Inc., 303 Ky. 633, 
198 S.W. 2d 789 (1947). See the discussion in Matthews, supra note 4 at 
371-374. Also see City of Greenville v. Martin, 308 Ky. U7, 214 S.W. 
2d 271 (1948); Martin v. City of Greenville, 312 Ky. 292, 227 S.W. 
2d435 (1940). 
9 Reynolds Metals Co. v. Martin, supra note 6. Also see City of Louisville 
v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420, 214 S.W. 2d 248 (1948), concerning a local 
"wages and net profit" tax. 
10 Booth's Exr. v. Commonwealth, supra note 7. 
11 Middendorf v. Goodale, 202 Ky. 118, 259 S.W. 59 ( 1923). 
12 Raydure v. Board of Sup'rs of Estill County, 183 Ky. 84, 209 S.W. 
19 (1919). 
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Insofar as the uniformity required of property taxes is con-
cerned, the primary change brought about by the 1915 
amendment to section 171, adding the phrase "of the same 
classes" to the uniformity clause, is that absolute uniformity 
in effective rates, which was required under the uniformity 
clause as originally phrased, 13 is no longer required. Property 
may now be classified for the purpose of applying different 
effective rates to the different classes.14 However, there is 
still a requirement of universality for the state property 
tax, because, as explained in Martin v. High Splint Coal 
· Company,u; the introduction of the classification phrase did 
not alter the explicit prohibitions found in sections 3, 170, 
and 174, insofar as the state property tax is concerned. It was 
admitted that the new second paragraph added to section 
171 in 1915 did authorize the exemption of property from 
local taxation, "but it will be perceived that the authorization 
was confined solely to such taxes .•. . m 6 Nor can this strict 
limitation be avoided by the substitution of an "in lieu" 
nonproperty tax which reaches a class of prop€rty indirectly.17 
Finally, it is quite obvious that property may be taxed only 
13 For example, see Eminence Distillery Co. v. Henry County Board of 
Sup'rs, 178 Ky. 811, 200 S.W. 347 (1918), in which the decision was 
made under the uniformity clause in § 171 as it existed prior to its amend-
ment in 191 5. In that case the constitutional requirement of uniformity 
was held to prevail over the requirement in § 17 2 that property be assessed 
at "fair cash value." 
14 See, for example, Klein v. Jefferson County Board of Tax Sup'rs, 230 
Ky. 182, 18 S.W. 2d 1009 (1929). Cf. Fayette County Board of Sup'rs v. 
O'Rear, 275 S.W. 2d (Ky.) 577,580 (1955). 
111 268 Ky. 11, 103 S.W. 2d 711 (1937). Also see Reeves v. Island 
Creek Fuel & Transp. Co., 313 Ky. 400,230 S.W. 2d 924 (1950). 
16 Martin v. High Splint Coal Co., supra note 15 at 19-20. 
17 Intercounty Rural Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Reeves, 294 Ky. 458, 171 
S.W. 2d 978 (1943). Also see Raydure v. Board of Sup'rs,supra note 12. 
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by the ad valorem method18 because, apart from the possible 
derivation of such a principle from the uniformity clause in 
section 171, section 174 expressly requires that "All property 
•.• shall be taxed in proportion to its value .•.. " 
3. Maryland 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The uniformity structure of the present constitution of 
Maryland, dated 18 67, is found in Art. 15 of the Declaration 
of Rights. A substantial change was made in that provision 
by amendment in 1915. Originally, Art. 15 had read: 
. . . every person in the State, or person holding property 
therein, ought to contribute his proportion of public taxes for 
the support of the Government, according to his actual worth 
in real or personal property; yet fines, duties or taxes may 
properly and justly be imposed, or laid with a political view 
for the good government and benefit of the community.1 
The first clause in the quoted excerpt from Art. 15 served as 
the source of the Maryland uniformity limitation,2 and it was 
this clause which was changed in 1 915, so that Art. 15 now 
reads: 
• • • the General Assembly shall, by uniform rules, provide 
for separate assessment of land and classification and sub-
classifications of improvements on land and personal prop-
18 For example, see the dictum in Raydure v. Board of Sup'rs, supra 
note 12 at 97-98. 
1 The prior Maryland Constitutions (Art. 13, 1776; Art. 13, 18 51; 
Art. 15, 1864) had substantially the same provision. See Lewis, "The Tax 
Articles of the Maryland Declaration of Rights," 13 Md. L.R. 8 3 ( 19 53), 
on the historical development. 
2 Cf. the uniformity clause classified as Type IX, infra Part I of thia 
chapter. 
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erty, as it may deem proper; and all taxes . . . shall be 
uniform as to land within the taxing district, and uniform 
within the class or sub-class of improvements on land and 
personal property which the respective taxing powers may 
have directed to be subject to the tax levy .... 3 
The final clause as to "fines, duties or taxes" was left un-
changed. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
The usual division of taxes for purposes of uniformity into 
property taxes and nonproperty taxes has long been estab-
lished in Maryland, and nonproperty taxes have been free 
from the restrictive limitations of the uniformity clause in 
Art. 15. Nonproperty taxes have only been required to meet 
a standard of uniformity within classes.4 Because of the more 
restrictive property-tax limitation, it was of crucial impor-
tance, at least before 1915, to determine the nature of a given 
tax. Thus, in an early case, the determination that a tax of 
five per cent on the gross receipts of railroads was a non-
property tax meant that the uniformity limitation was not a 
substantial barrier to its validity. 5 Also, an inheritance tax was 
held to be a non property tax. 6 Subsequent to the 1915 amend-
ment to the uniformity clause, the court has avoided any 
8 The omission after "all taxes" is a phrase indicating that both state and 
local taxes are referred to. 
4 See the leading case of State v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co., 4-5 Md. 
361, 24- Am. Rep. 511 {1876). Also see: Bevard v. Baughman, 167 Md. 
55, 173 Atl. 4-0 {1934-) {motor vehicle license tax, classifications of object 
for different rates, held to be reasonable classes); Jones v. Gordy, 169 Md. 
173, 180 Atl. 272 {1935) (exemptions from sales tax held valid); Rohr v. 
Gray, 80 Md. 274-, 30 Atl. 632 (1894-); Ruggles v. State, 120 Md. 553, 
87 Atl. 1080 (1913); State v. Applegarth, 81 Md. 293, 31 Atl. 961 
(1895); State v. Dalrymple, 70 Md. 294-, 17 Atl. 82 (1889); Tyson v. 
State, 28 Md. 586 (1868). 
5 State v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co., supra note 4-. 
6 Tyson v. State, supra note 4-; State v. Dalrymple, supra note 4-. 
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possible constitutional doubt by holding that an income tax 
is not a tax upon property.7 
Before 1 915, the original uniformity clause was inter-
preted to require the strictest degree of uniformity. Con-
sequently, absolute uniformity was required of the effective 
rate applied to all property by a single taxing authority,8 
property could be taxed only by the ad valorem method,9 
and there was a rule of universality.10 
Dissatisfaction with the existing tax structure led to the so-
called classification amendment of 1915. As a result of the 
amendment, the uniformity limitation has been relaxed to 
some degree. The ad valorem method is still required, and 
that requirement is derived from the word "uniform."11 The 
7 Oursler v. Tawes, supro note 4. 
8 State v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co., mpro note 4. But the require-
ment was only territorial. McGraw v. Merryman, 133 Md. 247, 104 Atl. 
540 (1918). It is interesting to note that there was a low rate intangibles 
tax imposed in 1896 and never challenged, although generally considered 
to be unconstitutional. See Lewis, supro note 1 at 99-100; Leland, The 
Classified Property Tax in the United States 333-334 (1928); Jensen, 
Property Taxation in the U.S. 19 3 ( 1 9 31 ) . 
9 State v. Cumberland & P.R. Co., 40 Md. 22 ( 1873); and see State v. 
Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co., supro note 4. 
10 Leading cases usually cited for this proposition are Wells v. Hyattsville, 
77 Md. 125, 26 Atl. 357 (1893), and Baltimore v. Starr Methodist 
Protestant Church, 106 Md. 281, 67 Atl. 261 (1907). However, note 
that there was not a list of the usual public and quasi-public property des-
ignated as exemptible in the constitution. Consequently, there were cases 
upholding certain exemptions which were characterized as having a public 
benefit; see, for example, Simpson v. Hopkins, 82 Md. 478, 488-489, 33 
Atl. 714 (1896). 
11 Anne Arundel County Com'rs v. English, 182 Md. 514, 35 A. 2d 135 
(1943). A flat tax of $30 a year upon trailers used for habitation was held 
to be a revenue measure and a tax upon property-not a "use" tax. It was 
held to be invalid because it was not levied according to value; the court 
saying, at 527, the tax must be uniform, "and where the tax is the same 
upon" trailers of different values "there is, of course, no uniformity ..•. 
Arbitrary taxes on property without regard to value, are expressly prohibited . 
• • • " However, it might be pointed out that the cases quoted and cited 
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extent to which the legislature may classify property for the 
purpose of either applying different rates to, or exempting 
classes of property has not yet been determined by the court. 
This is probably explained by the lack of any utilization of its 
new powers by the legislature. However, a reading of the 
words seems to indicate that property may be classified for 
the purpose of applying different effective rates to different 
classes, the only limitation being that the classifications of 
property be reasonable.12 However, the uniformity provision 
does limit the power to classify to this degree: real property 
is established as a minimum class. Discretion rests in the 
legislature only insofar as it might wish further to classify 
personal property. Finally, it would seem that Art. 15 no 
longer contains a rule of universality, except as to real prop-
erty as a class.13 Thus, personal property may be classified for 
purposes of exemption, but real property may not be so 
classified. This result would stem from the final phrase in 
the uniformity clause: "all taxes . . . shall be uniform as to 
land within the taxing district, and uniform within the class 
or sub-class of improvements on land and personal property 
which the respective taxing powers may have directed to be 
subject to the tax levy. . . ." The final phrase appears to 
modify only "improvements on land and personal property." 
were decided before the 1915 amendment to Art. 15. Cf. the decision in 
Herman v. Baltimore, 189 Md. 191, 196-200, 54 A. 2d 491 (1947). 
12 See Lewis, supra note 1 at 1 0 3-1 09, for a problem relating to the ap-
plication of the uniformity clause in Art. 15 when the variation in the ratio 
of valuation is not a systematic, intentional classification but a discrepancy 
found as to a single taxpayer's property. Also see State Tax Commission v. 
Brandt Cabinet Works, 97 A. 2d 290 (1953). 
13 See the assertion by Lewis, supra note 1 at 102. 
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4. North Carolina 
a. The provisions; historical note 
In the original North Carolina Constitution of 1776 there 
were no provisions expressly dealing with uniformity in 
taxation. The present constitution of 1868 incorporated a 
uniformity structure which was fundamentally altered by 
amendment in 1935. The basic uniformity clause of the 1868 
constitution is found in Art. V, §3, and it originally read as 
follows: 
Laws shall be passed, taxing by a uniform rule all moneys, 
credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint-stock companies, 
or otherwise; and, also, all real and personal property, 
according to its true value in money. The general assembly 
may also tax trades, professions, franchises, and incomes: 
Provided, That no income shall be taxed when the property 
from which the income is derived is taxed.1 
The words of this original uniformity clause were clearly 
phrased to require universality. Furthermore, Art. V, §6 
spelled out both mandatory and permissible exemptions of 
designated classes of property. Article VII, §9 specifically 
concerned the uniformity required of local taxes. It provided: 
All taxes levied by any county, city, town, or township shall 
be uniform and ad valorem upon all property in the same, 
except property exempted by this constitution. 
In 1935, the uniformity structure of the North Carolina 
Constitution was changed by introducing a new uniformity 
1 In 1917 Art. V, §3 was amended by introducing the following clause 
to modify the word "moneys": 
Provided, notes, mortgages, and all other evidence of indebtedness given 
in good faith for the purchase price of a home, when said purchase price 
does not exceed $3,000, and said notes, mortgages, and other evidence 
of indebtedness shall be made to run for not less than five nor more than 
twenty years, shall be exempt from taxation of every kind: PrOflided, 
that the interest carried by such notes and mortgages shall not exceed 
5.5%. 
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clause. The "local" uniformity provision in Art. VII, §9 
was repealed, and the uniformity clause and accompanying 
provisions in Art. V, §3 were changed so that they now read: 
. . . Taxes on property shall be uniform as to each class of 
property taxed .... The General Assembly may also tax 
trades, professions, franchises, and incomes: Provided, the 
rate of tax in income shall not in any case exceed ten per 
cent, and there shall be allowed the following [certain mini-
mum personal exemptions]. . .. 2 
The exemption section, formerly Art. V, §6, was renumbered 
Art. V, §5; it now reads as follows: 
Property belonging to the State, or to municipal corpora-
tions, shall be exempt from taxation. The General Assembly 
may exempt cemeteries and property held for educational, 
scientific, literary, charitable, or religious purposes; also 
wearing apparel, arms for muster, household and kitchen 
furniture, and mechanical and agricultural implements of 
mechanics and farmers; libraries and scientific instruments, or 
any other personal property, to a value not exceeding three 
hundred dollars. The General Assembly may exempt from 
taxation not exceeding one thousand dollars in value of 
property held and used as the place of residence of the owner. 
The last sentence of Art. V, §5 was added in 1935 at the 
time the provision was renumbered. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
Even before the amendment in 1935, the court had held 
that the "uniform rule" requirement in Art. V, §3 governed 
the imposition of non property taxes; but, as expected, it was 
also ruled that this limitation only required such nonproperty 
taxes to be uniform within classes.3 Subsequent to the 1935 
2 In 1920 the proviso found in the original Art. V, §3 which limited the 
taxation of income was changed to impose the present limitation, with the 
exception that in 1920 a 6% limitation on the rate was provided. 
3 See, for example, State v. Stevenson, 109 N.C. 730, 14 S.E. 385 
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amendment, the court has held that the same requirement is 
derived from the new uniformity clause in Art. V, §3.4 Of 
course, this is another example of rather loose treatment of 
the sources of constitutional limitations. In the first place, 
a statement to the effect that either type of uniformity clause 
found in the successive North Carolina Constitutions is ap-
plicable to nonproperty taxes is questionable when the words 
of such provisions are actually examined. All the reference 
really means is that nonproperty taxes will have to conform 
to the limitation of reasonable classifications, regardless of the 
rather hazy designation of the source of that limitation. 
Because of the provision which expressly provides for an 
income tax, and appeared in Art. V, §3 both before and after 
1935, there has been no doubt as to the power of the legisla-
ture to impose such a tax; however, the court did find it 
necessary under the old uniformity limitation to hold that the 
income tax was not a property tax and consequently did not 
have to be taxed by the ad valorem method. 5 The graduated 
rate schedule of that tax has not been challenged. Inciden-
(1891); Gatlin v. Tarboro, 78 N.C. 119 (1878). Also see Clark v. Max-
well, 197 N.C. 604, 150 S.E. 190 (1929); Dalton v. Brown, 159 N.C. 
17 5, 7 5 S.E. 40 ( 1912) ; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Maxwell, 199 
N.C. 433, 154 S.E. 838 (1930); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. 
Doughton, 196 N.C. 145, 144 S.E. 701 (1928); Maxwell v. Kent-
Coffey Mfg. Co., 204 N.C. 365, 168 S.E. 397 ( 1933); In re Morris' 
Estate, 138 N.C. 259, 50 S.E. 682 (1905); Roach v. Durham, 204 N.C. 
587, 169 S.E. 149 (1933); State v. Carter, 129 N.C. 560, 40 S.E. 11 
(1901); Wayne Mercantile Co. v. Mt. Olive, 161 N.C. 121,76 S.E. 690 
(1912); Worth v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 89 N.C. 291, 45 Am. Rep. 
679 (1884). 
4 See, for example, Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Shaw, Com'r of 
Revenue, 232 N.C. 307, 59 S.E. 2d 819 (1950); Kenny Co. v. Town of 
Brevard, 217 ~.C. 269, 7 S.E. 2d 542 ( 1940) ; Leonard v. Maxwell, 216 
N.C. 89, 3 S.E. 2d 316 (1939); Nesbitt v. Gill, Com'r of Revenue, 227 
N.C. 174,41 S.E. 2d 646 (1947); State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E. 
2d 854 (1940); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Maxwell, 221 N.C. 528, 
20 S.E. 2d 840 (1942). 
5 Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., supra note 3. 
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tally, at an early date the North Carolina court ruled that an 
inheritance tax was a nonproperty tax.6 
Property Taxation: before 1935. Under Art. V, §3, as it 
was originally phrased, the strictest degree of uniformity 
governed the taxation of property. The requirement of uni-
versality was explicit, and this was confirmed by the de-
cisions. 7 Absolute uniformity was required of the effective 
rate applied by any one taxing authority,8 and the taxation 
of property by other than the ad valorem method was for-
bidden by the "uniform rules" requirement. 9 The court 
applied the same uniformity limitation regardless of whether 
the tax under consideration was a local or state property-tax 
rate. It made no distinction as to the different phraseology 
which was found in Art. V, §3 and Art. VII, §9. Usually it 
simply cited both of the provisions when dealing with a local 
tax rate.10 
Property Taxation: since 1935. The changes made in the 
uniformity provision have not altered the universality rule; 
the court now holds that the enumeration of permissible ex-
emptions of property in Art. V, §5 forbids the exemption of 
other property.11 "The grant [to exempt] is limited in its 
6 In re Morris' Estate, supra note 3. 
7 Charlotte Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Mecklenburg, 115 N.C. 410, 20 
S.E. 526 (1894); Drainage Com'rs v. C. A. Webb & Co., 160 N.C. 594, 
76 S.E. 552 (1912); Redmond v. Tarboro, 106 N.C. 122, 10 S.E. 845 
(1890); Southern Assembly v. Palmer, 166 N.C. 75, 82 S.E. 18 {1914); 
United Brethren of Salem & Vicinity v. Forsyth, 115 N.C. 489, 20 S.E. 
626 (1894). 
8 Anderson v. City of Asheville, 194 N.C. 117, 138 S.E. 715 (1927). 
That the requirement was only territorial, see Jones v. Com'rs, 143 N.C. 
59 (1906). 
11 See Bickett v. State Tax Comm., 177 N.C. 433, 99 S.E. 415 {1919); 
Pocomoke Guano Co. v. Biddle, 158 N.C. 212, 73 S.E. 996 (1912). 
1° For example, Anderson v. City of Asheville, supra note 8. 
11 Rockingham County v. Board of Trustees of Elon College, 219 N.C. 
342, 13 S.E. 2d 618 (1941); Sir Walter Lodge No. 411, I.O.O.F. v. 
Swain, 217 N.C. 632,9 S.E. 2d 365 (1940).' 
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terms, and the power to exempt stops at the boundary of the 
grant.m2 Nor has any case indicated that the requirement of 
ad valorem method has been relaxed.13 It would appear that 
the only certain change has been the deletion of the require-
ment of absolute uniformity in effective rates, so that at the 
present time property may be classified for the purpose of 
applying different rates to the different classes. There have 
been no cases dealing with the validity of the rather limited 
classification introduced by the legislature.14 
5. North Dakota 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The uniformity structure of the original and present North 
Dakota Constitution, dated 18 8 9, consists of Art. XI, § 1 7 6. 
The uniformity clause of that section was originally a Type 
IV clause, and it read: 
Laws shall be passed taxing by a uniform rule all prop-
erty according to its true value in money. 
The original section also provided for the mandatory ex-
emption of designated classes of property, including personal 
property not exceeding $200 in value for each individual 
liable to taxation. In addition, a proviso stated that the legis-
lature might provide for the payment of a railroad gross 
12 Sir Walter Lodge No. 41I, l.O.O.F. v. Swain, supra note II at 638. 
13 But see Nesbitt v. Gill, Com'r of Revenue, supra note 4. 
14 In a recent case the court indicated that the limitation is, in any case, 
territorial. Jamison v. City of Charlotte, 80 S.E. 2d 904 ( 1954). In re-
ferring to the substance of the new limitation applicable to effective rates, 
the court said: "Uniformity in taxation on real and personal property is 
effected, when the tax is levied equally and uniformly on all property in 
tke same class." ld. at 9I2. Emphasis by the court. The court pointed out 
that the legislature had classified intangible personal property for taxation 
at a lower rate than tangible personal property or realty. 
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earnings tax "to be paid in lieu of all" state and local taxes 
on property used exclusively in and about the prosecution of 
the business of such companies as common carriers. An 
amendment in 1899 added a proviso stating: "The legislative 
assembly [might] further provide that grain grown within 
the state and held therein in elevators, warehouses and 
granaries [might] be taxed at a fixed rate." (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
In 1911 a radical change was made in the type of uni-
formity clause found in Art. XI, § 176. That section was 
amended so that the uniformity clause now reads: 
Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property in-
cluding franchises within the territorial limits of the au-
thority levying the tax. 
The mandatory exemptions found in the original section 1 7 6 
were carried over. 
In 1918 the uniformity structure was again amended. The 
uniformity clause was left intact, but the rule of universality 
was expressly abolished in part. Also the minimum exemp-
tion of personal property was deleted, so that at the present 
time Art. XI, § 1 7 6 reads (with that part added in 1918 
indicated by brackets) : 
Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property 
including franchises within the territorial limits of the 
authority levying the tax. [The legislature may by law 
exempt any or all classes of personal property from taxation 
and within the meaning of this section, fixtures, buildings and 
improvements of every character, whatsoever, upon land 
shall be deemed personal property.] The property of the 
United States and of the state, county and municipal corpora-
tions and property used exclusively for schools, religious, 
cemetery, charitable or other public purposes shall be exempt 
from taxation. . . • 
Also in 1918, Art. XI, § 177 was amended in order to provide 
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for a special "acreage tax on lands within the state" with the 
proceeds being earmarked for a special indemnity fund. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
Before the amendment in 1911 the court ruled that non-
property taxes were not limited by the uniformity clause in 
Art. XI, §176, and that such taxes only had to be uniform 
within classes.1 While the same distinction has been made 
since the amendment of 1911,2 it is no longer likely to be of 
substantial importance for purposes of uniformity because of 
the liberal interpretation given the new uniformity limitation. 
In its original form, the uniformity clause was said to require 
the strictest degree of uniformity in the taxation of property, 
universality, absolute uniformity in effective rates, and the 
ad valorem method. 3 
After the amendment of 1911, which introduced the new 
uniformity clause, and before the 1918 amendment, which 
expressly provided for exemptions, the uniformity structure 
was interpreted and applied in the important case of State 
ex rel. Fargo v. Wetz.4 The W etz case concerned the valid-
ity of a graduated license tax on motor vehicles which was in-
tended to be in lieu of all other taxes, including both local 
and state property taxes. In the opinion it was indicated that 
only the requirement of universality was retained, and, in-
deed, that this requirement was retained only to the extent 
1 See, for example, In re Lipschitz, 14 N.D. 622,95 N.W. 157 (1902); 
Statev. Klectzen, 8 N.D. 286,78 N.W. 984 (1899). 
2 See Figenskau v. McCoy, 66 N.D. 290,265 N.W. 259 (1936). 
3 There was no development of these rules by the court, but such was the 
nature of the limitation as described in a case under the amended clause, 
State ex rei. Fargo v. Wetz, 40 N.D. 299, 168 N.W. 835 (1918). In 
Malin v. Lamoure, 27 N.D. 140, 145 N.W. 582 (1914} a graduated pro-
bate fee was held unconstitutional as a tax upon property and a violation of 
the original uniformity clause. 
4 Supra note 3. 
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that property could not be exempted from all taxes-that is, 
it only had to be taxed by some taxing jurisdiction. Thus, 
property might be exempted from either the state or the 
local property tax. It was also indicated that property could 
now be taxed by other than the ad valorem method, and that 
it could be classified for application of different rates. Con-
sequently, the court upheld the motor vehicles tax and the 
in lieu provision. It should be pointed out that the court was 
in effect permitting an indirect form of taxation to be sub-
stituted for all taxes upon a class of property, since the tax 
was characterized as a license tax.5 In any case, whatever the 
rationale, the court asserted that the substitution could be al-
lowed without the prohibition against exemptions being vio-
lated. In reviewing the changes made in the uniformity limi-
tation, the court made the often repeated statement that the 
new uniformity clause was no more restrictive than the fed-
eral equal protection clause. 
The particular problem of the W etz case was met by the 
1918 amendment to Art. XI, § 17 6 which stated that "any or 
all" classes of personal property may be exempted. The first 
case of interest decided after 1918 was Northwestern I m-
provement Company v. State.6 In that case, the court struck 
down a specific property tax as a violation of the uniformity 
clause. The tax was three cents per acre on all mineral re-
serves where the ownership thereof was severed from the 
overlaying strata and surface of the land. The basis of the 
decision was not that the method of taxation violated the uni-
formity clause in § 176, but that the classification was based 
solely on ownership and was consequently arbitrary.7 
5 But see the statement, id. at 319, in which the court indicates that 
"really" the tax is both property and license tax. 
6 57 N.D. 1, 220 N.W. 436 (1928). 
7 /d. at 8, 10-11. See Northwestern Improvement Company v. County 
of Morton, 78 N.D. 29, 47 N.W. 2d 543 (1951) in which the same classi-
fication was struck down as arbitrary. This time the tax was framed in terms 
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Subsequently, the leading case of State ex rel. Haggart v. 
Nichols,8 decided in 1936, illustrated the dictum of the Wetz. 
case concerning the liberality of the new uniformity clause. 
In the Nichols case the court had to pass upon the validity of 
a graduated net income tax. The tax was upheld in a unani-
mous decision. The majority opinion of three ruled that the 
nature of the tax was immaterial; consequently, it took no 
stand on the arguments of opposing counsels on that ques-
tion, the reason being: 
The view which we take of the matter renders it unnecessary 
to consider whether or not the law· under discussion imposed 
an excise tax or a property tax . . . , for the members of the 
court are all agreed that under § 1 7 6 . . . of the state con-
stitution the legislature has wide discretionary powers to 
classify property for the purposes of taxation, and that the 
standard of uniformity under section 176 of the state consti-
tution is substantially the same as the standard of equality 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution of the 
nation.0 
Consequently, the majority was of the opinion that even if 
the tax had to be characterized as a property tax, the grad-
uated rate was permissible.10 Two judges concurred in "the 
result" solely on the ground that the income tax was not a 
property tax and hence did not come within the scope of the 
uniformity provisions in section 176. In summary, the court 
of being a tax on a "privilege." Also see Gamble-Robinson Fruit Co. v. 
Thoresen, 53 N.D. 28, 204 N.W. 861 (1925). 
8 66N.D. 355,265 N.W. 859 (1936). 
0 /d. at 363. Emphasis added. Northwestern Improvement Co. v. State, 
supra note 6, was distinguished as simply finding an arbitrary classification. 
The court concluded, at 370, that "in this state the legislative power to 
classify property for purposes of taxation is subject only to the limitation 
against arbitrary classification imposed by the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses in the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States." 
10 /d. at 373. 
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has given every indication that considerable discretion is al-
lowed the legislature under the amended uniformity limita-
tion. 
6. South Dakota 
a. The provisions; historical note 
The uniformity structure of the original South Dakota 
Constitution of 18 8 9 was found in several sections. One uni-
formity clause, Art. XI, §2, provided: 
All taxes . . . shall be uniform on all real and personal 
property, according to its value in money, to be ascertained 
by such rules of appraisement and assessment as may be pre-
scribed by the legislature by general law, so that every per-
son and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value 
of his, her or its property. And the legislature shalLprovide 
by general law for the assessing and levying of taxes on all 
corporation property as near as may be by the same methods 
as are provided for assessing and levying of taxes on indi-
vidual property.1 
In addition, a second clause was found in section 1 7 of Art. 
VI [the Bill of Rights], reading: "· .. and all taxation 
shall be equal and uniform." Accompanying these two uni-
formity clauses was the following provision in Art. XI, §4: 
The legislature shall provide for taxing all moneys, cred-
its, investments in bonds, stocks, joint stock companies, or 
otherwise; and also for taxing the notes and bills discounted 
or purchased, moneys loaned and all other property, effects 
or dues of every description, of all banks and of all bankers, 
so that all property employed in banking shall always be sub-
ject to a taxation equal to that imposed on the property of 
individuals. 
1 Article XI, §2 was amended in 1912, but the uniformity clause therein 
was not substantially altered. 
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Article XI, §§5 and 6, provided for the mandatory exemp-
tion of designated classes of property, and section 7 of Art. 
XI ruled out other exemptions by stating that "All laws ex-
empting property from taxation, other than that enumerated 
in sections 5 and 6 of this article, shall be void." Finally, just 
to be sure, the framers of the constitution stated in Art. XI, 
§ 1 O, that ". . • [local] tax shall be uniform in respect to 
persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body 
levying the same." 
But the prodigious efforts of the drafters to leave no word 
unsaid went for naught. In 1918, less than thirty years later, 
an amendment brought about a radical change in the effec-
tive uniformity limitation. The .amendment was limited to 
the basic uniformity clause in the second section of Art. XI, 
which was changed to read: 
To the end that the burden of taxation may be equitable 
upon all property, and in order that no property which is 
made subject to taxation shall escape, the legislature is em-
powered to divide all property including moneys and credits 
as well as physical property into classes and to determine 
what class or classes of property shall be subject to taxation 
and what property, if any, shall not be subject to taxation. 
Taxes shall be uniform on all property of the same class. 
. . . Taxes may be imposed upon any and all property in-
cluding privileges, franchises and licenses to do business in 
the state. Gross earnings and net incomes may be considered 
in taxing any and all property, and the valuation of property 
for taxation purposes shall never exceed the actual value 
thereof. The legislature is empowered to impose taxes upon 
incomes and occupations, and taxes upon incomes may be 
graduated and progressive and reasonable exemptions may be 
provided. 
For reasons which will be explained, this was apparently not 
enough, so that Art. VIII, § 15 was amended in 1930 by the 
addition of this sentence: 
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The legislature is empowered to classify properties within 
school districts for purposes of school taxation, and may con-
stitute agricultural lands a separate class. Taxes shall be uni-
form on all property in the same class. 
Finally, it must be emphasized that the amendment of 1918 
was limited to a change in the words of Art. XI, §2. The 
second uniformity clause, found in Art. VI, § 1 7; the local 
uniformity clause in Art. XI, § 1 0 ; and the prohibition 
against exemptions, found in Art. XI, §7-all remained, al-
though obviously modified, or even "repealed," by the 
amended Art. XI, §2. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
Nonproperty taxes are required to be uniform within 
classes, 2 and the source of the limitation is said to be the uni-
formity clause in Art. VI, § 1 7: " [A] ll taxation shall be 
equal and uniform."3 Again, it is seen that if a uniformity 
clause framed in "absolute'' terms is interpreted as applying 
2 Before 1918, see: Ex parte Hoffert, 34 S.D. 271, 148 N.W. 20 
(1914); In re McKennan's Estate, 27 S.D. 136, 130 N.W. 33 (1911); 
Queen City Fire Ins. Co. v. Basford, 27 S.D. 164, 130 N.W. 44 (1911); 
State v. Doran, 28 S.D. 486, 134 N.W. 53 (1912); In re Watson, 17 
S.D. 486,97 N.W. 463 (1904). Since 1918, see: Eastern Dakota Elec. Co. 
v. Kirlin, 48 S.D. 462,205 N.W. 33 (1925); Schmitt v. Nord, 71 S.D. 
575, 27 N.W. 2d 910 ( 1947); Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 48 S.D. 482, 
205 N.W. 72 (1925); State v. Black Hills Transp. Co., 71 S.D. 28, 20 
N.W. 2d 683 (1945); State ex rei. Roddewig v. Kutcher, 68 S.D. 366, 2 
N.W. 2d 669 (1942); State ex rei. Botkin v. Welsh, 61 S.D. 593, 251 
N.W. 189 (1933). 
3 See State ex rei. Botkin v. Welsh, supra note 2 at 640, in which the 
court stated: 
For the purposes of this case, however, the existence of section 17, art. 6, 
will probably have little, if any, practical effect upon the result arrived 
at, for it seems universally agreed so far as concerns occupational taxation, 
that a general constitutional provision requiring equality and uniformity 
of taxation imposes upon the legislature no limitation or restriction differ-
ent from or beyond that imposed by the Federal Constitutional require-
570 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
to nonproperty taxes, the result is that the limitation is met 
when all in the same class are treated alike. 
Before the amendment to the property tax uniformity 
limitation there was no occasion for the court to rule upon 
the nature and validity of an income tax. However, in In re 
McKennan's Estate/ the court did hold that an inheritance 
tax was a nonproperty tax and that the graduated rate sched-
ule found therein was a reasonable scheme of classification. 5 
The court has also ruled that a mortgage registration tax 
was a nonproperty tax.6 In State ex rel. Botkin v. Welsh? the 
court considered the validity of the 1933 "Occupation Tax 
with a base of Gross Income from all sources." In a very 
lengthy opinion the tax was distinguished from an "income 
tax" (said to be limited to "net" income taxes) and held to 
be a tax upon the privilege of engaging in occupations. Con-
sequently, the tax was upheld only insofar as it reached in-
come from the occupation engaged in. The rate schedule 
which made five classifications based on the source of income 
was upheld. 
In view of the numerous overlapping provisions in the 
original uniformity structure, it should come as no surprise 
that before 1918 the strictest degree of uniformity was re-
ment of equal protection of the laws, and there is therefore little practical 
difference whether our standard of constitutionality be sought in the 
federal equal protection clause or Art. VI, § 1 7. 
4 Supra note 2. 
5 It should be noted that the graduated rate schedule was not graded 
according to the process with which we are familiar today. The increasing 
rates were applied to the entire amount taxed, not to just the increment. It 
was on this point that a prior opinion (25 S.D. 369 (1910)) was overruled 
on rehearing. In the original opinion the rate has been held to be arbitrary. 
In State ex rel. Roddewig v. Kutcher, supra note 2, the graduated rate under 
the chain store tax was upheld. 
6 Eastern Dakota Elec. Co. v. Kirlin, supra note 2. 
7 Supra note 2. 
UNIFORMITY STRUCTURES 571 
quired in the taxation of property.8 With the particular rules 
being derived from several alternate sources, it was clear that 
there was a requirement of universality, absolute uniformity 
was required in effective rates, and property could be taxed 
only by the ad valorem method. 
Since 1918, property taxes are required to conform only 
to a limitation of uniformity within classes. Exemptions are 
permitted,9 and it is possible that specific property taxes are 
not forbidden. 10 While property may be classified for differ-
ent effective rates, some classifications have been adversely 
dealt with by the court. In Commercial State Bank v. Wil-
son, 11 the court upheld the separate classification of money 
and credits for a low rate tax, indicating that the uniformity 
clause in Art. VI, § 1 7, which was left unchanged, no longer 
prevents such classification. Insofar as the provisions from 
the original uniformity structure which have been retained 
(i.e., Art. VI, §17; Art. XI, §7; and Art. XI, §10) are in-
consistent with the power of classification, they are super-
seded by the new uniformity provision in Art. XI, §2. 
However, in Simmons v. Ericson12 the court struck down 
an attempt by the legislature to classify land in school dis-
tricts into agricultural land and other realty for the purpose 
of applying a lower property-tax rate to the former. It held 
that there was no "reasonable" basis for the classification. 
The next year the clause expressly sanctioning such a classifi-
cation was added to Art. VIII, § 15, as pointed out above. 
8 See, for example, In re Construction of Revenue Law, 2 S.D. 58, 48 
N.W. 813 (1891). 
9 State ex rei. Eveland v. Johns, 43 S.D. 279, 178 N.W. 945 (1920); 
State ex rei. Bottum v. Knudtson, 65 S.D. 547, 276 N.W. 150 (1937). 
10 There have been no pertinent cases on this point. However, note the 
deletion of the several p.hrases in the original Art. XI, §2 which might 
have required the ad valorem method. 
11 53 S.D. 82,220 N.W. 152 (1928). 
12 54-S.D. 429,223 N.W. 342 (1929). 
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Subsequently, such a classification for school district property 
taxes was upheld in Great Northern Railway Company v. 
W hitfteld.18 Obviously, the Simmons rationale was now im-
material insofar as the state constitutional limitation was con-
cerned. However, in effect, the court overruled its opinion 
in Simmons and held that there was a reasonable classifica-
tion. Consequently, it held that the statute violated neither 
the state constitution nor the federal equal protection clause. 
7. Washington 
a. The provisions; historical note 
Washington has had but a single constitution, that of 
1889. Its uniformity structure was originally found in Art. 
VII, §§1-3 and 9. Article VII, §1 contained a Type II 
"proportionality" clause, and read: 
All property in the state, not exempt under the laws of 
the United States, or under this constitution, shall be taxed 
in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by 
law •... 
Section 2 of Art. VII, which contained a uniformity clause 
similar to the Type VI clause, read: 
The legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal 
rate of assessment and taxation on all property in the state, 
according to its value in money, and shall prescribe such 
regulations by general law as shall secure a just valuation for 
taxation of all property, so that every person and corporation 
shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its 
property; Provided, That a deduction of debts from credits 
may be authorized; Provided further, That the property of 
the United States and of the state, counties, school districts 
and other municipal corporations, and such other property as 
18 65 S.D. 173,272 N.W. 787 (1937}. 
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the legislature may by general laws provide, shall he ex-
empt from taxation. [Emphasis added.] 
Like so many of the constitutions which were drafted in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century, its drafters inserted 
sufficient verbiage from which the uniformity limitation 
might be drawn. Article VII, §3 provided that taxes on cor-
porate property were to be assessed and levied by the same 
methods as were provided for assessing and levying of taxes 
on individual property. Finally, Art. VII, §9 was directed 
specifically to local taxation. It read: 
... For all corporate purposes, all municipal corporations 
may be vested with authority to assess and collect taxes, and 
such taxes shall be uniform in respect to persons and prop-
erty within the jurisdiction of the body levying the same. 
In 1930, a significant change was made in the uniformity 
structure of the Washington Constitution. By Amendment 
Fourteen it was provided that Art. VIII was to be amended 
by striking out all of sections 1, 2, 3, and 4, and inserting in 
lieu thereof a new Art. VII, § 1. The new Art. VII, § 1 con-
tains a different type of uniformity clause and, in addition, 
spells out certain particular limitations. It now reads: 
. . . All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of prop-
erty within the territorial limits of the authority levying the 
tax. . . . The word "property" as used herein shall mean 
and include everything, whether tangible or intangible, sub-
ject to ownership. All real estate shall constitute one class: 
Provided, That the legislature may tax mines and mineral 
resources and lands devoted to reforestation by either a yield 
tax or an ad valorem tax at such rate as it may fix, or by both. 
Such property as the legislature may by general laws provide 
shall be exempt from taxation. 
The new section 1 further provides that public property and 
"credits secured by property actually taxed in this state" 
shall be exempt from taxation, and that the legislature "shall 
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have power ... to exempt" $300 of personal property to 
each head of a family liable to taxation. The "local" provi-
sion found in Art. VII, §9 remains unchanged, so that the 
present uniformity structure is found in sections 1 and 9 of 
Art. VII. 
b. Meaning of the uniformity limitation 
Both before1 and after2 1930 the court has ruled that non-
property taxes are not limited by the uniformity clauses 
found in Art. VII, §§1 and 9. Such taxes need only be uni-
form within classes. 3 There is no clear-cut ruling that the 
principle of progressively graduated rates meets the reason-
1 A leading case is Fleetwood v. Read, 21 Wash. 54 7, 55 5, 58 Pac. 66 5 
(1899). And see the three cases: State v. Ide, 35 Wash. 576, 77 Pac. 961 
(1904); Thurston v. Tenino Stone Quarries, 44 Wash. 351, 87 Pac. 634 
(1906); and Tekoa v. Reilly, 47 Wash. 202, 91 Pac. 769 (1907), in which 
the court engaged in the not unusual process of finding a uniformity clause 
of the type found in the "local" provision, Art. VII, §9, applicable to non-
property taxes but then interpreting that provision to mean that such taxes, 
as opposed to property taxes, had only to be uniform within classes. 
2 For example, see the very important case of State ex rei. Stiner v. Yelle, 
174 Wash. 402, 25 P. 2d 91 (1933), discussed infra notes 46-51. Also see 
the cases in note 3, infra. 
8 Before 1930, see: Fleetwood v. Read, supra note 1; State v. Clark, 30 
Wash. 439,71 Pac. 20 (1902); State v. Hart, 125 Wash. 520,217 Pac. 
45 (1923); Stull v. DeMattos, 23 Wash. 71, 62 Pac. 451 (1900). Since 
1930, see the following cases: Morrow v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 625, 47 
P. 2d 1016 (1935) (retail sales tax, upholding the exemption of certain 
foodstuff sold for consumption off the premises and casual and isolated sales 
by persons not engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property 
at retail); Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford, 183 Wash. 317, 49 P. 2d 14 
(1935) (general compensating use tax); State ex rei. Hansen v. Salter, 190 
Wash. 703, 70 P. 2d 1056 ( 1937) (motor vehicle use tax); Gruen v. State 
Tax Comm., 35 Wash. 2d 1, 211 P. 2d 651 (1949) (cigarette tax, the 
object held to be a reasonable class); Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. 
City of Seattle, 172 Wash. 668, 21 P. 2d 727 ( 1933) (local public utilities 
gross receipts tax, object held to be a reasonable class). Also see Benjamin 
Franklin Thrift Stores v. Henneford, 187 Wash. 472, 60 P. 2d 86 (1936); 
Golden Age Breweries, Inc. v. Henneford, 193 Wash. 536, 76 P. 2d 598 
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able classification test.4 However, the discussion of income 
taxes, infra, indicates that under the property-tax uniformity 
clause in Art. VI I, § 1, even though classification is permitted, 
graduated rates have been held to be inherently arbitrary. 
Before the amendment of 1930 it was obviously of the ut-
most importance to determine the nature of a given tax be-
fore reaching a conclusion on its validity under the uniform-
ity limitation. Since the 1930 amendment, even though some 
degree of classification is allowed for property taxes, a deci-
sion favorable to the validity of any given tax is more likely 
if that tax is characterized as a nonproperty tax. For com-
parative purposes it is of interest to note that the court has 
held the following taxes to be nonproperty taxes: an inherit-
ance tax; 5 a corporate franchise tax with a base of capital 
stock,8 and a general compensating "use" tax.7 To the con-
trary, a graduated probate "fee" was held to be on the prop-
erty involved and a violation of the pre-1930 property-tax 
uniformity limitation.8 In 1952, the court held that a con-
(1938). Compare State v. Inland Empire Refineries, 3 Wash. 2d 651, 101 
P. 2d 975 (1940) with Texas Co. v. Cohn, 8 Wash. 2d 360, 112 P. 2d 
522 (1941) for the treatment of classifications found in the fuel use taxes. 
4 But note that in State v. Clark, supra note 3, decided in 1902, the 
court held that the inheritance tax was a nonproperty tax and held that the 
challenged classifications were reasonable. The tax had a graduated rate 
schedule. However, for the most part, the controversy centered on the na-
ture of the tax. The validity of a minimum exemption was upheld as rea-
sonable. No mention was made of the graduated rate. 
11 State v. Clark, supra note 3. 
6 Spokane International R. Co. v. State, 162 Wash. 395, 299 Pac. 362 
( 19 31). However, no issue was raised in this case as to a state constitutional 
requirement. The primary issue concerned the federal constitutional limi-
tation on state taxation of interstate commerce, and in addition a problem 
of discrimination under the federal equal protection clause. 
7 Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford, supra note 3; Spokane v. State, 198 
Wash. 682, 89 P. 2d 826 (1939), affirming the Vancouver Oil Co. case. 
And see St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co. v. State, 40 Wash. 2d 347, 24-3 
P. 2d 474 (1952). 
8 Stateex rei. Nettleton v. Case, 39Wash. 177,81 Pac. 554 (1905). 
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veyancing tax was a tax on the sale of real estate, and not a 
tax on the property itself.9 The treatment accorded certain 
"income" taxes-on both net income and gross income-is 
worthy of a separate discussion which will be delayed until 
after the general uniformity limitation governing the taxa-
tion of property has been described. 
( 1 ) Property taxation 
Prior to 19 3 0. The strictest degree of uniformity in the 
taxation of property was required under the original uni-
formity provisions found in Art. VII, §§ 1 and 2. First, there 
was a requirement of universality. In State ex rel. Chamber-
lin v. DanieP0 the court held that a statute providing for a 
minimum exemption of $500 of personal property to each 
taxpayer was a violation of Art. VII, §§ 1 and 2. In so hold-
ing the court was faced with an interpretation of the last 
clause of Art. VII, §2, which read: "and such other property 
as the legislature may by general laws provide, shall be ex-
empt from taxation." Admitting that the clause considered in 
isolation might lead to the conclusion that the legislature 
could exempt such property as it might choose, the court 
ruled that this interpretation had to yield to a reading of the 
two sections as a whole.11 Emphasizing the words in section 1 
to the effect that "All property in the state ... shall be 
taxed ... ", and the following words in section 2 that "The 
legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of 
assessment and taxation on all property in the state .•. ", 
the court ruled that it was the intention of the framers to 
9 Mahler v. Tremper, 40 Wash. 2d 405, 243 P. 2d 627 (1952). 
10 17 Wash. Ill, 49 Pac. 243 ( 1897). Also see Pacific Cold Storage Co. 
v. Pierce, 85 Wash. 625, 149 Pac. 34 (1915) (emphasizing the words of 
the uniformity clause in Art. VII, §2); and MacLaren v. Ferry County, 135 
Wash. 517,238 Pac. 579 (1925). 
llfd. at 113-115. 
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prohibit the exemption of property, other than the classes 
enumerated in Art. VII, §2.12 The exemption clause in Art. 
VII, §2 was interpreted to refer to "such other property" of 
the same classes which were enumerated, i.e., public prop-
erty and possibly property of a quasi-public nature.13 
Second, under the original effective limitation it was ruled 
that absolute uniformity was required of the effective rate ap-
plied to all property taxed by any one taxing authority.14 
Third, property could be taxed only by the ad valorem 
method.111 
It is important to note that the principle of universality 
12 U. at 119-121. Note the court's review of other constitutional pro-
visions, at 117-118, in which it used a common technique when it found 
no support in the interpretation of other constitutions. It said "our constitu-
tion is materially different from any other constitution in the Union, and 
the cases cited under the constitutions of different states are of very little 
value in construing this constitution." 
13 U. at 121. 
14 The same ratio of valuation had to be used for all property taxed by a 
single jurisdiction, Spokane & Eastern Trust Co. v. Spokane, 70 Wash. 48, 
126 Pac. 54 (1912). Also see State ex rei. State Board of Tax Com'rs v. 
Cameron, 90 Wash. 407, 156 Pac. 537 (1916); Hammond Lumber Co. v. 
Cowlitz, 84 Wash. 462, 147 Pac. 19 (1915). However, classification of 
property for purposes of the mechanics of determining value was not pro-
hibited; Pacific National Bank v. Pierce, 20 Wash. 675, 683-684, 687-688, 
56 Pac. 936 ( 1899) ; Spokane & I. E. R. Co. v. Spokane, 7 5 Wash. 72, 
85-88, 134 Pac. 688 ( 1913); Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 
ll7Wash. 351,201 Pac. 449 (1921). 
Also see the following cases dealing with a particular problem of uniform-
ity and rates; i.e., whether the taxation of both corporate property and 
corporate shares was "double taxation": Pacific National Bank v. Pierce, 
supra; Ridpath v. Spokane, 23 Wash. 436, 63 Pac. 261 (1900); Lewiston 
Water & Power Co. v. Asotin, 24 Wash. 371, 64 Pac. 544 (1901); Dexter 
Horton Nat. Bank v. McKenzie, 69 Wash. 314, 124 Pac. 915 (1912); 
Spokane & Eastern Trust Co. v. Spokane County, 153 Wash. 332, 280 Pac. 
3 (1929). 
115 MacLaren v. Ferry County, supra note 10; State ex rei. Nettleton v. 
Case, supra note 8. 
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was avoided in one instance when that principle was found 
to be in an apparent conflict with the principle of absolute 
uniformity in effective rates. In State ex rel. Wolfe v. Par-
menter16 the court held that the general property-tax act did 
not violate the requirement of universality, as established in 
the Chamberlin case, even though that act so defined per-
sonal property as to exclude "credits" and, therefore, in ef-
fect exempt such items from taxation.17 However, the exclu-
sion of "moneys" was held to violate the universality 
requirement. The court reasoned that all property in the 
state could be taxed without the taxation of "credits." 
The constitution simply requires that all property shall be 
taxed, but the method of doing it is left to the legislature. 
. . . The constitutional requirement that all property shall 
be taxed is certainly satisfied through a method by which the 
total of all wealth in the state is once taxed. Double taxation 
should be avoided as far as possible, and in any event the 
constitution should not be so construed as to require it.18 
The court then proceeded to demonstrate to its satisfaction 
that "credits" were only representative of tangible property 
which would be taxed. Thus, to tax the "credits" as well 
would not simply tax all wealth in the state once, but instead 
would result in "double taxation.m9 "Moneys," however, 
were not considered to be representative of tangible prop-
erty. Consequently, the statute was held to be void insofar 
as it attempted to exclude "moneys" from the definition of 
16 50 Wash. 164, 96 Pac. 1047 (1908). And see State ex rei. Egbert v. 
Gifford, 151 Wash. 43, 275 Pac. 74 (1929), in which the court affirmed 
the Parmenter case, but pointed out that the case did not hold that the 
legislature must so exempt credits. 
17 /d. at 171-172, 175. The reference was to "mortg~ges, notes, ac-
counts, moneys, certificates of deposit, etc." Moneys was, of course, deleted 
by the force of the decision as noted in the text. 
18 /d. at 173-4. Cf. the cases cited in note 14, supra. 
19 /d. at 17 5•176. 
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personal property. Nonetheless, it was held that "the omis-
sion of credits from a scheme of taxation [did] not violate 
the requirement that all actual property shall be taxed."20 
Subsequent to 1930. The new uniformity clause in Art. 
VII, § 1 has been subject to little interpretation by the court. 
Immediately after the amendment came into force the leg-
islature enacted a statute21 exempting intangibles from "ad 
valorem taxation." This exemption statute was challenged 
and upheld in State ex rel. Atwood v. Wooster,22 decided in 
1931. That case was the first to comment fully on the mean-
ing of the new Art. VII, §1. It was said: 
. . . the requirements that a uniform tax be assessed against 
all property were swept away, and in their place were 
adopted constitutional provisions which say nothing about 
uniformity, and do not provide that all property shall be 
taxed, but which do permit of the classification of all prop-
erty, and provide that all taxes shall be uniform upon the 
same class of property, and also that such property as the 
legislature may provide shall be exempt from taxation. So 
that the legislature, freed from the former limitations, may 
now determine what property shall be taxed, the different 
rates upon which different classes of property shall be taxed, 
and what property shall pay no tax at all, subject only to the 
limitations found in the new constitutional provisions.23 
Turning to the precise issue at hand, the court held that in-
tangibles constituted a reasonable class of property and that 
consequently the exemption was valid.24 
Thus, as illustrated by the decision, there is no longer a 
rule of universality.25 There may be some question as to 
20 !d. at 177. 
21 Wash. Laws 1931, c. 96, §1. 
22 163 Wash. 659,2 P. 2d 653 (1931). 
23 !d. at 663, emphasis added. 
24 !d. at 664. 
211 And see Miethke v. Pierce County, 173 Wash. 381, 23 P. 2d 405 
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whether the ad valorem method limitation continues, or 
whether specific property taxes are now permissible. If an ad 
valorem requirement is found, it will have to be derived 
from the words "taxes shall be uniform upon the same class 
of property," because the words in the old provisions which 
spelled out this requirement are no longer present. Certainly 
their deletion could stand as a good argument for the propo-
sition that property may be classified and the classes taxed by 
the specific method.26 Turning to classification of property for 
different rates, one limitation is spelled out in the new Art. 
VII, § 1. Real estate may not be further classified, except for 
certain express exceptions. The discussion below of the in-
come taxes indicates that classifications of property may well 
be looked upon much more critically than classifications 
found in nonproperty taxes. Moreover, the court has ruled 
out graduated property tax rates as being arbitrary classifica-
tions. 
( 2) Net income and gross income taxes 
The record of the Washington legislature's attempt to in-
corporate a net income tax of some form (whether on indi-
vidual income, or corporate income, or both) into the Wash-
( 1933); Libby, McNeill & Libby v. lvarson, 19 Wash. 2d 723, 144 P. 2d 
258 (1943). 
26 A problem arising under the proviso in Art. VII, § 1 (which provides 
"that the legislature may tax mines and mineral resources and lands devoted 
to reforestation by either a yield tax or an ad valorem tax at such rate as it 
may see fit, or by both"} was dealt with in State ex rel. Mason County Log-
ging Co. v. Wiley, 177 Wash. 65, 31 P. 2d 539 (1934}. The proviso 
states an exception to the requirement that real estate shall be one class. In 
the Wiley case the court, by a 6-3 decision, upheld a specific tax upon such 
property. The issue involved only an interpretation of the proviso, however, 
and, in particular, the words reading "either a yield tax or an ad valorem 
tax as such rate as it may see fit, or by both." By a rather strained inter-
pretation of the word "rate," the majority decided that the proviso sanctioned 
a tax upon an arbitrary or fixed value of such land per acre. The dissent 
contended that the proviso ruled out a specific property tax. 
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ington tax structure is a record of frustration, albeit by a slim 
judicial majority. The record perhaps justifies the apparent 
attitude on the part of the legislature, which might be char-
acterized as, "if at first you don't succeed .... " A chrono-
logical review of the cases, including those cases marking the 
success of the legislature in the gross income tax field, will be 
most enlightening. 
The first cases pertinent to this particular problem were 
decided immediately before the adoption of the new uni-
formity clause in Art. VII, § 1 by the amendment of 1930. 
However, they laid the groundwork for the later judicial 
bulwark erected to prevent the use of a net income tax in 
Washington. In 1929 the legislature enacted a statute pur-
porting to impose a "tax measured by income upon banks and 
financial corporations."27 The statute, in sections 3 and 4, re-
cited that banks, other than national banking associations,28 
and financial corporations, as defined, were to pay annually, 
in addition to all other taxes or charges, for the privilege of 
exercising its corporate franchise within this state, a tax ac-
cording to or measured by its net income . . . at the rate of 
five per cent upon the basis of its net income. . . . 
The tax was immediately challenged in Aberdeen Savings & 
Loan Association v. Chase/9 and Burr, Conrad & Broom v. 
Chase.30 The only issue which the court actually faced con-
cerned the validity of the tax under the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution. The court first held that the tax was a property 
tax-that is, the tax was upon income, income is property, 
27 Wash. Laws 1929, c. 151. 
28 National banks were dealt with separately in section 2 of the act, the 
different method being necessary in order to conform to the federal limita-
tion in R.S. §5219. 
29 157 Wash. 351, 289 Pac. 536 ( 1930). 
30 157 Wash. 393, 289 Pac. 551 (1930). 
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therefore the tax was upon property.31 Relying solely upon 
Quaker City Cab Company v. Pennsylvania,82 a United 
States Supreme Court decision applying the federal equal 
protection clause to a Pennsylvania tax, the court held that 
the tax under consideration violated the equal protection 
clause because co-partnerships and individuals engaging in 
the same type financial business as the corporations subject 
to the tax, and consequently engaging in competition with 
those corporations, were not subject to the tax.83 Translated 
into terms of the object of the tax-i.e., income-, the court 
was saying that it was discriminatory to tax the property (in-
come) of a certain class of corporations (the class being based 
on the type of business done), when the same type of property 
in the hands of others engaged in a similar business was not 
taxed. It should be noted that the minimum class referred to 
was not "income" as such, but a class of property character-
ized by the kind of business conducted by the owner of the 
property taxed. Both of these cases were 6-3 decisions, the 
dissenting judges vigorously disagreeing with the determina-
tion of the majority that the tax was a property tax.84 
In 1932 a general net income tax law was passed as an 
initiative measure.85 The measure provided for a tax which 
was to reach income from all sources. Various exemptions 
from gross income were allowed in computing net income, 
and various deductions were allowed in computing the taxa-
ble net income. There were minimum personal exemptions, 
81 Aberdeen Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Chase, supra note 29 at 361, 363-
364; Burr, Conrad & Broom v. Chase, supra note 30 at 397. On rehearing, 
at 392. 
82 277 U.S. 389,48 S. Ct. 553 (1928). 
33 Aberdeen Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Chase, supra note 29 at 373; Burr, 
Conrad & Broom v. Chase, supra note 30 at 395-396. On rehearing, at 392. 
34 Aberdeen Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Chase, supra note 29 at 375, 379. 
85 Initiative Measure No. 69; Wash. Laws 1933, c. 5. 
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and the rate schedule was progressively graduated. Section 
1 of the measure stated: 
Present conditions point the need of a new subject matter for 
taxation, which should be based on the ability to pay. Earn-
ings for a given period are a fair measure of such ability. 
The people of the state of Washington, therefore, exer-
cising herein their supreme power and fundamental right, 
declare their purpose hereby to tax all annual incomes 
within the state as such, and not as property. 
There shall be assessed, levied, collected and paid an-
nually, a tax on all net income as hereinafter provided. . . . 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
The measure was adopted on November 8, 1932, to be ef-
fective a month later. 
The tax was immediately challenged and held unconstitu-
tional in Culliton v. Chase.86 The opinion, delivered on Sep-
tember 8, 1933, was 5-4, with very strong dissents. The 
language of all the opinions, when considered together with 
the opinions in the 1936 Jensen case, infra, suggest almost 
violent controversy.37 The majority first held that the tax 
was a property tax.38 It reasoned that the tax was imposed 
directly on income, and, notwithstanding the recital to the 
contrary, income is property: therefore the tax was upon 
property. Two factors supported this conclusion. First, Art. 
VII, § 1 defined "property" to ". . . mean and include 
everything, whether tangible or intangible, subject to owner-
ship." Second, the majority asserted that the Aberdeen case, 
supra, "definitely decided in this state that an income tax is a 
property tax. . . . " 39 
36 174- Wash. 363,25 P. 2d 81 (1933). 
37 Cf. Pound, "Cacoethes Dissentiendi: the Heated Judicial Dissent," 39 
A.B.A.]. 794 (1953). 
88 Culliton v. Chase, supra note 36 at 374-378, 380-381. 
89 !d. at 376. The majority asserted that the numerous cases from other 
jurisdictions on this problem had no relevancy because "of our peculiarly 
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Being characterized as a property tax, the act was therefore 
subject to the requirement of Art. VII, § 1 that "taxes shall 
be uniform upon the same class of property." And it was held 
that the graduated rate feature was an arbitrary classification 
of property, the majority opinion simply asserting that "It 
needs no argument to demonstrate that the income taxes 
here levied are wholly lacking in uniformity. . . ."40 The 
opinion is not clear as to precisely what extent the majority 
of five felt that income might be classified. That two of the 
five in the majority looked upon income as a minimum class 
is indicated by the dictum in the chief opinion, concurred in 
by one other justice. 
It may be possible to frame an income tax law which will 
assess all incomes uniformly and comply with our constitu-
tion, which, of course, is not now before us and we need not 
consider it. 41 
However, the three other concurring justices made it quite 
clear that the objectionable feature of the tax was the gradu-
ated rate schedule!2 
The dissent in the Culliton case took issue with the major-
ity on all points. First, it asserted that regardless of the words 
in the statute the tax was an "exaction for the enjoyment of 
privileges, made possible by the protection of the organized 
forceful constitutional definition and the difference in their constitutional 
authorization or restriction." In further support of its analysis of the prob-
lem, the majority noted (at 377) that the Aberdeen case was decided in 
June of 1930, and that the present Art. VII, § 1 was adopted by amendment 
in November of 1932; therefore, it was concluded that "After the decision 
by this court in the Aberdeen Sar~ings & Loan Assn. case ... deciding 
that income was property for the purposes of taxation, the people adopted 
the fourteenth amendment [i.e., that amendment altering Art. VII, § 1] 
• . . which made it a part of the fundamental law of the state. " 
oW ld. at 378. 
41 U. at 379. 
42 /d. at 382, 384. 
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state," and, therefore, a nonproperty tax.43 Second, even as-
suming that the tax was upon property, the dissent would 
have held that the graduated rates were reasonable classifica-
tions and therefore within the limitation of Art. VII, § 1. 44 
At the same time that a majority of the Washington Su-
preme Court was looking unfavorably upon net income 
taxes, a different majority of the court was willing to view 
more liberally a Business and Occupation Tax/5 first im-
posed in 1933. The tax was upheld in State ex rel. Stiner v. 
Y elle,46 decided in 1933. The opinion was handed down on 
the date of the Culliton case opinion. Section 2 ( 2) of the act 
which imposed the tax provided that there was to be levied 
upon 
every person an annual tax or excise for the privilege of en-
gaging in business activities. Such tax or excise shall be meas-
ured by the application of rates against values, gross proceeds 
of sales, or gross income, as the case may be, as follows. . . . 
There followed an enumeration of the several "classes" of 
business, classified according to type of business done, with a 
different proportional rate applicable to each class. The rates 
ranged from .25% to 5% of gross income derived from the 
particular type of business. The governor had vetoed two 
provisions of the act-one as to that part which classified the 
business of those engaged in agriculture, and, second, the 
43 /d. at 389-390, 393. The dissent by Judge Blake supported this po-
sition in part by a reference to Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City 
of Seattle, 172 Wash. 649, 21 P. 2d 721 (1933) (also see Puget Sound 
Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, suprfJ note 3), decided some few months 
previously, and in which the court had upheld a local occupation tax with a 
base of gross revenue as a nonproperty tax. It was his position, at 394, that 
"If a tax on gross revenue is an excise, a tax on net income must be." 
44 /d. at 3 96-40 1. · 
411 Wash. Laws 1933, c. 191. 
48 174 Wash. 402,25 P. 2d 91 (1933). 
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final "catch-all" clause 2(f), which described a "class" as 
follows: 
Upon every person engaging in or continuing within this 
state in any business not included in [the enumerated 
classes], and upon every person engaging or continuing 
within this state in the business of rendering, performing or 
selling services, professional or otherwise. . . . 
Obviously, the scope of the act as originally conceived by the 
legislature was considerably restricted by force of the gov-
ernor's veto. 
In the Yelle case, it was first held that the tax was not a 
property tax, and therefore not within the scope of Art. VII, 
§ 1 of the constitution.47 The majority on this point distin-
guished the tax from a net income tax, saying: 
The act does not concern itself with income which has been 
acquired, but only with the privilege of acquiring, and that 
the amount of the tax is measured by the amount of the in-
come in no way affects the purpose of the act or the principle 
involved.48 
This, of course, is the same argument used by the dissent in 
the Culliton case. If perchance the distinctions have become 
too finely drawn for the casual reader, perhaps the dilemma 
which produced such fine distinctions is explained by this 
statement of the majority: 
. . . we are well satisfied that this is not a property tax, even 
under the broad and all inclusive terms of our constitution. 
To hold otherwise would render it exceedingly difficult if 
not impossible to sustain any excise tax.49 
Having held that the tax was a nonproperty tax, the ma-
jority then held that the classifications in the act were not 
47 /d. at 404-407. 
48 /d. at 407. 
49 !d. at 406. Emphasis added. 
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arbitrary/0 that is, that the object was not unreasonable even 
though all possible businesses or occupations were not in-
cluded. 
Finally, it might be of interest to note that the decision 
which upheld the Business and Occupation Tax was also a 
5-4 decision, as was the decision striking down the Net In-
come Tax, supra. The majority in Yelle consisted of the four 
dissenters in Culliton plus Judge Holcomb. However, two 
of the four dissenting judges in Yelle agreed as to the na-
ture of the tax, but would have ruled that the exclusion of 
farmers and professionals was arbitrary.51 
When the legislature evidently took its cue from the 
Yelle case, and in 1935 again enacted net income tax meas-
ures, but now framed in terms of "privileges," it failed to 
estimate the court majority's aversion to net income measures 
in any form. The legislature imposed a Personal Net Income 
Tax/2 and a companion Corporate Net Income Tax. 53 
Section 2 of the Personal Net Income Tax provided that 
there was to be 
levied, collected and paid to the state for each income year by 
every resident of the State of Washington for the privilege 
of receiving income therein while enjoying the protection of 
its laws ... 
a "normal tax" of 3% of taxable net income, and a "surtax'' 
of 4% of all "surtax net income in excess of $4,000." The tax 
reached income from all sources, with certain credits and 
minimum personal exemptions being allowed. In Jensen v. 
110 !d. at 4-08-•1-12. And see Supply Laundry Co. v. Jenner, 178 Wash. 72, 
34 P. 2d 363 ( 1934 ), upholding particular classifications under the act 
as amended in 1933 (Wash. Laws 1933, Ex. Sess., c. 57) which consider-
ably broadened the scope of the act. 
51 /d. at 4-21-4-2 5. 
52 Wash. Laws 1935, c. 178. 
53 Wash. Laws 1935, c. 180, Title XVII, §§159-184. 
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H enneford,54 decided in 1936, this tax was challenged and 
held to violate the uniformity clause in Art. VII, § 1 of the 
state constitution. As in the Culliton case, this was a 5-4 de-
cision. The bench was composed of the same nine judges, and 
there was the same division among them on this question. 
First, the majority held that the tax was a property tax, not-
withstanding the words of the statute. "The character of a 
tax is determined by its incidents, not by its name."55 A leg-
islative body cannot change a tax's fundamental features by 
use of a title. To the majority, the act was clearly concerned 
with the property, i.e., income, upon which the rate was to be 
applied, not with the mere privilege of receiving such in-
come. 
Having held that the tax was a property tax, the majority 
in the Jensen case then ruled that the tax violated the uni-
formity clause of Art. VII, §1 for three reasons.56 First, the 
surtax provision was held to be a graduated rate and there-
fore invalid on the authority of the Culliton case. However, 
the surtax provision was said to be severable, and for that 
reason the remainder of the tax might stand. Second, as for 
the normal tax provision, the court reasoned as follows: 
rents from real estate were included as a part of taxable net 
income. A tax upon the income from realty was ruled to be a 
tax upon the realty itself. Thus, the act in effect divided real 
estate into two classes (i.e., that which produced rent and 
that which did not) and taxed only one. This was a violation 
of the limitation in Art. VII, § 1 which declares that "real 
estate shall constitute one class" of property. Third, the pro-
visions under the normal tax rate providing for credits and 
minimum personal exemptions were held to constitute a vio-
lation of the classification limitation in Art. VII, § 1. This re-
54 185 Wash. 209, 53 P. 2d 607 (1936). 
55 /d. at 217-219. 
56 !d. at 220-223. 
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suit was required because "net income" under Art. VII, § 1 
"constitutes one class of property." This ruling made it un-
necesary for the court to pass on the taxpayer's contention 
that there was an arbitrary classification because the act 
reached only the income of individuals. However, the court 
did note that the two companion acts should be read in pari 
materia, and that, consequently, they showed an intent to 
reach all income. 57 Thus, the foundation for the decision on 
the Corporate Net Income Tax was laid. 
In Petroleum Navigation Company v. Henneford58 the 
remainder of the 1935 net income tax structure was killed 
when the court held that the Corporate Net Income Tax59 
violated the uniformity clause in Art. VII, § 1. In a 6-3 de-
cision (one of the dissenting judges in the Jensen case now 
saw fit to join the majority) the court briefly disposed of the 
tax. Relying on the Aberdeen case, the court held that the 
tax imposed a property tax, not an excise tax. Citing the Burr 
case, the court without discussion stated that the tax was a 
violation of the uniformity clause because " [ t] he property of 
the respondent may not be subjected to a tax not imposed 
upon the property of copartners and individuals."60 It is sub-
mitted that this proposition is really broader than the Burr 
case, for, as pointed out above, the decision there rested on 
67 /d. at 224. 
58 185 Wash. 495, 55 P. 2d 1056 (1936). 
69 Wash. Laws 1935, c. 180, §161, provided that: 
Every bank and corporation other than a national bank or national 
banking association, for the privilege of exercising its corporate franchise 
in this state or for the privilege of doing business in this state, shall an-
nually pay to the state, in addition to annual license fees, a tax according 
to, or measured by, its net income equal to four per cent of such net 
income .••• 
The phrasing of the statute is substantially identical to the 19 3 0 financial 
institutions tax, supra, which was held in the Aberdeen case, supra note 29, 
to be on net income. 
60 Petroleum Nav. Co. v. Henneford, supra note 58 at 497. 
590 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
the fact that the property (i.e., income) of copartners and 
individuals engaged in similar business (i.e., the banking 
business) was not taxed. No suggestion was made in the Burr 
and Aberdeen cases that income was a single minimum class. 
Some sixteen years later the Washington legislature again 
made an effort to use net income as the base of a corporate 
excise tax. Using language almost identical to that in the 
1935 statute which was struck down in the Petroleum Navi-
gation Company case, the legislature provided that 
Every bank and corporation other than a federal savings and 
loan association or national banking association, for the privi-
lege of exercising its corporate franchise in this state or for 
the privilege of doing business in this state, shall annually 
pay to the state, in addition to annual license fees, an excise 
tax according to, or measured by, its net income equal to four 
per cent of such net income. . . . 61 
If the Aberdeen, Burr, Culliton, Jensen, and Petroleum N av-
igation Company cases were to be followed, the result was a 
foregone conclusion. 
With one exception (Judge Beal) there had been a com-
plete turnover on the court. Judge Beal had been in the 
minority in the Jensen case, but had switched to the majority 
in the Petroleum Navigation Company case. Whatever 
might have been the hopes of the legislative branch of the 
government, the court did not reverse itself, and in Power, 
Incorporated v. Huntley,62 decided in 1951, the 1951 Cor-
porate Excise Tax was held to violate the uniformity clause 
in Art. VII, § 1 of the Washington Constitution. The ma-
jority asserted that "[i]t is no longer subject to question in 
this court that income is property."63 Relying on the Jensen 
61 Wash. Laws 1951, Ex. Sess., c. 10, §7. 
62 39Wash. 2d 191,235 P. 2d 173 (1951). 
63 ld. at 194. 
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and Petroleum Navigation Company cases, the majority con-
cluded that 
the tax is a mere property tax "masquerading as an excise." 
... It has no reference to income from the various business 
activities on which the business and occupation tax, a true ex-
cise tax, is based, but taxes any income from almost every 
source .... 
We recognize the right to levy an excise tax on the privi-
lege of doing business or exercising corporate franchises and 
to base that tax on income; but the tax must be, "in truth, 
levied for the exercise of a substantive privilege granted or 
permitted by the state."64 
The majority held that the act violated the uniformity 
clause because "it levies no tax on the incomes of individuals 
and copartnerships which may be in competition with cor-
porations required to pay the tax."65 The Burr and Aberdeen 
cases were cited, as well as the Culliton and Petroleum Navi-
gation Company cases. It should be noted that the court here 
revived the phrase "in competition with," which narrows the 
minimum class to less than income as a whole. It is interesting 
to note that this decision was again a split decision, now 6-3. 
Thus, perhaps the legislature should not feel that all hope is 
lost. 
I. ANALYSES OF STATES WITH TYPE IX CLAUSES 
1. Rhode Island 
The present constitution of Rhode Island was adopted in 
1843. Prior to that time the 1663 Charter of Rhode Island 
and the Providence Plantations served as the organic docu-
ment of the state. In the present constitution of Rhode Is-
84/d. at 196-197. 
IIIIJd. at 195. Emphasis added. 
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land there is a single provision concerning uniformity of tax-
ation. Section 2 of Art. I (the Declaration of Rights) reads: 
All free governments are instituted for the protection, 
safety and happiness of the people. All laws, therefore, 
should be made for the good of the whole; and the burdens 
of the state ought to be fairly distributed among its citizens. 
The underlined clause is the nearest thing to a uniformity 
clause in the Rhode Island Constitution. 
There has been little positive judicial development of the 
meaning of the effective uniformity limitation in Rhode Is-
land. No statements are found concerning the distinction be-
tween property and nonproperty taxes. Indeed, there is noth-
ing to indicate the source of the uniformity required of 
nonproperty taxes. The few cases have dealt with property 
taxation. Those cases indicate that the limitation in Art. 1, 
§2, which is applicable to property taxation, is no greater a 
limitation than that found in the equal protection clause of 
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.1 However, there have been few occasions for the Rhode 
Island court to test this proposition. It has held that there is 
no rule of universality.2 In upholding the exemption of prop-
erty the court stated: 
That the last clause of said article [i.e., Art. I, §2] relates to 
and was intended to control, in a general way at least, the 
framing of laws relating to taxation, there can be no doubt. 
It clearly means that taxes are to be fairly distributed; that 
A ought not to be taxed and B exempted from taxation, they 
being similarly situated; nor ought the one to be taxed on a 
different basis from the other .... But that it means that 
1 For example, Manufacturers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 41 R.I. 
277,281-283, 100 Atl. 400 (1918). 
2 See Manufacturers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Clarke, supra note 1; Brown 
University v. Granger, 19 R.I. 704, 36 Atl. 720 (1897). Cf. McTwiggan 
v. Hunter, 18 R.I. 776, 30 Atl. 962 (1895). Any implications to the con-
trary in the McTwiggan case were dispelled in the Brown University case. 
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the General Assembly has no power to exempt any property 
whatever from taxation, or that property theretofore ex-
empted by charter was to be affected thereby, is wholly un-
reasonable.8 
The court has not faced the problem of approving or disap-
proving a particular classification of property for the purpose 
of applying different effective rates.4 Nor is there any indica-
tion whether property may be taxed by the specific method. 
2. Vermont 
The present constitution of Vermont came into effect in 
1793. Serving as the basic uniformity clause of that constitu-
tion is the following italicized part of Art. IX of the Bill of 
Rights (chapter I) : 
. • . every member of society hath a right to be protected in 
the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property, and therefore is 
bound to contribute his proportion toward the expense of 
that protection. . . . 
The same provision appeared in substantially the same form 
in the prior constitutions of 1777 (Ch. I, Art. IX) and 1786 
(Ch. I, Art. X). 
The Vermont court has ruled that Art. IX, of Chapter I, 
limits all taxes, and has equated that provision to the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United 
States Constitution, saying: 
The equality clause [in the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution] and the proportional clause of our 
8 Brown University v. Granger, supra note 2, at 710. Emphasis added. 
4 However, see the dictum in Manufacturers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Clarke, supra note I, at 281, 283. Also, cf. Mexican Petroleum Corp. v. 
Bliss, 43 R.I. 243, 100 Atl. 867 {1920). 
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Constitution are of the same effect so far as the question of 
classification is concerned. 1 
As for the taxation of property, the court has indicated that 
there is no rule of universality,2 and that property may be 
classified for the purpose of applying different effective 
rates.8 However, the court has had no occasion to test in any 
critical way these propositions and the equation of the uni-
formity limitation with the federal equal protection clause. 
For example, there has been no test of a comprehensive 
classified property tax, or the principle of progressively 
graduated rates. The court has ruled that an inheritance tax 
was a nonproperty tax.4 There have been no uniformity cases 
concerning the Vermont graduated personal net income tax. 
1 Clark v. City of Burlington, 101 Vt. 391, 4-09, 14-3 Atl. 677, 684 
(1928), emphasis supplied. Also see Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. 
Harvey, 107 Vt. 215,225, 177 Atl. 4-23 (1935). In the Atlantic & Pacific 
Tea Company case the court struck down the state chain store tax on the 
authority of Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294- U.S. 550, 55 S. Ct. 525 
(1934-). The tax had a base of gross sales receipts, with a rate progressively 
graduated according to the amount of gross sales. Also see State v. Caplan, 
100 Vt. 14-0, 135 Atl. 705 ( 1927) upholding a classification under the 
motor vehicle registration tax, a nonproperty tax. 
2 See Colton v. Montpelier, 71 Vt. 4-13, 45 Atl. 1039 (1899); Village 
of Hardwick v. Wolcott, 98 Vt. 34-3, 129 Atl. 159 (1925). In the Hard-
wick case, the court said at 34-9: 
The only requirement of our Constitution in this matter is that every 
member of society shall contribute his proportion towards the expense of 
the governmental protection afforded him. • • . It is enough to say for 
the purpose of this case, at least, that the limitation imposed by our Con-
stitution does not forbid any classification of property for the purpose of 
taxation, or the adoption of any scheme of taxation, provided that they do 
not offend the Federal Constitution, the equality clause in the former and 
the uniform clause in the latter being in effect the same for such purposes. 
[Emphasis supplied.] 
8 Clark v. City of Burlington, supra note 1. 
4 In re Hickok's Estate, 78 Vt. 259, 62 Ad. 724 ( 1904-). 
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J. ANALYSES OF STATES WITHOUT UNIFORMITY CLAUSES 
1. Connecticut 
The constitution of Connecticut, which came into force in 
1818, has no provisions expressly dealing with uniformity of 
taxation. Any requirement of uniformity of taxation must be 
derived from section 1 of Art. I (Bill of Rights). Section 1 
is the equivalent of an "equal protection" clause, and reads: 
That all men when they form a social compact, are equal 
in rights; and that no man, or set of men are entitled to ex-
clusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. 
The Connecticut court, in holding that there is no provi-
sion in the state constitution which requires uniformity and 
equality of taxation, has stated: 
. . . [I] s there in our fundamental law any express provi-
sion, or clear implication from provisions therein contained, 
that "taxation shall be uniform and equal?" 
There can be no claim that such a mandate is directly ex-
pressed, either in the State or National Constitution. Express 
provisions of that nature may be found in the local Constitu-
tions of many States, and have proved a source of practical 
difficulties for legislatures and courts. They are not found in 
our own, which assumes that experience has taught that the 
power of taxation cannot safely be cabined within a theory of 
uniformity and equality. Taxes, to be both uniform and 
equal, affecting each inhabitant in proportion to his ability to 
contribute, can only be devised by a government unham-
pered by the limitations of humanity .... 
Is this maxim necessarily implied from any provisions of 
our fundamental law? Unless the vague notion of a higher 
law is claimed as a constitutional provision, we are pointed to 
no provision, nor to any combination of provisions, from 
which it is claimed that such a maxim is a necessary implica-
tion.1 
1 State v. Travelers Ins. Co., 73 Conn. 255, 261-262, 47 Atl. 299 
(1900}. And see In re Nettleton's Appeal, 76 Conn. 235,243, 56 Atl. 565 
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Generally, when a particular tax has been challenged on the 
principle of uniformity (the cases are extremely few) the 
discussion has turned chiefly on the equal protection clause in 
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.2 
While one may conclude that in Connecticut there is only 
a requirement that taxes be uniform within classes (whether 
the tax be property or nonproperty ), few cases have arisen 
concerning the many specific problems of uniformity of taxa-
tion as analyzed in this monograph. In State v. Travelers In-
surance Company3 the court upheld a minor classification o£ 
property for the application of different effective rates. In 
In re Nettleton's Appeal4 the court upheld an exemption un-
der the inheritance tax. All estates of deceased persons were 
exempted from the tax if such estates amounted to less than 
$10,000. The court held that the tax was an exaction from 
the estate of the decedent. 
2. Iowa 
The present constitution of Iowa, dated 1857, contains a 
single provision which deals expressly with uniformity o£ 
taxation. Article VIII, §2 concerns a particular problem, and 
reads: 
( 190 3). In Phelps Montgomery v. Branford, I 0 7 Conn. 697, 142 Atl. 57 4 
( 1928), the court equated the federal equal protection clause and Art. I, 
§I of the Connecticut Constitution. 
2 For example, State v. Murphy, 90 Conn. 662, 98 Atl. 343 (1916), and 
the cases cited supra note I. 
8 Supra note 1, and see the dictum in Bassett v. Rose, I 04 A. 2d 212, 214 
(1954). 
4 Supro note I. Also see State v. Murphy, supra note 2, in which the 
court upheld as reasonable an exemption from a license tax on the use of 
billboards on land, with the rate being so much per square foot, and with an 
exemption of all signs four square feet or less. Other recent cases are 
Hoenig v. Connelly, lOS A. 2d 775 (1954), and First Federal Svg. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Connelly, II 5 A. 2d 455 (195 5). 
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The property of all corporations for pecuniary profit shall 
be subject to taxation, the same as that of individuals. 
Any other requirement of uniformity in taxation must be 
derived from the Bill of Rights, Art. I, §6, which provides 
that 
All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform opera-
tion; the General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or 
class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the 
same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens. 
In the original constitution of Iowa ( 1846), only Art. I, §6 
was present. 
All taxes-property or nonproperty--are limited only by 
the requirement that they be uniform within classes.1 This 
requirement stems from Art. I, §6, which is the rough equiv-
alent of the federal equal protection clause. For this particu-
lar purpose, the court has equated the uniformity required 
by the Iowa Constitution with that degree of uniformity re-
quired by the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitu-
1 For example, in Pierce v. Green, 229 Iowa 22, 294- N.W. 237 (194-0) 
the court stated, at 28: 
In almost all of the constitutions of the states there are provisions 
requiring that taxation be equal and uniform. These provisions vary in 
their phraseology. Some are general, and others are quite specific and 
definite. These provisions of the Iowa constitution are of the first class. 
The court had reference to Art. I, §6. However, the court indicated, at 29, 
that the "purpose of equality and uniformity provisions of the constitution" 
is accomplished when all property of the same class is treated alike. And see, 
as to non property taxes: Vilas v. Iowa State Board of Assessment and Review, 
223 Iowa 604, 273 N.W. 338 (1937) (Income Tax); Tolerton & War-
field Co. v. Iowa State Board of Assessment & Review, 222 Iowa 908, 270 
N.W. 4-27 (1937) (Chain Store Tax); Plank v. Grimes, 238 Iowa 594, 
28 N.W. 2d 34 ( 1947) (Motor Vehicle Fuel Tax); W. J. Sandberg Co. 
v. Iowa State Board of Assessment & Review, 225 Iowa 103, 278 N.W. 64-3 
(1938) (Sales Tax); Iowa Motor Vehicle Ass'n v. Board of Railroad 
Com'rs, 207 Iowa 461,221 N.W. 364- (1928) (Motor Carrier Tax). 
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tion.2 The court has upheld the validity of graduated rates 
found in certain non property taxes, 8 and has ruled that the 
Iowa income tax is a nonproperty tax.4 The distinction in 
Iowa between property and nonproperty taxes becomes im-
portant only insofar as the special limitation found in Art. 
VIII, §2 is concerned.5 
As for property taxation, there have been few cases devel-
oping particular rules of uniformity. However, it does seem 
clear that property may be classified for the application of 
different effective rates to the different classes.6 The court 
has held that there is no rule of universality.7 However, the 
requirement in Art. VIII, §2 limits to a degree the possible 
2 For example, in Dickinson v. Porter, 240 Iowa 303, 400, 35 N.W. 2d 
66 ( 1949), the court said: · 
Article III, section 30, and Article I, section 6, of our state constitution, 
• • • require that the law in question have a uniform operation through-
out the state. The effect of section 1, Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States as applied to this case is substantially 
the same as these uniformity provisions of our own constitution. In gen-
eral, if a law does not offend against one constitution it is inoffensive· to 
the other. 
Also see Tolerton & Warfield Co. v. Iowa State Board of Assessment & 
Review, supra note 1. 
3 Vilas v. Iowa State Board of Assessment & Review, supra note 1, uphold-
ing the graduated rate schedule under an income tax. Also see Tolerton & 
Warfield Co. v. Iowa State Board of Assessment & Review, supra note 1, as 
to the graduated rate schedule under the chain store tax, and following the 
federal cases discussed infra, Chap. IV, in striking down as an arbitrary 
classification that part of the act which imposed a graduated rate according to 
the amount of gross sales. 
4 Vilas v. Iowa State Board of Assessment & Review, supra note 1. 
11 For example, the Vilas case, supra note 1, in which the court found that 
the income tax was not a property tax and therefore not limited by Art. 
VIII, §2. Also see Scottish Union & National Ins. Co. v. Herriott, 109 Iowa 
606, 80 N .W. 665 ( 1899). 
6 For example, Pierce v. Green, supra note 1. 
7 See Leicht v. Burlington, 73 Iowa 29, 34 N.W. 494 ( 1887); Dickin-
son v. Porter, supra note 2. 
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classes of property which may be exempted. Thus exemp-
tions relating solely to corporate property are likely to run 
afoul of Art. VIII, §2.8 
3. NewYork 
The state of New York has had three constitutions, dated 
1777, 1846, and 1894, respectively. There have been several 
substantial revisions of the existing constitution of 1894, the 
latest being by the constitutional convention of 1938. Until 
1938 there were no provisions expressly dealing with uni-
formity of taxation other than the provision of the 18 94 
constitution (Art. III, §18, renumbered §17 in 1938) pro-
hibiting a private or local bill from granting an exemption 
from taxation on real or personal property. Nor was any pro-
vision in the Bill of Rights equivalent to an equal protection 
clause. 
Some minor changes were made (insofar as the problem 
of uniformity of taxation is concerned) by the 19 3 8 conven-
tion. An equal protection clause was added, numbered Art. I, 
§ 11. A new "Taxation" article was added. Article XVI, § 1 
provides that "Exemptions from taxation may be granted 
only by general laws." A special problem is dealt with by 
Art. XVI, §3, which does not change the uniformity struc-
ture, but does restrict the manner in which intangible per-
sonal property may be taxed. That section provides: 
. . . Intangible personal property shall not be taxed ad va-
lorem nor shall any excise tax be levied solely because of the 
8 For example, Dubuque v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 39 Iowa 56 (1874), in 
which the court held that a gross-earnings tax on railroads, purportedly in 
lieu of all property taxes, was a violation of Art. VIII, § 2; similarly in 
Hawkeye Ins. Co. v. French, 109 Iowa 585, 80 N.W. 660 (1899) the 
court held invalid the in lieu provision of an insurance company gross-earn· 
ings tax, exempting the companies from payment of all other taxes, except 
those on realty and special assessments. 
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ownership or possession thereof, except that the income 
therefrom may be taken into consideration in computing any 
excise tax measured by income generally. Undistributed prof-
its shall not be taxed. 
The New York court has ruled that taxes in New York 
need only be uniform within classes, whether the particular 
tax is characterized as a property tax or a nonproperty tax.1 
Before 1938, the source of the limitation was solely the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the 
federal Constitution. Since 1938, the equal protection clause 
of the New York Constitution (Art. I, § 11 ) has also served 
as a source for the limitation. There has been little contro-
versy in New York as to particular rules of uniformity, the 
cases cited being generally limited to the problem of whether 
the object of a given tax was a reasonable class. It might be 
noted that under the new Art. XVI, §3 the nature of a mort-
gage tax has become of some importance. Thus, in Franklin 
Society for Home Building and Savings v. Bennett,2 the 
court held that the tax was a recording privilege tax and 
therefore not within the limitation of Art. XVI, §3. 
1 Perhaps the cases which might be singled out as leading cases are In re 
McPherson, 104 N.Y. 306, 10 N.E. 685 ( 1887); People ex rei. Hatch v. 
Reardon, 184 N.Y. 431, 77 N.E. 970 {1906); and In re Watson's Estate, 
226 N.Y. 384, 123 N.E. 758 (1919). Also see: In re Bank of Manhattan 
Co., 293 N.Y. 515,58 N.E. 2d 713 {1944), affirming 267 App. Div. 456; 
In re Keeney's Estate, 194 N.Y. 281, 87 N.E. 428 {1909}; New York 
Steam Corp. v. City of N.Y., 268 N.Y. 137, 197 N.E. 172 {1935); 
People ex rei. Moskowitz v. Jenkins, 202 N.Y. 53, 94 N.E. 1065 {1911); 
People ex rei. Eisman v. Ronner, 185 N.Y. 285, 77 N.E. 1061 {1906); 
In re Wendel's Estate, 223 N.Y. 433, 119 N.E. 879 {1918); Woodruff 
v. Oswego Starch Factory, 177 N.Y. 23, 68 N.E. 994 {1903). And see 
Peoplev. Equitable Trust Co., 96 N.Y. 387 {1884). 
2 282 N.Y. 79, 24 N.E. 2d 854 (1939). 
CHAPTER IV 
Uniformity and Equality in Taxation Required 
by the Federal Equal Protection Clause 
T HE primary purpose of this monograph is to make a comparative study of the state constitutional limi-tation of uniformity in taxation. Such a study would 
not be complete, however, without some consideration of the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the 
United States Constitution, as it is applied to state taxes. The 
equal protection clause provides a minimum standard of uni-
formity within classes. Therefore, it protects the interests of 
the taxpayer wholly apart from any state constitutional uni-
formity limitation and regardless of the identity of the state 
levying the tax. However, because an analysis of this federal 
limitation is essentially collateral to the primary purpose of 
this monograph, the degree of uniformity required of state 
taxes by the equal protection clause will only be briefly out-
lined.1 
Prior controversy was settled in 1890, when Justice 
Bradley stated, in Bell's Gap Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania,2 
that the equal protection clause does limit state revenue leg-
islation.3 The "formula" by which the court has guided itself 
1 A comprehensive analysis of the meaning of the federal equal protection 
clause as it applies to state taxes was made in 1938 by Professor Sholley, 
"Equal Protection in Tax Legislation," 24 Va. L. Rev. 229, 388 (1938). 
Also see The Constitution of the United States of America, 1146-115 3 
(Edward S. Corwin, Editor; S. Doc. NO'. 170, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess., 
1953); and Rottschaefer, Handbook of American Constitutional Law, 664-
67 5 ( 1939). The present writer is greatly indebted to these sources. 
2 134 u.s. 232 (1890). 
8 See the discussion in Sholley, supra note 1, at 230-232, which traces 
the development from the position taken by Justice Miller in Davidson v. 
New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1878), to the statement by Justice Bradley in 
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in cases concerning the validity of state taxes under the equal 
protection clause has been restated as late as the spring of 
1954. Justice Jackson, speaking for the court, stated: 
Equal protection does not require identity of treatment. It 
only requires that classification rest on real and not feigned 
differences, that the distinction have some relevance to the 
purpose for which the classification is made, and that the dif-
ferent treatment be not so disparate, relative to the difference 
in classification, as to be wholly arbitrary.4 
This standard determines the legitimacy of state legislative 
classifications in general,11 and here it is applied in particular 
to tax legislation. 
This formula is not too helpful in determining results in 
particular cases. Just when do classifications rest on "real and 
not feigned differences?" More significantly, when is "dif-
ferent treatment . . . so disparate, relative to the difference 
in classification, as to be wholly arbitrary?" As for "the pur-
pose for which the classification is made," remember that 
ostensibly, at least, the purpose of revenue legislation is to 
obtain revenue. Consequently, while the "purpose" test can 
have real meaning in cases involving police power regulation, 
one may doubt the extent to which it aids in evaluating clas-
sifications in tax legislation. 6 Nevertheless, the standard is 
used, and the decisions of the court may be arranged accord-
ing to coherent patterns. It will be helpful for the purposes 
the Bell's Gap case, supra note 2. Also see The Constitution of the United 
States of America, supra note 1 at 1146. 
4 Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237, 74 S. Ct. 505 (1954), 
summarized in note 21, infra. 
11 However, classifications based on either race or alienage must be ex-
cepted from any generalizations made in the text. See, for example, the 
court's latest major pronouncement on such classifications in Brown v. Board 
of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954), discussed in Kauper, 
"Segregation in Public Education-The Decline of Plessy v. Ferguson," 
52Mich.L.Rev.1137 {1954). 
8 For a hypercritical view of the court's "verbal formula," see Sholley, 
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of this monograph to follow the outline used for analysis of 
the state uniformity limitations." However, it should be 
noted that the Supreme Court has never made a distinction 
between property and nonproperty taxes for the purpose of 
applying a stricter limitation to the former. Nevertheless, for 
comparative purposes that distinction can be made. 
First, as for property taxes, the federal equal protection 
clause, in general, does not contain a rule of universality, re-
quires only a uniformity within classes for effective rates, and 
does not restrict the method of taxation of property to the ad 
valorem method.8 The precise issues have not too often been 
ruled upon, perhaps because it is simply accepted as dogma 
not open to challenge that the equal protection clause does 
not prohibit state legislatures from classifying property, 
either for the taxation of such classes at different effective 
rates or for their exemption. The validity of the broadest 
types of classification of property such as realty and person-
alty, tangible and intangible, was early established in princi-
ple.9 The United States Supreme Court decisions have for 
supra note 1 at 232. A more restrained characterization of the formula is 
made by Rottschaefer, supra note I at 665. 
The principal problem under the equal protection clause has been the 
degree of classification permitted thereby. The rule, as generally stated, 
is that it prohibits unreasonable classifications only. The decisions show 
that there exist no universally applicable tests by which to determine 
whether a given classification is reasonable or unreasonable. A classifica-
tion on a given basis may be valid with respect to one tax and invalid with 
respect to another. 
1 Cf. the analysis by Sholley, supra note I, and his arrangement according 
to the characteristics of the classifications reviewed by the Supreme Court. 
8 For the first two propositions, see the cases in notes 9 through 20, infra. 
On the second proposition, see, for example, Lake Superior Mines v. Lord, 
27I U.S. 577, 46 S. Ct. 627 (I926). 
9 For example, see the following dictum from Justice Bradley in the Bell'• 
Gap case, supra note 2 at 237: 
[The equal protection clause] was not intended to prevent a State from 
adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. It may, 
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the most part been concerned with more refined classifica-
tions. A number of decisions have sustained subclassifications 
of intangibles. For example, in Klein v. Board of Tax Super-
visors,10 the Supreme Court sustained a Kentucky statute 
which taxed shares of stock in all corporations, but excepted 
shares in corporations which had paid property taxes in Ken-
tucky upon seventy-five per cent or more of their total as-
sets. In a later decision, Madden v. Kentucky/1 the court 
sustained a tax of fifty cents per one hundred dollars on de-
posits in banks out of the state, in contrast with a rate of ten 
cents per one hundred dollars on deposits in the state.12 Other 
cases have sustained the subclassification of tangible person-
alty; for example, in Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co.13 the 
court sustained a Pennsylvania special ad valorem tax on 
hard coal, although no similar tax was laid on soft coal or 
other personal property. It will be recalled that that tax was 
a good illustration of the Pennsylvania uniformity limita-
if it chooses, exempt certain classes of property from any taxation at all, 
such as churches, libraries and the property of charitable institutions . 
• • • [I]t may tax real estate and personal property in a different 
manner; it may tax visible property only, and not tax securities for pay-
ment of money; it may allow deductions for indebtedness, or not allow 
them •••• We think that we are safe in saying, that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was riot intended to compel the State to adopt an iron rule 
of equal taxation. If that were its proper construction it would not only 
supersede all those constitutional provisions and laws of some of the 
States, whose object is to secure equality of taxation, and which are usually 
accompanied with qualifications deemed material; but it would render 
nugatory those discriminations which the best interests of society re-
quire .••• 
10 282 U.S. 19, 51 S. Ct. 15 (1930). 
11 309 U.S. 83,60 S. Ct. 406 (1940). 
12 And see, for other examples, Beii's Gap Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 
supra note 2; Home Insurance Company v. New York, 134 U.S. 594, 10 
S. Ct. 593 (1890); Coulter v. L. & N.R. Co., 196 U.S. 599, 25 S. Ct. 342 
(1905); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 252 U.S. 412, 40 S. Ct. 371 
(1920). 
13 260 U.S. 245, 43 S. Ct. 83 ( 1922). 
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tion.14 It has been said, "Another classification of property 
which has always been sanctioned by the Supreme Court is 
that between railroad property and all other property.m5 
However, the court has found certain classifications of prop-
erty to be arbitrary. For example, in Wheeling Steel Corpo-
ration v. Glander/6 decided in 1949, the court held invalid 
that part of the Ohio ad valorem property tax which levied 
the tax on accounts receivable owned by foreign corporations, 
but exempted accounts receivable of an identical nature which 
were owned by residents and domestic corporations.17 
The general principle is well illustrated in those cases con-
cerning the application of a different ratio of valuation to a 
complaining taxpayer's property. In another recent case, 
Hillsborough Township v. Cromwell/8 the court indicated 
that the consistent, systematic, and intentional discrimination 
in the assessment of a taxpayer's property for the purposes of 
ad valorem taxation would be invalid under the equal protec-
tion clause. However, it should be noted that the application 
of a different ratio of valuation will not run afoul the equal 
14 See the discussion in the Pennsylvania study, chapter III, part G supra. 
15 Shelley, supra note I, 235, with citation of authorities. 
16 337 U.S. 562,69 S. Ct. 1291 (1949). 
17 The court said that the inequality was not based on the owner's relation 
to the decisive transaction but solely on a difference in residence of the 
owners of accounts receivable, and that the foreign corporation was due as 
equal a treatment as that given domestic corporations, at least in so far as 
the ad valorem tax was concerned. 
Also see Louisville Gas & Electric Company v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 
48 S. Ct. 423 (1928), in which the court held invalid a tax on the record-
ing of mortgages because it applied only to mortgages which did not mature 
within five years. A very severe and telling criticism of the Coleman case is 
found in Shelley, supra note I at 241-243. The opinion of the majority did 
not square with numerous prior cases, and it is not consistent with the trend 
of subsequent decisions. 
18 326 U.S. 620, 66 S. Ct. 445 ( 1946). The decision of the court 
concerned remedies available to the taxpayer. On this problem, see Note, 
"Remedies for Unequal Tax Assessments," 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1000 (1933). 
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protection clause if the property affected might reasonably be 
placed in a separate class for purposes of taxation.19 Thus, it 
is clear that under the equal protection clause the state legis-
latures retain a great deal of discretion in classifying prop-
erty, subject only to a minimum standard protecting the tax-
payer against patently arbitrary classifications, an extreme 
case being the singling out of an individual's property.20 
Second, as for nonproperty taxes the same limitation 
applies, namely, a requirement of uniformity within classes.21 
This, of course, is substantially the same limitation which was 
found to limit nonproperty taxes in practically all of the 
forty-eight states. More significant is the ruling of the 
19 Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182, 
65 S. Ct. 624 ( 1945). 
2°Cf. Independent Warehousesv. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70; 67 S. Ct. 1062 
(1947), in which the court sustained a New Jersey municipal license tax. 
The court held that the fact the ordinance applied only to commercial 
storage facilities, and that there were no other commercial storage facilities 
in the municipality subject to taxation, did not result in a violation of the 
equal protection clause. The principal issue concerned state taxation of 
interstate commerce, and on that issue there were dissents. 
21 The most recent decision is Walters v. City of St. Louis, supra note 4, 
in which the court upheld the constitutionality of the St. Louis "income 
tax." The ordinance on its face classified income for taxation according to 
its source. One category consisted of salary and wage income, the other of 
profits from self-employment or business enterprise. The court did not pass 
upon regulations under the tax which granted employers deductions for 
taxes paid the federal government, but which did not allow employees a 
deduction for the same tax. Justices Douglas and Black expressly suggested 
that this latter classification raised a "serious and substantial question under 
the Equal Protection Clause. . . ." (p. 51 0). Selected important cases are 
Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 32 S. Ct. 192 ( 1937) (sustaining 
a state license tax on hand laundries employing more than two women); 
Magnano Company v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 54 S. Ct. 599 ( 1934) 
(sustaining a discriminatory tax on oleomargarine); Southwestern Oil Co. 
v. Texas, 217 U.S. 114, 3 0 S. Ct. 496 ( 191 0) (sustaining a two per cent 
tax on the gross receipts of wholesale dealers in mineral oils against the 
contention that dealers in other commodities were not subject to comparable 
tax burdens). 
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Supreme Court that progressively graduated rates are reason-
able classifications. 22 The court has rarely found a classifica-
tion under a nonproperty tax to be unreasonable and 
arbitrary. 
Thus, there is a minimum standard of uniformity to which 
state tax legislation must conform, apart from any state 
constitutional limitation. The federal equal protection clause 
stands as a barrier to "unreasonable" classifications in state 
tax legislation. Of course, the difficulty here is in the use of 
the question-begging term "unreasonable." And like the 
due process limitation, 23 the equal protection limitation per-
mits a margin for differences of opinions even as to this 
minimum standard of uniformity. 
22 In the leading case, Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 
2 8 3, 18 S. Ct. 5 94 ( 1 8 9 8), the court sustained the provisions of an Illinois 
inheritance tax law which granted exemptions and established rate differ-
entials depending on the total amount of the legacy and the relationship of 
the beneficiary to the deceased. Also see Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 
40 S. Ct. 221 (1920) (graduated net income tax); Metropolis Theater Co. 
v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 33 S. Ct. 441 (1913) (graduated license tax on 
theaters, the rate graduated according to the price of admission). The 
graduated rate principle embodied in the ordinary chain store tax was ap-
proved in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 
412, 57 S. Ct. 772 (1937), in which the court sustained a tax on chain 
stores graduated according to the total number of stores in the chain, in-
cluding stores located outside of the state. In Grosjean the court distin-
guished L. K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 53 S. Ct. 481 (1933), in 
which the court had held invalid a chain store tax under which the gradua-
tion depended upon whether the chain had stores in more than one county 
in the state. The first of these chain store tax cases was State Board v. 
Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 51 S. Ct. 540 (1931), in which the court upheld 
the Indiana tax under which the graduated rate depended only on the num-
ber of stores within the state. To be contrasted with these cases is Stewart 
Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, 55 S. Ct. 525 (1935), in which 
the court held invalid a chain store tax under which the graduated rate de-
pended upon total volume of business and was applied to grou sales. See the 
discussion in Sholley, supra note 1 at 250-256, 261-265. Also see the dis-
cussion in Chapter V, Part C, infra. 
28 See Paulson, "The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the 
States," 34 Minn. L. Rev. 91 (1950). 
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In substantially all cases the state constitutions have the 
equivalent of an "equal protection" limitation-that is, some 
clause of the state constitution will bar "unreasonable" 
classifications in state legislation. While the United States 
Supreme Court will have the last word as to the meaning 
of "reasonable" under the federal equal protection clause, 
so will the forty-eight state courts have the last word to say 
as to the meaning of "reasonable" under their respective state 
constitutional limitations. 
But in the final analysis the important point is, that even 
though as to some individual cases there will be differences of 
opinion concerning the reasonableness of the classification, the 
state and federal equal protection limitations will afford this 
minimum standard of protection even in the absence of state 
constitutional uniformity in taxation clauses. Indeed, many 
would contend that the abolition of the state uniformity. in 
taxation clauses would not be undesirable, since legislative 
discretion-though obviously increased-would still be 
subject to this minimum standard of reasonableness, which 
would, however, permit a great flexibility in arranging a state 
revenue structure to approach more nearly a just distribution 
of the tax burden.24 Again, however, a question-begging term 
is used. For, indeed, advocates of the strictest degree of uni-
formity in taxation will insist that such absolute uniformity is 
the key to a "just" distribution of the tax burden. Thus, 
ultimately, the decision must be one of fiscal policy, which in 
turn governs the choice of constitutional doctrine. If one does 
accept the view that absolute uniformity is not necessarily the 
sine qua non for a wise fiscal policy, then the needed protec-
tion against arbitrary legislative action is found in the federal 
and state equal protection limitations. 
24 Cf. Matthews, Wm. L., Jr., "The Function of Constitutional Pro-
visions Requiring Uniformity in Taxation," 38 Ky. L. J. 503 at 525-526 
(1950). 
CHAPTER v 
A Comparative Analysis of the Uniformity 
Limitations 
A. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 
X pointed out in the introduction, this monograph has two major purposes. First, it should provide an un-derstanding of the existing state constitutional limi-
tations concerning uniformity and equality in taxation. Sec-
ond, it should provide material for study in a revision of 
those state constitutional limitations. Both of these purposes 
were served by the empirical analysis of the judicial gloss 
given the constitutional provisions. That analysis, in Chapter 
III, forms the larger part of this monograph. The present 
section will trace briefly, and in a very general manner, the 
origin and subsequent development of the several types of 
basic uniformity clauses.1 Some knowledge of this historical 
development will serve, primarily, to provide light for the 
second purpose of the monograph. This writer recognizes 
that an analysis and evaluation of the economic, political, and 
social factors underlying this skeletonic description would be 
helpful. However, such a study is not deemed absolutely es-
sential, and several factors preclude this writer from includ-
ing it in this monograph. 
The existing uniformity clauses, so-called, have been 
classified according to phraseology. The following nine basic 
Types were found: 
I. Property shall be taxed according to its value. 
II. Property shall be taxed in proportion to its value. 
III. The legislature may impose proportional and rea-
1 Cf. Jensen, Property Taxation in the United States 35-43 (1931). 
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sonable assessments, rates, and taxes upon all per-
sons and estates within the state. 
IV. There shall be a uniform rule of taxation. 
V. Taxation shall be equal and uniform. 
VI. The legislature shall provide by law for a uniform 
and equal rate of assessment and taxation. 
VII. Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of 
subjects. 
VIII. Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of 
property. 
IX. There shall be a fair distribution of the expense of 
government. 
This classification merely reflects the existing basic uniformity 
clauses, and it should be emphasized that the Types are 
hypothetical. For example, the actual uniformity clauses 
found in the four states classified as Type II states will vary 
in their precise phraseology from the hypothetical Type II 
clause. Also, some of the predecessors of the existing clauses, 
no longer in use, cannot conveniently be fitted into any of 
the nine Types used for this study. Throughout this discus-
sion, the writer will use the hypothetical Types for a common 
reference, but note will be taken of the several variations of 
each clause which have appeared. 
* * * * * 
At the time the Union was formed, ten of the original 
thirteen states (Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, New 
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, and Virginia) had constitutions which 
contained no provisions either framed in terms of "uni-
formity" or "equality" or interpreted as providing an effec-
tive uniformity limitation. However, the constitutions of three 
of the original states (Maryland, Massachusetts, and New 
Hampshire) contained provisions which have proved to be 
the source of effective uniformity limitations even though 
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they were not framed in the "uniform and/ or equal" 
terminology. Of these three, the Maryland Constitution 
contained a variation of the basic Type IX uniformity clause, 
the provision reading: 
Every person in the state ought to contribute his proportion 
of public taxes for the support of the government, according 
to his actual worth in real or personal property .... 2 
In the constitution of Massachusetts there was a provision 
similar to basic Type III, reading: 
[The legislature may] impose and levy proportional and 
reasonable assessments, rates and taxes, upon all the in-
habitants of, and persons, residents, and estates lying within 
the said commonwealth. • . . 8 
The New Hampshire Constitution contained two provisions, 4 
one of which was substantially identical to the Type III 
clause in the Massachusetts Constitution, and another which 
was a second variation of the Type IX clause found in 
Maryland. The latter clause read: 
Every person of the community has a right to be protected 
by it, in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property; he 
therefore is bound to contribute his share in the expense of 
such protection. 
Thus it appears that historically the first of the so-called 
uniformity clauses were Types III and IX, even though 
those types are not phrased in "uniform and/ or equal" ter-
minology. Massachusetts and New Hampshire still retain the 
Type III uniformity clause without change, although, as will 
be pointed out, New Hampshire has avoided the effect of 
2 Supra, p. 554. The present section is based on the historical notes in-
cluded in the separate studies of the several states in Chapter III. 
8 Supra, p. 172. 
4 Supra, p. 181. 
612 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
that clause to some degree by special constitutional amend-
ment. 
The first two states admitted to the Union after its forma-
tion were Vermont ( 1791) and Kentucky ( 1792). Vermont 
included in its constitution5 a variation of the Type IX uni-
formity clause, substantially identical to that originated by 
New Hampshire. The Vermont provision has remained 
unchanged, and is in effect today. The first Kentucky Consti-
tution had no provision relating to uniformity. At the same 
time that Vermont and Kentucky were admitted as new states, 
Delaware adopted a new constitution (1792). However, no 
provision relating to uniformity was included in that constitu-
tion; consequently, Delaware remained among those states 
having no uniformity clause of any kind. 
With the admission of Tennessee into the Union in 1796, 
there appeared what has been characterized as the "first real 
uniformity provision."6 This characterization is accurate only 
if one considers terminology apart from effective limitation. 
As the state studies in Chapter III have shown, the Type III 
"proportionality" clause found in Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire provides a very strict property-tax uniformity 
limitation. Indeed, although this first Tennessee clause did 
use the terms "uniform" and "equal," it was a provision with 
a very special and limited character, requiring a quantitative 
rather than a qualitative uniformity. The provision read: 
All lands liable to taxation, in this state, shall be taxed equal 
and uniform, in such manner, that no one hundred acres shall 
be taxed higher than another, except town lots, which shall 
not be taxed higher than two hundred acres of land each. 
7 
5 Supra, p. 573. 
6 Matthews, Wm. L., Jr., "The Function of Constitutional Provisions 
Requiring Uniformity in Taxation," 38 Ky. L. J. 31, 4-1 (194-9-1950). 
7 Supra, p. 66. 
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This original Tennessee provision does not easily fall within 
any of the nine basic types of today's uniformity clauses. 
However, terminology-wise, this provision is the predecessor 
of the basic clauses Types V and VI. 
Following this innovation in the Tennessee Constitution 
of 1796, there was no new development until the period 
from 1818 to 1821. The four states admitted to the Union 
prior to 1818 (Ohio in 1803; Louisiana in 1812; Indiana in 
1816; and Mississippi in 1817) and the three states adopting 
new constitutions prior to 1819 (Georgia in 1798; Kentucky 
in 1799; and Connecticut in 1818) did not include in their 
constitutions any provisions which might be characterized as 
uniformity clauses. 
* * * * * 
However, each of the three states entering the Union dur-
ing the period from 1818 to 1821 (Illinois in 1818; Ala-
bama in 1819; and Missouri in 1821) did incorporate a 
uniformity clause into their respective constitutions. None em-
ployed the terms "uniform" or "equal," but used the term 
"value" which is characteristic of basic clauses Types I and 
II. Specifically, the Illinois Constitution of 1818 introduced 
the first version of the Type II basic uniformity clause. It 
read: 
. . . the mode of levying a tax shall be by valuation, so that 
every person shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of the 
property he or she has in his or her possession. 8 
Alabama followed in its constitution of 1819 with a second 
variation of basic Type II, which read: 
All lands liable to taxation in this state shall be taxed in 
proportion to its value.8 
8 St#pra, p. 117. 
8 Supra, p. 94. 
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The Alabama provision is more limited in scope than the 
Illinois clause, being limited to real property taxes. A third 
variation of basic Type II was introduced in the Missouri 
Constitution of 1820: 
All proper7o subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion 
to its value. 0 
The Missouri version of Type II was more akin to the briefer 
Alabama clause, but broader in application, being applicable 
to the taxation of all property. The fourth of these new 
states, Maine, introduced in its constitution of 181 9 the 
original version of the Type I basic uniformity clause: 
All taxes upon real estate, assessed by authority of this state, 
shall be apportioned and assessed equally, according to the 
just value thereof. . . .11 
Thus, within a three-year period, the two basic uniformity 
clauses characterized by the use of the word "value" (Types 
I and II) were introduced by Maine ("according to value") 
and Illinois ("in proportion to value"), with Alabama and 
Missouri following Illinois in the use of the word "propor-
tion." 
A very definite trend was established in 1818-18 21 by 
these four states. Since that period, with three exceptions 
(Michigan, Iowa, and Nebraska), every newly admitted 
state has included some type of uniformity clause in its 
original constitution. Indeed, of the three exceptions, two 
adopted new constitutions within thirteen years or less 
(Michigan, 1837-1850; Nebraska, 1867-1875) which did 
contain some form of uniformity clauses. In addition, steady 
inroads have been made among those ten original states hav-
ing no uniformity clause of any type, so that, at the present 
10 Supra, p. 4-17. 
11 Supra, p. 58. 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 615 
time, only two (Connecticut and New York) remain without 
any such provision. 
Following the innovations in Illinois, Alabama, Missouri, 
and Maine there was little further development before 1838. 
New constitutions were adopted in Delaware ( 1831 ), Vir-
ginia (1830), and Mississippi (1832), none of which con-
tained uniformity clauses, thus leaving unchanged the status 
of each of the three states. Tennessee adopted a new constitu-
tion in 1834, and in doing so abandoned its original "quan-
titative" uniformity clause previously described, which was 
applicable only to the taxation of realty. In its place a second 
version of basic Type I was inserted, the first version having 
been introduced by Maine. Of most importance was the 
manner in which the Type I clause was coupled with "equal 
and uniform" terminology. The revised Tennessee provision 
now read: 
All property shall be taxed according to its value, that value 
to be ascertained in such manner as the legislature shall 
direct, so that taxes shall be equal and uniform throughout 
the state. 12 
Thus, Tennessee retained the "equal and uniform" language, 
but now subordinated it to a basic clause of the "value" type. 
This subordinate clause was soon to be separated and to stand 
as a primary clause in other states, thus establishing the basic 
Type V provision in full force. Tennessee also included in 
its 1834 constitution a supplementary provision, later 
adopted by a number of other states, which specified: 
No one species of property from which a tax may be collected, 
shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of 
the same value.13 
Upon admission to the Union in 1836, Arkansas' original 
constitution included a basic uniformity clause which was a 
12 Supra, p. 65. Emphasis added. 
18 Supra, p. 65. 
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third variation of the type originated by Maine in 1819, i.e., 
Type I. However, like Tennessee, Arkansas tacked the words 
"uniform and equal" onto this ad valorem type provision, 
with this important distinction that in the Arkansas provision 
the words "uniform and equal" clearly referred to "valua-
tion." The Arkansas provision read: 
All property subject to taxation shall be taxed according to its 
value, that value to be ascertained in such manner as the 
General Assembly shall direct, making the same equal and 
uniform throughout the state.14 
Adhering closely to the Tennessee uniformity structure, the 
Arkansas Constitution15 also included the supplementary pro-
vision concerning rates, referred to above. 
* * * * * 
The period from 1838 to 1851 (with activity concentrated 
in the years from 1845 to 18 51) saw the first use of uni-
formity clauses phrased in "equal and uniform" language 
such as is used in existing uniformity clauses. In 1838, the 
original Florida Constitution was drafted, and it included a 
provision which is the distinct predecessor of basic Types V 
and VI, though closer in phraseology to Type V. The pro-
vision read: 
The General Assembly shall devise and adopt a system of 
revenue, having regarded to an equal and uniform mode of 
taxation throughout the state.16 
The Florida Constitution did not come into effect until 1845, 
because it was not until that year that Florida was admitted to 
the Union. 
Also, in 1845 we find the first clear formulation of Type V. 
In that year Louisiana adopted a new constitution, which was 
14 Supra, p. 49. Emphasis added. 
111 Supra, p. 49. 
16 Supra, p. 274. 
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actually drafted in 1844, and for the first time adopted a 
uniformity clause. That clause was the first version of Type 
V, and it read: "Taxation shall be equal and uniform 
throughout the state.m7 But the Louisiana basic clause did 
not stand alone, and we have here the first example of 
several overlapping uniformity clauses being included in a 
single uniformity structure. Louisiana's basic clause, Type V, 
was accompanied18 by the version of the Type II clauses ("in 
proportion to value") first introduced in 1820 by Missouri. 
In addition, there was the special supplementary clause19 
concerning rates first introduced in 1834 by Tennessee. 
In the same year in which the new Louisiana Constitution 
came into force, 1845, Texas was admitted to the Union, and 
in its constitution20 followed the Louisiana pattern in so far 
as both the Type V "equal and uniform" clause and the 
Type II "proportionality" clause were included. However, 
the Tennessee type provision concerning rates was omitted. 
During the period of the Florida-Louisiana-Texas innova-
tions, Pennsy 1 vania ( 18 3 8) and New Jersey ( 1844) adopted 
new constitutions, but no uniformity clauses of any kind were 
introduced. Michigan (1837) and Iowa (1846) were ad-
mitted as new states, but neither of those two states included 
in its original constitution any form of a uniformity clause. 
On the other hand, when Rhode Island adopted a new con-
stitution in 1843, it joined those states having uniformity 
clauses, and included a third variation of the Type IX basic 
clause:"· .. the burdens of the state ought to be fairly dis-
tributed among its citizens."21 
Within six years of the Florida-Louisiana-Texas develop-
ment, both Types IV and VI of the basic uniformity clauses 
17 Supra, p. 387. 
18 Supra, p. 387. 
19 Supra, p. 387. 
20 Supra, p. 254-. 
21 Supra, p. 592. 
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had been introduced. Upon being admitted to the Union in 
1848, Wisconsin included in its original constitution the first 
version of Type IV: "The rule of taxation shall be uniform . 
. . . " 22 In 1851 Indiana, in adopting a new constitution, 
introduced the precise phraseology of Type VI, which is a 
modified version of the 1838 Florida provision: 
The General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a uniform 
and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe 
such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation 
of all property, both real and personal. ... 23 
The prior Indiana Constitution had not contained any form 
of uniformity clause. 
During this period of the Wisconsin-Indiana innovation, 
from 1848 to 1851, there was considerable other activity. 
California and Virginia followed the pattern set by Texas 
in 1845, and combined a Type V clause with a Type II 
provision. This was done by California in its original constitu-
tion24 when admitted to the Union in 1850, and by Virginia 
in the same year when a new constitution211 was adbpted. 
Michigan also adopted a new constitution in 1850, and in 
doing so joined for the first time the ranks of those states 
with uniformity clauses. A second version of Type IV, 
similar to the 1848 Wisconsin provision, was introduced, this 
version reading: 
The legislature shall provide by law a uniform rule of taxa-
tion, except on property paying specific taxes. 26 
This provision, with its "except" clause, established a unique 
situation in Michigan, as described in the Michigan study in 
Chapter III. On the basis of the "except" clause taxes are 
22 Supra, p. 234. 
28 Supra, p. 281. 
24 Supra, p. 107. 
211 Supra, p. 542. 
26 Supra, p. 197. 
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classified for purposes of uniformity into ad valorem and 
specific rather than property and nonproperty. 
Ohio's new constitution of 1851 contained that state's first 
uniformity clause. This provision was a third variation of 
basic Type IV, similar to those clauses already used by Wis-
consin and Michigan. The provision read: 
Laws shall be passed, taxing by a uniform rule, all moneys, 
credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint stock companies, or 
otherwise; and also all real and personal property, according 
to its true value in money.27 
Note that the Ohio clause, while predominantly a Type IV 
clause, also contains language characteristic of the Type I 
ad valorem clause. 
In 1848 Illinois adopted a new constitution. The Type II 
clause ("in proportion to value") which Illinois had origi-
nated in 1818 was retained. However, it was amended, so 
that we now find a fourth version of Type II in use. The 
provision, as rephrased, read: 
The General Assembly shall provide for such revenue as 
may be needful by levying a tax, by valuation, so that every 
person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the 
value of his, her, or its property .... 28 
This flurry of activity during the period from 1845 to 
18 51 set the pace for the last half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Until 1900 there was a steady adoption of uniformity 
provisions which, with one important exception to be noted, 
were simply variations on the types of uniformity clauses 
already introduced by 1851. 
* * * * * 
In 1852, Louisiana adopted a new constitution, but made 
no change in its prior uniformity structure, notably consisting 
27 Supra, p. 221. 
28 Supra, p. 1 1 7. 
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of the first version of Type V, introduced in 1845. Kentucky 
( 1850) and Iowa ( 1857) also adopted new constitutions 
without changing their prior status. That is, Kentucky and 
Iowa had not yet included any form of uniformity clause in 
their constitutions. 
Minnesota was admitted to the Union in 1858 and its con-
stitution contained the following unique provisions: 
All taxes to be raised in this state shall be as nearly equal as 
may be, and all property on which taxes are to be levied 
shall have a cash valuation and be equalized and uniform 
throughout the state. 20 
Supplementing this basic clause was a new version of the 
Type I clause first introduced by Maine in 1820: 
Laws shall be passed taxing all [property] according to its 
true value in money.30 
Minnesota later abandoned its unique basic uniformity 
clause to which the court had given a most restrictive inter-
pretation. As shown in the Minnesota study, in Chapter III, 
the provision caused no end of trouble. Fortunately, no other 
state adopted it. 
The next succeeding four states to be admitted to the Union 
wereOregon (1859),Kansas (1861), West Virginia (1863), 
and Nevada ( 1864 ). All continued the trend started by 
Florida in 1838 by using a basic uniformity clause phrased 
in terms of "equal and uniform." Oregon, leaving nothing 
to chance, included in its constitution of 185981 both a Type 
V clause (introduced in 1845 by Louisiana and Texas) and a 
Type VI clause (introduced in 1851 by Indiana). Thus, 
Oregon combined two clauses, both in "uniform and equal" 
language. This is fairly unusual, although it is evident that 
20 Supra, p. 392. 
80 Supra, p. 392. 
81 Supra, p. 45 5. 
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the combination of a "uniform and equal" clause with one or 
more "value" clauses was quite common. Kansas, in its 1861 
constitution,32 and Nevada, in its 1864 constitution,83 were 
satisfied with a single clause, namely, the first version of 
Type VI introduced by Indiana in 1851. 
West Virginia, like Oregon, was not satisfied with a single 
provision. Its 1863 constitution34 contained the original Type 
V clause, first introduced in 1845 by Louisiana and Texas. 
Unlike Oregon, the second West Virginia provision35 was 
the third version of a Type II proportionality clause, first 
introduced by Missouri in 1820. In addition, a third pro-
vision36 was included, the special provision concerning rates 
introduced by Tennessee in 1834. Thus, the West Virginia 
structure of 1863 was identical to the complex structure first 
introduced in 1845 by Louisiana. Remember that in 1850 
Virginia had copied the Texas structure, which, unlike 
Louisiana's, was limited to a combination of Type V and 
Type II. However, in a new constitution adopted in 1870, 
Virginia added the supplementary provision concerning 
rates,37 so that its structure was now identical to that in 
Louisiana and West Virginia. 
Florida adopted new constitutions in 1861 and 1865 but 
left its uniformity clause of 1838 unchanged. However, 
when adopting a new constitution in 1868, Florida modified 
its original clause, the predecessor of both Types V and VI, 
so that it now conformed to the version of Type VI intro-
duced by Indiana in 1851.88 At about this same time four 
"old" states joined the parade, and in adopting new con-
82 Supra, p. 307. 
83 Supra, p. 333. 
84 Supra, p. 261. 
85 Supra, p. 262. 
86 Supra, p. 261. 
87 Supra, p. 542. 
88 Supra, p. 274. 
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stitutions also acquired for the first time uniformity clauses. 
They were Mississippi ( 1869), South Carolina ( 1865, 
1868), North Carolina ( 1868), and Georgia ( 1868). 
The new Mississippi Constitution of 1869 added another 
example of a multi-clause structure. Principally, the structure 
consisted of the Type V clause, introduced in 1845 by Loui-
siana and Texas, joined by the 1820 Missouri version of the 
Type II ad valorem clause.89 This was a combination which 
was to become quite popular. In addition, the Mississippi 
Constitution contained a third clause, which was a mixture of 
a Type IV clause, such as introduced in 1848 by Wisconsin, 
with Type I language: 
Property shall be assessed for taxes by uniform rules, accord-
ing to its true value.40 
A similar approach was taken by South Carolina. When that 
state adopted a new constitution in 1865 and acquired its first 
uniformity clause, a new variation of Type I, a single pro-
vision was sufficient. It read: 
All taxes upon property, real and personal, shall be laid upon 
the actual value of the property taxed, as the same shall be 
ascertained by an assessment made for the purpose of laying 
such a tax. 41 
However, within a few years South Carolina adopted another 
constitution ( 18 68), and in that constitution there was the most 
redundant uniformity structure yet to be found.42 The Type 
I clause introduced in 1865 was retained. Three other clauses 
were added. A Type VI clause, introduced by Indiana in 
1851, was combined with the 1820 Missouri version of the 
Type II ad valorem clause. The fourth provision was the 
variation of Type IX, introduced by New Hampshire. 
89 Supra, p. 249. 
' 0 Supra, p. 249. 
n Supra, p. 338. 
u Supra, p. 3 3 8. 
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North Carolina and Georgia were satisfied with less 
redundant uniformity structures. In its new constitution of 
1868, North Carolina included a single uniformity clause/8 
the version of the Type IV "uniform rule" provision first 
used by Ohio in 1851. Georgia also settled for a single uni-
formity clause, and in its new 1868 constitution included the 
following: 
Taxation on property shall be ad valorem, and uniform on all 
species of property taxed. 44 
This clause does not comfortably fit into any of the basic 
classifications heretofore used, and it was never adopted by 
any other state. 
During this period, Arkansas indulged in considerable 
constitutional revision.411 As pointed out above, the original 
Arkansas Constitution of 1836 contained a variation of the 
Type I ad valorem clause, supplemented by the special pro-
vision concerning rates first introduced by Tennessee in 1834. 
A new constitution adopted in 18 61 left the situation un-
changed. However, in its next new constitution, adopted in 
1868, Arkansas altered its uniformity structure, abandoning 
the provisions introduced in 1836 and adopting the Ohio 1851 
version of the Type IV "uniform rule" clause. But this 
change lasted for only a very brief period. In 18 7 5, another 
new constitution was adopted, and Arkansas reverted to its 
original uniformity clauses, which are still in force today. 
Action was taken by Nebraska in 18 7 5. That state was first 
admitted to the Union in 18 67, but the original constitution 
did not include a uniformity clause of any kind. However, 
in 1875, a new constitution was adopted and it included48 
48 Supra, p. 55 8. 
44 Supra, p. 364. 
411 Supra, p. SO. 
46 Supra, p. 166. 
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the version of the Type II "in proportion to value" clause 
introduced by Illinois in 1848. 
Before continuing the chronological development, it is 
interesting to note a trend which developed following the 
introduction of the clauses containing "uniform and/ or 
equal" terminology during the period from 184 5 to 18 51. 
When a Type V or Type VI clause was adopted it was not at 
all unusual for the state to adopt also one of the "value" 
clauses. Types I and II. When a Type IV "uniform rule" 
clause was adopted, we find quite often that within the basic 
uniformity clause itself was inserted "ad valorem" termi-
nology which before 1845 had been sufficient standing alone 
to constitute the basic uniformity clause. 
* * * * * 
The year 18 7 4 marks a very important date in the histori-
cal development of uniformity clauses. As the precursor of 
an era of liberalization, Pennsylvania introduced the original 
basic uniformity clause Type VII. This was the first uni-
formity clause to add to the words "taxes shall be uniform" 
the phrase "uniform within classes." Pennsylvania, one of the 
original thirteen states, had no uniformity clause of any kind 
in its original constitution. When a new constitution was 
adopted in 1874, the following provision was inserted: 
All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, 
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. 
47 
The Pennsylvania study in Chapter III showed that the 
introduction of this uniformity clause had no effect upon the 
effective uniformity limitation in Pennsylvania. However, 
the clause did expressly provide for a limitation which there-
tofore had been implied. 
Pennsylvania's action was followed immediately by 
47 Supra, p. 461. 
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Missouri in 1875. When Missouri was admitted to the Union 
in 1820, it had been one of the originators of the Type II 
"in proportion to value" clause. The first version was intro-
duced in 1818 by Illinois, a second version in 1819 by 
Alabama, and a third version in 1820 by Missouri. The 
Missouri version was adopted by several states, as this 
review has shown. In its new constitution of 18 7 5, Missouri 
retained its Type II proportionality clause, but added the 
Type VII clause originated by Pennsylvania the prior year.48 
The word "all" which modified the word "taxes" in the 
Pennsylvania clause was omitted. This combination of Type 
II with Type VII resulted in a great deal of confusion, as 
the Missouri study in Chapter III indicated, because the 
court found the two provisions in conflict. In determining the 
effective uniformity limitation a priority was given the Type 
II clause, with the effect of negating the newly introduced 
Type VII clause. However, this conflict was resolved in 1945 
by constitutional amendment which removed the source of 
conflict. In its new 1945 constitution Missouri deleted the 
Type II provision and inserted in its place a provision 
expressly authorizing the classification of property.49 
The experience of Georgia has been very similar to that of 
Missouri. As indicated above, Georgia adopted its first uni-
formity clause in 1868, providing that "Taxation on property 
shall be ad valorem, and uniform on all species of property 
taxed." When adopting a new constitution in 1877, Georgia 
modified this original provision so that it was phrased in 
substantially the same words of the Missouri 1820 version of 
Type II. Then, like Missouri, a second provision was added 
in the 18 77 constitution, the Type VII clause originated by 
Pennsylvania. Continuing the similarity, the resulting conflict 
in the Georgia judicial opinions was resolved by a 1938 
48 Supra, p. 419. 
49 Supra, p. 425. 
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amendment to the Georgia Constitution which deleted the 
Type II clause.110 
The pattern established by Pennsylvania, Missouri, and 
Georgia was also adopted by Colorado. Upon being admitted 
to the Union in 1876, Colorado included in its original con-
stitution111 the Pennsylvania Type VII provision. Colorado, 
like Pennsylvania, but unlike Missouri and Georgia, was 
satisfied with the single clause. At approximately the same 
time that the Type VII clause was being introduced, action 
was also taken in New Jersey and California. The New 
Jersey Constitution was amended in 18 7 5 by the adoption of 
the 18 68 Mississippi version of the Type IV "uniform rule" 
provision.52 Prior to 1875, New Jersey had no uniformity 
clause of any kind. In 1879, California adopted a new con-
stitution, and in doing so simplified its prior structure. As 
indicated above, when admitted to the Union in 1850, Cali-
fornia had incorporated both a Type V and Type II clause 
in its constitution. In the new 1879 constitution, the Type V 
clause was deleted, leaving only the Type II proportionality 
clause.113 
In marked contrast to the preceding forty years, there was 
no activity in this field during the decade of 1879-1889. This 
period of inactivity was ended with the entrance of six states 
into the Union from 1889 to 1890 (Montana, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Washington, Idaho, and Wyoming). Two of 
these six states, Montana in its constitution of 188954 and 
Idaho in its constitution of 1890,55 followed, in part, the 
example of Pennsylvania and adopted a Type VII clause. 
However, in each of those states the Type VII clause was ac-
110 Supra, p. 364. 
111 Supra, p. 349. 
112 Supra, p. 217. 
118 Supra, p. 107. 
114 Supra, p. 428. 
1111 Supra, p. 378. 
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companied by a basic clause of another type. The second 
Montana provision was the Type VI "uniform and equal" 
clause originated in 1 8 51 by Indiana. The second Idaho pro-
vision was the variation of the Type II proportionality clause 
originated in 1848 by Illinois. The studies of these two states, 
in Chapter III, revealed a conflict similar to that found in 
Missouri and Georgia where the Type VII clause was com-
bined with a potentially strict clause. However, the studies 
show that the Montana and Idaho courts resolved the conflict 
in diametrically opposed manners. 
The remaining four of these six states adopted pre-18 7 4 
type uniformity clauses. In its constitution of 1889 North 
Dakota introduced a new version of the Type IV provision, 
which contained, as well, words characteristic of Type I: 
Laws shall be passed taxing by a uniform rule all property 
according to its true value in money. 56 
This version of Type IV is quite similar to that originated by 
Mississippi in 18 69. Both South Dakota in its 18 8 9 consti-
tution57 and Wyoming in its 1890 constitution58 relied pri-
marily on the Type V "equal and uniform" clause first intro-
duced in 1845 by Louisiana and Texas. However, the South 
Dakota Constitution contained a second clause drawing on the 
combined characteristics of Types V, I and II: 
All taxes shall be uniform upon all real and personal prop-
erty, according to its value in money, to be ascertained, ... 
so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in pro-
portion to the value of his, her or its property.59 
No other state has ever adopted this rather unusually phrased 
provision. 
56 Supra, p. 562. 
57 Supra, p. 576. 
58 Supra, p. 270. 
119 Supra, p. 567. 
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Washington also included two uniformity clauses of differ-
ent types in its 18 8 9 constitution. 60 There was the now fa-
miliar combination of a Type VI clause, originated by In-
diana in 1851, with the 1820 Missouri version of a Type II 
proportionality clause. It is interesting to note that only 
Wyoming retains today the strict "equal and uniform" type 
clause, while North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington 
have all adopted a "uniformity within classes" provision 
originated in 1911 by North Dakota. 
At the time these six states were admitted to the Union 
the only other activity in the field of uniformity in taxation 
clauses was in Kentucky. In its new constitution of 18 91, 
Kentucky adopted a new version of the Type V clause first 
originated in 1845 by Louisiana and Texas. The provision 
read: 
Taxes shall be uniform upon all property subject to taxation 
within the territorial limits of the taxing authority .... 61 
Before this time, Kentucky had no uniformity clause of any 
kind in its constitution. 
Subsequent to 18 8 9-18 91, there was only intermittent 
activity on this front for nearly twenty years, to be exact, 
until 1911, when North Dakota introduced another new 
basic type of uniformity clause. Five states took some action 
of interest. On adopting its new constitution in 1897 Dela-
ware followed the lead of Pennsylvania. Originally, Dela-
ware had no uniformity clause of any kind, but in its 18 97 
constitution62 incorporated a Type VII clause originated in 
1874 by Pennsylvania. Three more states were soon added 
to the rapidly growing list adopting the Pennsylvania type 
clause. Virginia and Minnesota converted to the "uniformity 
60 Supra, p. 5 72. 
61 Supra, p. 549. 
62 Supra, p. 359. 
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within classes" type provision after having first adopted the 
stricter type clauses. In 1902, Virginia adopted a new consti-
tution and substituted the Type VII clause63 for its prior 
Type V "equal and uniform" clause, which had been supple-
mented by a Type II proportionality provision. In 1908, 
Minnesota adopted its so-called "wide open" tax amendment 
which abandoned its prior uniquely phrased provision which 
had been the source of so much trouble and confusion, and 
adopted the Type VII clause.64 Oklahoma, when admitted 
to the Union in 1907, incorporated a Type VII clause in its 
uniformity structure.65 In contrast to the "liberalizing" action 
taken during this twenty-year period by Delaware, Virginia, 
Minnesota, and Oklahoma, Utah adopted two of the stricter 
type clauses. Admitted to the Union in 1896, Utah incor-
porated in its constitution a Type VI clause, originated in 
1851 by Indiana, supplemented by the 1848 Illinois version 
of Type II "in proportion to value" clause.66 
* * * * * 
In 1911, North Dakota introduced the newest, and most 
liberal, of the several types of uniformity clauses. As indi-
cated above, North Dakota, on being admitted to the Union 
in 1889, had adopted a version of the Type IV "uniform 
rule" clause. Twenty-two years later North Dakota amended 
its constitution and adopted the original Type VIII clause: 
Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property 
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. 67 
By 1935, six other states (Arizona, Kentucky, South Dakota, 
63 Supra, p. 542. 
64 Supra, p. 393. 
65 Supra, p. 447. 
66 Supra, p. 342. 
67 Supra, p. 563. 
630 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
Washington, North Carolina, and Mary land) had adopted 
this type of uniformity clause. 
Arizona incorporated the provision in its original constitu-
tion68 upon being admitted to the Union in 1912. There-
maining five states converted to Type VIII from a more 
strict uniformity clause. In 1915, Kentucky abandoned its 
version of Type V which it had adopted in 1891, having had 
no uniformity clause before that time. By amendment of its 
constitution, Kentucky substituted a Type VIII clause.69 
South Dakota also abandoned a basic Type V clause when it 
amended its constitution in 1918 and joined its sister state, 
North Dakota, in relying on a Type VIII clause.70 Like 
North Dakota, South Dakota had adopted the stricter type 
uniformity clause on being admitted to the union in 18 8 9. 
About the same time that Arizona, Kentucky, and South 
Dakota were adopting verbatim the North Dakota clause, 
Mary land amended its constitution ( 1 915) and incorporated 
therein a basic uniformity clause which may be classified as 
Type VIII, but which differs substantially from the North 
Dakota phraseology. The provision reads: 
. . . all taxes . . . shall be uniform as to land within the 
taxing district, and uniform within the class or sub-class of 
improvements on land and personal property which the 
respective taxing powers may have directed to be subject to 
the tax levy. . 71 
Several years later, Washington (in 1930) and North 
Carolina (in 1935) amended their constitutions72 and 
adopted verbatim the original North Dakota clause. Wash-
ington converted from a combination of the Type VI clause, 
68 Supra, p. 545. 
69 Supra, p. 550. 
70 Supra, p. 568. 
71 Supra, p. 5 54. 
72 Supra, pp. 5 59, 573. 
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supplemented by a Type II proportionality provision. North 
Carolina had previously had a version of the Type IV "uni-
form rule" clause as a basic uniformity Clause. 
During this period of the growth of the Type VIII clause, 
two states joined the substantial number of states having a 
basic clause of Type VII as the primary uniformity provision. 
Oregon was one of those states which had redundantly com-
bined two uniformity clauses of Types V and VI, doing this 
in its original 1859 constitution. In 1917, the Oregon Con-
stitution was amended to substitute a single provision, a Type 
VII clause, as its basic provision. 73 Louisiana converted from 
its Type V clause, which it had originated in 1845, when it 
adopted a new constitution in 1 921 and included a Type VII 
clause. 74 Thus, the trend to adopt one of the two "uniformity 
within classes" type provisions was continued at a steady pace. 
As a result, at the present time thirteen states have a pro-
vision of the type originated in 1874 by Pennsylvania, Type 
VII, and seven have the North Dakota innovation, Type 
VIII. 
This trend towards adopting one of the "uniformity within 
classes" provisions, however, is only one branch of this 
"liberalizing" trend. The second branch occurred concur-
rently with the origin and growth of the liberal Type VIII 
clause. In a number of states the liberalization was brought 
about without an abandonment or change of a strict type uni-
formity clause. The method has been to leave the strict type 
provision unchanged, and amend the effective uniformity 
limitation of the state by adding a constitutional provision ex-
pressly sanctioning special treatment for a class or classes of 
property, usually intangible property, notwithstanding the 
basic uniformity clause. This technique was introduced in 
1913 by Maine. Maine has a Type I clause, and the court 
78 Supra, p. 457. 
74 Supra, p. 390. 
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had ruled that property taxation was governed by a strict de-
gree of uniformity: requiring absolute uniformity in rates 
and the use of the ad valorem method. In 1913, the Type I 
clause was left unchanged, but a new provision provided that 
special "rate" might be applied to intangible property.711 
Very similar situations are found in Nebraska, Kansas, 
Florida, Utah, and South Carolina. Nebraska had a Type II 
proportionality clause, and the effective uniformity limitation 
required the strictest degree of uniformity in the taxation of 
property: universality, absolute uniformity in rates, and the 
use of the ad valorem method. A 1920 amendment left the 
basic uniformity clause intact, but limited its application to 
the taxation of tangible property, with taxes to be "uniform 
as to class" and "by valuation upon all other property." The 
result is that intangibles may be classified for rates.76 
Kansas, Florida, Utah, and South Carolina all have a 
Type VI uniformity clause requiring "a uniform and equal 
rate of assessment and taxation." With the exception of 
Kansas, all required the strictest degree of uniformity in 
property taxation. In Kansas exemptions were permitted. 
In 1924, both Kansas and Florida provided by amendment 
for special treatment of intangible property.77 In Kansas only 
the rule requiring absolute uniformity in rates has been re-
laxed, and probably the same can be said of Florida. In 1930, 
Utah removed intangibles from the scope of the strict uni-
formity clause, and a fair reading of the amendment indicates 
that the taxation of intangibles is no longer limited by any of 
the three strict rules.78 In 1933, South Carolina also used an 
amendment to provide for special treatment of intangible 
property, but like Maine apparently the only relaxation of 
711 Supra, p. 58. 
76 Supra, p. 167. 
77 Supra, pp. 273, 307. 
78 Supra, p. 342. 
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strict uniformity is that a single special rate may be applied 
to such property. 79 
Action taken in Nevada in 1 942 also is of interest at this 
point. Nevada had a Type VI uniformity clause, and an 
amendment in 1942 also provided for special treatment of 
intangible property. But in Nevada the special treatment 
consists of requiring the exemption of intangibles from any 
taxation.80 It is interesting to note that of the six states 
presently having a basic uniformity clause of Type VI all but 
Indiana have provided in this manner for the taxation of 
intangible property to be removed from the scope of the uni-
formity limitation. However, in Indiana such an amendment 
was unnecessary, because, as the study in Chapter III showed, 
an unusual interpretation of the uniformity limitation has in 
fact permitted the exemption of intangibles from the general 
property tax and their separate taxation by a tax, conveniently 
characterized as a nonproperty tax not subject to the strict 
property uniformity limitation.81 
In Ohio, the special treatment proviso has a much broader 
scope. Prior to 1928, the Ohio court had given a Type IV 
"uniform rule" clause the strictest interpretation. In 1928, 
an amendment limited the application of that basic clause to 
taxation of "land and improvements," with the result that 
taxes on all personal property-not just intangibles-need 
only be uniform within classes.82 California made an abortive 
attempt in 1924 to provide special treatment for intangible 
property. In 1933, success was had with a broad amendment 
which, in fact, limited the Type II proportionality clause, 
formerly interpreted to require the strictest degree of uni-
formity, to the taxation of real property. The amendment 
79 Supra, p. 337. 
80 Supra, p. 333. 
81 Supra, p. 303. 
82 Supra, p. 222. 
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expressly permits the classification of all personal property 
for rates, its exemption from taxation, and the use of different 
methods of taxation. 88 
But this technique of modification through amendments 
providing for special treatment has found its broadest scope 
in West Virginia. The basic uniformity clause in that state is 
Type V, "taxation shall be equal and uniform." The effective 
uniformity limitation in that state required the strictest 
degree of uniformity. However, in 1932, West Virginia 
amended its constitution, and qualified the basic clause by this 
phrase: "subject to the exceptions in this section contained." 
The "exceptions" in fact included a classification of all prop-
erty, real and personal, into defined classes subject to differ-
ent maximum rates. The rules concerning universality and ad 
valorem method were left unchanged. 84 
Since 1911, which marked the origin of the Type VIII 
basic clause and preceded by only two years the use of 
"special treatment" amendments, only a single exception to 
the liberalizing trend has occurred. New Mexico was ad-
mitted to the Union in 1912, and its original constitution con-
tained a new version of the Type VI uniformity clause: "The 
rates of taxation shall be equal and uniform upon all subjects 
of taxation •.•• " Two years later, in 1914, there was a 
comprehensive revision of the New Mexico uniformity 
structure. The basic uniformity clause was now an unusual 
combination of Type VII, first originated in 1874 by Penn-
sylvania, and Type II. The provision reads: 
Taxes levied upon tangible property shall be in proportion to 
the value thereof, and taxes shall be equal and uniform upon 
subjects of taxation of the same class.811 
Thus, like several other states having a basic clause of Type 
88 Supra, p. 1 06. 
84 Supra, p. 261. 
811 Supra, p. 440. 
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VII, this potentially liberal provision was coupled with a 
clause which could potentially restrict the operation of the 
liberal provision. 
* * * * * 
The preceding chronological review of the ongm and 
growth of ' the so-called uniformity clauses reveals three 
definite periods. The first period might be called the period 
of inactivity, and extended from 1789 (the origin of the 
Union) to 1818. This period is characterized by a lack of 
any form of uniformity clause. The second period extends 
from 1818 to 1896, and might be called the restrictive 
period. This middle period is characterized by the adoption 
of the several basic types of uniformity clauses which may be 
called strict provisions-Types I through VI, and several 
clauses of peculiar phraseology no longer used by any state. 
The third period may be called the period of liberalization, 
and extended from 1874 to 1945. This period has two 
branches. First, there was the adoption of the two basic 
clauses, Types VII and VIII, which may be categorized as 
potentially liberal provisions, originating respectively in 
18 7 4 and 1911. The adoption of the Type VIII clause 
coincided with the beginning of the second branch of the 
"liberalization" trend; in 1913, there began the practice of 
introducing constitutional amendments providing for special 
treatment of enumerated classes of property, notwithstanding 
the presence of a strict type of uniformity clause which was 
left unchanged. Since 1945, there has been no activity of any 
kind in this field, which leaves us to speculate concerning the 
future course of events, since this summary will show that 
the counteracting third period has placed the situation in a 
near balance. 
During the first period, from 178 9 to 1818, twenty states 
entered the Union. Only five of those twenty states had pro-
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visions of any kind in their constitutions which might be 
called uniformity clauses. Of the original thirteen states, ten 
(Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, New Jersey, New York, 
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Caro-
lina, and Virginia) had no clause, one (Maryland) had a 
basic clause of Type IX, and two (Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire) had a "strict" clause. Three states were ad-
mitted in the next decade, 1790 to 1800. One state (Ken-
tucky) had no clause, one (Vermont) had a Type IX clause, 
and one (Tennessee) introduced the first version of a clause 
actually phrased in the words "uniform and equal," which 
was a "strict" clause. During the next two decades, to 1818, 
four states were admitted to the Union (Ohio, Louisiana, 
Indiana, and Mississippi) but none had any form of uni-
formity clause. 
In 1818, the year marking the beginning of a second 
period, the trend of the first period came to an abrupt halt. 
Since that time, twenty-eight states have entered the Union. 
Only three (Michigan in 1837, Iowa in 1846, and Nebraska 
in 1867) of those states have failed to include some sort of 
uniformity clause in its constitution. And in no case has any 
state which had a uniformity clause of some kind removed 
that clause without substituting another. Indeed, by 1897, 
only three of these eighteen states having once had no uni-
formity clause still remained without such a provision. They 
are Connecticut and New York of the original ten, and Iowa 
from among the others. This conversion occurred substan-
tially during the heart of the second period of "strict 
clauses," from 1840 to 18 7 5. 
The second period, characterized by the creation and adop-
tion of the potentially strict uniformity clauses (Types I 
through VI), was begun in 1818-18 2 0 by four new states 
(Illinois, Alabama, Maine, and Missouri). Each of those 
four states adopted some version of either Type I or Type II. 
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However, this was not typical of the period. A trend was 
clear by the 1850's. Not only was a potentially strict basic 
uniformity clause adopted, but the trend was heavily 
weighted in favor of adopting two or more of the several 
potentially strict type clauses, quite often combining one of 
the clauses actually phrased in terms of "equal and/or uni-
form" (Types IV through VI) with an ad valorem type 
clause (Types I and II). 
Three states (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and 
Tennessee) had adopted strict clauses before this second 
period had begun. Thus, combined with the four states above, 
this meant by 1830 seven states of the twenty-four then in 
the Union fell within the "strict clause" group. One other 
state (Arkansas) joined the trend in the 1830's, but the 
greatest concentration of activity during this second period 
occurred from 1840 to 1870. During the 1840's four more 
states (Louisiana, Florida, Texas, Wisconsin) adopted a 
strict clause, three of the states being new states and the 
fourth converting from "no clause." Now twelve of thirty 
states fell within the "strict clause" group, an increase from 
about 2 9% to 40% since the period began. 
The "strict clause" became even more popular during the 
next two decades. In the 1850's seven states (Virginia, Ohio, 
Indiana, Michigan, California, Minnesota, and Oregon) fell 
in line and adopted one or more strict uniformity clauses. 
Three of those seven states were new states--all of the new 
states admitted during the 1850's. Four of those seven states 
were old states converting from "no clause." The next decade 
saw the continuance of this strong trend. During the 1860's 
seven more states (Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Mississippi, Kansas, West Virginia, and Nevada) adopted 
one or more strict uniformity clauses. The division of those 
seven states was the same as in the 1850's, but during the 
1860's there was not a single state which chose to "adopt" no 
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uniformity clause at all. Thus, by the end of the 1860's 
twenty-six states fell within the "strict clause" group. There 
were now thirty-seven states in the Union, which meant that 
the "strict clause" group constituted approximately 70% 
of the total states. This was close to the peak of this trend, 
although as the period ended in 1896 there was a minute 
percentage gain. 
The 1870's saw the tapering off of the second period. 
During that decade only two states (New Jersey and Ne-
braska) adopted a strict uniformity clause. Both states con-
verted from "no clause" status. Balanced against this gain of 
two was a loss of two states (Georgia and Missouri) to the 
embryo period of "liberalization." Those two states adopted 
the new "uniformity within classes" type of provision. The 
1880's saw a clean gain of three states (North Dakota, South 
Dakota, and Washington) for the "strict clause" group, all 
three being new states. Again in the 1890's three more states 
(Kentucky, Wyoming, and Utah) adopted strict uniformity 
clauses. Two of these three were new states, one was an old 
state converting from "no clause." 
The second period in the development of the so-called 
uniformity clauses came to an end with the adoption of a 
strict clause by Utah in 1896. And this was the peak of the 
trend toward the development of the strict type uniformity 
clause. Now there were thirty-two states having such a clause, 
and only forty-five states in the Union. Thus, about 71% 
could be grouped among the "strict clause" states. Since 
1896, only one state (New Mexico in 1912) has adopted a 
"strict clause," and that state was to convert to the liberal 
provision within two years. Beginning in the early 1900's 
there was a steady erosion of the "strict clause group," so 
that today only twenty-three states have a basic uniformity 
clause of the potentially strict type. Moreover, this does not 
take into account the trend among those twenty-three states 
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to amend the effective uniformity limitation by special treat-
ment amendments. But even considering the twenty-three 
states, this means that the percentage of states classifiable as 
"strict clause" states is only about 48 %-a considerable loss 
from the peak 71 %. 
The erosion of this substantial group of states having some 
form of a "strict type" uniformity clause can be credited to 
the new force of liberalization given its initial impetus in 
1874. At the very time when the second period in the de-
velopment of uniformity in taxation was reaching its summit 
and gaining adherents in the greatest numbers a strong re-
action had set in, and the third period of development of the 
so-called uniformity clauses overlapped in its origin the 
demise of the "strict clause" period. This third period has 
two branches, and is characterized as a period of "liberaliza-
tion." The first branch has its root at the beginning of the 
period, and is the introduction of a potentially liberal clause 
framed in terms of "uniformity within classes." Two 
types of clauses are here considered, Type VII (uniformity 
within the same class of subjects) and Type VIII (uniformity 
within the same class of property). The second of these two 
liberal types of clauses was not introduced until 1911, and 
thus preceded by two years the second branch of the period 
of liberalization, which has been the trend to deal with the 
uniformity problem where necessary by "special treatment" 
amendments to the constitution. 
In 1874, Pennsylvania introduced the Type VII clause, 
which was adopted by three other states during the 1870's 
(Missouri, Colorado, and Georgia). One of these four states 
(Colorado) was a new state, one was an old state converting 
from the "no clause" status (Pennsylvania), and two were 
old states converting from the "strict clause" status (Missouri 
and Georgia). After this there was a slow, but steady, in-
crease in the number of "liberal clause" states during the next 
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thirty years. One state (Montana) adopted the liberal Type 
VII clause during the 1880's, that state being a new state. 
Two states (Delaware and Idaho) were added to this grow-
ing group during the 1890's, one being a new state and the 
other converting from "no clause." Three states (Virginia, 
Minnesota, and Oklahoma) adopted the liberal clause during 
the period from 1900 to 191 0. One was a new state, and two 
of the states converted from a "strict clause." 
During the second decade of the 1900's the growth of the 
"liberal clause" continued rapidly. Two states (Oregon and 
New Mexico) continued the trend by adopting the Type VII 
clause. Both of these states were converting from a "strict 
clause." During the same period, North Dakota originated 
the Type VIII clause in converting from a "strict clause" 
and four other states (Maryland, Kentucky, South Dakota, 
and Arizona) immediately adopted it. One of the four was a 
new state, two were converting from a "strict clause," and the 
fourth converted from a Type IX clause. 
During this same decade, 191 0 to 1920, Maine began the 
second branch of the liberalization trend by leaving its strict 
uniformity clause untouched, but introducing an amendment 
providing for special treatment of some property, thus 
modifying to a degree the effective strict uniformity limita-
tion. 
The remainder of the third period of development of the 
so-called uniformity clauses is characterized essentially by the 
trend to follow the lead of Maine and deal with the problem 
by special treatment amendments. In the 1920's one state 
(Louisiana) adopted a Type VII clause, converting from a 
strict clause, but no state adopted a Type VIII clause. In the 
1930's two states (North Carolina and Washington) con-
verted from a strict clause in adopting the Type VIII clause. 
Since the action taken by North Carolina in 1935, no state 
has converted to either a Type VII or Type VIII clause. 
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This period from 1920 to 1940 marked the rapid growth of 
the special treatment amendments. During the 1920's, four 
states having a "strict clause" (Nebraska, Ohio, Florida, and 
Kansas) adopted a constitutional amendment providing for 
special treatment for enumerated classes of property, the 
strict clause to the contrary notwithstanding. Similarly, four 
states (South Carolina, California, West Virginia, Utah) 
took such action during the 1930's. The only action taken 
since that time has been a special treatment amendment 
adopted in 1942 by Nevada. 
However, the enumeration of the adoptions by thirteen 
states of the Type VII clause, originated in 1874 by Penn-
sylvania, does not accurately reflect the status of uniformity 
clauses since, of the first six states to adopt such a clause prior 
to 1890, four joined it with one of the strict clauses: Mis-
souri, Georgia, Montana, and Idaho. Seven states have 
adopted a Type VII clause since that time, and only one 
(New Mexico) combined it with a strict clause. The experi-
ence of the four states combining the liberal and strict pro-
visions has well illustrated the confusion which stems from 
such a combination, and during the development of the 
second branch of this period of liberalization, two states 
(Missouri in 1945 and Georgia in 1938) have amended their 
constitutions to delete the strict clause. 
Since 1945, no action has been taken, either to continue 
the liberal period, or revive the strict period. Thus, in brief, 
the tendency originally was to omit any reference in the state 
constitutions to uniformity and equality in taxation. However, 
this tendency soon gave way to the trend which marks the 
second period-a tendency to insert in the constitution a clause 
which provided, on its face, for a strict degree of uniformity 
and equality in taxation. It should be noted that these strict 
clauses were phrased in various ways, many omitting any 
reference to the terms "uniform or equal" and relying on 
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"according to" or "in proportion to value." At the same time, 
during this second period there was a tendency to complicate 
the uniformity structure by the inclusion of several clauses, 
any one of which might have served as a source of the strict 
degree of uniformity limitation. Before this second period 
had ended a third had already begun-the trend to return 
to the original effective status. But, there was this important 
difference. Originally, there was no requirement of strict uni-
formity because of the absence of any express uniformity 
provision. Now the result was to be reached by express pro-
visions phrased in terms of "uniformity within classes." 
In summary, we find that twenty-three states retain today 
the basic uniformity clause of a potentially strict type. This 
is a considerable recession from the one-time high of thirty-
two. Twenty states now have a basic uniformity clause of a 
potentially liberal type, and to these twenty must be added 
the three states which remain without a uniformity clause of 
any kind, and the two states having a Type IX clause. Thus, 
there appears to be a near balance of twenty-three to twenty-
five. However, this does not take into account the fact that 
ten of the twenty-three strict states have modified to some 
degree their effective limitation by special treatment amend-
ments. Thus, there remain only thirteen states having the 
strict clause standing alone. However, a severe imbalance has 
not yet been created, and there is great room for develop-
ment. Especially is there room for development in light of 
the disparity which oftentimes exists between literal and 
effective uniformity limitations. Moreover, it must be re-
membered that even among the so-called strict and liberal 
states, there are several varying degrees of effective uniform-
ity limitations. 
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B. A SUMMARY COMPARISON OF EFFECTIVE AND LITERAL 
LIMITATIONS IN TERMS OF PARTICULAR RULES OF UNIFORMITY 
An attempt will now be made to make certain generaliza-
tions concerning the meaning of the several types of uni-
formity clauses, as classified according to phraseology, 1 with 
primary interest being in the uniformity limitation applica-
ble to the taxation of property. The state by state analysis 
in Chapter III should have impressed one with the fact that 
the effective uniformity limitation is quite often determined 
not only by almost imperceptible gradations in the phrase-
ology of the basic uniformity clauses themselves, but as well 
by other provisions in the constitution of a given state. These 
other provisions are either alternate uniformity clauses or 
provisions dealing with some particular rule of uniformity 
for the taxation of property. In addition, the complex histor-
ical growth of the uniformity provisions, described in the 
preceding section of this chapter, emphasizes the danger of 
referring to "the" requirement of uniformity and equality 
found in state constitutions, for such a reference is latent 
with potentially misleading conclusions. Not only do the 
words of the basic uniformity clauses vary considerably, but 
the combinations of provisions which make up the uniformity 
structures of the several state constitutions are seldom iden-
tical. 
Nevertheless, as long as one bears in mind the dangers 
of generalizations in this area, it will be helpful to recapitu-
late in general terms the effective uniformity limitations as 
compared with the literal uniformity limitations. Two dis-
tinctly different approaches will be used in making this anal-
ysis. First, the particular rules of uniformity derived from 
1 Cf. Matthews, Wm. L., Jr., "The Function of Constitutional Pro-
visions Requiring Uniformity in Taxation," 38 Ky. L. J. 31, 187, 377, 
503 ( 1949-1950); Note, "Uniformity of Taxation," 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 
728 (1940). 
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the general uniformity clauses will be summarized. Sec-
ondly, a comparison will be made of the uniformity struc-
tures of the several states taken as a whole. 
1. A "Rule by Rule" Summary Analysis 
Throughout this monograph, four basic inqumes have 
been made into the operative effect of each state's uniformity 
structure. First, does the uniformity clause apply to all 
taxes, or only property taxes? Second, is there a rule of uni-
versality? In other words, must all property, except that 
designated as exemptible by the constitution, be selected for 
taxation? Third, what does the uniformity clause require in 
respect to the effective rate of a property tax? Or more pre-
cisely, must all property taxed by a single taxing authority 
be assessed for taxation at the same ratio of valuation and 
subject to the same percentage rate so that an absolute uni-
formity is required of the effective rate? Or, to the contrary, 
is only a uniformity within classes required? Fourth, does 
the uniformity clause require that property be taxed only by 
the ad valorem method, or may specific taxes be used? The 
answers to each of these questions in respect to each type of 
uniformity clause, as classified according to phraseology, 
will now be summarized. 
a. Application 
Do the uniformity clauses apply to all taxes, or only to 
the taxation of property? The results as to this question are, 
for the most part, not unexpected. For example, among those 
states (Arkansas, Maine, and Tennessee) having a Type I 
basic clause (Property shall be taxed according to its value), 
and those states (Alabama, California, Illinois, and N e-
braska) having some version of a Type II clause (Property 
shall be taxed in proportion to its value), it would have been 
surprising, indeed, startling to have found a ruling that such 
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provisions applied to other than property taxation. There 
were no surprises. 2 
Similarly, one would expect that a Type III basic uni-
formity clause (The legislature may impose proportional 
and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes upon all persons 
and estates within the commonwealth) would in all likeli-
hood apply only to property taxes. Such is the case in Mas-
sachusetts.3 However, a very unusual situation exists in New 
Hampshire, the second of the two states having this type of 
basic clause. As shown in the New Hampshire study/ in that 
state only "property" taxes are permissible, and, conse-
quently, all taxes are subject to the proportionality limita-
tion. However, the apparent rigidity of that situation was 
relieved in 1903 by an amendment of the constitution. Be-
fore 1903, only the ad valorem general property tax was 
permissible. Under the 1903 amendment a second category 
of "property" taxes is permissible, namely, taxes on "other 
classes of property," as opposed to the taxation of "estates~" 
The latter is the characterization given the ad valorem 
general property tax. The practical effect of this amendment 
is to permit the imposition of most taxes, but not quite all, 
usually characterized as nonproperty taxes in the other 
forty-seven states. However, these taxes upon "other classes 
of property" are still limited by the proportionality 
clause. Here, too, an impossible rigidity is avoided by an 
interpretation which admits that there is no necessity of a 
"correlation" of the uniformity requirement among the sev-
eral "property" taxes. Nevertheless, the result is that these 
taxes upon "other classes of property" are subject to a degree 
of uniformity somewhat stricter than that required of non-
property taxes in the other states. This unique situation must 
2 Supra, pp. 51, 59, 67, 96, 109, 118, 168. 
8 Supra, p. 173. 
4 Supra, p. 182. 
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be kept constantly in mind when making any comparative 
survey, because the characterization of any tax, for example, 
an income tax, as a "property" tax is the prime requisite for 
its existence in New Hampshire. To the contrary, in most 
states the problem is one of characterizing an income tax as 
a nonproperty tax in order that it may be upheld. 
Among those states having some version of the Type IV 
basic uniformity clause (A uniform rule of taxation), three 
states (New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin) limit the applica-
tion of the clause to property taxes-however, all such taxes 
are limited.5 In New Jersey and Ohio the phraseology of the 
respective provisions is expressly framed in reference to the 
taxation of property. However, the same result was reached 
in Wisconsin where the clause is not so phrased. The fourth 
state having a Type IV clause is Michigan. There we found 
a unique application of the basic uniformity clause.6 For 
purposes of uniformity all taxes in Michigan are classified as 
either ad valorem or specific. The Type IV clause applies 
only to ad valorem taxes. Thus, the clause, while limiting 
only property taxation, does not limit all such taxation. All 
nonproperty taxes are characterized as specific taxes, but 
property taxes may be either ad valorem or specific, depend-
ing on the method of taxation. Thus, all nonproperty taxes 
and some property taxes are specific taxes, while only some 
property taxes are ad valorem taxes. Specific taxes are lim-
ited by a separate uniformity clause which only requires that 
such taxes "shall be uniform upon the classes upon which 
they operate." This distinction is unique, in that all other 
states the basic distinction for purposes of uniformity is be-
tween property and nonproperty taxes. Consequently, con-
trary to the usual situation, the method of taxing property 
is not governed by the uniformity limitation, rather the ap-
11 Supra, pp. 218, 224, 235. 
8 Supra, p. 198. 
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plicable rules of uniformity are determined by the method 
used to tax property. The result in Michigan, as in New 
Jersey and Ohio of this group, was foreshadowed by the 
particular phraseology of the Michigan version of the Type 
IV clause: "The legislature shall provide by law a uniform 
rule of taxation, except on property paying specific taxes. 
. . ." (Emphasis added.) 
Unanimity is found among those ten states having either 
a Type V basic uniformity clause (Taxation shall be equal 
and uniform) or a Type VI clause (The legislature shall 
provide by law for a uniform and equal rate of assessment 
and taxation). Neither of these basic types has been held 
applicable to other than property taxation. Of course, the 
words of the Type V clause do not necessarily preclude a 
larger scope of operation, although the result is probable in 
view of the literal strictness of the provision. Wyoming7 is 
the only state which has a Type V clause standing alone, un-
accompanied by any supplementary provisions similar to 
other basic types. Indeed, the word "taxation" in the Wy-
oming clause is modified by the word "All," which is not 
the case in the other three states having this type basic clause 
(Mississippi, Texas, and West Virginia).8 The result was 
more certain under the Type VI clause, considering phrase-
ology alone. Moreover, five of the six states having this type 
clause (Florida, Indiana, Nevada, South Carolina, and 
Utah) coupled in the same sentence with the basic clause a 
provision requiring the just valuation of all property.9 Kan-
sas, the sixth state in this group, did not incorporate the sup-
plementary clause into its basic uniformity clause.10 
The greatest diversity in result, as might well have been 
7 Supra, p. 271. 
8 Supra, pp. 250, 255, 263. 
9 Supra, pp. 275, 282, 334, 339, 344. 
10 Supra, p. 308. 
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expected, was found among the thirteen states having 'a Type 
VII basic uniformity clause (Taxes shall be uniform upon 
the same class of subjects). This clause could very well be 
applied· to all taxes without regard to the nature of the tax, 
and no unusual rules would necessarily result from this 
application. However, if this type clause is held applicable 
to all taxes, one may more logically reach the result that a 
strict uniformity governs the taxation of property by holding 
that property constitutes a single "subject" of taxation. In 
seven of these thirteen states the courts have ruled that the 
clause applies to all taxes. The seven are: Delaware, Geor-
gia, Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Pennsyl-
vania.11 And, contrary to what might be expected, among 
these seven states are found some of the most liberal inter-
pretations given the property tax uniformity limitation. 
Thus, in Delaware, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and, with 
some reservation, Pennsylvania, only a uniformity within 
classes is required of property taxes.12 In Georgia and Mis-
souri the strictness of the property tax uniformity limitation 
stemmed from supplementary provisions which were inter-
preted to mean that property was to be a single "subject" of 
taxation. These supplementary provisions have since been 
deleted by amendment. 13 No clear ruling on the question of 
application has been made in New Mexico and Virginia.14 
However, in both of those states at least some degree of 
classification is allowed in effective rates, although other 
strict rules of uniformity apply. 
The remaining three states having a Type VII clause are 
Colorado, Idaho, and Montana.15 In those states, the uni-
formity clause applies only to property taxes. And here we 
11 Supra, pp. 360, 366, 378,419,448,458, 537. 
12 Infra, p. 678. 
13 /nfra, p. 678. 
14 Supra, pp. 442, 544. 
111 Supra, pp. 350, 380, 430. 
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find excellent illustrations of diametrically opposed judicial 
attitudes toward the uniformity in taxation concept.16 In 
Montana classification of property for effective rates is per-
missible. To reach this conclusion, the Montana court relied 
on the Type VII clause which it said sanctioned such legisla-
tive discretion notwithstanding a Type VI clause also found 
in the Montana constitution. An opposite tack was taken by 
the Idaho court. The Idaho constitution also contained a 
supplementary provision which might have conflicted with a 
liberal interpretation of the Type VII clause. But the Idaho 
court, which ruled that the strictest degree of uniformity 
applies to property taxes, saw no potential conflict. Rather, 
the court simply referred to the Type VII clause as "a" uni-
formity clause, applicable only to property taxation, and 
necessarily requiring of its own force a strict uniformity. All 
types of uniformity clauses were simply lumped together, 
ignoring marked differences in phraseology. In Colorado 
the court has indicated that the Type VII clause limits only 
property taxes, and lip service has been given to the power 
of the legislature to classify property for effective rates. 
There has been very little judicial development on the mat-
ter, and a subsequent constitutional amendment expressly 
provides for the classification of personal property. 
One would naturally expect that the words of a Type VIII 
basic uniformity clause (Taxes shall be uniform upon the 
same class of property) would limit its application to prop-
erty taxes. However, such was the case only in Arizona, 
Maryland, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington.17 
To the contrary, in both Kentucky and North Carolina the 
courts have started from the premise that the clause limits 
all taxes.18 The only result of this position is that the courts 
16 See the discussion, infra, pp. 660-662. 
17 Supra, pp. 545, 555, 564, 569, 574. 
18 Supra, pp. 551,559. 
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of those two states simply erected unnecessary obstacles 
which it then became necessary to avoid. 
Finally, in Vermont the Type IX basic uniformity clause 
has been held to be applicable to all taxes.19 There has been 
no clarification of the problem in Rhode Island, the only 
other state having this type clause. In any case, in neither 
state has this particular rule played a role of any importance 
because of the liberal content of the property tax uniformity 
limitation. 
b. The requirement of universality 
The next question to be considered is whether the legisla-
ture may exempt classes of property from taxation. Con-
versely stated, is there a rule of universality. In making a 
comparative study of the effective uniformity limitations as 
to this particular rule one must be very careful to avoid 
generalizations which may be misleading, because in a great 
many cases the rule of universality (or, the lack of such a 
rule) will stem expressly from some supplementary provi-
sion of the uniformity structure of a given state. 
There is some apparent diversity in result among those 
three states (Arkansas, Maine, and Tennessee) having a 
Type I basic uniformity clause. Both Arkansas and Tennes-
see require universality in the taxation of property.20 To the 
contrary, in Maine there is no requirement of universality. 21 
However, in the constitutions of both Arkansas and Tennes-
see there are elaborate provisions dealing with the exemption 
of constitutionally designated classes of property. In Maine, 
the constitution does not enumerate exemptible classes of 
property. Nevertheless, the Maine court has held that ex-
emptions must be on a statewide basis so that there must be a 
19 Supra, p. 593. 
20 Supra, pp. 54, 68. 
21 Supra, p. 62. 
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correlation between state and local exemptions, although 
correlation is not necessary as between state and local prop-
erty tax rates. It is of further interest that in Tennessee the 
exemption of all representative intangible property is now 
permissible under a "double taxation" rationale, although 
such property may be taxed. As for the source of the uni-
versality limitation, in both Tennessee and Arkansas the 
courts have indicated that the requirement might well be 
derived from the basic uniformity clause itself. Nevertheless, 
in each state there are other provisions which are sufficient 
to support a rule of universality even in the absence of a 
ruling that the requirement that "property be taxed accord-
ing to its value" means all property must be taxed. 
Again, a diversity in results is found among the four states 
having a Type II basic clause. There is no requirement of 
universality in Alabama,22 but the opposite holds true in 
California, Illinois, and Nebraska.23 However, in California 
an amendment was adopted in 1933 expressly removing this 
requirement insofar as personal property is concerned. In the 
two states (Massachusetts and New Hampshire) having a 
Type III basic clause, one finds an interesting similarity in 
the status of this rule. In neither of these states is there a 
requirement of universality. 24 However, in both states the 
power of the legislature to exempt classes of property is 
limited to a considerable extent. In New Hampshire, the 
reasonable classification test is coupled with a test of "just 
reason" and "public welfare." In Massachusetts, exemptions 
are limited to those "not impairing the force" of the consti-
tutional principle of proportionality. 
The diversity in results continues among the four states ' 
(Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin) having a 
22 Supra, p. 99. 
28 Supra, pp. 113, 126, 169. 
24 Supra, pp. 176, 189. 
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Type IV basic uniformity clause. In Michigan, with its 
unique situation, the applicability of the uniformity clause is 
determined by the "rate-base" structure, i.e., the method of 
taxation of property. Since the uniformity clause applies only 
to property taxed ad valorem, there is no requirement of 
universality derived from the requirement of "a uniform 
rule" of taxation. Thus, even as to property selected for ad 
valorem taxation, subclassifications may be made for the 
purposes of exemptions.25 In New Jersey there is no rule of 
universality, 26 and the same now holds true for Wisconsin. 
However, in Wisconsin this result was reached only after 
extended controversy and conflict among the cases. These 
conflicts were reconciled in 1906 with a definitive ruling that 
the "uniform rule" requirement does not demand that all 
property be taxed. 27 The fourth of these four states has 
reached an opposite result. In Ohio the court has ruled that 
the words "uniform rule" demand universality.28 That result 
was reached even though a universality requirement was 
spelled out in supplementary words. This situation in Ohio 
was changed by amendment in 1 92 9. Since that time, there 
is no requirement of universality for personal property, but 
as to realty there remains some doubt which has not yet 
been settled. 
Turning now to those four states (Mississippi, Texas,-West 
Virginia, and Wyoming) having the Type V uniformity 
clause, we continue to find diversity in results as to this par-
ticular rule of uniformity. In both Texas and West Virginia, 
there is a requirement of universality, which the courts have 
said is derived from the basic uniformity clause, even though 
the limitation is also found in supplementary provisions.29 To 
211 Supra, p. 212. 
26 Supra, p. 218. 
27 Supra, p. 245. 
28 Supra, p. 227. 
29 Supra, pp. 257, 266. 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 653 
the contrary, in Wyoming there is no requirement of uni-
versality.30 However, this is so only because the power to 
exempt classes of property from taxation is spelled out in a 
supplementary provision. Indeed, the Wyoming court has 
indicated that this express clause makes an exception to the 
rule of uniformity embodied in the requirement that "taxa-
tion shall be equal and uniform," which would otherwise 
require universality. In Mississippi, no requirement of uni-
versality is found, but there has been no indication whether 
or not the power of exemption is an exception to the require-
ment of uniformity and equality in taxation.31 
Among the six states (Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Nevada, 
South Carolina, and Utah) having a Type VI basic uni-
formity clause there is a greater similarity in result. As 
pointed out before, in the constitutions of all of these states, 
except Kansas, the basic uniformity clause is coupled with a 
provision in the same sentence providing for a "just valua-
tion" of property. In Florida, Nevada, South Carolina, and 
Utah there is a clear requirement of universality. 32 It is true 
that in all of those four states the courts have at times relied 
upon the "just valuation" clause as well as other supplemen-
tary provisions to reach this conclusion; nevertheless, they 
have all given indications that the requirement would in any 
case be derived from the basic uniformity clause itself. The 
universality requirement in those four states has been avoided 
to some degree, for example, as in Nevada where by amend-
ment since 1942 it has been required that intangibles be 
exempt from taxation. Similarly, by an amendment of the 
Utah Constitution in 1930 intangibles are no longer subject 
to the requirement of universality. 
In Kansas, we find a direct conflict with the interpretation 
80 Supra, p. 272. 
81 Supra, p. 252. 
82 Supra, pp. 278, 335, 340, 34-5. 
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given this type of clause by the above states. The Kansas 
court has ruled that this provision does not require univer-
sality.88 However, in Kansas exemptions must meet, in addi-
tion to the test of reasonable classification, a test of "public 
interest." But the most interesting result among this group 
of states is found in Indiana. 34 In that state we find a sharp 
distinction being made between the "selection" of property 
for taxation and the "exemption" of property from taxation. 
The court has ruled that once the legislature has selected a 
general class of property for ad valorem taxation, any at-
tempt to "exempt" a part of that general class-however 
reasonable that sub-classification might appear to be as a 
class-is a violation of the requirement that there be a "uni-
form and equal rate of assessment and taxation" because such 
"exemptions" produce "inequality" in the tax burden. How-
ever, one is not unwarranted in concluding that the court has 
in fact permitted the exemptions of intangibles from the ad 
valorem general property tax. It reasoned that the uniform-
ity clause does not limit the power of the legislature to "se-
lect" a general class of property, such general class being less 
than the whole which it might "select" as object for the gen-
eral property tax. This sharp, and perhaps overly refined 
line of distinction, as was described in the separate state 
study, stemmed from the attempts to devise new ways of 
taxing intangibles in Indiana. The legislature, recognizing 
the need to reach all intangibles by a lower rate tax, and 
being restricted by the requirement of absolute uniformity in 
effective rates, enacted a separate intangibles tax which con-
tained an in lieu provision removing, in effect, all intangibles 
from the general property tax. The intangibles tax itself was 
upheld by the process of designating it a nonproperty tax, 
not upon intangibles themselves, but upon certain named 
83 Supra, p. 310. 
34 Supra, p. 303. 
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privileges. The in lieu provision was then upheld by the 
process of designating the same as being nothing more than a 
"withdrawal" of intangibles from the general class of prop-
erty taxables. This power of "withdrawal" was said to be 
simply one aspect of the power of "selection," thus there was 
no restriction placed upon the "withdrawal" by the uniform-
ity clause. Consequently, a "withdrawal" was said to be 
something other than, and not synonymous with, "exemp-
tion." This distinction was based to some degree on the ra-
tionale that the general class of property "selected" was to 
be based upon the character or nature of the property, not 
upon its use as are the "exemptions." 
c. Uniformity and effective rates 
The third question to be considered, in comparing the 
effective uniformity limitations as to the particular rules of 
uniformity, concerns the degree of uniformity which is re-
quired of effective rates. That is, may a classified property 
tax be levied? 
As might be expected, in all of the states (Arkansas, 
Maine, and Tennessee) having a basic clause of Type I 
(Property shall be taxed according to its value) that provi-
sion is interpreted as requiring absolute uniformity in the 
effective rate applicable to all property taxed by any one 
taxing authority. In Arkansas and Tennessee there is a sup-
plementary provision dealing directly with this problem, but 
the requirement is said to be derived from the basic uniform-
ity clause as welP15 In Maine, the situation has been altered 
to some degree by an amendment providing for special treat-
ment of intangible property. Such property may be taxed at 
a different "rate" from that applied to other property ac-
tually taxed.86 
811 Supra, pp. S S, 86. 
36 Supra, p. 61. 
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Among those four states (Alabama, California, Illinois, 
and Nebraska) having the Type II clause (Property shall be 
taxed in proportion to value) a uniformity of result was also 
found, disregarding subsequent amendments making express 
inroads on this limitation. In each of the states an absolute 
uniformity in effective rates was required. However, in Cali-
fornia an amendment now provides that personal property 
is to be excepted from the operation of the uniformity clause 
and it may be classified for application of different rates. 37 
Similarly, in Nebraska there has been a modification by 
amendment adopted in 1920 providing for the classification 
of intangible property for the application of rates.38 As for 
the development in Illinois on this point, we find one of the 
most interesting situations revealed by the entire state by 
state analysis. The Illinois court has constantly given lip 
service to the doctrine that absolute uniformity of effective 
rates is required. Nevertheless, it was shown that in fact the 
Illinois court has sanctioned a de facto system of classification 
of property for the purpose of applying different ratios of 
valuation, consequently permitting to some degree a classified 
property tax even though an absolute uniformity is actually 
required as to the percentage rate.39 True to form, the una-
nimity of result as to this problem continues in Massachu-
setts and New Hampshire, the two states having a Type Ill 
clause. In both of these states, an absolute uniformity in ef-
fective rates is required. 40 
Turning to those four states having basic uniformity clauses 
of Type IV (A Uniform Rule of Taxation), or some varia-
tion of that clause, we find some diversity in the effective 
limitations. In two states (Ohio and Wisconsin) absolute 
87 Supra, p. 113. 
88 Supra, p. 170. 
89 Supra, p. 129. 
4° Supra, pp. 1791 190, 
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uniformity in effective rates is without any question required, 
the requirement being derived from this type clause.41 How-
ever, in Ohio by an amendment adopted in 1929, personal 
property has been expressly removed from the scope of the 
operation of the uniformity clause and such property may be 
classified for the application of different effective rates. An 
opposite result was found in New Jersey, where it has been 
held that classification of property for rates is permissible.42 
It should be pointed out that since 194 7 it appears that real 
property in New Jersey constitutes a minimum class by force 
of an express amendment to the uniformity provision. In the 
fourth state of this group, Michigan, we have the unique 
situation already referred to in the preceding discussion of 
universality. In Michigan, the uniformity clause of Type IV 
limits only property taxed ad valorem. As to such property 
an absolute uniformity in effective rates is required. As to 
that property taxed by a "specific" property tax, the only 
requirement is that the rates be uniform within classes.43 
A uniformity in results was also found among those four 
states (Mississippi, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming) 
having a Type V clause (Taxation shall be,equal and uni-
form), and those six states (Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Ne-
vada, South Carolina, and Utah) having a Type VI clause 
(The legislature shall provide by law for a uniform and 
equal rate of assessment and taxation). In all of those states 
it was ruled that an absolute uniformity in effective rates was 
required by such uniformity clauses.44 However, in the Kan-
sas study45 the pattern was disturbed by an anomalous case 
decided in 1949 in which the court apparently relaxed or, at 
41 Supra, pp. 227, 245. 
42 Supra, p. 219. 
43 Supra, p. 213. 
44 Supra, pp. 25 3, 259, 266, 272, 279, 303, 311, 335, 340. 
45 Supra, p. 320. 
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least, ignored the strict uniformity requirement in upholding 
a tax on the property of private car companies. It was pointed 
out that the single case hardly warranted a conclusion that 
the Kansas court has reversed the interpretation formerly 
given to the basic uniformity clause, but that the case simply 
stands as an interesting anomaly illustrating the manner in 
which the strict uniformity limitations have caused much 
difficulty. Because of the inflexibility of this strict limitation 
a substantial number of these ten states have seen fit to par-
tially avoid the result. This has not been done by the adop-
tion of a more liberal type of uniformity clause. Rather, in 
each case, the procedure has been to retain the same uni-
formity clause while adopting an amendment providing for 
special treatment of named classes of property. Thus, for 
example, in West Virginia (of Group V) an amendment 
adopted in 1932 classifies all property and provides for a 
different maximum rate to be applied to each of the classes.46 
Indeed, in five of the six states having a Type VI clause an 
amendment has been adopted which alters to some degree 
the effective uniformity limitation. Since 1924, in Florida it 
has been permissible to classify intangibles for different 
rates.47 In Indiana, there has been no amendment; however, 
the interpretation referred to in the universality discussion 
has permitted the "exemption" of intangibles from the prop-
erty tax and the imposition thereon of a "nonproperty" tax, 
the rate of which obviously differs from the general property 
tax rate.48 Since 1924, in Kansas an amendment has expressly 
provided for the classification of intangible property for 
rates.49 In Nevada no modification has been made as to 
rates; however, as noted above, all intangibles must be ex-
'6 Supra, p. 268. 
47 Supra, p. 280. 
48 Supra, p. 285. 
49 Supra, p. 323. 
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empt by authority of a 1942 amendment.110 A 1932 amend-
ment to the South Carolina Constitution provides for the 
classification of intangibles for a different "rate" from that 
applied to other property.~1 And in Utah a 1930 amendment 
provides for special treatment of intangibles by classification 
for application of different rates.ll2 
In summary, of the twenty-three states which have basic 
uniformity clauses ranging from Type I through Type VI, 
only one state, New Jersey, permits property to be classified 
for the purpose of applying different effective rates. Other-
wise, there was a unanimity of agreement that those types of 
uniformity clauses require an absolute uniformity in effective 
rates, which, however, has been avoided in nine states by 
amendments withdrawing to varying degrees certain classes 
of property (usually intangibles) from the scope of the uni-
formity clause. In addition, there is the unique situation in 
Michigan which results in the absolute uniformity in rates 
requirement being only "partially" applicable; that is, only 
as to property taxed ad valorem. Finally, there is the very 
unusual development in Illinois where a de facto classification 
system has been sanctioned, the continuation of which could 
well make a farce out of the apparent strict uniformity lim-
itation. 
Turning now to those twenty states having basic uniform-
ity clauses of either Type VII (Taxes shall be uniform upon 
the same class of subject) or Type VIII (Taxes shall be uni-
form upon the same class of property), we find a result as 
completely in favor of classification-at least by way of lip 
service-as was the result against classification under the 
basic clauses of Types I through VI. 
Of the thirteen states having a Type VII basic uniformity 
llO Supra, p. 333. 
Ill Supra, p. 341. 
112 Supra, p. 34 7. 
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clause, only one, Idaho, has clearly ruled that an absolute 
uniformity in effective rates is required,58 but in the Idaho 
Constitution there is a plenitude of uniformity provisions. 
The Type VII basic uniformity clause is coupled with a "just 
valuation" type clause, and in another section of the consti-
tution there is a Type II "proportionality" clause. Neverthe-
less, the Idaho court has never recognized any possible 
conflict among these s~veral provisions. The basic clause of 
Type VII is simply referred to as requiring an absolute uni-
formity in effective rate, even though the court has limited 
the application of that provision to the taxation of property. 
As pointed out in the Idaho study, the court as recently as 
1952 refers to the Type VII clause as one requiring taxes 
to "be uniform," or containing a "requirement of uniform-
ity" and "equality in burden," or as "the constitutional man-
date of equality of taxation." The words "upon the same 
class of subjects" have simply been ignored. 
In the remaining twelve states of this group property may 
ostensibly, at least, be classified for the purpose of applying 
different effective rates. This result has not been easily 
reached in all cases, and, indeed, in some instances it would 
appear that this power to classify will be viewed rather hos-
tilely by the court when exercised. For example, the Colo-
rado court in its opinions has indicated that classification of 
property is permissible, but in fact its decisions indicate that 
in all likelihood little classification will be approved other 
than a broad classification such as personal property and real 
property, with intangible property possibly being a permissi-
ble class. The power to classify personal property into fur-
ther subclassifications was spelled out in a 1936 amendment 
adding a new section to the Colorado Constitution. In fact, 
however, the express proviso may well result in even further 
limiting the power to classify personal property because it 
58 Supra, p. 383. 
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apparently is now conditioned upon the imposition of an in-
come tax. 54 In New Mexico no categorical answer as to classi-
fication has been given.5~ Some question might well arise as 
to the extent of permissible classification because of the unu-
sual phraseology of the New Mexico uniformity clause. 
"Tangible property" is to be taxed in proportion to value, 
and in the absence of decisions one is not warranted in 
concluding that classification of "tangible property" into sub-
classifications would be permitted. The supplementary "pro-
portionality" clause might well be used to establish "tangible 
property" as a minimum subject of taxation as occurred in 
Georgia and Missouri. 
There has been considerable confusion and difficulty con-
cerning this question in Georgia,56 Missouri,57 and Mon-
tana.58 In all three states, the Type VII clause was accom-
panied by a supplementary clause which on its face would be 
more strict. In Georgia and Missouri, there appeared, in ad-
dition to the Type VII clause, supplementary clauses of 
Type I (property shall be taxed according to its value) and 
Type II (property shall be taxed in proportion to its value). 
In both states, the courts held that the supplementary provi-
sions established property as a single minimum subject of 
taxation, and consequently a further subclassification for ef-
fective rates was not permissible. An opposite result was 
found in Montana, where the court had to reconcile a poten-
tial conflict between a Type VII clause and a supplementary 
provision of Type VI (The legislature shall provide by law 
for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation). 
The Montana court held that had there been no clause of 
54 Supra, p. 3 57. 
55 Supra, p. 445. 
56 Supra, p. 376. 
57 Supra, p. 427. 
58 Supra, p. 434. 
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Type VII then property taxation would have been limited 
by a requirement of absolute uniformity in effective rates, 
this limitation being derived from the Type VI supplemen-
tary clause. However, the "uniformity within classes" clause 
of Type VII was held to take precedence on this particular 
point, and the intent of the clause was said to be that prop-
erty might be classified for applying different effective rates. 
In both Georgia and Missouri this problem was subse-
quently dealt with by amendments, dated 1937 and 1945 
respectively. These amendments deleted the supplementary 
clauses requiring taxation of property to be according or 
in proportion to its value, and expressly provided that prop-
erty might be classified. However, in each case the minimum 
classes are spelled out. In Missouri, real property is a mini-
mum class, all other property being subject to further sub-
classification. In Georgia, even greater restriction upon po-
tential classifications is made, the amendment expressly 
establishing two general classes of property, tangible and in-
tangible. Only intangible property is subject to further 
classification. 
These three states furnish an excellent illustration of how 
the subjective predilections of the various courts must have 
had much to do in determining whether a classified property 
tax might be enacted. In Georgia and Missouri, the poten-
tially liberal uniformity clause was construed to apply to all 
taxes, and the supplementary clauses were held to predomi-
nate, consequently preventing classification of property for 
taxation. To the contrary, in Montana the court took ex-
press notice of the conflict and gave a preference to the con-
stitutional provision which permitted the greater legislative 
discretion. Any other course by the Montana court would 
have meant that little was accomplished by the introduction 
of the "uniformity within classes" type clause of more recent 
origin. The studies of these three states further emphasize 
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how hazardous generalizations are in this area of "the" state 
constitutional requirement of uniformity in taxation. Al-
though having identical clauses, different results will often 
be dictated by supplementary provisions which are often ig-
nored by writers when classifying the several states as to 
their types of uniformity limitations. 
In the remaining six states (Delaware, Minnesota, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) having a Type 
VII clause, classification of property for application of differ-
ent effective rates is permitted,59 and among those six states 
are found some of the most liberal in terms of degree of 
classification allowed. For example, in Minnesota, Oregon, 
and Pennsylvania, the courts have permitted the legislatures 
the greatest degree of discretion for the purpose of classify-
ing property for effective rates, including the subclassifica-
tion of real property as well as other extensive classifications. 
As for those seven states (Arizona, Kentucky, Maryland, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, and South Dakota) having 
a Type VIII basic clause, we find the anticipated result. In 
all of those states property may be classified for application 
of different effective rates. 60 However, one might note how 
the apparently liberal limitation has not been in all cases 
liberally applied. In Arizona, the court, despite giving lip 
service to the classification principle, has indicated that any 
classifications of property whatsoever are likely to face con-
siderable difficulty in being established as reasonable. In 
Maryland, real property is made a minimum class by express 
constitutional provision, and a similar situation is found in 
Washington. 
The last five states are Rhode Island and Vermont, hav-
ing a Type IX basic uniformity clause, and Connecticut, 
Iowa and New York which have no provision of any kind. 
liD Supra, pp. 363, 404-, 453, 460, 540, 544. 
60 Supra, pp. 547, 553, 557, 561, 566, 571, 580. 
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It appears certain that in all of those five states property 
may be classified for application of different effective rates. 61 
However, before one concludes that the two states having a 
clause of Type IX should simply be included in the group 
which have no uniformity provision of any kind, one should 
note that in Mary land before 1 915, the only provision in 
its constitution relating to uniformity in taxation was a Type 
IX clause, and under that provision the strictest degree of 
uniformity was required. 62 
We can return now to the question originally posed, may 
a classified property tax be imposed in any of the states? Re-
member that we are here concerned only with classification 
for rates, not for exemptions. On the basis of this study it 
would appear that in twenty-five states a classified property 
tax is possible. The writer emphasizes "possible" because 
not every state which can apparently utilize classification for 
rates has done so. States in which a classified property tax 
is permissible are: Type IV (a uniform rule of taxation): 
New Jersey; Type VII (taxes shall be uniform upon the 
same class of subjects): Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Min-
nesota, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia; Type VIII (taxes shall be 
uniform upon the same class of property): Arizona, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, North Carolina, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, and Washington; and among those states having 
either Type IX or no clause of any kind: Rhode Island, Ver-
mont, Connecticut, Iowa and New York. However, it should 
be remembered, as pointed out above, that in a number of 
those twenty-five states the power to classify is limited in 
varying degrees by supplementary provisions. In a twenty-
sixth state, Michigan (having a Type IV clause) a classified 
81 Supra, pp. 591, 595. 
82 Supra, p. 556. 
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property tax is partially possible, that is, as to that property 
taxed other than by the ad valorem method. 
Furthermore, of those states having uniformity structures 
interpreted to require the strictest of uniformity, it was 
pointed out that ten states have avoided this result by 
amendment, leaving the basic uniformity clause unchanged 
but expressly providing for the power to classify to some 
degree. Those ten states are: Type I (property shall be taxed 
according to its value) : Maine; Type II (property shall be 
taxed in proportion to its value): California and Nebraska; 
Type IV (uniform rule of taxation): Ohio; Type V (taxa-
tion shall be equal and uniform) : West Virginia; Type VI 
(legislature shall provide by law for a uniform and equal 
rate of assessment and taxation): Florida, Kansas, Nevada, 
South Carolina, and Utah. However, in most of these ten 
states the power to classify extends only to a limited class of 
property, for example, classification of intangibles. 
Twelve states have the strict uniformity requirement un-
altered by any exceptions.63 They are: Type I (property 
shall be taxed according to its value): Arkansas and Tennes-
see; Type II (property shall be taxed in proportion to its 
value): Alabama and Illinois; Type III (proportional and 
reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes etc.) : Massachusetts 
and New Hampshire; Type IV (uniform rule of taxation): 
Wisconsin; Type V (taxation shall be equal and uniform): 
Mississippi, Texas and Wyoming; Type VI (uniform and 
equal rate of assessment and taxation): Indiana; Type VII 
(taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects): 
Idaho. Among these twelve states, a trend in Illinois per-
mitting different valuations changes considerably the ap-
parent strict requirement. 
Having determined that in some of the states a classified 
63 Cf. the classification made by Cushman, "The Proposed Revision of 
Article IX of the Illinois Constitution," 1952 Ill. L. Forum 226, 236-237. 
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property tax is permissible, the next question to be asked is 
this: may a graduated property tax rate be imposed in those 
states? It should come as no surprise to anyone even slightly 
familiar with this general problem of uniformity in taxation, 
that this is a question which has not often been raised in the 
cases, even by implication. In the cases concerning classified 
property taxes the discussion seldom departs from the more 
basic question of whether any classification is permissible. 
However, in a very limited number of cases, the question of 
a graduated rate applicable to property has been touched 
upon, by implication if not directly. 
The most important discussion is found in the Minnesota 
development of the uniformity limitation. 64 In the Minne-
sota study it was shown that the principle of a graduated 
property tax rate was expressly approved, although not elab-
orated upon to any great extent. In approving this principle, 
the court emphasized that "ability to pay may properly be 
taken into consideration by the legislature in classifying 
property for the purpose of taxation." On the other hand, in 
Washington the court has expressly ruled out graduated 
property tax rates on the grounds of arbitrary classification.611 
This decision, it should be noted, was made in relation to 
an income tax which was held to be a tax upon property. 
Indeed, it is among the income tax decisions that we find 
the few other decisions pertinent to the immediate question. 
In both Oregon66 and North Dakota67 the courts have up-
held income taxes which had graduated rates, and in neither 
case did the courts determine the nature of the tax on the 
ground that this question was immaterial since the uniform-
ity required of property taxes was said to be no greater than 
6' SuprtJ, p. 406. 
611 SuprtJ, p. 580. 
66 SuprtJ, p. 459. 
67 Supra, p. 566. 
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that required of nonproperty taxes. In both cases, incident-
ally, the courts equated the respective uniformity clause with 
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to 
the United States Constitution. Furthermore, it might be 
pertinent to note that the concurring opinion in the North 
Dakota case was on the ground that the tax was a non-
property tax. Thus, it would appear to be evident that out-
side of the Minnesota case, anything pertinent to this ques-
tion is derived from a discussion of the more controversial 
and larger issue, the validity of an income tax under these 
state constitutional uniformity provisions. In fact, the only 
straightforward graduated property tax was found in Okla-
homa, but that tax was never enforced and no opinion was 
ever rendered as to its validity under the uniformity limita-
tion.68 
It is also pertinent at this point to raise the question 
whether the uniformity clauses apply to the method of as-
sessment used under the property tax; i.e.> the mechanics of 
assessing and valuing the property in order to determine the 
value of the property. Without exception, the state by state 
analysis indicated that regardless of the strictness of the uni-
formity limitation applicable to the effective rate (that is, 
percentage rate plus ratio of valuation) there was no prohibi-
tion against classification of property for the purpose of 
reaching a figure to be used as the "value" of the property. 
The only reason for giving any attention to this problem is 
because the statement of the rule has often been the basis for 
later unwarranted generalizations.69 It was shown in the state 
by state analysis that in several states in which absolute uni-
formity is required of effective rates some confusion was 
caused by a somewhat careless use of the method of assess-
ment cases. The statements in such cases to the effect that 
68 Supra, p. 454. 
69 For example, see the Arkansas study, C. III, §A/I, note 8, supra. 
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classification of property was permissible for determining a 
single ratio of valuation applicable to all property were then 
used, without any basis, as authority for indicating that 
property might be classified for application of different ef-
fective rates. Sometimes the confusion stemmed from a some-
what unnecessarily broad generalization in the case on 
method of assessment. At other times, for example, in some 
digests and annotations the quotations from such cases are 
used under a heading which indicates that property may be 
classified generally. 
d. Method of taxation 
The last problem in comparing results as to particular 
rules of uniformity applicable to the taxation of property is 
this: may a specific tax (as opposed to an ad valorem tax) 
be levied upon property? That is, what does the uniformity 
limitation require of the "method" of taxation of property? 
As for those states (Arkansas, Maine, Tennessee, Ala-
bama, California, Illinois, and Nebraska) having either a 
Type I or Type II basic uniformity clause, property may be 
taxed only by the ad valorem method. 70 This rule, of course, 
is derived from the express words of the "uniformity" clauses 
since they are framed in terms of "according to value" or "in 
proportion to value." In California, a 1933 amendment 
withdrew all personal property from the operation of the 
uniformity clause and expressly provides that such property 
may be taxed in any "manner" as the legislature may choose. 
In Massachusetts and New Hampshire, having Type III 
basic uniformity clauses, the same general result was reached, 
i.e., property may be taxed only by the ad valorem method.71 
However, at this point, the rather unusual situation in New 
Hampshire is of interest. All taxes in New Hampshire are 
70 Supra, pp. 54, 60, 86, 98, 113, 126, 169. 
71Supra,pp. 175,187. 
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"property" taxes. Taxes on "estates" conform to what are 
designated as property taxes in the other forty-seven states 
and taxes on "other classes" of property conform to the usual 
concept of nonproperty taxes. The important point is that 
even the taxes on "other classes" of property must ostensibly 
meet the ad valorem requirement. However, as pointed out 
in the New Hampshire study this limitation has been usually 
avoided in any case where it would have invalidated the tax, 
the court using a technique of designating the revenue pro-
ducer as either a "charge" or "toll." This was done in the 
case of the fuel tax which has a specific base-rate structure. 
The remaining types of uniformity clauses are framed in 
words of "uniform" and/ or "equal" rather than words of 
"value," and consequently one would expect more diversity 
in results. Of those four states having a Type IV clause (a 
uniform rule of taxation), three have a requirement that 
property must be taxed by the ad valorem method. They 
are New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin.72 In New Jersey there 
was no judicial development of this particular rule and the 
conclusion here made is drawn from the words "according to 
value" which are added to the words "uniform rule." The 
same situation is found in Ohio where the phrase "uniform 
rule" is joined with the word "proportional." However, the 
Ohio court has had occasion to state that the ad valorem re-
quirement would be derived from the uniformity clause 
even without the additional words of proportionality. Also 
in Wisconsin the uniformity clause is accompanied by other 
clauses which might well be the source of the ad valorem re-
quirement. The Wisconsin court has never made it precisely 
clear whether the requirement would exist in the absence 
of the supplementary provisions. In both Ohio and New 
Jersey this strict rule has been alleviated to some degree. In 
1929, an amendment to the Ohio Constitution limited the 
72 Supra, pp. 218, 224, 239. 
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operation of the basic uniformity clause to taxation of real 
property. Consequently one may conclude that personal 
property may now be taxed by the specific method. A sim-
ilar conclusion may be drawn from the 1 94 7 revision of the 
New Jersey Constitution. The fourth state, Michigan, has a 
unique status.73 Contrary to the rule in the other forty-seven 
states, the method of taxation of property is not determined 
by the uniformity clause. Rather, the applicability of the 
strict uniformity clause (strict in that absolute uniformity in 
rates is required) is determined by the method by which 
property is taxed, that limitation applying only to that 
property taxed ad valorem. Thus, the Michigan legislature 
apparently has a free choice in determining the method of 
taxing property, with the method chosen in turn determin-
ing the rule of uniformity which will apply. For example, 
intangibles have been subjected to a "specific" tax which is 
called a property tax but not subject to the rule of absolute 
uniformity in effective rates. 
Surveying those ten states having either a Type V (taxa-
tion shall be equal and uniform) or Type VI (a uniform 
and equal rate of assessment and taxation) clause, we find 
that in all cases there is a requirement that property be 
taxed only by the ad valorem method. However, in all but 
two states there has been little judicial opinion on the prob-
lem, the source of the limitation being in any case expressly 
spelled out in a supplementary clause of either Type I or 
Type II, or, with one exception, a "just valuation" clause 
coupled to the Type VI uniformity clause. The states are 
Mississippi, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming having a 
Type V clause/4 and Florida, Nevada, South Carolina, and 
Utah having a Type VI clause.711 In Indiana, which has a 
73 Supra, p. 198. 
74 Supra,pp. 252, 258, 266, 271. 
75 Supra, pp. 278, 3 35, 340, 345. 
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Type VI clause coupled with a "just valuation" clause, the 
court seems to have expressly derived the limitation from 
the basic uniformity clause as well. 76 The most significant re-
sult among these ten states is found in Kansas77 which has a 
Type VI clause standing alone. There are no provisions in 
the Kansas Constitution containing any express words of 
"value." Nevertheless, the Kansas court has ruled that the 
ad valorem method is required. The only change by amend-
ment among these ten states is found in Utah, that state's 
constitution being amended in 1930 in order to remove in-
tangible property from this limitation. 
Among those thirteen states having a Type VII basic uni-
formity clause (taxes shall be uniform upon the same class 
of subjects) we find some rather diverse results which are 
usually explained by the appearance of supplementary provi-
sions framed in words of "value." In Colorado, the problem 
has not been clearly ruled upon, but there is most likely an 
ad valorem requirement, probably stemming from the "just 
valuation" clause which follows the basic uniformity clause. 78 
Before 1 9 3 7, in Georgia there was an ad valorem require-
ment spelled out in a Type I clause, but by an amendment in 
1937 that clause was deleted and the requirement may no 
longer exist.79 The reason for the deletion of the supplemen-
tary provision did not concern the method for taxation re-
quirement. Rather, the Georgia court had used that provision 
to establish property as a single subject of taxation, conse-
quently preventing classification for rates. In Idaho, there 
has been no judicial development, but quite likely the ad 
valorem requirement is present in view of the supplementary 
clause of Type II.80 In any case, one might note that as to 
16 Supra, p. 303. 
77 Supra, p. 31 0. 
78 Supra, p. 3 52. 
79 Supra, p. 372. 
80 Supra, p. 381. 
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effective rates, the Idaho court has ruled that absolute uni-
formity is required, simply referring to the Type VII clause 
as simply a "constitutional mandate of equality in taxation." 
Even in the absence of the supplementary clause, therefore, 
one cannot be sure just how the court would react to a spe-
cific property tax. In Missouri, 81 the experience has been 
quite similar to that in Georgia. Before 194 5, there was a 
Type II supplementary clause in the Missouri Constitution 
which was relied upon by the court in finding an ad valorem 
requirement. An amendment in 1945 deleted the supple-
mentary clause; however, there was inserted a detailed pro-
vision in which it is expressly provided that tangible property 
must still be taxed by the ad valorem method, while in-
tangibles are now to be taxed by the yield method. The de-
tailed provision introduced by amendment leaves the basic 
uniformity almost without purpose, certainly as to this par-
ticular limitation. In Montana, as in Georgia and Missouri, 
a supplementary clause of Type VI was the source of the ad 
valorem limitation. 82 The deletion of this supplementary 
provision from the Montana Constitution has not been 
necessary because the Montana court has construed the basic 
clause of Type VII to predominate as to the limitation ap-
plicable to effective rates. Consequently, classification is per-
missible. In New Mexico, we find a supplementary provision 
which is the source of the requirement that tangible property 
must be taxed by the ad valorem method. 83 There is some 
question in New Mexico concerning the rule applicable to 
the taxation of intangibles. In Virginia, as in Missouri and 
Georgia, a supplementary ad valorem type clause was de-
leted by amendment, and, while there has been no judicial 
development, it is likely that there is no longer any ad 
81 Supra, p. 422. 
82 Supra, p. 432. 
88 Supra, p. 443. 
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valorem requirement.84 The study of the Pennsylvania uni-
formity limitation revealed some confusion on this point. 85 
The Pennsylvania court has on occasion ruled that property 
may only be taxed by the ad valorem method. The only 
decision by the highest Pennsylvania court concerned a "tax" 
(the alcoholic floor tax) which was in reality a regulatory 
measure. The study revealed an earlier case in which the 
court apparently approved a specific property tax, but that 
opinion has been ignored in the later cases. The remaining 
four states in this group (Delaware, Minnesota, Oklahoma, 
and Oregon) have no ad valorem requirement.86 In the 
constitutions of those states there are no supplementary pro-
visions. It is also pertinent to note that they are among the 
most liberal of the states in discretion allowed the respective 
legislatures in taxation of property. 
Examining that group of seven states having the Type 
VIII clause (taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of 
property) we again find some diversity in results. In three 
of these states (Kentucky, Maryland, and North Carolina) 
there is possibly an ad valorem requirement. In Kentucky 
this is certain, the limitation being spelled out, however, by 
a Type II supplementary clause.87 Also in Maryland, the 
problem is settled.88 However, the Maryland court has ruled 
that the ad valorem requirement is derived from the word 
"uniform" in the Type VIII basic uniformity clause. In 
North Carolina there is some doubt whether the ad valorem 
limitations still exists. 89 On the other hand, in the remaining 
four states of this group (Arizona, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, and Washington) there is no requirement that 
84 Supra, p. 544. 
85 Supra, p. 537. 
86 Supra, pp. 359,415,449,457. 
87 Supra, p. 55 3. 
88 Supra, p. 55 6. 
89 Supra, p. 561. 
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property be taxed by ad valorem method only.90 One might 
note, however, that in Arizona there is no judicial opinion 
available, and in view of the strict interpretation used by the 
Arizona court in reviewing legislative classification of prop-
erty for rates it is not too unlikely that the court would be 
equally hostile to any attempted specific property taxes. The 
most significant result among these states is that in Mary-
land, where the court clearly derived the ad valorem re-
quirement from the basic uniformity clause of Type VIII. 
As would be expected, there is no ad valorem requirement 
among those states having a clause of Type IX (Rhode Is-
land) or having no clause of any kind (Connecticut, Iowa, 
and New York). 
2. A Summary Comparison of Effective Uniformity 
Limitations 
Thus far in this study the states have been grouped on 
the basis of a classification of their respective uniformity 
clauses based on phraseology alone. For convenience, the 
nine basic classes of such provisions were referred to as 
Types of clauses. These basic uniformity clauses standing 
alone, without interpretation, might be referred to as literal 
limitations of uniformity. A state by state study was made 
to determine the effective uniformity limitation which exists 
in each state, this effective limitation being the literal limi-
tation plus the judicial gloss. Having made a "rule by rule" 
comparison among the forty-eight states, it will now be 
helpful to compare the effective >uniformity limitations found 
in the several states to the literal limitations, and in that way 
one may determine to what degree they coincide. For the 
purpose of the present comparison it is possible to classify 
the several types of possible effective limitations in the fol-
90 Supra, pp. 546, 564, 569, 579. 
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lowing manner, ranging from the most strict possible to the 
most liberal. The degree of strictness is determined by a 
combination of the three particular rules of uniformity. 
( 1) There is an effective limitation of: 
(a) universality; 
(b) absolute uniformity in effective rates; 
(c) ad valorem method only. 
(2) There is an effective limitation of: 
(a) NO UNIVERSALITY; 
(b) absolute uniformity in effective rates; 
(c) ad valorem method only. 
( 3) There is an effective limitation of: 
(a) NO UNIVERSALITY; 
(b) absolute uniformity in effective rates; 
(c) NO AD VALOREM REQUIREMENT. 
( 4) There is an effective limitation of: 
(a) universality; 
(b) RATES UNIFORM WITHIN CLASSES; 
(c) ad valorem method only. 
(5) There is an effective limitation of: 
(a) universality; 
(b) RATES UNIFORM WITHIN CLASSES; 
(c) NO AD VALOREM REQUIREMENT. 
( 6) There is an effective limitation of: 
(a) NO UNIVERSALITY; 
(b) RATES UNIFORM WITHIN CLASSES; 
(c) ad valorem method only. 
(7) There is an effective limitation of: 
(a) NO UNIVERSALITY; 
(b) RATES UNIFORM WITHIN CLASSES; 
(c) NO AD VALOREM REQUIREMENT. 
Thus, in (7) the only requirement is a uniformity within 
classes, the most liberal effective limitation. The key re-
quirement in determining the strictness of the limitation is 
that degree of uniformity required of the effective rates. It 
is this requirement that determines whether a classified prop-
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erty tax, as such a tax is generally conceived, is possible. In 
this respect the effective limitations ( 1 ) , ( 2) and ( 3) are 
the strictest limitations. Thus, those effective limitations per-
mitting classified property taxes would be ( 4), ( 5), ( 6) and 
(7). However, only ( 6) and (7) would permit the most 
flexible types of classified property tax, one under which free 
exemption is permitted. 
The author has classified the states according to the gra-
dations of effective limitations of uniformity as set forth 
above. This classification is based on the conclusions reached 
in the state by state study, and is reproduced graphically on 
the accompanying chart. In the following discussion the 
roman numeral following each state signifies the nature of 
its basic type of uniformity clause. First, there are thirteen 
states which have an effective uniformity limitation of the 
strictest degree, class ( 1 ) . They are: Arkansas (I), T ennes-
see (I), California (II), Illinois (II), Nebraska (II), Ohio 
(IV), Texas (V), West Virginia (V), Florida (VI), Indi-
ana (VI), Ne'Uada (VI), South Carolina (VI), and Utah 
(VI). However, seven of these thirteen states have subse-
quently modified this effective limitation by amendment 
without altering the basic uniformity clause in its phraseol-
ogy. Those seven states are indicated by italics. Indiana is 
included in this group although in that state a distinction is 
made between the "exemption" and "selection" of property 
for taxation, with the result being that there is not a full rule 
of universality governing in that state. 
Second, there are nine states which have an effective uni-
formity limitation of class (2), which is also a strict limita-
tion, although exemptions are permitted. These states are: 
Maine (I), Alabama (II), Massachusetts (III), New 
Hampshire (III), Wisconsin (IV), Mississippi (V), Wyo-
ming (V), Kansas (VI), and Idaho (VII). Two of these 
nine states have modified this effective limitation by amend-
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CHART OF LITERAL AND EFFECTIVE PROPERTY TAX 
UNIFORMITY LIMITATIONS (continued on p. 678) 
(I) (2) (3) (4) ( ~) (6) (7) 
Effective a)YES a)NO a) NO a)YES a)YES a)NO a)NO 
Lim ita- b)YES b)YES b)YES b)NO b)NO b)NO b)NO 
tions: c)YES c)YES c)NO c)YES c)NO c) YES c)NO 
TYPES Sector "A" Sector "B" 
I Ark Ak --- --- ---
Maine Me1 --- ---
Tenn Tenn 
II Ala AI"a --- ------ --- ---
Cal Cal2 
~ --- --- ---Ill ' --- ---
Neb Neb1 --- ---
III Mass Mass --- ------NH NH ------ ------




Wis Wis --- ---
VMiss Miss --- ---
Texas Tex ------
WVa WVa3 --- ---
Wyo Wyo --- ---
VI Fla Fla1 --- ---
Ind Ind6 --- ------
Kan Kan1 --- --- ---
Nev Nev1 
sc SCi --- --------- ---Utah Utah 1 
Reading down, states are grouped according to types of uniformity clauses; the 
literal limitations .••• Reading from left to right, classification is from strict to 
liberal effective uniformity limitation, depending on answers to three questions: 
(a) Is there a rule of universality' (b) Is absolute uniformity required of effective rates' 
(c) Is the ad valorem method required' Heavy lines separate strict from liberal limita-
tions. The four sectors, reading clockwise, are: A) Strict literal-strict effective. B) 
Strict literal-liberal effective. C) Liberal literal-liberal effective. D) Liberal literal-
strict effective. 
I. The effective limitation has been modified, constitutionally, by a "special 
treatment" amendment for intangible property. 
2. Same as note I, except special treatment is for tangible property. 
3· Same as note I, except special treatment is for all property-that is, all proP-
erty is classified by amendment, leaving the basic clause unchanged. 
678 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (S) (6) (7) 
Effective a)YES a)NO a)NO a)YES a)YES a)NO a)NO 
Limita- b)YES b)YES b)YES b)NO b)NO b)NO b)NO 
tions: c)YES c)YES c)NO c)YES c)NO c)YES c)NO 
Sector "D" Sector "C" 
VII Colo 7 Colo2 • 7 
Del Del 
Ga 8 Ga8 
Ida Ida 
La ---
Minn Minn --- ---













Wash Wash --- ---IXRI RI ---
Vt Vt ---
X Conn Conn 
Iowa Iowa 
NY NY 
4· A de facto classification for rates is sanctioned in Illinois. See text. 
5· In Michigan the metho~ of taxation (ad valorem or specific) determines the 
applicable rules of uniformity for exemptions and rates. See text. 
6. In Indiana a distinction is made between "selection" and "exemption," no 
rule of universality applies to "selection," See text. 
7· Probably only a very limited classification would have been actually per-. 
mitted in Colorado; and now an amendment expressly provides for the classification 
of personal property. 
8. In Georgia and Missouri the strictest degree of uniformity was in force until 
the deletion of supplementary clauses of Types I or II. The classification for rates is 
now spelled out by. amendment. There is some doubt as to the ad valorem rule 
being applicable in Georgia. 
9· There is some question as to the ad valorem rules being applicable in Montana •. 
Io. In New Mexico the strict rules apply only to the taxation of tangible property 
because of peculiar phraseology. 
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ment without altering the basic uniformity clause in its phra-
seology. Those two states are indicated by italics. 
Third, a single state, Michigan (IV), has a modified form 
of effective limitation (3). One must say modified because 
of the unique situation found in Michigan. There only that 
property taxed ad valorem is subject to the strict rule of 
uniformity as to rates. 
Fourth, there are six states which have an effective limi-
tation of class ( 4 ). Those states are: Kentucky (VIII), 
Maryland (VIII), North Carolina (VIII), Colorado (VII), 
Missouri (VII), and New Mexico (VII). Only Colorado 
has modified this effective limitation by amendment with-
out altering the basic uniformity clause in its phraseology. A 
further qualification should be noted in respect to Missouri 
and New Mexico in which the ad valorem requirement ap-
plies in part only, namely, to the taxation of tangible prop-
erty. 
Fifth, there are four states which have an effective limita-
tion of class (5). Those states are: Arizona (VIII), Georgia 
(VII), Montana (VII), and Virginia (VII). A qualification 
should be made as to Virginia in which the rule of universal-
ity applies in part only. 
Sixth, two states, New Jersey (IV) and Pennsylvania 
(VII), have effective limitations of class ( 6). However, as 
pointed out in the Pennsylvania study, substantial arguments 
may be made against the continuing validity of the ad valo-
rem requirement. 
Seventh, there are twelve states which have an effective 
limitation of class (7). Those states are: North Dakota 
(VIII), South Dakota (VIII), Washington (VIII), Dela-
ware (VII), Minnesota (VII), Oklahoma (VII), Oregon 
(VII), Rhode Island (IX), Vermont (IX), and the three 
states which have no clause of any kind: Connecticut, Iowa, 
and New York. 
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Summarizing, we find that twenty-three states have the 
strictest types of effective uniformity limitations. This in-
cludes Michigan, which might be subject to question. How-
ever, of these twenty-three states there are nine which have 
modified the effective limitation to permit to some degree 
classification of property for taxation. These modifications 
have been made without altering the basic uniformity clause. 
On the other hand, there are twenty-five states which permit 
classification for rates. However, of these twenty-five there 
are ten states which do not permit classification for exemp-
tions. Thus, in terms of the existing effective limitation of 
uniformity in taxation, a substantial majority of the states 
(twenty-five plus nine) have an effective limitation of uni-
formity in taxation which does not prohibit some form of a 
classified property tax. 
* * * * * 
Having classified the states according to their effective 
limitations, it will be helpful to approach the matter from 
another direction. What generalizations may be made in 
comparing the literal words of the basic uniformity clauses 
to the effective uniformity limitations? What sort of results 
were found in those states having the types of basic uniform-
ity clauses which, on their face, would most likely be con-
strued as requiring the stricter degree of uniformity in the 
taxation of property? Those types of clauses are: 
I. Property shall be taxed according to its value. 
II. Property shall be taxed in proportion to its value. 
III. The legislature may impose proportional and rea-
sonable assessments, rates, and taxes upon all per-
sons and estates. . . . 
IV. There shall be a uniform rule of taxation. 
V. Taxation shall be equal and uniform. 
VI. The legislature shall provide by law for a uniform 
and equal rate of assessment and taxation. 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 681 
Looking to the accompanying chart, it can be seen that there 
was an almost complete correlation here, there being only 
two important exceptions, Michigan and New Jersey. 
Putting aside for the moment the two exceptions, twenty-
one states have these types of basic clauses. The only relaxa-
tion in the degree of uniformity required was found in the 
nine states having no requirement of universality. But even 
on this point, one finds that the power to exempt is hedged 
to a considerable extent in a number of those nine states. 
The states which relax the strict form of uniformity only 
by permitting exemptions are Maine, Alabama, Massachu-
setts, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Mississippi, Wyoming, 
Indiana, and Kansas. Indiana may be included here only 
because of a rather finely drawn theory which makes a dis-
tinction between "selection" and "exemption." In two of 
these nine states (Maine and Kansas) the strict rules have 
been modified to a degree by collateral amendment. 
Thus, twelve states of the twenty-one (Arkansas, Tennes-
see, California, Illinois, Nebraska, Ohio, Texas, West Vir-
ginia, Florida, Nevada, South Carolina, and Utah) require 
the strictest degree of uniformity: universality, absolute uni-
formity in effective rates, and ad valorem method. How-
ever, in eight of the twelve states (California, Nebraska, 
Ohio, West Virginia, Florida, Nevada, South Carolina, and 
Utah) the effective limitation has been modified by collat-
eral amendment to the basic uniformity clause. In addition, 
in Illinois there was the very interesting situation in which 
a de facto system of classification of property for effective 
rates was given court approval. Consequently, in only three 
of these twelve states has the effective uniformity limitation 
been left unchanged. Those three states are Arkansas, Ten-
nessee, and Texas. 
As indicated in the state by state study, and as well in the 
rule by rule comparison, in substantially all of these twenty-
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one states the effective limitation of uniformity in taxation 
of property was derived from numerous variations of sup-
plementary provisions as well as the basic uniformity clauses. 
However, there was no indication that the requirements 
would not have been derived from the basic uniformity 
clause had it stood alone. To the contrary, the study had indi-
cated that in some of the states permitting exemptions (for 
example, Wyoming) this was the result of supplementary 
provisions and would not have been permitted had there 
been only the basic uniformity clause. Furthermore, it should 
be noticed that the diversity in result as to the rule of univer-
sality was found under each of the five types of basic clauses 
being considered. 
The two important exceptions among these twenty-three 
states are Michigan and New Jersey. In New Jersey we find 
that the only strict rule of uniformity is that property must 
be taxed ad valorem, while there is no requirement of uni-
versality and property may be classified for rates. There is 
some uncertainty whether real property could be further 
classified, and since 194 7 it is possible that personalty no 
longer need be taxed by the ad valorem method. This result 
in New Jersey does not appear to stem from any unique 
phraseology of the basic uniformity clause. To the contrary, 
the unique result in Michigan stems precisely from the unu-
sual manner in which the basic uniformity clause of Type 
IV is phrased. In that state we found that, contrary to the 
approach in the forty-seven other states, the manner in which 
property is taxed determines the applicable uniformity 
clause, and as to that property taxed ad valorem there is no 
requirement of universality but the effective rate must meet 
the test of absolute uniformity. As to property taxed by a 
specific method the only limitation is a uniformity within 
classes. This unusual situation stems from the phraseology: 
"The legislature shall provide by law a uniform rule of tax-
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ation, except on property paying specific taxes. ." Con-
sequently, the result in Michigan does not indicate a signifi-
cant difference of judicial opinion as to the meaning of one 
of the more literally strict types of basic uniformity clause. 
A greater and significant diversity of results is found 
among those states having the basic types of uniformity 
clauses which on their face are more susceptible of being con-
strued so as to permit some degree of classification in the 
taxation of property. Those types are: 
VII: Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of sub-
jects. 
VIII: Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of 
property. 
There are twenty states having one of these types of clauses 
as their basic uniformity provisions. To these may be added 
the two states having a basic clause of Type IX, and those 
three states without a uniformity provision of any kind. 
The most marked deviation among this group of twenty-
five states was found in Idaho, where the court has ruled 
that property in that state when taxed is governed by a re-
quirement of absolute uniformity in effective rates and the 
method used must be ad valorem. While there is no require-
ment of universality in Idaho, this was only because the 
power to exempt was expressly spelled out. It is true that 
the Idaho Type VII basic clause is accompanied by a Type 
II clause. However, the court has not necessarily relied 
on that second provision and has found no conflict between 
the two, merely referring to the basic clause of Type VII 
as establishing "a requirement of uniformity." Consequently, 
in Idaho the existence of one of the more liberally phrased 
basic uniformity clauses has not prevented the effective uni-
formity limitation from being one of the strictest. 
Along with Idaho, there are other states among these 
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twenty-five which are of interest because of their strict effec-
tive limitations. For example, in Colorado we found that for 
all practical purposes there was an effective limitation of the 
strictest character. However, an amendment in 1936 ex-
pressly provided that personal property may be classified for 
rates or exemptions, but this power is conditioned upon the 
imposition of an income tax law. Similarly, in Missouri, be-
fore a 1945 amendment, there was an effective limitation of 
the strictest degree even though the basic uniformity clause 
was Type VII. However, for each of the fundamental par-
ticular rules of uniformity the source was not the clause of 
Type VII but a supplementary provision (Type II). The 
1945 amendment deleted this supplementary Type II pro-
vision and consequently removed a part of the strict effective 
limitation. However, the universality limitation remained 
because of a supplementary provision which spelled out this 
requirement. While classification of property for rates is no 
longer prohibited, there remains additional constitutional 
limitation on this power because the minimum classes of 
property are spelled out in the constitution by the 1945 
amendment. In addition, other words of the 1945 amend-
ment spell out the requirement that tangible property must 
still be taxed by the ad valorem method. 
In New Mexico, where there is a Type VII basic clause, 
the effective uniformity limitation requires the strictest de-
gree of uniformity for the taxation of tangible property. This 
result stems from a rather unusually phrased provision 
which directly modifies the basic uniformity clause. Before 
19 3 7, Georgia had a situation similar to that found in Mis-
souri. The Georgia Constitution had in addition to the Type 
VII basic clause a Type I supplementary provision. It was 
the latter provision which was the source of a strict effective 
uniformity limitation. The universality rule was spelled out 
by words dealing expressly with that problem, but was also 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 685 
said to be derived from the basic uniformity clause itself. 
The supplementary provision of Type I was used to estab-
lish property as a minimum class. The Type I provision was 
deleted by the 1937 amendment; however, new words were 
introduced which limit the power of the legislature to the 
classification of intangibles into subclassifications. 
Summarizing, among the twenty-five states having po-
tentially liberal uniformity limitations, there are five in 
which the effective uniformity limitation is of the strictest 
degree. However, as the state studies indicated, only in 
Idaho, and to a degree, New Mexico, has this strict type of 
uniformity limitation prevailed. In the other states (Colo-
rado, Georgia, and Missouri) amendments have removed 
the collateral provisions which were the sources of the strict 
rules. It is significant that in all five states other than Idaho 
(and, perhaps, Colorado) the source of the restrictive limi-
tation was always a supplementary provision which was in-
terpreted by the court in such a manner as to limit the po-
tentially liberal limitation inherent in the Type VII or Type 
VIII clauses. In the final analysis, it was only in Idaho that 
the court simply ignored the words of the conflicting uni-
formity provisions found in a single constitution and cate-
gorized all the provisions as simply "uniformity clauses." 
Turning to the remainder of these twenty-five states we 
still find considerable diversity in results. In addition to Col-
orado, Missouri and New Mexico, there are three other 
states (Kentucky, Maryland and Montana) which permit 
classification for rates but require universality and the use 
of the ad valorem method. In Kentucky these two strict rules 
are both derived from collateral provisions. The rule of uni-
versality is spelled out and a supplementary clause of Type 
II is the source of the ad valorem requirement. Conse-
quently, the Type VIII basic clause in the Kentucky Consti-
tution is restricted so as to permit only the classification of 
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property for rates. To the contrary, in Maryland, which also 
has a basic clause of Type VIII, the ad valorem requirement 
is derived from the word "uniform" in the basic clause. In 
both Kentucky and Maryland, the rule of universality is 
somewhat limited in operation. In Kentucky, by express 
amendment property may be exempted from local property 
taxation, and in Maryland the rule is applied only to the 
exemption of any sub-classifications of real property. In 
Montana, which has a basic clause of Type VII, we find a 
situation similar to that in Idaho, but with an opposite result. 
The Montana Constitution contains a Type VI clause which 
might well be used to negate any liberal effect of the Type 
VII basic clause which was also found in the Montana Con-
stitution. However, the Montana court recognized the po-
tential conflict and reconciled the two provisions by giving 
pre-eminence to the more liberal Type VII clause. The Type 
VI clause was allowed to require universality and the ad va-
lorem method, but the Type VII clause was relied upon as 
definitely indicating the intent of the framers that property 
might be classified for rates. 
Three of the remaining states (Arizona, North Carolina, 
and Virginia) have a strict rule of universality but permit 
classification of property for rates, or the use of other than 
the ad valorem method in taxing property. In Arizona, this 
strict rule of universality is not derived from the Type VIII 
basic clause but is spelled out in a supplementary provision. 
The rule of universality may be avoided in Arizona by the 
use of an in lieu tax if the in lieu tax is a property tax. It 
might be noted, however, that the Arizona court has given 
the impression that any but the most basic classification of 
property for rates would be frowned upon. Similarly, in 
North Carolina, which has a basic clause of Type VIII, the 
requirement of universality is derived from collateral pro-
visions which enumerate permissible exemptions. In addition, 
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some doubt might be raised as to the assertion that the re-
quirement of ad valorem method is not now present in the 
North Carolina Constitution. In Virginia, the rule of univer-
sality is also derived from a collateral provision expressly 
prohibiting exemptions, but by amendment of the constitu-
tion there are no state taxes on real property and no local 
taxes on personal property. 
Pennsylvania is in a rather unusual position. That state 
has a basic uniformity clause of Type VII, and stands as hav-
ing one of the more liberal uniformity limitations in many 
aspects. However,. that state does have a requirement that 
property be taxed ad valorem only, although it may be clas-
sified for both rates and exemptions. The cases which ruled 
upon the ad valorem requirement derived that limitation 
from the basic clause Type VII. Illustrating a different atti-
tude by the same court, the provision in the constitution 
spelling out the requirement that property may not be ex-
empted is avoided by limiting its operation to the exemption 
of real property; but real property is subject to further clas-
sification for rates. 
The remaining nine states (North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Washington, Delaware, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Ore-
gon) having basic clauses of Types VII and VIII, along 
with Rhode Island and Vermont, which have the basic clause 
Type IX, and the three states (Connecticut, Iowa and New 
York) having no clause of any kind, all require only a uni-
formity within classes. There is no rule of universality or 
ad valorem method, and property may be classified for rates. 
Among those states one might call particular attention to 
North Dakota, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Oregon. Those 
four states are the ones in which the liberal interpretation of 
the uniformity clause has been most extensively developed. 
In the other states, there has been less use of legislative 
power, and consequently less judicial development. In all 
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of these four states, the courts have appeared to give the 
legislature the greatest discretion in classification of prop-
erty, and, most significantly, they have equated the property 
tax uniformity limitation with the federal equal protection 
clause limitation. 
Another interesting point to note is that in Washington 
and Pennsylvania extensive classifications of property for ef-
fective rates have been upheld, but in these two states income 
taxes have been held to be property taxes and consequently 
struck down because of their graduated rate features. The 
courts of the two states ruled out classifications of property 
according to quantity as arbitrary. On the other hand, in 
North Dakota, Minnesota, and Oregon the courts found 
that it was immaterial to consider the nature of a graduated 
net income tax, finding that the graduated rates would stand 
in any case, the classification on the basis of quantity or abil-
ity to pay being reasonable. 
Summarizing, the study has shown that in substantially 
all (but cf. Idaho) cases of diversity in result on particular 
rules of uniformity among those states having potentially 
liberal uniformity clauses, the diversity is a result of sup-
plementary provisions of varying nature. When such supple-
mentary provisions made their appearance in the constitutions 
of those states having the potentially restrictive uniformity 
clauses (Types I, II, III, IV, V, and VI) there was no neces-
sary conflict, such supplementary provisions merely but-
tressing the effective limitation which might likely be de-
rived from the basic clause itself. To the contrary, the ap-
pearance of these supplementary provisions in the constitu-
tions of those states having the more potentially liberal pro-
visions (Types VII, VIII, and IX) often meant conflicting 
results among states having identical basic provisions. 
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C. A COMPARISON OF RESULTS AS TO PARTICULAR TAXES 
As stated in the introduction to this monograph, in most 
states when a tax is challenged as violating the constitutional 
limitation of uniformity in taxation, the crucial problem is 
the determination of the nature of the tax. Is the tax a 
"property" or "nonproperty" tax? The reason the answer to 
this question often determines the constitutionality of the tax 
is that most state constitutional provisions provide more 
strict uniformity limitations for property taxes than for non-
property taxes. Although the distinction between property 
and nonproperty taxes may with justification be assailed as 
artificial and unsound, 1 it remains the crucial question in 
most states. Even among the twelve states which have the 
most liberal effective uniformity limitations,2 only half 
(North Dakota, Minnesota, Oregon, Connecticut, Iowa, and 
New York) equate the property tax uniformity limitation, 
however liberal, to the uniformity required of nonproperty 
taxes. Therefore, it will be enlightening to consider the prob-
lems involved in characterizing the nature of a particular 
tax when its validity has been questioned. 
The income tax has been selected for this purpose, since 
the validity of this tax has probably raised the most contro-
versy concerning the requirements of uniformity in taxation. 
Although there is a fairly exhaustive amount of legal litera-
ture concerning the income tax, 3 it will be helpful to review 
1 Cf. Matthews, Wm. L., Jr., "The Function of Constitutional Provisions 
Requiring Uniformity in Taxation," 30 Ky. L. J. 31, 33-34 ( 194-9). 
2 See the discussion in the preceding section, supra, p. 679. 
8 See, for example, Matthews, supra, note 1, 504--514-; Brown, "The 
Nature of the Income Tax," 17 Minn. L. Rev. 127 ( 1933); Allen, "Limi-
tations of Uniformity Provisions of State Constitution upon Income Tax 
Legislation," 11 Tax Mag. 4-20, 4-64- ( 1933). Also see Note, "State Income 
Tax Laws and the Uniformity Clause," 3 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 32 (1930), 
5 id. 70 (1932). 
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the treatment afforded that tax in the context of a study of 
uniformity in taxation. 
1. Judicial Precedent and the Income Tax 
The sharp division of judicial opinion concerning the na-
ture of an income tax came into focus for the purposes of this 
monograph with the opposite views taken by the Massachu-
setts and Missouri courts in 1915 and 1918, respectively.4 
The Massachusetts advisory opinion, given in 1915,5 estab-
lished the beachhead for the restrictive viewpoint. The Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court ruled that a tax upon the income 
from property would be, in effect, a tax upon the property 
itself. Consequently, such a tax came within the strict uni-
formity limitation applicable to property taxation, which re-
quired an absolute uniformity in effective rates. The ration-
ale of the court was as follows: 
A tax upon the income of property is in reality a tax upon the 
property itself. Income derived from property is also prop-
erty. Property by income produces its kind, that is, it pro-
duces property and not something different. It does not 
matter what name is employed. The character of the tax can-
not be changed by calling it an excise and not a property tax. 
In its essence a tax upon income derived from property is 
a tax upon the property. This was decided after most elab-
orate consideration, with affluent citation of authorities, in 
4 In 1912 the Wisconsin Court decided State v. Frear, 14-8 Wis. 4-56, 
134- N.W. 673 (1912). It ruled that the income tax under attack was not 
a property tax. However, the decision loses impact because of the· 1908 
amendment to the Wisconsin constitution which expressly authorized the 
imposition of an income tax. Consequently, the Frear case has had no ap-
preciable effect on the precedent concerning this question. · 
11 In re Opinion of the Justices, 220 Mass. 613 (1915). Cf. the earlier 
case, Wilcox v. Middlesex, 103 Mass. 54-4- (1870}. For further discussion, 
see the Massachusetts study, supra, p. 180. 
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Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 581. 
6 
Thus, the Massachusetts court cited as its authority for this 
proposition the discussion in the famous Pollock case. When 
the United States Supreme Court decided that case in 1895, 
the problem faced was entirely different from that which 
state courts subsequently faced in determining the nature and 
validity of general net income taxes. In the Pollock case, the 
United States Supreme Court was concerned with the federal 
constitutional requirement that direct taxes be apportioned. 
For that purpose it ruled that a tax on the income derived 
from land or personal property was to be characterized as 
a direct tax on such income-producing property. There were 
vigorous dissents from the 5-4 decision, and subsequent 
cases7 by the United States Supreme Court have somewhat 
discredited the Pollock rationale. Nevertheless, that majority 
opinion has played its role in the state constitutional problem 
of uniformity in taxation. Massachusetts relied on the opin-
ion, and later state courts taking the restrictive view also 
have gained comfort from the Pollock majority rationale, al-
though not so directly relying on it. 
It should be noted that the Massachusetts court did not 
rule on the nature of a tax on "earned" income. As pointed 
out in the Massachusetts study this 1915 ruling was avoided 
to some extent by an amendment to the Massachusetts Con-
stitution which expressly provides for a "tax on income." But 
in a subsequent 1929 advisory opinion8 the court ruled that 
the amendment did not alter the nature of the tax, and since 
the amendment did not expressly provide for graduated 
rates, such rates were prohibited by the strict property tax 
6 /d. at 623-624. 
7 See, for example, New York ex rei Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 
57 S. Ct. 466 (1937), and Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 
36 S. Ct. 236 (1916). 
8 In re Opinion of the Justices, 266 Mass. 583 (1929). 
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uniformity limitation. Any classifications were limited strictly 
to those spelled out in the amendment.9 
The Massachusetts view did not go long unchallenged. 
Within three years, the Supreme Court of Missouri faced the 
same problem. In 1918, the Missouri court decided Ludlow-
Saylor Wire Co. v. W ollbrinck10 and reached a conclusion 
opposite from that taken by the Massachusetts court. The 
decision was 4-3, with a vigorous dissenting opinion. Indeed, 
one may safely assert that both majority and minority opin-
ions in most all of the state cases on this problem have re-
flected deeply felt attitudes concerning the income tax. As 
the Missouri study11 indicated, in 1918 the constitution of 
that state contained a Type VII basic uniformity clause 
(taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects), but 
that clause was supplemented by an ad valorem clause of 
Type II from which was derived the strict degree of uni-
formity required of property taxes. One may characterize the 
majority opinion in the Ludlow-Saylor case as ruling that 
the income tax under consideration was not a tax upon prop-
erty-that is, it was neither a tax on income as property, nor 
a tax upon the property from which the income was derived. 
Relying in part on the rationale of an 1869 opinion, Glas-
gow v. Rowse/2 the court reasoned as follows: 
The reasoning and conclusion of the court in the above 
case [the Glasgow case] has never been disapproved in this 
9 It is interesting to note that the Massachusetts court has ruled that the 
Massachusetts corporate franchise tax with a base of net income is an 
"excise" tax, not a property tax. See, for example, Alpha Portland Cement 
Co. v. Comm., 244 Mass. 530, 139 N.E. 158 (1923). 
10 275 Mo. 339, 205 S.W. 196 (1918). 
11 Supra, p. 418. 
12 43 Mo. 479 ( 1869). The basic uniformity clause in effect at the 
time of the Glasgow decision read as follows: " •.. all property subject to 
taxation ought to be taxed in proportion to ita value." Art. I, §30, Const. 
1865. 
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State .... It is predicated upon a distinction made by the 
court as to the application of the term "property" used in 
the Constitution. In law and in the broadest sense "property" 
means a "thing owned," and is, therefore, applicable to 
whatever is the subject of legal ownership .... In short it 
embraces anything and everything which may belong to a 
man and in the ownership of which he has a right to be pro-
tected by law. The court held, in effect, that in directing, as 
the Constitution does, that taxes on property should be 
levied according to value, reference was intended to be made 
to other species of property than that which a person has in 
his income; that the Constitution did not abridge the power 
of the Legislature to provide revenue by a taxation of in-
come; that its command was directed to other and distinct 
classes of property which (on account of their peculiar nature 
could be measured on value) become the object of taxation 
independent of the owner, and are susceptible, by proper 
procedure, to lien or seizure for the enforcement of the tax. 
The court held that it was property having such a nature 
and characteristics, and not the mere usufruct of such prop-
erty, nor the earnings of physical or mental labor, which was 
referred to in the clause under review and intended thereby 
to be subjected to taxation according to its value .... 
In consonance with these distinctions the court held . . . 
that the term "property" in the Constitution did not apply 
to that species of ownership enjoined by the possessor of an 
income, and hence the Legislature was no more restricted in 
taxing incomes than it or its subordinate agencies are re-
stricted in laying occupation and other taxes relating to the 
activities or personalty of the individual taxed; indeed, the 
fact that the act in question is a tax upon the owner of an in-
come is distinctly recognized and stated in Section 2 of the 
act, which uses these words; "the net income of a taxable 
person" ..•• 
That income is property because it is an ownable thing, is 
a matter of simple apprehension which has been affirmed 
under the definition of property above stated. That it is, "in 
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effect," a taxation of the labor or capital which produced it, 
may be conceded, since by reason it affects the value of the 
thing or things from which it is derived. But none of these 
considerations alter the fact that incomes are distinguishable 
from the tangible or intangible property yielding them, nor 
do they affect the established law in Missouri, that incomes 
are thus connoted by our Constitution and decisions. These 
recognize incomes as one of the classes entering in propor-
tion to value, and, therefore, not falling within the designa-
tion of property which the Legislature is forbidden to tax 
except in that way. • . .13 
This quite lengthy quotation is set forth in order to illus-
trate the way in which the court avoided the application of 
the strict uniformity limitation. This writer has characterized 
the decision as ruling that the tax was a nonproperty tax. 
However, as the quotation illustrates, the Missouri court did 
not spell it out so neatly. Indeed, one can understand why 
the decision has been referred to as ruling that the tax was a 
property tax, but not limited by the property tax uniformity 
limitation.14 However, it is suggested that the court verged 
closer to finding the tax sui generis, as, indeed, later states 
expressly decided. For example, the court relied in part upon 
the words of the statute to indicate that the tax was upon the 
owner as much as upon the income as such. Further, if in-
come was to be considered property, it was not property 
within the constitutional sense; hence, the tax was not, con-
stitutionally, a tax upon property, that is, a property tax. The 
important point is that the court avoided applying the 
harsher uniformity limitation, and vaguely touched upon the 
approaches later explicitly used in different instances to 
characterize the tax as not being a property tax. 
However viewed, the Missouri court held that the income 
tax was not to be characterized as a property tax. Just what 
1S Supra note 10, at 352-3, 354, 355. 
14 Cf. Matthews, supra note 1, at S 11-S 12. 
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the court believed to be its nature may be left to speculation. 
The court did not feel compelled to force the tax into some 
concept of privilege or excise tax. It was sufficient to rely on a 
property-nonproperty tax dichotomy, with a property tax 
being one with an object of "property" in the constitutional 
sense, and all other taxes being loosely joined as the opposite 
in a two-class analysis. Had the tax been held to be a tax 
upon property, it would have violated the property tax strict 
uniformity requirement. In 1932, the Missouri court in Ba-
con v. Ransom15 reaffirmed the rationale of Ludlow-Saylor, 
and further extended its position in holding that a graduated 
rate schedule was a reasonable classification. In so ruling, the 
court relied on the ability to pay rationale. 
It might be pointed out that the dissenters in the Ludlow 
case relied strongly upon both the Pollock rationale used by 
the United States Supreme Court and the Massachusetts 
opinions. The tenor of the dissent is aptly illustrated by the 
following typical statement found therein: "However, the 
origin of the heresy is not important now, for scarcely any 
respectable court is adhering to the view that income derived 
from real and personal property, at least, is not itself prop-
erty and that a tax upon such income is not a charge against 
and a tax upon such property itself.m6 The following discus-
sion will show that a substantial number of courts never en-
joyed reaching that "respectable" status. 
* * * * * 
At the same time that this general controversy was brought 
into sharp focus by the divergent Massachusetts and Mis-
souri opinions, there was a third case which illustrates what 
might be called a second theme running throughout this 
111 331 Mo. 985, 56 S.W. 2d 786 (1932). 
16 Supra note 10, at 370. 
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general controversy. In 1919, the Supreme Court of Dela-
ware in State v. Pinder11 asserted: 
In the absence of any authority on the subject, this court 
would unhesitatingly hold that income is property within the 
meaning of section 1, article 8 of our Constitution, and, 
therefore, subject to taxation or exemption .... 18 
Yet this opinion cannot be taken as support for the general 
position taken by the Massachusetts court. The Delaware 
court's characterization of the tax was made in answer to the 
argument that the income tax was a nonproperty tax and 
that the legislature's power was limited to the taxation of 
property. The court, in the final analysis, rejected this con-
struction of the constitution. However, it was said that the 
argument could also be met on the ground that income was 
property within the meaning of the tax clause of the consti-
tution. 
It is interesting to note how the early Missouri case, Glas-
gow v. Rowse, was distinguished. The Delaware court ex-
pressed an attitude quite diametrically opposed to that im-
plicit in the Massachusetts opinions. The court said: 
This case [Waring v. Savannah, a Georgia case discussed 
infra] is similar in principle to Glasgow v. Rowse, in which 
it was held that income tax "did not come within the mean-
ing of the term 'property' as used and designated in the Con-
stitution." Necessarily it was so held, because the Constitution 
required that taxation on property should be in proportion 
to its value, and a tax on income would be in violation of the 
ad valorem principle. The tax could not, therefore, be sus-
tained if income was property within the meaning of the 
Constitution. . . . 
In the absence of any authority on the subject, this court 
17 30 Del. (7 Boyce) 416, 108 Atl. 43 (1919). 
18 IJ. at 421. 
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would unhesitatingly hold that income is property within 
the meaning of . . . our Constitution, and therefore, sub-
ject to taxation or exemption, shall we hold differently be-
cause the court, in a Georgia case, decided in 1850, declared 
that income was not property within the meaning of the tax-
ation laws of that state then before the Court? 19 
It should be observed that the Georgia case, cited by Dela-
ware, held as it did in order to sustain the tax. The quotation 
illustrates without elaboration the distinctly different prob-
lems faced by the Massachusetts and Delaware courts in char-
acterizing an income tax. In one case, the tax was challenged 
as a property tax in order to invalidate it. In the other, the 
tax was challenged as a nonproperty tax in order to invali-
date it. For purposes of uniformity in taxation, as the Dela-
ware study indicated,20 the nature of a tax is apparently 
of no importance in that state since all taxes are limited by 
the same liberal uniformity limitation which, significantly, 
has been equated to the equal protection clause of the Fed-
eral fourteenth amendment. 
Therefore, it will be necessary to deal quite cautiously 
with any state opinions which have characterized income 
taxes as property taxes when such characterization was neces-
sary in order to establish the validity of the tax. The Del-
aware opinion showed considerable hostility to the view 
that income was not property, and that an income tax was 
not a property tax, if such characterization would deny the 
legislature the power to impose the tax. That is, the view of 
the court was, "Income is property ... and therefore sub-
ject to taxation." Unquestionably the characterization by the 
Delaware court reflects an acute awareness of the result to be 
thereby achieved. Had the Massachusetts court faced a sit-
uation identical to that faced by the Delaware court, would 
19 /d. at 420, 421. Emphasis added. 
20 Supra, p. 360. 
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it have hastened to agtee with the contention that the tax 
on income was not a tax on property? 
* * * * * 
Decisions by two southern states followed sharply on the 
heels of the Missouri decision and furnished support for each 
side of the controversy. In 1920, the Alabama court showed 
its preference for the strict position and ruled in Eliasberg 
Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Grimei1 that a tax upon income was 
a property tax. Consequently, the court held that the tax in 
question violated the property tax maximum rate limitation 
in the Alabama Constitution. The uniformity limitation was 
not involved. Nevertheless, the property tax maximum rate 
and uniformity limitations are closely related in principle 
and the Alabama court apparently realized the consequence 
of its ruling in relation to the established interpretation that 
the uniformity limitation required absolute uniformity in the 
property tax rate. 22 The rationale of the Alabama court 
was not precisely that of the Massachusetts court. Rather 
the Alabama court relied on the theory that income was 
embraced within the meaning of the word "property" as 
used in the constitution, and, consequently, any tax upon 
income was a tax upon property. The majority opinion con-
cluded: 
If they [the constitution makers] regarded money as prop-
erty-and it is inconceivable that they could have regarded 
it otherwise-they must have entertained a general purpose 
to protect it from excessive or unequal taxation, by whatever 
name it might be called, and by whatever scheme it might 
be taxed. Money, when received as income, is visible, tangi-
ble, concrete, and that, in its last analysis, is what is taxed. 
It is of no consequence that items of money are added to-
21 204- Ala. 4-92, 86 So. 56 ( 1920). 
22 See the Alabama study, supra, p. 103. 
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gether, and the sum, reduced by the cost of its acquisition, is 
designated as income. That indicates merely the mode and 
extent of its taxation. Nor is it of any consequence that the 
money thus taxed has left the hands of its quondam owner, 
however speedily; for the state has the inherent power to tax 
property owned at any time during the tax year, though it 
has not always seen fit to do so.23 
A large part of the opinion was devoted to an evaluation of 
prior Alabama decisions, and the majority did not, therefore, 
consider it necessary to dwell at length on any developments 
in other states. However, support for its conclusion was 
found by the court not only in the Pollock case, but as well 
in the Ludlow-Saylor dissenting opinion in Missouri, and the 
Pinder decision in Delaware. Again, one may venture the 
conclusion that the opinion, read as a whole, exhibits a hos-
tility to the idea of an income tax as a revenue producer. 
The response to the Eliasberg decision was similar to the 
response to the earlier Massachusetts advisory opinion. In 
1933, the Alabama Constitution was amended so as to avoid 
the Eliasberg rationale. The amendment expressly provides 
for a graduated income tax. But contrary to the Massachu-
setts experience, the Alabama court in a decision subsequent 
to the amendment, while disclaiming any intent to "dis-
credit" the Eliasberg opinion, in fact tends to question the 
validity of the reasoning therein.24 However, because of the 
1933 amendment it was not necessary to overrule the Elias-
berg case. The later decision is significant in evaluating the 
23 Supra note 21, at 498. 
24 State v. Weil, 232 Ala. 578, 168 So. 679 (1936). See especially 
p. 582, referring to the Alabama decisions prior to Eliasberg which the court 
asserted did not support the Eliasberg rationale, and noting that sub-
sequent to Eliasberg the Georgia court had approved the older Georgia de-
cision there criticized. See note 46, infra. But the W eil case must be read 
in light of a 1950 decision, discussed in note 33 to Ch. III, §B/1, supra, 
p. 104. 
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weight to give Eliasberg as precedent for this restrictive 
VIeW. 
Paired against the Alabama Eliasberg opinion is the view 
of the Mississippi court, first expressed in 1921 in H attics-
berg Grocery v. Robertsont" and reaffirmed in 1925 in State 
ex rel. Knox v. Gulf, M. & N.R. Co.26 The Mississippi Su-
preme Court ruled that the net income tax under attack in 
the Knox case was an "excise" and not a tax upon property. 
Consequently, the tax was not subject to the stricter uniform-
ity limitation. In addition, in the Knox case, the court upheld 
the graduated rate schedule under attack as a reasonable 
classification. The dissenting opinion adopted the view that 
a tax on income derived from property is a tax on the prop-
erty itself, and therefore that a tax on such income would 
result in an illegal "double taxation" on the income-producing 
property. Indicating the continued heated nature of this 
controversy, the dissenting opinion concluded: 
Good-bye section 112 [the basic uniformity clause], this 
is the last of you. The framers of our Constitution by your 
adoption thought they were affording the taxpayers of the 
state some security against unjust and unequal taxation. 
They were mistaken. Little by little you have been whittled 
away by the courts until there was little left. By this stroke 
that small remaining vestige has been swept away. Now by 
giving each scheme of taxation a new name, property may be 
taxed times without number. It is all in the name. The 
state now, without let or hindrance from the Constitution 
may fill its insatiate tax maw to overflowing.27 
There was really little, if anything, new added to the con-
troversy either by the majority or minority of the Mississippi 
court. At most, there is the stress by the majority that the in-
25 126 Miss. 34, 88 So. 4 (1921). 
26 138 Miss. 70, 104So. 689 (1925). 
27 /d, at 115. 
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come tax partakes of the nature of both a property and per-
sonal tax, and is, therefore, an "excise" tax. 
In less than a decade the controversy had reached this 
high pitch. Because of the somewhat logical approaches taken 
by both sides to the controversy, one wonders whether the 
opinions are merely reflections of the attitudes of individ-
uals concerning the desirability of imposing an income tax. 
* * * * * 
The opinion by the Georgia court in 1930, in the case of 
Featherstone v. Norman/8 is considered by this writer to be 
the turning point in the controversy. But even before this 
time there were decisions in three states which indicated that 
a trend was in the making. Oregon, Arkansas, and New 
Hampshire became aligned with those states whose decisions 
made the imposition of an income tax possible. However, the 
decision in New Hampshire must be cautiously dealt with 
for comparative purposes because of the unique constitutional 
limitation in that state. 
In Standard Lumber Company v. Pierce,29 decided in 
1924, the Oregon court did not find it necessary to determine 
the nature of a general net income tax with a graduated rate 
schedule in order to conclude that the tax did not violate the 
uniformity limitation. The reason was that an income tax 
could be characterized as a property tax and still not run 
afoul the uniformity limitation. In other words, the situation 
was similar to that in Delaware. Both states had Type VII 
uniformity clauses (taxes shall be uniform upon the same 
class of subjects). The Oregon court, like the Delaware 
court, equated the uniformity clause with the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal con-
stitution. Essentially the same limitation was said to apply 
28 170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930). 
29 112 Ore. 314-,228 Pac. 812 (1924). 
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to all taxes, whatever their nature might be. Consequently, 
the classification features of the Oregon general net income 
tax, including the graduated rate feature, were held valid 
regardless of the nature of an income tax. Reading the 
Pierce opinion in combination with the 1 9 31 decision, Red-
field v. Fisher,30 one is warranted in concluding that the 
Oregon court has not unequivocally committed itself on the 
issue of the nature of a net income tax, and if pushed on the 
question might well align itself with the position found in 
other later state decisions, namely, that an income tax is just 
that, an "income tax"-sui generis, if a categorization is 
necessary. 
The Arkansas court also reached a conclusion favorable to 
the imposition of an income tax, but not without some con-
fusion in the process. The Arkansas legislature's first experi-
ment was with an abortive general gross income tax, the 
validity of which was passed on in 1925 in Sims v. Ahren.31 
A majority of three agreed that the tax was not a property 
tax, but that the tax as levied was discriminatory and conse-
quently invalid under the uniformity within classes limita-
tion applicable to nonproperty taxes. The two concurring 
justices did not disagree as to the nature of the tax, but 
would have struck it down for other constitutional reasons, 
30 135 Ore. 180, 292 Pac. 813 (1931). In that case the court held that 
a tax of 5ro upon the gross income from certain intangibles was in fact a 
property tax, and that the tax violated the federal equal protection clause 
because it reached only the income of intangible belonging to individuals. 
The classification was said to be arbitrary, the court relying for this proposi-
tion on the somewhat discredited case of Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania, 277 U.S. 389, 48 S. Ct. 553 (1928). On rehearing (p. 205) the 
court distinguished the Pierce case, expressly not overruling it and stressing 
that the tax under consideration was on gross income, not net income. In 
McPherson v. Fisher, 143 Ore. 615, 23 P. 2d 913 (1933) the court 
sustained the subsequent 1931 tax upon the net income from intangibles 
which was so drafted to overcome the objections in the Redfield case. 
81 167 Ark. 557,271 S.W. 720 (1925). 
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explained more fully in the Arkansas study, namely, under 
a theory that the legislature was limited to the imposition of 
property taxes and the taxation of "occupations" or "priv-
ileges" not of "common right." In any case, the legislature 
subsequently enacted a general net income tax, with a classi-
fied and graduated rate schedule. This tax was upheld in 
Stanley v. Gates,82 decided in 1929. All justices (now num-
bering seven) agreed as to the nature of the tax, saying: 
Reference to the various opinions in that case [Sims v. 
Ahren] will show that the court recognized that there was 
a division in the authorities upon the subject whether an in-
come tax was a property tax or not, and we deliberately 
adopted the view that it was not a property tax. If it is 
not a property tax, it does not make any difference what 
name it is called. Whether it is called an excise tax, or a tax 
in the nature of an excise tax, or a personal tax, is a mere 
matter of definition, and does not in any wise change its 
character. 33 
This being the case, the strict property tax uniformity limita-
tion was not applicable, classifications were permissible, and 
the classifications embodied in the tax under consideration 
were held to be reasonable. While no rationale was ever fully 
developed by the court, the usual arguments were recog-
nized, the usual precedents were cited, and the opinion con-
cluded, "· .. a majority of the court holds that 'property,' 
as the term is used in art. 16, §5 of the Constitution [the 
uniformity clause, Type I J, means the property itself as dis-
tinguished from the annual gain or revenue from it."34 
A third ruling favorable to the imposition of an income 
tax was made by the New Hampshire court at approximately 
82 179 Ark. 886, 19 S.W. 2d 1000 (1929). 
88 /d. at 891. 
84 /d. at 893-894. Also see the separate opinion by Wood, ]., on re-
hearing, in the Sims case, JUpra note 31, at 586-593. 
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the same time as the first Oregon and Arkansas cases. How-
ever, in evaluating New Hampshire decisions concerning the 
nature and validity of an income tax one must always keep 
in mind the unique situation under the New Hampshire 
Constitution. To designate a tax a property tax is a sine qua 
non for its existence in New Hampshire, because in theory 
only property taxes are permissible in that state, the legisla-
ture having no authority to levy nonproperty or "excise" 
taxes. As the New Hampshire studySG demonstrated, taxes 
in New Hampshire are either taxes on "estates" or "other 
classes of property." The "estates" tax conforms to the usual 
notion of a general ad valorem property tax. The taxes on 
"other classes of property" conform to what are known as 
nonproperty taxes in other states. However, because of this 
designation of the second general class of taxes the New 
Hampshire legislature is somewhat more restricted in its 
taxing power than other states. But for purposes of this com-
parison, it must be remembered that if an income tax is to be 
levied at all it must be characterized as a tax upon property, 
either "estates" or "other classes of property." Understand-
ing that, one is better able to evaluate the first New Hamp-
shire ruling on the nature of an income tax. This was an ad-
visory opinion36 given in 1915, the same year in which the 
first Massachusetts opinion on this issue was given. A major-
ity of the New Hampshire court ruled that income from 
certain intangibles (interest or dividends from bonds, notes, 
interest bearing credits, and corporate stock) could be taxed 
at the same rate as that levied upon all other property in the 
taxing district.37 Thus such income could be taxed by the 
"estates" tax--a general ad valorem tax in any other state. 
Justice Peaslee dissented in an extended and elaborate opin-
311 Supra, p. 182. 
86 In re Opinion of the Justices, 77 N.H. 611, 93 Atl. 311 ( 1915). 
87 See note 46 to Ch.III, §C/2, supra, p. 195. 
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ion, contending that the tax under consideration was in re-
ality an income tax, an income tax was an excise tax, and, 
therefore, not permissible under the New Hampshire Con-
stitution. The reason this is stressed is because Justice Peas-
lee's characterization of the tax is quite often cited and 
quoted by justices in other states who would characterize an 
income tax as a nonproperty tax and, consequently, not only 
permissible but also not subject to the stricter property tax 
uniformity limitation. 
The care with which Justice Peaslee's opinion must be 
handled is well illustrated by the definitive New Hamp-
shire ruling on the problem in 1925 in Conner v. State38 for 
which Justice Peaslee wrote the opinion of the court. The 
court upheld an intangibles income tax, but the basis for the 
ruling was different from that of the 1915 advisory opinion. 
The tax imposed a proportional rate, but a rate different 
from that levied under the "estates" tax. The ruling of the 
court was that the tax was not an "excise" tax, but a property 
tax upon "other classes of property" than "estates." The 
1915 advisory opinion was not overruled, being distinguished 
as simply indicating that income could be taxed as property 
under the "estates" tax (that is, the general property tax). 
Justice Peaslee rejected his dissent in the prior case insofar 
as it assumed that there was no constitutional basis for the 
imposition of an income tax; that is, he took the position that 
an income tax need not necessarily be characterized as a non-
property tax. The basis for this conclusion was that in the 
1915 advisory opinion the interpretation of taxes on "other 
classes of property" was not given sufficient consideration. In 
addition, it is significant that in the 1925 decision no mention 
is made of the precedents found in other states pro and con 
the nature of an income tax for the purpose of applying the 
uniformity clause. It should be stressed that the New Hamp-
ss 82 N.H. 126, 130 Atl. 357 (1925). 
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shire opinions have at all times been concerned with the char-
acterization of an income tax in relation to the unique con-
stitutional situation in New Hampshire.39 
Chronologically the next development was in Tennessee. 
The Tennessee opinions on the nature of an income tax 
normally would merit no more than passing reference in the 
context of a comparative analysis were it not for the fact 
that they are often cited in both judicial and other discus-
sions of the problem. Consequently, they should be placed in 
their proper perspective in order to show that they have 
little relevance to the particular problem. As pointed out in 
the Tennessee study/0 the power of the legislature to im-
pose an income tax in that state is governed by the following 
constitutional provision: "The legislature shall have power 
to levy a tax upon incomes derived from stocks and bonds 
that are not taxed ad valorem." A tax upon the income from 
stocks and bonds was upheld in Shields v. Williams,41 with 
the court not finding it necessary to determine the nature of 
the tax in order to determine the uniformity limitation ap-
plicable. A strict rule of uniformity governs the taxation of 
property in Tennessee, but it was held not to be applicable to 
this special tax because the special constitutional provision 
was interpreted as withdrawing the tax from the scope of 
the property tax uniformity limitation-regardless of the 
nature of the tax. Then in Evans v. McCabe/2 decided in 
1932, the court held that a general net income tax which the 
legislature attempted to impose was prohibited by that provi-
sion of the constitution. As the court stated: 
89 See the text to notes 49 through 51, Ch. III, §C/2, supra, p. 196, for 
illustrations of how in New Hampshire the uniformity limitation applicable 
to taxes on "other classes of property" is somewhat stricter than that limiting 
nonproperty taxes in other states. 
40 Supra, p. 91. 
41 159 Tenn. 349, 19 S.W. 2d 261 (1929}. 
42 164Tenn. 672,52 S.W. 2d 159 (1932}. 
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In Shields v. Williams we did not find it necessary to ex-
press our opinion as to the nature of an income tax. No such 
necessity arises now. The income tax clause of our constitu-
tion . . . destroys chapter 21 of the Acts of the Extra ses-
sion of 1931 [the general net income tax], whether that 
Act undertakes to levy a property tax or a privilege tax.43 
In both opinions the court referred to the considerable con-
flict as to the nature of income tax for purposes of deter-
mining applicable uniformity principles, and recognized that 
the problem would have been crucial in Tennessee in view of 
the strict property tax uniformity limitation had it not been 
for the special constitutional provision. 
The Georgia decision of 1930, Featherstone v. Norman/4 
may rightfully be termed the turning point in this contro-
versy. No new arguments or theories were introduced; much 
the same approach was taken as that found in the state deci-
sions already described. However, in a lengthy opinion, the 
Georgia court canvassed the field and took a vigorous stand 
in favor of the position that an income tax is not to be sub-
jected to the strict property tax uniformity limitation. With 
this decision by the Georgia court the scales were definitely 
weighted in favor of the income tax. Six years later, the 
controversy approached a standstill, although during the 
intervening period the fight was no less heated. By 1937, a 
very definite majority of the states passing on the question 
had construed their constitutional uniformity limitations so 
that an income tax might be levied. Since that time, there 
has been a tendency in some states to by-pass the judicial 
controversy and spell out in the constitution the extent to 
which an income tax might be levied. 
As the Georgia study45 indicated, at the time of the 
48 !d. at 682. 
44 170 Ga. 370,153 S.E. 58 (1930). 
411 Supra, p. 364-. 
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Featherstone opinion, Georgia had-and still has-a Type 
VII basic uniformity clause (taxes shall be uniform upon the 
same class of subjects). However, at that time there was an 
accompanying provision of Type I, and from this ad valorem 
clause the Georgia court derived a strict property tax uni-
formity limitation. Property was said to constitute a single 
class and had to be taxed ad valorem. Therefore, if any re-
ally effective income tax was to survive in Georgia, it could 
not be characterized a property tax. In 1929, the legislature 
imposed a general net income tax. In the Featherstone case, 
the court adopted the view that an income tax is not a tax 
upon property because income is not property within the 
meaning of the constitutional provisions relating to tax limi-
tations-in particular, the uniformity in taxation limitation. 
In so deciding, the Georgia court could find support in an 
1868 decision of its own, Waring v. Savannah/6 a decision 
often quoted in this respect. In the main, however, the opin-
ion was a thorough review of other state decisions to date on 
the income tax-uniformity limitation problem, with the 
court viewing its conclusion as supported by the number and 
weight of "outside authorities."47 The court posed no par-
ticular rationale of its own as support for its conclusion. 
Rather, the conclusion was based upon an approval of the 
rationale running through those past cases ruling that, for 
purposes of uniformity, an income tax is not to be consid-
ered a property tax. 
46 60 Ga. 93 (1878). The discussion of this case in the Georgia study 
should be reviewed at this point. See the text to notes 15 through 22, Ch. 
111, §G/3, supra, p. 369. Also, see the discussion in the Featherstone case, 
supra note 44, at 380. 
47 Supra note 44, at 384. A quotation, at p. 383 from the New Hamp-
shire advising opinion of 191 5, supra note 3 6, is a good example of how 
that opinion may be misused because of a failure to appreciate the unique 
constitutional situation in New Hampshire. 
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Between 1930 and 1936, seven state courts passed upon 
the issue, and four other state decisions might be mentioned 
in passing. The Georgia decision, plus the decisions in Idaho, 
Illinois, Montana, Washington, Minnesota, Pennsylvania 
and North Dakota represent the most important phase of the 
controversy. There was considerable pressure for the impo-
sition of income taxes to supplement the traditional tax 
structures in order to meet the growing revenue needs of 
state governments. Criticism was mounting against the al-
leged defects of the general property tax as the bedrock of 
state tax structures. Could net income taxes and sales taxes 
be introduced to shore up the weakening tax structures? 
The sales taxes ran into no serious state constitutional ob-
jections, and the battles pro and con were confined to the 
legislative fora where the fiscal wisdom or unwisdom of sales 
taxes could be avowedly argued. However, the net income 
tax not only had to overcome that obstacle, but also the 
state constitutional obstacle in the form of uniformity limi-
tations. Ostensibly in the judicial fora after enactment of a 
tax law, there is no longer any concern about the wisdom 
of the tax, the question being reduced to one of legitimacy. 
Was the uniformity limitation an insurmountable obstacle to 
any effective revenue producing income tax-for example, 
one reaching unearned as well as earned income, and having 
a classified rate structure, including graduated rates? The 
answer depended on whether the tax was to be limited by 
the stricter property tax uniformity limitation. Therefore, 
under the analysis used by the courts, it was necessary to 
determine the nature of an income tax. This, then, was the 
only issue before the judicial fora, the fitting of the income 
tax into the property-nonproperty tax dichotomy. However, 
as might be expected, in determining this issue the judicial 
opinions reflected the partisan policy arguments, and at times 
those opinions were not exactly models of judicial restraint. 
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When there was a divided opinion, the heat engendered 
could hardly stem from division on so conceptual an issue as 
the nature of an income tax. Among those seven states, the 
courts of Illinois, Washington, and Pennsylvania fought the 
losing battle for a restrictive interpretation which rather ef-
fectively prevented any net income tax without constitu-
tional amendment. However, the courts of Idaho, Montana, 
Minnesota, and North Dakota joined the Georgia court in 
accepting the view that the income tax was not a property 
tax, whatever else one might wish to call it. 
Chronologically Idaho and Illinois led the way with de-
cisions in 1932. On March 11 of that year, a unanimous 
Idaho court decided Diefendorf v. Gallet.48 The opinion is 
certainly one of the outstanding state opinions on the con-
troversy at hand. Furthermore, it is quite interesting to com-
pare the attitude of the Idaho court on this question with its 
attitude in determining the degree of uniformity required of 
property tax effective rates. As indicated in the Idaho study, 49 
the Idaho Constitution contains not only a Type VII basic 
uniformity clause (taxes shall be uniform upon the same 
class of subjects), but a provision similar to Type II, a pro-
portionality clause. The Idaho court has found no possible 
conflict between the two, but simply refers to them as "uni-
formity clauses" limiting property taxes only, and requiring 
an absolute uniformity in rate as well as ad valorem method 
of property taxes. A separate provision is the source of a 
requirement of universality. Thus, property taxes are gov-
erned by the strictest uniformity requirement in Idaho. A 
more thorough analysis, in the Idaho study, suggested that 
this approach by the court demonstrated one of the most 
strict attitudes among those thirteen states having Type VII 
basic uniformity clauses, and one which ruled out a classified 
48 51 Idaho 619, 10 P. 2d 311 {1932). 
49 Supra, p. 378. 
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property tax although this construction was not the only 
reasonable one. Nevertheless, when faced with the question 
of determining the validity of a general net income tax, 
modeled after the federal income tax of that date, the court 
unanimously agreed that the tax was a nonproperty tax, and 
consequently not subject to the strict property tax uni-
formity limitation which would have invalidated the tax be-
cause of its features, such as a progressive graduated rate. 
The court made an extensive review of the authorities to 
date from other states, and concluded that the weight of 
authority-with which it agreed-was that an income tax 
was not a tax on property, but an "excise" tax. The term was 
used in the sense the term "nonproperty" tax is used in this 
monograph, the court saying: 
It is difficult to arrive at any all-inclusive definition of the 
term excise tax, since it has long been changed from its orig-
inal connotation of an impost upon a privilege. In its modern 
sense an excise tax is any tax which does not fall within the 
classification of a poll tax or a property tax, and embraces 
every form of burden not laid directly upon persons or 
property.110 
As seems to be the case with most of the income tax-uniform-
ity limitation opinions those other state decisions in line with 
the court's conclusion were most prominent and the basis for 
the conclusion that the weight of authority agreed with the 
court's ruling. The court simply failed to stress the Dela-
ware and New Hampshire opinions to the contrary, although, 
as indicated above, they might well have been distinguished. 
In any case, the court relied on the Ludlow-Saylor opinion 
by the Missouri court as "representing a sound and clear 
summary" of the view which the Idaho court adopted. 
Moreover, the Idaho court found the income tax best char-
110 Supra note 48, at 633. 
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acterized as a tax upon the right or ability to produce, cre-
ate, receive, and enjoy, and not on specific property.111 
Some months after the Idaho decision, the Illinois court 
decided Bachrach v. Nelson.52 The basic uniformity clause 
in the Illinois Constitution is Type II, and the Illinois 
study53 pointed out that there is the strictest degree of uni-
formity required of property taxes in Illinois. In the Bach-
rach case, the court was faced with determining the validity 
of the personal net income tax act which had a graduated 
rate and certain exemptions and was passed by the legislature 
of Illinois in a special session during February, 1932. The 
court held that the tax was a property tax, and, obviously, a 
violation of the property tax uniformity limitation. The ra-
tionale of the court was that income was property within the 
meaning of the constitutional limitation, the tax was upon 
income, and, therefore, upon property. In addition, the court 
agreed with the Massachusetts position that a tax upon in-
come from property would be upon the property from which 
the income was derived.M The opinion by the Illinois court 
was quite dogmatic, asserting, for example, that "The over-
111 /d. at 634. The court used two arguments, either of which was suffi-
cient to support the result. The second argument was based on Art. VII, §3 
of the constitution, which provided that "The words 'property' as herein 
used shall be defined and classified by law." The act levying the tax 
purported to "define" income, and so defined it that it was not property 
within the meaning of the constitutional tax article. The court concluded 
that this classification of income as not being property was a proper exercise 
of legislative discretion under Art. VII, §3. 
112 349 III. 579, 182 N.E. 909 (1932}. 
113 Supra, p. 125. 
114 Supra note 52, at 595. Also see Ohio Oil Co. v. Wright, 386 Jll. 206, 
53 N .E. 2d 966 ( 1944), discussed in the text to footnotes 22 to 3 1, Ch. 
III, §B/3, supra, p. 124. An earlier case, Young v. III. Athletic Club, 310 
III. 75, 141 N.E. 369 (1923} is distinguished in footnote 22 to Ch. III, 
§B/3, supra, p. 123. See pp. 584 to 591 in the Bachrach case for the 
tenuous "historical" argument of the court, from which it was concluded 
that the purpose of the framers of the present Illinois Constitution had been 
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whelming weight of judicial authority holds that [income] 
is [property J ."55 For this proposition, the court cited the 
Alabama Eliasberg case, as well as other Alabama decisions, 
certain Massachusetts opinions, certain United States Su-
preme Court opinions, and the Missouri Ludlow case and 
the Delaware Pinder case. These cases were cited as defining: 
What is personal property and in substance hold that money 
or any other thing of value acquired as gain or profit from 
capital or labor is property, and that, in the aggregate, these 
acquisitions constitute income, and, in accordance with the 
axiom that the whole includes all of its parts, income in-
cludes property and nothing but property, and therefore is 
itself property.56 
This statement is hardly accurate as to the Ludlow opinion, 
which held that income was not property within the sense 
used by the constitutional uniformity limitation. In addition, 
this writer has already suggested that the Pinder case should 
be cited with considerable caution in this field. Apart from 
that, the court cited the Alabama, Massachusetts, and Dela-
ware opinions, along with the Pollock case, as basis for its 
"overwhelming weight" of judicial authority. Missouri cases 
constitute authority to the contrary, as do the Mississippi, 
Oregon, Arkansas, Georgia, and Idaho opinions. The court 
in a later paragraph does refer to those states as having stat-
utes providing for income taxes, along with the states of New 
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and others. No judicial author-
ity is referred to, these states being dismissed by citing Wis-
consin and New York as states in which either an income tax 
to limit the legislature to the same sources of revenue to which it had been 
limited by the prior constitution of 184-8. Considerable comfort was derived 
from the fact that there was no express authorization for an income tax 
included in the present 1870 constitution. 
155 /d. at 59 I. 
116 /d. at 592. 
714- UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
was expressly sanctioned by the constitution or no constitu-
tional uniformity limitations existed. ~7 The point is, the Illi-
nois court had no basis for its evaluation of the precedent in 
other states-if weight of number is to be so important. But 
this assertion by the Illinois court is typical of the approach 
used by a good many of the opmwns on this particular 
problem. 
* * * * * 
Within nine months of the Illinois decision, the Montana 
court in 1933 decided O'Connell v. State Board of Equali-
zation. 58 The Montana legislature had enacted a graduated 
personal net income tax law, copied from the Idaho law. 
Contemporaneously, a constitutional amendment was pro-
posed which would have expressly authorized the imposition 
of such a tax. The court, however, in the O'Connell case de-
termined the validity of the tax before the amendment be-
came effective. In a 3-2 decision, the majority concluded 
that the income tax was not a tax on property, and, there-
fore, not subject to any of the property tax uniformity re-
quirements which might be stricter than the uniformity 
required of nonproperty taxes.~9 Consequently, both the ex-
emptions and the graduated rate schedule were held reason-
able classifications, neither of which could stand in a prop-
erty tax. The majority relied a great deal upon the Idaho 
act and the interpretation placed thereon by the Idaho court 
in the Diefendorf case. The decision of the majority was 
that the tax was "in the nature of an excise,"60 although the 
precise nature of the tax was not elaborated upon. It was 
. sufficient that the tax was not a property tax. Recognizing 
the controversy the court said: 
117 /d. at 594--595. 
CIS 95 Mont. 91, 25 P. 2d 114- (1933). 
119 See the Montana study, supra, p. 4-31. 
60 Supra note 58, at 120. 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 715 
we do not feel disposed, nor do we think it necessary, 
to enter into a lengthy discussion as to the character of the 
tax imposed by the chapter here under consideration. . . . 
We content ourselves with saying that there are reasons why 
such a tax might be classed as a property tax, and reasons 
why it should be classed as an excise tax. Volumes, in fact 
libraries, have been written in a vain endeavor to accurately 
classify the income tax. Courts and text-writers have .en-
deavored to argue the world into the belief that the income 
tax is a property tax .... Other courts are just as emphatic 
in the claim that it is an excise tax. • . . 
It is not necessary for us to declare the exact nature of the 
income tax under consideration. It is apparent that the legis-
lature of the state of Montana intended to enact an income 
tax and did not intend that it should be considered as a 
1 61 property tax aw. . .. 
Perhaps in the end, the maJonty could be said to have 
looked quite favorably on the view that an income tax is 
sui generis, the idea presented in a well-known law review 
article quoted by the court.62 If the majority did not seek 
to find the definitive answer in view of the clashing opinions 
by courts of last resort in other states, but found in this 
clashing opinion itself the basis for upholding the tax, this 
was grounded upon the premises the majority began with, 
that the court was to indulge in every possible presumption 
in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative act. The court 
was sitting to determine "not whether it [was] possible to 
condemn but whether it [was] possible to uphold the Act."63 
No doubt the clashing opinion furnished a reasonable doubt 
to be resolved in favor of the validity of the act.64 
61 !d. at 112-113. 
62 !d. at 113, quoting Brown, supra note 3. 
13 /d. at 107. 
84 Cf. the dissenting opinion by Blake, J., infra note 82, in the Washing-
ton Culliton case. 
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To dissenting Chief Justice Callaway, there was no rea-
sonable doubt. In a vitriolic dissenting opinion, he asserted 
that an income tax is a property tax, and consequently had 
to fall under the Montana property tax uniformity limita-
tion. In reaching his conclusion Justice Callaway, too, was 
guided by certain premises. 
We should observe at the outset . • . that the settled 
determination of the people in framing and adopting the 
Constitution to restrict the legislature in matters of taxation 
is an outstanding feature of that fundamental law. The his-
toric tendency of governments constantly to exact more 
money from the taxpayer pursuant to popular desire in fur-
thering public activities was in the mind of the framers; they 
knew that the history of the human race tells with startling 
repetition the story of ships of state going to destruction 
upon the rocks of high taxation. 65 
First, he considered the idea that income was not property 
within the contemplation of constitutional provisions. This, 
he said, seems to have had its origin in the Waring case de-
cided by the Georgia court, and the idea there expressed 
(and so often quoted) that income is "the fruit" and prop-
erty, labor and capital "the tree," and that "the fruit" is no 
"tree" so long as it is "plucked to eat, and consumed in the 
eating." 
Upon this and similar fallacious reasoning a number of 
respectable courts have declared that income is not property. 
It would be useless to discuss these authorities. . . . Their 
sophistry is adequately exposed by the eminent Justice Som-
erville speaking for the Supreme Court of Alabama, in 
Eliasberg Bros. Mere. Co. v. Grimes . .• ,66 
Other arguments were reviewed, 67 but Justice Callaway's 
65 Supra note 58, at 122-123. 
66 /d. at 123-124. Emphasis added. 
67 Note particularly his discussion of the "privilege" tax argument, at 
pp. 127-128. 
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patience seemed to wear thin and he concluded, "But the 
idea that an income tax is an excise under our Constitution 
is a fantasy."68 Justice Callaway closed with this admonition: 
Admitting that income taxes are desirable, that, as differ-
ent writers say, the income tax system is a long step in ad-
vance, which in the interest of good government should be 
taken, and that it is the only practical system to reach intan-
gibles which to a large extent are and have been escaping 
taxation, and is generally conceded by economists and tax 
experts to be the most equitable and just of all kinds of 
taxes, the question to be decided by us is whether that sys-
tem is permissible under the Constitution, or whether it will 
be necessary to amend it in order that the system may be 
employed. My answer is: The Constitution must be amended 
to warrant a valid income tax law.69 
It is interesting to note how the Montana court's approach 
to the income tax problem is of the same spirit as its ap-
proach to the problem of a classified property tax. As pointed 
out in the Montana study, the Montana Constitution con-
tains both a Type VII and Type VI clause, the latter being 
generally interpreted as requiring strict uniformity in prop-
erty taxes. When faced with determining the validity of a 
classified general property tax the Montana court in 1919 
had reconciled the two conflicting clauses so as to permit 
classification for rates, though no exemptions could be made 
and the ad valorem method was required. In other words, 
whether it be a classified property tax or an income tax, the 
majority of the Montana court would start with the premise 
that it was sitting to determine "not whether it was possible 
to condemn but whether it was possible to uphold" legisla-
tive enactments. Where reasonably possible, legislative dis-
cretion is given the benefit of the doubt. 
68 !d. at 128. 
69 !d. at I 31. 
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In the same year of the Montana decision, but nearly two 
months later, the Washington court entered the arena to re-
veal a bitter internal split on this highly controversial prob-
lem. As related in the Washington study/0 a graduated 
general net income tax was passed in 1932 in Washington 
as an initiative measure. The act stated its purpose to be the 
taxation of "all annual incomes within the state as such, and 
not as property." This was to no avail. The act was chal-
lenged immediately and a majority of the court on Septem-
ber 8, 1933, in Culliton v. Chase,71 held it unconstitutional. 
The decision was 5-4. The majority's rationale was: the act 
imposed a tax directly on income (notwithstanding the legis-
lative recital to the contrary), income is property, therefore 
the tax was a property tax. Being a property tax, the act was 
subject to the uniformity limitation applicable to property 
taxes. In 1930, the Washington Constitution was amended 
to change the basic uniformity clause to Type VIII (taxes 
shall be uniform upon the same class of property). Before 
that time, property taxes were subject to the strictest uni-
formity limitation. All five of the majority were agreed that 
the graduated rate feature was not such a classification as 
was provided for under the new and, to a limited extent, 
more liberal property tax uniformity limitation. Indeed, two 
of the majority indicated that income would be a minimum 
class. Consequently, even in a state having modified its strict 
property tax uniformity requirement, the characterization of 
the income tax as a property tax was fatal-at least, insofar 
as a graduated income tax was desired. 
The rationale of the majority depended, first, upon the 
definition of property found in the Washington Constitu-
tion in the same provision containing the uniformity clause: 
"The word 'property' as used herein shall mean and include 
" 0 Supra, p. 582. 
n174 Wash. 363,25 P. 2d 81 (1933). 
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everything, whether tangible or intangible, subject to owner-
ship." Income was said to be "something," and surely "sub-
ject to ownership," while "everything'' includes "some-
thing,"72 therefore it followed that income was property. 
Because of this "peculiarly forceful constitutional defini-
tion"73--as characterized by the principal opinion-the ma-
jority could assert that none of the decisions from other 
states had any bearing on the problem before the Washing-
ton court.74 However, as an aside, without reference to such 
judicial authority, it could also be asserted that "The over-
whelming weight of judicial authority is that 'income' is 
property and a tax upon income is a tax upon property.m5 
An almost identical statement in the Illinois case has already 
been considered. Second, the majority could assert that in a 
1930 opinion, Aberdeen Savings & Loan Assn. v. Chase/6 
it had "definitely decided ••. that an income tax is a 
property tax, which should set the question at rest. . . .m1 
The significance of that case is more closely examined in 
the Washington study/8 and that analysis could be referred 
to at this point with profit. 
The tone of the principal and concurring opinions of the 
72 Cf. the analysis of the majority rationale in the concurring opinion by 
Steinert, J., at p. 384. See the principal opinion at p. 374. 
73 /d. at 374. 
74 However, the court did have to distinguish the Idaho Diefendorf case, 
supra note 48, and the Montana O'Connell case, supra note 58. The basis 
upon which the majority could distinguish the Idaho case was the second 
reason used in that opinion, supra note 51, which was based on the provision 
in the Montana constitution defining property. The majority asserted that 
the Montana majority had been unduly swayed by the Idaho decision. U. 
at 376-377. However, it should be pointed out that the majority in the 
Idaho Diefendorf decision did not rely on the special constitutional pro-
vision referred to for its nonproperty tax argument. 
111 /d. at 374. 
T8J57 Wash. 351,289 Pac. 536 {1930). 
71 Supra note 71, at 376. 
18 See the text to notes 28-34 inCh. III, §H/7, supra, p. 581. 
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majority hint at a bitter dispute lying close to the surface 
but not yet spilling over into the printed opinion. This is 
reflected in the rather defensive tone of the dissenting opin-
ion. This feeling about the several opinions in the Culliton 
case is confirmed by the 1936 Jensen case in which acrimoni-
ous debate was not kept in the conference room. 
In the eyes of the four dissenting justices the tax was a 
nonproperty tax, with its object the enjoyment of privileges 
made possible by the protection of the organized state. Fur-
thermore, the dissent felt that even if the tax were character-
ized as a property tax it was not unconstitutional because the 
uniformity clause for property taxes required only a uni-
formity within classes. The dissenting opinion preceded its 
discussion of the meaning of the constitutional provision 
with a review of "not only its historical background, but 
the social and economic condition of the state when" the 
original, and superseded, uniformity clause was written into 
the constitution in 1889.70 It is interesting to set forth this 
discussion at some length, as it illustrates the justification 
used by those who would liberally interpret the uniformity 
limitations as opposed to the justification typical of those 
opposing the income tax. Judge Blake wrote: 
In 1889, the major portion of the wealth of the state lay 
in its lands and their produce-agricultural, mineral and 
timber. Taxation was a fairly simple process. Its subjects 
were tangible, visible-easy to evaluate. The functions of 
government were also fairly simple. Relatively speaking, in 
those days the value of tangible property was great and 
the cost of government little. The burden of taxation was 
nothing compared to the benefits the owner of real property 
received as the result of his comparatively small contribu-
tion to the organized state, which protected him in his own-
ership and use of property. 
But even then, the economic complexion of the country 
79 Supra note 71, at 385. 
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was changing. More and more of the country's wealth was 
going into intangibles-into stocks, bonds, securities of vari-
ous sorts-indicia of property which could easily elude the 
search of the tax collector. In the light of subsequent history, 
even then it should have been obvious that the powers of 
taxation must be elastic. . . . 
This . . . was a new state, whose vast resources of wealth 
that lay in and on the land seemed inexhaustible. After the 
depression of the middle nineties, a tide of immigration 
started, which continued until toward the end of the first 
decade of this century. As a result of this influx of people, 
and the still popular belief that wealth lay in the land, 
values of real property increased amazingly and kept rela-
tively well ahead of increasing taxes. But in the latter part 
of that decade the tide of immigration began to ebb rapidly, 
and real property value receded with equal celerity. 
In the meantime, due to a growing complexity in organic 
society, the state had been called upon to take over an ever-
increasing burden of functions, and the cost of government 
had relatively increased. As long as property values were 
increasing, the additional tax burden went unnoticed. But 
when property values collapsed, the problem of taxation be-
gan to be acute-and for twenty odd years it has been in-
creasing. The cry for reduction of taxes has become ever 
louder in the face of increasing cost of government. 
The burden of taxation on real estate became more oner-
ous during the second and third decades of this century by 
reason of several facts, among which were the following: 
. . . ( 2) as the burden of taxes on real property increased, 
capital sought investment in bonds, stocks and other securi-
ties, and escaped taxation entirely, or carried, at most, only 
a small portion of the burden. 
A growing agitation for decrease in taxes developed. But 
the relief was not available, because the state found itself 
in a strait-jacket in the shape of article VII of the constitu-
tion [the original uniformity clause, Type VI, a uniform 
and equal rate of assessment and taxation], with the judicial 
interpretation that had been placed upon it. . . . 
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As a result of these years of agitation and investigation 
of the subject, there was submitted to the people and 
adopted by them at the general election of 1930 [an 
amendment which substituted the present uniformity pro-
vision] •80 
That provision contained a Type VIII clause (taxes shall be 
uniform upon the same class of property). Having made 
this review, Judge Blake observed, 
As I see it, the real question presented on this appeal is 
whether, by construction of this amendment, we are going 
to thwart the effort of the state to throw off the strait-
jacket in which it was bound. To do so requires a literal, 
technical construction of a few words of the amendment, in 
perversion of their true and obvious intent and purpose and 
in total disregard of its historical background and the condi-
tions which brought it into being.81 
Of course, the attitudes of the majority and minority in this 
case are excellent illustrations of the techniques of interpre-
tation of written law. Shall we do as the majority, look at 
the words of the instrument and thereby determine the 
"plain meaning" of the words, or shall we, with the dissent-
ing justices, look to historical scene to determine the "true" 
meaning of the words? What was the intention of those 
who drafted and those who approved the words of the new 
uniformity provision? Choose your technique of interpreta-
tion, and the opposing conclusions may reasonably follow. 
Perhaps it is superfluous to say that what seemed a wise re-
sult might have influenced the choice of interpretive tech-
nique used to justify the conclusion drawn. In any case, the 
dissenting opinion, in light of these interpretive considera-
tions, reasoned to its above conclusion. Recognizing that 
other decisions were not binding, the dissent nevertheless 
80 U. at 385, 386-387. 
81 IJ. at 388. 
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noted that if one is to follow the principle that legislation 
is presumptive! y valid, then " [ t] he disagreement of courts 
and judges on identical problems seems to afford the high-
est proof that 'reasonable doubt' does exist."82 Consequently, 
such reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of the 
legislation. 
In order best to evaluate the Culliton decision one must 
consider State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle,88 an opinion handed 
down on the same day of the Culliton opinion. In the Yelle 
case a majority of five (the minority of Culliton plus one) 
upheld a Business and Occupation Tax first imposed in 1933. 
That Act, described in more detail in the Washington study, 
purported to levy upon "every person an annual tax or 
excise for the privilege of engaging in business activities." 
The base of the tax was gross income from the business en-
gaged in, with a different proportional rate applicable to 
different classes of business, as classified in the Act. Because 
of a veto the tax did not reach either those engaged in agri-
culture or professionals. The majority of five, in the Yelle 
case, agreed that the tax was not a property tax, distinguish-
ing it from a net income tax as follows: 
The act does not concern itself with income which has 
been acquired, but only with the privilege of acquiring, and 
that the amount of the tax is measured by the amount of 
the income in no way affects the purpose of the act or the 
principle involved.84 
If one recognizes this argument as having a familiar ring, 
remember it is by the "dissent-plus-one" of the Culliton 
case. If one wonders how the "plus-one" (Judge Holcomb) 
could be convinced by such finely drawn distinctions, con-
82 /d. at 396. 
83 174 Wash. 402,25 P. 2d 91 (1933). 
84 /d. at 407. 
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sider this statement by the writer of the majority opinion, 
concurred in by Judge Holcomb: 
... it seems necessary first to determine whether the 
tax under consideration is a property tax or an excise tax, 
because of the uniformity clause. • . • 
Time and space will not permit a review of the authori-
ties on this question. Slight differences in the terms of the 
acts considered, or in constitutional provisions, have led to a 
maze of conflicting and bewildering decisions. It may be 
that we have, in some prior case, used language not wholly 
consistent with our present views. After an exhaustive study 
of the cases, we are all well satisfied that this is not a 
property tax, even under the broad and all inclusive terms of 
our constitution. To hold otherwise would render it ex-
ceedingly difficult if not impossible to sustain any excise 
tax.85 
The juxtaposition of these two cases in the jurisprudence 
of a single court, indeed in the same volume of reports, de-
cided on the same day and found on adjoining pages of the 
reports, should serve as well as any example to illustrate the 
almost hopeless task of arranging the precedent on this gen-
eral problem with any reasonable degree of symmetry. Two 
of the four dissenting justices in the Yelle case agreed that 
the tax was not a property tax, but disagreed with the con-
clusion of the majority that the exclusion of farmers and 
professionals was not arbitrary. Two dissenters adamantly 
clung to their view that this tax, as well as a net income tax, 
was a tax upon property within the scope of the uniformity 
limitation. 
But this was not the last word in Washington. As de-
scribed in the Washington study, the legislature tried again 
in 1 9 3 5, enacting a personal net income tax and a companion 
85 /d. at 405-406. Emphasis added. 
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corporate net income tax. Apparently finding some faint 
hope in the Yelle case, the legislature framed the acts in 
terms of "privileges," providing that the personal net in-
come tax was to be paid by every resident of the state "for 
the privilege of receiving income therein while enjoying the 
protection of its laws." The Culliton majority was not to be 
so easily persuaded. In Jensen v. Henneford,86 decided in 
1936, the personal net income tax was held to be unconsti-
tutional. Again there was a 5-4 decision, with majority and 
minority being composed of the same judges composing the 
majority and minority in the Culliton case. The majority 
ruled that the tax was a property tax, regardless of the stat-
utory recitation to the contrary. 
The 1935 act purports to levy a tax upon "the privilege 
of receiving income." But an examination of the various 
provisions of the act shows clearly that the legislature was 
concerned with the property (income) upon which the 
amount of the tax was to be levied, not with the mere 
privilege of the individual to receive the income. When a 
tax is, in truth, levied for the exercise of a substantive privi-
lege granted or permitted by the state, the tax may be con-
sidered as a excise tax and sustained as such. Illustrations of 
such taxes are found in the cases of State ex rel. Stiner v. 
Yelle . . . (for the privilege of engaging in business ac-
tivities). • . . 
But the mere right to own and hold property cannot be 
made the subject of an excise tax, because to tax by reason of 
ownership of property is to tax the property itself. . . . 
The right to receive property (income in this instance) is 
but a necessary element of ownership, and, without such 
right to receive, the ownership is but an empty thing and 
of no value whatever. · . . . The right to receive, the recep-
tion, and the right to hold, are progressive incidents of own-
ership and indispensable thereto. To tax any one of these 
86 185 Wash. 209, 53 P. 2d 607 (1936). 
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elements is to tax their sum total, namely, ownership, and, 
therefore, the property (income) itself. . • . 87 
Having disposed of the first issue with this specious but 
common reasoning, the majority then ruled that the tax 
violated the property tax uniformity limitation on several 
counts. It is sufficient to note that the majority viewed the 
power of the legislature to classify income (as property) as 
a very limited one, even though, ostensibly, property taxes 
need only be uniform within classes in Washington. 
Judge Blake wrote the Jensen dissenting opinion, as he 
had written the dissenting opinion in Culliton. Admitting 
that if Culliton stood unimpaired it would dispose of the 
present case, Judge Blake proposed that Culliton had for all 
intents and purposes been destroyed as precedent by cases 
decided between 1933 and 1936. His persuasive argument 
rested primarily on the Yelle case, in which the business and 
occupation tax with a base of gross income was upheld 
as a nonproperty tax, the object of which was the privilege 
of engaging in enumerated occupations. The Yelle rationale 
had been reaffirmed in a subsequent case. 88 In addition, the 
case89 upholding the Washington sales tax as a nonproperty 
tax was cited, and, more significantly, he referred to the 
case110 which ruled that the compensating use tax was a non-
property tax, the use tax being on the "privilege of using" 
tangible personal property. Judge Blake could find no signif-
icant difference between those taxes and a net income tax, 
insofar as their nature was concerned. Using the rationale 
87 /d. at 218-219. 
88 See Supply Laundry Co. v. Jenner, 178 Wash. 72, 34 P. 2d 363 
(1934), and note SO to Ch. III, §H/7, supra, p. 587. 
89 Morrow v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 625, 47 P. 2d 1016 (1935), and 
note 3 to Ch. lll, §H/7, supra, p. 574. 
90 Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford, 183 Wash. 317, 49 P. 2d 14 
(1935), and notes 3 and 7 to Ch. lll, §H/7, supra, pp. 574, 575. 
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of the majority, he could find no basis upon which to differ-
entiate among the enumerated taxes. 
Apart from the arguments on legal issues, the Jensen de-
cision is illustrative of how this general issue of the validity 
of a net income tax has resulted in bitter controversy. The 
concurring opinion of Millard, C.J., must be set forth sub-
stantially in full in order to reveal the acrimonious nature of 
the debate: 
None of the authorities cited justifies or excuses the 
minority's disregard of the doctrine of stare decisis. We held 
in [the Aberdeen case, supra] .•. and in [the Culliton 
case, supra] . . . that, under our constitution, income is 
property and that an income tax is a property tax. From 
that declaration, this court has never departed, and the peo-
ple have not seen fit to amend the constitution to permit us 
to hold otherwise. It is true that some of the judges who 
concurred in the majority view in the first case cited dis-
sented when the second case was decided. 
"In future cases, even a dissenting justice should be 
bound by the decision of the majority until and unless au-
thoritatively overruled or reversed by some higher tri-
bunal. . . ." Culliton v. Chase. • . . 
Surely, the rule of stare decisis--a rule whereby uniform-
ity, certainty and stability in the law are obtained-should 
apply. This is not a forum where personal predilection 
should obtain. Political expediency has no place on this tri-
bunal. Neither threats nor promises should dissuade one 
from the performance of duty. To sacrifice the rule of legal 
stability for acquisition or retention of official position is a 
price no honest person can exact, a price no self-respecting 
person can pay. Is a legal principle more than once enunci-
ated, and from which the court has never receded, to have 
no binding effect? 01 
These are, indeed, rather harsh words. 
Returning to the legal issues, the remainder of the 1935 
81 Supra note 86, at 225. Emphasis added. 
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net income tax structure was killed in Petroleum Naviga-
tion Company v. H enneford,02 a case decided later in the 
same term in which Jensen was decided. The corporate net 
income tax was held to be a property tax, by a 6-3 majority, 
with the majority briefly disposing of the tax on the ground 
that it was a violation of the property tax uniformity limita-
tion, again indicating the very limited extent to which in-
come (as property) might be classified. An effort made in 
19 51 by the Washington legislature to revive the issue in 
the form of a corporate net income tax met with failure in 
Powers v. Huntley93 for the same reasons expressed in the 
Petroleum case. The Washington study contains a more de-
tailed analysis of these corporate net income taxes and points 
to certain inconsistencies in the opinions as to permissible 
minimum classes of income (as property). 
* * * * * 
This "holding" action by the small Washington majority 
could not balance the steadily growing trend which favored 
the constitutionality of a net income tax under state uniform-
ity and equality limitations. In the spring following the 
Washington Culliton case, the Minnesota court passed on 
the question. On March 23, 1934 the Minnesota court, in 
Reed v. Bjornson,94 upheld a general net income tax law 
enacted in 1933 as against the contentions that the tax vi-
olated the state uniformity limitation and the federal equal 
protection clause. The principal arguments were directed 
at the graduated schedule and exemptions. 
The Reed decision was unanimous, something of a rarity 
in this controversial area. Justice Loring, writing the opin-
ion for the court, noted as the first issue that the briefs had 
92 185 Wash. 495,55 P. 2d 1056 (1936). 
93 39 Wash. 2d 191, 235 P. 2d 173 (1951). 
94 191 Minn. 254,253 N.W. 102 (1934). 
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substantial parts devoted to a discussion of whether or not 
the tax involved was a property tax. The court was quite 
aware of the heated controversy on this question, but did 
not find it necessary to enter the fray. The reason for this 
was the interpretation placed by the court upon the Minne-
sota basic uniformity clause which is Type VII (taxes shall 
be uniform upon the same class of subjects). The court ruled 
that this uniformity clause limited all taxes-whether prop-
erty or nonproperty. And, most importantly, the court was 
convinced that its uniformity clause was no more restrictive 
than the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment of the federal constitution. Consequently, regardless 
of the nature of the tax, the graduated rates and exemptions 
were not ruled out. As indicated in the Minnesota study,95 
the court has, at least in one case, approved a form of grad-
uated rate under an obvious property tax. If the issue con-
cerning the nature of the tax had been forced, it seems that 
the court did not look unfavorably on the view that an in-
come tax is sui generis. This is evident in the following dis-
cussion by the court: 
While income as it is received is necessarily property, a 
tax upon it has many characteristics which differ quite radi-
cally from those of a tax levied upon real or invested per-
sonal property. Income is a more fleeting or transitory ben-
efit which comes according to present efforts or the wisdom 
or luck of past accumulations. Many who own little or no tan-
gible or intangible property have large incomes and enjoy 
great benefit from the protection which organized society 
affords. They not only have ability to pay a tax for that 
protection but get value received in liberal measure for 
what they may be required to pay. So do those who receive 
large incomes from property. An income tax is calculated to 
115 Supra, p. 406. See the text discussion therein to footnotes 53 through 
77 for the development concerning the Minnesota corporate franchise tax 
with a base of net income, and the confusion concerning its nature. 
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take toll from the flow of this property to the individual 
through the arteries of organized social life and to cause 
it to bear a share of the burden of government. In many 
ways such a tax is sui generis. It imposes a tax on the net in-
come or revenue which passes into or through a man's hands 
within a prescribed period, a large share of which never finds 
permanent investment. 96 
On this analysis of the nature of an income tax and the mean-
ing of the uniformity clause the court found much comfort 
in the Oregon Standard Lumber Co. decision. 
One further point of interest in the Reed case is the ap-
proach taken by the court. Reminiscent of Justice Blake's 
opinion, dissenting in the Washington Culliton v. Chase, 
the opinion in the Reed case noted that the present uniform-
ity clause in the Minnesota constitution was adopted in 
1906, replacing the clause theretofore governing taxation. 
The meaning of the new uniformity clause was to be de-
termined from "the history of the times" which "indicates 
clearly that the people, in adopting the 1906 amendment, 
were liberating the legislature from most of the previous 
constitutional restraints in regard to taxation."97 The opinion 
then proceeded to give full play to this intention in its in-
terpretation of the "wide open tax amendment," as the pro-
vision was designated when up for adoption. 
At this point it will be interesting to return for a moment 
to the situation in Montana. Recall that in the summer of 
1933, the Montana court decided the O'Connell case, in 
which a personal net income tax was characterized as a non-
property tax and upheld, but not without the outspoken 
opposition of two dissenting justices. Winter did not have 
a cooling effect upon the rather heated differences, and less 
than two months after the Minnesota opinion, in the spring 
116 Supra note 94-, at 260. 
117 U. at 259. 
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of 1934, the Montana court faced the problem again in a 
manner reminescent of the second Washington case of 1936, 
discussed above. On May 12, 1934, the Montana court in 
Mills v. State Board of Equalization98 reaffirmed its general 
position stated in the O'Connell case. After the O'Connell 
case the legislature had amended the income tax law to add 
a surtax provision. In the Mills case, taxpayers not only 
attacked the validity of the surtax provision, but would have 
re-opened the question of the validity of the tax in the ab-
sence of the surtax provision. 
As to the validity in general of an income tax, the ma-
jority opinion noted that attention had been directed to the 
assertion by Holcomb, J., in the Washington Culliton case, 
to the effect that "the overwhelming weight of judicial au-
thority" favors the view that an income tax is a property 
tax. The Montana majority's response was to refer to the ar-
ticle99 written by Professor Allen in 1933 in which he dis-
cussed the court opinions to that date and concluded that, 
while earlier state decisions were about equally divided, by 
1933 opinions rendered were "preponderantly" in favor of 
the view that an income tax is a nonproperty tax. The Mon-
tana majority concurred in this, saying: 
Through the course of his article Professor Allen refers 
to the decisions pro and con on this question, and then dem-
onstrates by his citations the truth of his observations. The 
learned jurist from our neighboring state does not fortify 
his conclusion by any such array of citations, and in fact our 
investigation of the adjudicated cases leads to the conclu-
sion reached by Professor Allen.100 
The majority further noted that some of the briefs "se-
verely" condemned the court for not "defining or classify-
98 97 Mont. 13, 33 P. 2d 563 {1934). 
99 Allen, supra note 3. 
100 Supra note 98, at 17-18. 
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ing'' the income tax in the O'Connell case. The majority 
properly responded, "We did, however, decide that the in-
come tax is not a property tax."101 That is, the crucial issue is 
not so much what an income tax "is," as what it "is not." If 
the tax is not a property tax, it makes little difference how 
it is defined. In other words, we reach the dichotomy used 
throughout this monograph-property taxes and nonprop-
erty taxes, with the latter category simply all taxes not falling 
in the first class. Thus, the majority did not retreat from its 
position in the O'Connell case.102 
Mr. Chief Justice Callaway was still not convinced-nor 
did any concept of stare decisis suppress his contempt for the 
majority rationale. In his opinion, O'Connell should be 
overruled. One reason given was: 
... the majority [in O'Connell] declared an excise tax 
to be an income tax, contrary to our Constitution and the 
great weight of authority . 
. . . [here the opinion by Holcomb, J., in the Wash-
ington Culliton case is referred to, and his assertion as to the 
weight of authority] . . . . 
That there is ample authority for the statement is seen 
by referring to the authorities cited in my opinion in the 
O'Connell case. In view of the "conclusion" of Professor 
Allen, referred to in the majority opinion, it may not be 
amiss to call attention to the fact that the "weight of author-
ity" does not depend upon the number of opinions upon one 
side or another of a debated question. It rests upon the 
sounder opinions, those which are supported by reason, expe-
rience and wisdom. Upon this foundation there cannot be 
any doubt that the great weight of authority sustains the as-
sertion that income is property; . . . ,103 
101 /d.atlS. 
102 However, the surtax provision was held invalid because of poor draft-
ing which resulted in an unintentional arbitrary discrimination. See note 8 
to Ch. Ill, §G/8, supra, p. 431. 
103 Supra note 98, at 34. Emphasis added. 
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All would agree that a "box-score" jurisprudence is not 
desirable. Sheer weight of numbers need not necessarily be 
persuasive. However, the "weight of authority" is usually 
distinguished when not followed as being contrary to the 
"sounder" premises. But this is hardly the place to become 
embroiled in controversy over that concept.104 For, however 
that may be, Mr. Chief Justice Callaway's Procrustean defi-
nition is really most persuasive of one thing: Justice Call-
away was convinced he was "right," and that should be the 
end of the matter. Further evidence of the basic "error" of 
the O'Connell decision was, in Justice Callaway's view, as 
follows: 
The result of the decision in the O'Connell case was fore-
seen; in my dissenting opinion it was predicted that the op-
eration of [the income tax law] would increase taxes during 
the present biennium. It has. It was also pointed out that 
"if the legislature has the right, under the Constitution, as 
it now exists, to levy an income tax, it may employ that tax 
to raise large sums of money in addition to the ad valorem 
tax as provided by the Constitution." 
The Extraordinary Session . . . attempted through the 
surtax device to increase the income taxes of individuals. 
. . . And it is to be noted that the legislature, unless re-
stricted by the Constitution, may do so again and go still 
further, by employing the pen of a more skilled draughts-
man, and thus the tax burden, now oppressive, will become 
unbearable, entailing ills upon the people beyond their suf-
ferance .... 
The constitutional barriers so carefully erected by the peo-
ple in their Constitution have been broken down by the 
O'Connell case. I call attention again to the desirability of 
enacting the pending constitutional amendment which pro-
vides that the legislative assembly may levy "and collect 
taxes upon incomes and persons, firms and corporations for 
the purpose of replacing property taxes.m05 
104 Cf. note 167, infra. 
1011 Supra note 98, at 34-3 5. Emphasis added. 
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One may well wonder how that passage got into an opinion 
concerning the constitutionality of an income tax, that ques-
tion ostensibly depending upon the nature of the tax and the 
applicable uniformity limitation. The majority opinion did 
attempt to answer this type of objection, and while having 
no bearing on the constitutional issue, that answer may be 
quoted to catch the full flavor of this judicial battle. 
Again our attention is invited to the impending disaster 
which will overtake the citizens of this state, by holding that 
the legislature in the enactment of future income tax laws is 
in nowise limited by the provisions of our Constitution. . . • 
The states of New York, Iowa, Connecticut, Vermont and 
Rhode Island have practically no constitutional limitations 
whatever upon the exercise of the taxing power by their leg-
islatures. It cannot be said that these states have not pros-
pered during their existence to any less degree than have 
the neighboring states of similar areas and resources. The 
lack of constitutional restriction upon the taxing power has 
not operated to drive wealth beyond their borders. The 
state of New York, without such constitutional restriction, 
is first in wealth and population, and, indeed, within its 
confines is the city said to be the financial center of the busi-
ness wor ld.106 
However persuasive these various arguments may be as 
to the wisdom, or lack of wisdom in imposing income taxes, 
they offer little aid in reaching some conclusion as to the 
proper interpretation of the pertinent constitutional limita-
tions. Finally, it is interesting to surmise whether Justice 
Millard of the Washington court would have invoked the 
spectre of stare decisis to condemn so thoroughly the dissent 
of Justice Callaway in the Mills case, as he did to condemn 
the continued dissent of Washington justices in the Jensen 
case. Was the continuing dissent of Justice Callaway a "per-
sonal predilection?" 
106 /d. at 18. 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 735 
Over a year went by after the Minnesota and second Mon-
tana decisions before another state court considered the prob-
lem. In the fall of 1935, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
decided Kelley v. KalodnerHJr in which it held unconstitu-
tional a personal net income tax law enacted in the summer 
of 1935. The law imposed a graduated rate, contained 
certain minimum exemptions, and reached the entire income 
from all sources, earned and unearned. Thus, income de-
rived from property-tangible or intangible-was reached. 
The court accepted as its first inquiry the determination of 
the nature of an income tax. Pointing out that there were 
no Pennsylvania cases determinative of the issue, the court 
noted that the numerous decisions on the point in other ju-
risdictions showed a clear-cut division of authority, referring 
to the Idaho, Missouri, and Arkansas decisions as holding 
the tax to be a nonproperty tax and Massachusetts, Del-
aware, Illinois, and Washington decisions to the contrary. 
The United States Pollock decision was, quite properly, dis-
tinguished as shedding no light on the particular problem 
at hand-the validity of income taxes under state constitu-
tional uniformity provisions. This split of authority appear-
ing, the court concluded: 
We are at liberty to determine the question along normal, 
natural lines. In so doing we are inevitably impelled to the 
conclusion that an income tax is a property tax. This result 
seems particularly clear in so far as a tax upon the income 
from real and personal property is concerned.108 
Consequently, insofar as income from property was taxed 
the tax was held to be a property tax. It was not necessary 
to go further because the tax was not severable. Thus, the 
court could assert: 
We pass no opinion upon the question of whether a tax 
107 320 Pa. ISO, 181 Atl. 598 {1935). 
108 !d. at 186. Emphasis added. 
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upon the income from trades, occupations or professions is a 
tax on property, although respectable judicial opinion has 
indicated that it is not. 109 
That part of the act passed upon-the tax upon income de-
rived from property-was held to violate the property uni-
formity limitation because of both the minimum exemptions 
and the graduated rate schedule. Classifications based upon 
quantity of the same thing were held to be unreasonable clas-
sifications. 
Thus, the court in the Kelley case never actually ruled on 
the nature or validity of an income tax limited to earned in-
come. However, the Pennsylvania study-both in general 
and on the income tax in particular-showed that there 
would be little significance in holding the tax on earned in-
come to be a nonproperty tax because the Pennsylvania 
court, after the Kelley case, clearly ruled that graduated 
rates were not permitted for any taxes-. property or non-
property-in Pennsylvania, and that all taxes are limited 
by the basic uniformity clause, which is Type Vll.110 Subse-
quent cases have also indicated, as demonstrated at length 
in the Pennsylvania study,111 that only to a limited extent 
will it be possible to impose a tax on unearned income in 
Pennsylvania under the existing constitutional uniformity 
limitation as it has been interpreted. Thus, however indeci-
sive was the Kelley case, Pennsylvania decisions have defi-
nitely been adverse to the imposition of income taxes. 
The spring following the Pennsylvania decision saw the 
controversy come substantially to a standstill-that is, inso-
far as judicial development was concerned. On March 7, 
1936, the North Dakota court, in State ex rel. Haggart v. 
109 /d. at 187-188. 
110 See especially the text to notes 174-180 and 197 of Ch. Ill, §G/12, 
supra, pp. 529-530. 
111 I d., see text to notes 186-190. 
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Nichols,112 unanimously held that a graduated net income 
tax did not violate the North Dakota uniformity clause, 
which was a Type VIII clause (taxes shall be uniform upon 
the same class of property). The writer of the principle 
opinion, concurred in by two other justices, viewed any dis-
cussion of the nature of the income tax as immaterial. The 
reason offered was similar to that found in Minnesota; after 
equating the uniformity clause to the federal equal protec-
tion clause, the principal opinion then found that even if 
the tax was held to be a property tax, the classifications (e.g., 
graduated rates) were permissible.113 Two justices specially 
concurred, both on the basis that an income tax was not a 
property tax. 114 
* * * * * 
During this period of the early thirties, other decisions 
favorable to the imposition of an income tax115 were made 
in North Carolina, 116 Maine, 117 Iowa/18 and Kentucky.119 
112 66 N.D. 355,265 N.W. 859 (1936). 
113 However, for the record, the court did hold that the tax on income 
from realty was not a tax on such realty. This decision was necessary be-
cause of another constitutional limitation. /d. at 387ff. 
114 /d. at 388. 
lUi For inconclusive precedent in West Virginia, see the text and notes 
10 and 11 to Ch. III, §E/3, supra, pp. 264--265. 
116 An income tax has been expressly sanctioned in the North Carolina 
constitution since as early as 1868. See the text in Ch. III, §H/4, supra, 
pp. 560-561. At the present time North Carolina has a Type VIII basic 
clause. However, before 1935 the basic clause was Type IV, and it re-
quired a very strict rule of uniformity of property taxes. In 1933, in 
Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., 204 N.C. 365, 168 S.E. 397 ( 1933), 
the North Carolina court found it necessary to rule that an income tax under 
attack was a nonproperty tax. Although the income tax is expressly per-
mitted, there is no mention of method or rates, and the tax was challenged 
as not conforming to the ad valorem requirement which existed before 
19 35. The court ruled that the tax did not have to conform to the limita-
tion because it was a non property tax. 
117 In 19 3 5 the Supreme Court of Maine ruled in an advisory opinion, In 
re Opinion of the Justices, 133 Me. 525, 178 N.E. 621 ( 1935), that a net 
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There has been no judicial development on this problem 
since the thirties, with the exception of decisions favorable to 
the imposition of an income tax in Maryland in 1940/20 and 
in Kansas in 194 7.121 
2. A Special Note on "Gross" Income Taxes and Cor-
porate Franchise Taxes with a Base of Net Income 
Before attempting any evaluation of this judicial develop-
ment concerning net income taxes, it will be of interest to 
survey very briefly the treatment given to gross income 
taxes by the state courts. The first of these decisions has al-
income tax would not be a property tax, and consequently would not be 
limited by the strict uniformity required of property taxes. The Maine 
basic clause is a Type I provision. However, in fact, Maine has never 
enacted any form of an income tax. See the text to notes 9-11 in Ch. III, 
§A/2, supra, p. 61. 
118 Vilas v. Iowa State Board of Assessment & Review, 223 Iowa 604, 273 
N.W. 338 (1937). Iowa has no uniformity clause of any kind, and nor-
mally it will not make any substantial difference whether a tax is characterized 
as property or nonproperty. See Ch. III, §J/2, supra, pp. 596-598. How-
ever, because of Art. VIII, §2, which provides that "The property of all 
corporations for pecuniary profit shall be subject to taxation, the same as 
that of individuals," it was necessary to characterize the income tax as a 
nonproperty tax in the Vilas case in order to sustain it against objections 
that Art. VIII, §2 was violated. 
119 Reynolds Metals Co. v. Martin, 269 Ky. 378, 107 S.W. 2d 251 
(1937). While Kentucky has a Type VIII basic clause, the limitation on 
property taxes is still somewhat stricter than that applied to nonproperty 
taxes. See Ch. III, §H/2, supra, pp. 551-553. Consequently, the character-
ization in the Reynolds case was of real importance, especially because of 
the graduated rates feature. 
120 Oursler v. Tawes, 178 Md. 471, 13 A. 2d 763 (1940). Maryland 
has had a Type VIII clause since 1915, but the characterization of the 
income tax as a property tax avoided certain stricter property-tax require-
ments, although classification for rates is now permitted in Maryland. 
121 Hartman v. State Comm. of Revenue and Taxation, 164 Kan. 67, 
187 P. 2d 939 ( 1947}. However, this decision was preceded by a constitu-
tional amendment in 1932 which expressly authorized the imposition of a 
graduated net income tax. See note 9 to Ch. III, §F /3, supra, p. 309. 
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ready been mentioned. In 1925, in Sims v. Ahrens/22 the 
Arkansas Supreme Court struck down the Arkansas gross 
income tax because of certain arbitrary classifications, al-
though the court characterized the tax as a nonproperty tax. 
Subsequent Arkansas development centered on the more or-
thodox net income tax. 
The other gross income tax cases were decided during the 
early 1930's, the same period during which the battle over 
the net income taxes reached its peak. The leading case is 
Miles v. Department of Treasury/23 decided in 1935 by 
the Indiana court. Like the Arkansas tax, the Indiana 1933 
gross income tax can be distinguished from a net income tax 
in that the base of the tax is gross income. However, it is 
to be distinguished from the ordinary "gross receipts" tax in 
that it applied to all persons, whether in business or not, and 
included all forms of earned and unearned income.124 The 
Indiana act was sustained, the court ruling that it was a non-
property tax and therefore not subject to the strict property 
tax uniformity requirement.125 The tax was characterized as 
being "upon the right or ability to produce, create, receive, 
and enjoy, and not upon specific property.m26 Any distinc-
tion between gross income and net income taxes was belittled. 
Although selective gross receipts taxes are quite com-
mon, and the broader "business and occupation tax," which 
122 Supra note 31, and text thereto. 
123 209 Ind. 172, 193 N.E. 855 (1935). 
124 See text to notes 52-62, Ch. III, §F /2, supra, pp. 304-306. A more 
detailed analysis of the Indiana tax and judicial development is found in 
that material. 
125 Also see Notgrass Drug v. State, 175 Miss. 358, 165 So. 884 (1936), 
discussed note 5 to Ch. III, §E/1, supra, p. 250 in which the Mississippi 
court characterized a broad business and occupation tax as a nonproperty 
tax. Of course, the Mississippi decisions had already characterized a net 
income tax as a nonproperty tax. Notes 25-27, supra. Cf. Redfield v. Fisher, 
supra note 30, decided by the Oregon court. 
126 See text to notes 56 and 61, Ch. III, §F/2, supra, pp. 305-306. 
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is a general gross receipts tax, is found in a few states, the 
true "gross" income tax is rare. However, there have been 
some developments concerning the broad business and occu-
pations taxes which are also of interest. In some states which 
have been the most severe on the net income tax, the busi-
ness and occupation tax has survived. The best example of 
this is found in Washington. At the same time the Washing-
ton court was placing an insurmountable barrier before a net 
income tax, a very broad business and occupation tax was sus-
tained in State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle.121 That decision has 
already been referred to in the net income tax discussion. 
The Washington legislature had attempted to impose, in 
fact, a tax having the scope of the Indiana gross income tax. 
However, because of a veto by the governor of a part of the 
act, the tax did not reach those engaged in agriculture and 
the professions. Also, the catch-all clause was knocked out. 
As noted before, in the Culliton case,128 decided on the same 
day as Yelle, the court by a 5-4 decision ruled that the net in-
come tax was a property tax and contrary to the uniformity 
clause. In the Yelle case, a 5-4 opinion characterized the 
business and occupation tax as a nonproperty tax, and conse-
quently the tax was sustained, not having to meet the strict 
property tax uniformity limitation.129 Two dissenters, from 
the majority in Culliton, would have ruled that the tax was 
a property tax. 
The judicial development concerning the corporate fran-
chise tax with a base of net income has paralleled the gross 
income tax development. In several states in which the 
127 Supra note 83, and text thereto. 
128 Supra note 71. 
129 Cj. the discussion of Winter v. Barrett, 352 Ill. 441, 186 N.E. 113 
(1933) and Rei£ v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 104, 188 N.E. 889 (1934), in note 8 
to Ch. Ill, §B/3, supra, p. 119. Also see: Laing v. Fox, 115 W. Va. 272, 
175 S.E. 354 (1934), and Lougee v. New Mexico Bureau of Revenue 
Com'r, 42 N.M. 115, 76 P. 2d 6 (1938). 
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courts have ruled that a general or personal net income tax 
was a tax upon property, and therefore subject to strict uni-
formity limitations, a more lenient attitude has been taken 
toward the corporate franchise tax with a base of net income. 
For example, in Massachusetts/30 Tennessee,131 and Penn-
sylvania132 the courts have ruled that such taxes are privilege 
taxes, even though having a base of net income. It should be 
pointed out that the taxation of corporate income by either a 
direct income tax or a franchise tax runs into certain federal 
constitutional law problems. Each method has its disadvan-
tages. Consequently, in those states having no uniformity 
limitation barrier, there is a freedom of choice in selecting 
either the corporate franchise tax with a base of net income 
or the corporate income tax. Indeed, Minnesota, for exam-
ple, uses both to get the greatest possible coverage.133 
3. An Evaluation of the Property-Nonproperty Tax Di-
chotomy in Light of the Special Study of the Income 
Tax 
Having reviewed the cases which reveal the sharp division 
of judicial opinion on the nature of an income tax for the 
purpose of applying the constitutional limitation of uniform-
ity in taxation, what conclusions may be drawn? First, note 
130 See, for example, Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Comm., 244 Mass. 
530, 139 N.E. 158 (1923), note 9 to Ch. III, §C/1, supra, p. 174. 
131 See Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Senter, 149 Tenn. 569, 260 
S.W. 144 (1923), note 66 to Ch. III, §A/3, supra, p. 91. 
132 See Turco Paint & Varnish Company v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 421, 184 
At!. 37 (1936), note 153 to Ch. III, §G/12 and text thereto, supra, pp. 
521-524. 
133 And see the abortive attempt made by Pennsylvania, described in 
note 154 to Ch. III, §G /12, supra, p. 5 21. No challenge was made on 
the basis of the Pennsylvania constitution's restrictive ruling as to income 
taxes. The invalidity of the supplementary tax was based on the federal 
constitutional limitation on state taxation of interstate commerce. 
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that this controversy concerning the income tax ran its 
course over a period roughly coinciding with the last trend 
which has developed in the historical growth of the so-called 
uniformity clause.134 In general terms that period covered 
the first forty years of the present century. In Section A of 
this Chapter it was pointed out that the historical growth of 
the so-called uniformity clauses has fallen into three pe-
riods. The third period was characterized by a liberalization 
of the effective uniformity limitation and covered the years 
18 7 4 to 1945. However, this period of liberalization had 
two branches, the second of which originated with Maine in 
1913. This second branch was characterized by a tendency 
to modify the strict uniformity limitation in the following 
manner. A basic clause of a strict type was left unchanged 
but a constitutional · amendment was introduced providing 
for special treatment of certain classes of property. 
As pointed out earlier in this monograph, the income tax 
development and the trend originating with Maine in 1913 
are both results of the social, economic, and political pres-
sures of the period. An increased demand for state services 
meant that additional revenue had to be produced. This 
demand for substantial increases in revenue threw a severe 
strain on the traditional state tax structures. Many difficult 
fiscal policy problems were raised. What sort of tax structure 
was desirable? These controversies over fiscal policy brought 
with them difficult problems concerning state constitutional 
limitations. One such constitutional limitation is the subject 
of this monograph-the constitutional requirement of uni-
formity and equality in taxation. The controversy over the 
uniformity limitation has centered principally on two issues. 
First, there was the stress on the traditional, but creaking ad 
valorem general property tax which brought a demand for 
classification in the taxation of property. That demand raised 
134 See Chapter V, §A, supra. 
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a constitutional issue concerning the scope and content of 
the uniformity limitation in terms of particular rules of 
uniformity as applied to property taxes. Section B of the 
present Chapter dealt with that problem; indeed, that prob-
lem was the principal feature of the state-by-state analysis in 
Chapter III. 
Second, the demand for additional revenue brought with 
it demands for new sources of revenue, new taxes. Consid-
erable controversy was centered on such taxes as sales and 
use taxes, but it did not principally involve the constitu-
tional issue of uniformity in taxation. Serious attention was 
also centered on the income tax as a new source of state 
revenue. Beyond the hotly debated fiscal policy issues obvi-
ously raised by the discussion of the income tax, there was 
the difficult constitutional problem of uniformity in taxation. 
If an income tax was adopted, would it have to conform to 
the property tax uniformity limitation? That is, what was 
the legal nature of an income tax-property or nonprop-
erty? 
a. Some preliminary information 
One way of approaching this comparative summary is to 
simply "sum up." What states, and how many, have ruled 
that an income tax for purposes of uniformity is a property 
tax, nonproperty tax, or that its nature is immaterial? A 
bird's-eye summary of the preceding chronological develop-
ment of judicial precedent follows. Seven states (Alabama, 
Illinois, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Delaware, Penn-
sylvania, in part, and Washington) have ruled that an in-
come tax is a property tax. On the other hand, thirteen 
states (Arkansas, Maine, Wisconsin, Mississippi, Kansas, 
Georgia, Idaho, Missouri, Montana, Kentucky, Maryland, 
North Carolina, and Iowa) have ruled to the contrary, that 
an income tax is a nonproperty tax. One might add Indiana 
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to those thirteen states, although the tax actually ruled 
upon by the Indiana court was a gross income tax. Finally, 
four states (Tennessee, Minnesota, Oregon, and North 
Dakota) have ruled that an income tax could be either 
property or nonproperty, since under their respective limita-
tions the nature of the tax was immaterial. 
Of course, such a summary as this, without more, would 
be "boxscore" jurisprudence at its worst. No such tabulation 
of state decisions concerning the nature of an income tax for 
purposes of uniformity in taxation is sufficiently informative. 
Indeed, such a tabulation is rather misleading. For example, 
the tabulation just made does not reflect the unique consti-
tutional situation found in New Hampshire which detracts 
from the weight of its decision that an income tax is a prop-
erty tax. A somewhat similar situation underlies the Del-
aware decision. Also, this "boxscore" does not reflect the in-
terrelation between the court decisions and the constitutional 
provisions which expressly deal with the income tax prob-
lem. For example, the Tennessee decisions are intelligible 
only against the background of its unique constitutional pro-
vision which expressly sanctions a very limited type of in-
come tax. If there is a constitutional provision, it is always 
helpful to know whether it preceded the court decision. 
Furthermore, before the significance of the above "box-
score" can be determined it will be necessary to set forth 
certain other data. First, it will be helpful to indicate which 
states have dealt with the income tax problem by way of a 
special constitutional provision.135 There are twenty such 
states, in all. Eighteen states have constitutional provisions 
which expressly sanction the imposition of an income tax. 
One state, Florida, is unique in that it has a constitutional 
135 The information in this summary is based on the historical note on 
each state in the state by state study, Chapter III. The provision will also 
be found in the Appendix, infra. 
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provision expressly ,prohibiting the imposition of an income 
tax.136 That provision was added to the Florida Constitution 
by an amendment in 1924. The twentieth state, Tennessee, 
has presented an unusual situation. Its constitution expressly 
sanctions the imposition of a tax on the income from intan-
gibles, and the court has interpreted that clause as implicitly 
prohibiting the imposition of any other tax on incomes re-
gardless of the nature of such a tax.137 
It will be helpful to make a few comments concerning the 
eighteen states having constitutional provisions favorable to 
the imposition of an income tax. This will be done by refer-
ence to the Groups established hereinbefore. Of the states in 
Group I, only Tennessee has any provision concerning in-
come taxes and uniformity. Two states in Group II have 
income tax provisions. They are Alabama and California. 
The Alabama provision was added by an amendment to the 
Alabama Constitution in 1933. It expressly provides for a 
maximum rate, but says nothing concerning either exemp-
tions or graduated rates.138 The California provision does 
nothing more than sanction the taxation of "incomes," and 
it was adopted in 18 79 at the time of the adoption of the 
present California Constitution.139 Only one of the two 
states in Group III has an income tax provision. In 1915 
the Massachusetts Constitution was amended to permit the 
taxation of income. Exemptions were expressly provided for, 
but no mention was made of graduated rates.140 
Two of the four states in Group IV have income tax pro-
visions. The Ohio Constitution was amended in 1912 to 
sanction an income tax. Minimum exemptions and graduated 
186 Supra, p. 275. 
137 Supra, p. 91. 
138 Supra, p. 96. 
139 Supra, p. I 06. 
140 Supra, p. 180. 
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rates are permissible.141 In 1908, at approximately the same 
time, the Wisconsin Constitution was amended to provide 
that an income tax might be imposed and that it might be 
"graduated and progressive."142 
Similarly, two of the four states in Group V have income 
tax provisions. The present constitution of Texas came into 
force in 1876. From the first it has contained a clause pro-
viding that the legislature might "tax incomes."143 More 
explicit, in West Virginia an amendment, adopted in 1932, 
provides that the legislature may ''classify and graduate a 
tax on all incomes according to the amount thereof."144 
In Group VI five of the six states have income tax provi-
sions. However, one of those five is Florida, which bans an 
income tax, as noted above. In 1932 the Indiana Constitu-
tion was amended by adding a provision permitting an in-
come tax "at such rates, in such manner, and with such ex-
emptions as may be prescribed by law.m411 In the same year, 
1932, the constitutions of Kansas146 and South Carolina147 
were also amended to permit the imposition of graduated 
income taxes. In Utah's first and only constitution, which 
came into force in 1896, provision was made not only for an 
income tax, but in addition the rates are required to be grad-
uated.148 
Six of the thirteen states in Group VII have income tax 
provisions. Such a provision was added to the Colorado Con-
stitution by an amendment in 1936. It permits either a 
141 Supra, p. 223. 
142 Supra, p. 238. 
143 Supra, p. 2 54. 
144 Supra, p. 262. 
145 Supra, p. 306. 
146 Supra, p. 309. 
147 Supra, p. 336. 
148 Supra, p. 345. 
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"graduated or proportional" income tax.149 As early as 
1845 Louisiana included in its constitution a provision per-
mitting an "income tax." However, the provision was 
omitted in the 18 78 constitution. The present constitution of 
Louisiana, adopted in 1921, re-adopted an income tax provi-
sion, this time permitting an "equal and uniform tax" to be 
"levied upon net incomes" and sanctioning "reasonable ex-
emption." In 1934 this provision was amended to provide: 
"Equal and uniform taxes may be levied upon net incomes, 
and such taxes may be graduated according to the amount 
of the net income. . . . Reasonable exemptions may be al-
lowed."150 In Missouri a provision was added to the new 
constitution of 1945 which indicated that nothing in the tax 
article was to prevent the taxation of incomes. Having al-
ready judicially approved an income tax, the purpose of 
this provision was apparently to explain a new provision 
added to the uniformity clause and spelling out the extent to 
which property might be classified for taxation.151 The Mon-
tana Constitution was amended in 1934 to permit the im-
position of a "graduated and progressive" income tax.152 The 
original and present constitution of Oklahoma, adopted in 
1907, provides expressly that a graduated income tax may 
be imposed.153 Like Louisiana, Virginia dealt with this prob-
lem at an early date. The present constitution of Virginia 
was adopted in 1902, and included a provision permitting 
the taxation of incomes. The antecedent of this provision 
first appeared in the Virginia Constitution of 1850.1~4 The 
only case of a state abandoning an income tax provision, with 
the exception of Louisiana, which re-adopted its provision, is 
149 Supra, p. 350. 
1~0 Supra, p. 387. 
1~1 Supra, p. 426. 
1~2 Supra, p. 431. 
158 Supra, p. 448. 
1114 Supra, p. 542. 
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found in New Mexico, also in Group VII. In its original 
constitution of 1911 New Mexico included a provision similar 
to the Oklahoma provision permitting the imposition of a 
graduated income tax. However, in 1914 the New Mexico 
uniformity structure was substantially revised. A more liberal 
Type VII clause was substituted for a Type V provision, and 
the structure was considerably reduced. This included the 
deletion of the income tax provision.155 
In Group VIII only one state has an income tax provision. 
North Carolina, like Louisiana and Virginia, adopted such a 
provision at an early date. North Carolina first adopted a 
provision permitting the taxation of income in its constitution 
of 1868, and the provision has been retained in substantially 
the same form to date. No mention is made of exemptions or 
graduated rates.156 There are no states in Groups IX and X 
which have special income tax provisions. 
Other data which will aid in evaluating the above "box-
score" concerns income taxes actually in force in the several 
states.157 For present purposes it will be helpful to make the 
following classification of income taxes: personal net income 
taxes, direct corporate net income taxes, and corporate fran-
chise taxes having a base of net income. Twenty-eight states 
have, in effect, a general net income tax-that is, a combina-
tion of a personal net income tax with one or both of the cor-
porate income taxes. The use of two types of corporate income 
taxes stems from federal constitutional law problems.1118 
Twenty states combine a personal income tax with a direct 
corporate net income tax. They are: Arkansas, Alabama, Wis-
consin, Mississippi, Kansas, South Carolina, Colorado, 
155 Supra, p. 440. 
156 Supra, p. 5 58. 
157 The following information is based on the latest data collected in the 
CCH State Tax Reporters for each state, and the All States volume. 
158 See the text to note 133, supra. 
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Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico, Okla-
homa, Virginia, Arizona, Kentucky, Maryland, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota, and Iowa. Six states combine a personal 
net income tax with a corporate franchise tax having a base of 
net income. They are: Massachusetts, Utah, Montana, Ore-
gon, Vermont, and New York. Two states, California and 
Minnesota, combine the personal net income tax with both a 
direct corporate income tax and a corporate franchise tax with 
a base of net income. The two corporate taxes are not overlap-
ping but complementary, and so devised in order to get the 
widest possible coverage under federal constitutional limita-
tions. A twenty-ninth state, Indiana, might well be grouped 
with the above twenty-eight states even though the Indiana 
tax is a gross income tax. 
One state, Delaware, has a personal net income tax only. 
Three states reach only corporate income, Rhode Island by 
a direct corporate income tax, and Pennsylvania159 and Con-
necticut by corporate franchise taxes with bases of net in-
come. Tennessee has a corporate franchise tax with a base of 
net income, and in addition there is a limited personal net 
income tax, reaching only the income from intangibles. In 
New Hampshire there is only limited income taxation, the 
tax being limited to income from intangibles. 
Thus, some thirty-five states have an income tax of some 
form or degree, leaving thirteen states with no income tax 
of any kind according to the usual classification. However, 
it should be noted that this group of thirteen states includes 
Michigan. And the Michigan Intangibles Tax is, in fact, a 
limited income tax such as is found in New Hampshire. For 
income-producing intangibles, the base of the tax is in-
come.160 The twelve remaining states are Maine, Illinois, Ne-
159 For the abortive attempt by Pennsylvania to impose a companion 
direct corporate income tax, see note 154 to Ch. III, §G/12. 
160 See text to notes 28 through 30 to Ch. III, §D/1, supra. 
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braska, New Jersey, Ohio, Texas, West Virginia, Wyoming, 
Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, and Washington. How-
ever, it should be noted that in Ohio income taxes are found 
in the major cities. 
b. A classification according to results favorable to the 
imposition of an income tax 
As stated before, it is inadequate merely to classify the 
states into those having held that an income tax, for pur-
poses of uniformity in taxation, is either a property tax or a 
nonproperty tax. Only seven state courts have ruled that an 
income tax is a property tax, as opposed to the fourteen 
which have ruled that such a tax is a nonproperty tax and the 
three (omitting Tennessee) which have decided that the 
nature of the tax was immaterial because of the liberal 
property tax uniformity limitation. A more significant clas-
sification is based on whether the ruling of the court was 
favorable to the imposition of an income tax. Admittedly, 
the property-nonproperty tax division generally coincides 
with an adverse-favorable division; however, this is not al-
ways the case-witness the decisions in New Hampshire and 
Delaware in which the courts ruled that the income taxes 
under consideration were property taxes, such rulings mak-
ing the imposition of such a tax possible. In New Hamp-
shire, while the income tax was held to be a property tax, 
in fact all taxes are "property" taxes in that state. However, 
"property" taxes are divided into taxes on "estates" and 
taxes on "other classes of property." The second category 
conforms to the usual classification of nonproperty taxes, and 
the New Hampshire tax was held to be a tax "on other 
classes of property." 
Even a classification of favorable-adverse effect is not 
sufficiently refined. It does not take into consideration the 
impact of constitutional provisions dealing expressly with 
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the imposition of an income tax. If there is such a constitu-
tional provision in a given state, it is necessary to relate that 
provision to judicial decisions in that state, if any, in the fol-
lowing manner. Did the constitutional provision precede or 
come after the court decision; and, is the constitutional pro-
vision in agreement with the judicial decision? That is, for 
example, did the constitutional provision follow the judicial 
decision and, in effect, "overrule" the court, either by ex-
pressly permitting or forbidding the imposition of an in-
come tax? 
The first classification is of those states in which a court 
decision was favorable to, and made possible the imposition 
of an income tax when that tax was challenged as being a 
violation of the state constitutional uniformity limitation. 
The ruling of the courts concerning the nature of the tax is 
disregarded. Thus, in Arkansas, Maine, Mississippi, Geor-
gia, Idaho, Minnesota, Oregon, Kentucky, Maryland, North 
Dakota, and Iowa court decisions that an income tax was a 
nonproperty tax removed such tax from the scope of the 
strict property tax uniformity limitation. It is true that in 
Minnesota, Oregon, and North Dakota the courts never 
really decided on the nature of the tax, indicating however, 
that if pushed, the tax would not be characterized as a 
property tax. In New Hampshire, as pointed out above, the 
decision of that court that an income tax was a property tax 
was necessary to impose any tax at all. Similarly, in response 
to the argument that only property taxes were permissible in 
Delaware the court was willing to characterize the tax as a 
property tax. Since the Delaware court has equated the 
property tax uniformity limitation to the federal equal pro-
tection clause this characterization of the tax did not have the 
effect of subjecting it to a stricter uniformity limitation. 
Summing up, there are thirteen states in which court deci-
sions made possible the imposition of an income tax. 
752 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
The second classification consists of three states and is 
quite closely related to the first classification. The only dif-
ference is that subsequent to the favorable judicial opinion 
a constitutional provision was approved expressly sanction-
ing the imposition of an income tax. In Indiana and Mon-
tana the constitutional provisions were introduced by way of 
amendment at almost the same time the court decision was 
made. Thus, both possibly indicate some doubt on the part 
of those proposing the tax as to the outcome of the court 
battle. However, in both states the favorable court decisions 
were not influenced by or dependent upon the constitutional 
provisions then up for adoption. In Missouri the decision that 
an income tax was a nonproperty tax occurred in 1918, and 
the constitutional provision made its appearance nearly 
thirty years later in the constitutional revision of 1945. 
The adoption of the provision was obviously designed to 
forestall any future argument that certain alterations in the 
uniformity clause might be taken to have overruled the 
earlier court decision of 1918. 
Thus, the first two classifications, consisting of sixteen 
states, constitute the strongest judicial precedent in favor of 
the imposition of an income tax. To this may be added the 
less significant authority of three states making up a third 
classification. In Wisconsin, Kansas, and North Carolina it 
is true that the courts have ruled that an income tax is a 
nonproperty tax and consequently not subject to the prop-
erty tax uniformity limitation. However, in each case there 
already was in force a constitutional provision expressly sanc-
tioning the imposition of an income tax, and, in addition, in 
Wisconsin and Kansas the constitutional amendments pro-
vided for graduated income taxes. Consequently, the Wis-
consin and Kansas decisions have little persuasive weight 
for courts of other jurisdictions. The decision of the North 
Carolina court is more important. Although the taxation "of 
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incomes" was expressly permitted by the constitution at the 
time of the decision, it was necessary for the court to decide 
whether the tax was subject to the property tax ad valorem 
rule. 
The fourth classification is made up of those states in 
which an income tax is expressly permitted by constitutional 
provision, and in which there is no judicial decision on the 
matter. Here the problem was solved by the people them-
selves, without resort to judicial controversy. There are ten 
such states: California ( 1879), Ohio ( 1912), Texas ( 1876), 
West Virginia (1932), South Carolina (1932), Utah 
(1896), Colorado (1936), Louisiana (1845, 1921, 1934), 
Oklahoma (1907), and Virginia (1850). It is significant 
that the Ohio amendment, while not following a judicial de-
cision concerning the income tax, did follow, and "overrule" 
to some degree, a decision severely restricting the power of 
the legislature to impose an inheritance tax. The 1912 
amendment expressly permits both income and inheritance 
taxes with graduated rates.161 In addition to these ten states, 
in Tennessee the constitution expressly permits the taxa-
tion of income from intangibles, a limited form of income 
tax. But judicial decisions have interpreted this provision so 
that it prohibits by implication any other form of income 
tax. 
To be considered now are those judicial decisions which 
have been adverse to the imposition of an income tax. The 
fifth classification consists of two states, Alabama and Massa-
chusetts. In those states the courts decided that an income tax 
was a property tax, and such decisions were adverse to the 
imposition of such a tax. However, constitutional amend-
ments were adopted subsequent to such decisions and, in 
effect, "overruled" the courts, expressly permitting the im-
position of income taxes. In neither case were graduated rates 
181 See the Ohio study, Ch. III, §D/3, text to notes 9-15. 
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mentioned by the amendments. In Massachusetts a subse-
quent decision restrictively interpreted the constitutional 
amendment, with the result that graduated rates were ruled 
out under the strict property tax uniformity limitation. A 
contrary attitude was found in Alabama. A court decision 
there, subsequent to the amendment of the constitution, se-
riously questioned the rationale of its original adverse deci-
sion, but did not find it necessary to overrule that decision 
because of the constitutional amendment. 
It does seem significant that while in two instances we 
have a court decision adverse to the imposition of an income 
tax which was later "overruled" by constitutional amend-
ment, in not a single instance do we find a court decision 
favorable to the imposition of an income tax later "over-
ruled" by constitutional amendment. Indeed, at the present 
time general net income taxes are out of the question for all 
practical purposes in only four states. A sixth classification 
of states is composed of those in which judicial decisions 
were adverse to the imposition of an income tax, essentially 
because the tax was characterized as a property tax. Illinois 
and Washington fall squarely into that category. However, 
in Pennsylvania, this is only partially so because as illus-
trated by the Pennsylvania study a limited form of tax on 
the earned income of individuals is possible. And, of course, 
the characterization of the Pennsylvania corporate franchise 
tax with a base of net income as a nonproperty tax avoided 
in part the restrictive Pennsylvania interpretation. Florida 
constitutes a seventh classification. In this state alone has the 
constitution been amended so as to prohibit the imposition of 
an income tax of any kind.162 
162 A proposed Illinois amendment would permit an income tax, but 
prohibit graduated rates. See the discussion in Cushman, "The Proposed 
Revision of Art. IX of the Illinois Constitution," 1952 Ill. L.F. 226, at 
243. 
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This leaves those states in which there is neither a court 
decision nor a constitutional provision dealing with the im-
position of an income tax. There are twelve such states. 
However, for reasons set forth below, those twelve states 
may be divided into those having some sort of income tax in 
force, and those having no form of income tax in form. 
Thus, the eighth classification consists of the six states (New 
Mexico, Arizona, Rhode Island, Vermont, Connecticut, and 
New York) having an income tax of some form, but having 
neither judicial decision nor constitutional provision on the 
matter. The ninth classification consists of the six states (Ne-
braska, Michigan, New Jersey, Wyoming, Nevada, and 
South Dakota) in which there is no income tax of any kind 
in force, and in which there are neither judicial decisions nor 
constitutional provisions concerning the validity of such a tax. 
At this point it is pertinent to note that, at least in terms 
of sheer weight of numbers among the forty-eight states, the 
scales are balanced in favor of the validity of an income tax. 
Leaving aside those twelve states which have no decision of 
any kind on the problem, this means that thirty-six states 
have passed, in one manner or another, on the problem. In 
thirty-one of those thirty-six states the final decision to date 
has been in favor of the validity of an income tax. In six-
teen of those thirty-one states the primary decision was made 
by the judiciary. In fifteen of those thirty-one states the pri-
mary decision was made by way of constitutional provision. 
And of these fifteen states, in two the decision of the people 
overruled the judicial opinion. 
c. A classification relating the results concerning the 
income tax to types of uniformity clauses 
At the risk of being unduly repetitious it will be interest-
ing to relate the prior information to the types of basic uni-
formity clauses. Except for a few exceptions which will be 
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noted, the judicial decisions and constitutional provtstons 
dealing with the income tax problem occurred in each state 
at a time when the present uniformity clause was in force. 
All states in Group I have dealt with the problem in some 
manner. In Arkansas and Maine judicial decisions have 
characterized the income tax as a nonproperty tax and con-
sequently made such a tax feasible. In Tennessee there has 
been a combination of constitutional provision plus judicial 
decision. The constitutional provision sanctions the taxation 
of incomes from intangibles, and the judicial decision con-
strued the constitutional provision to prohibit implicitly all 
other forms of income taxes. 
The greatest hostility to an income tax is found among 
the states in Group II. The problem was settled at an early 
date ( 18 79) in California by an approving constitutional 
provision. However, in Illinois an income tax is ruled out 
because of an adverse judicial decision which characterized an 
income tax as a property tax. In Alabama such an adverse 
judicial decision was overcome only by constitutional amend-
ment. In Nebraska the problem remains open. 
The income tax has met a mixed reception in Group III. 
The tax was made possible in New Hampshire because of a 
judicial characterization of the tax as a property tax. To the 
contrary, in Massachusetts an income tax is possible only 
because a constitutional amendment "overruled" to some de-· 
gree an adverse judicial decision which had characterized 
the income tax as a property tax. 
The greatest room for speculation is found in Group IV. 
Two states (Michigan and New Jersey) have not dealt with 
the problem either by judicial decision or constitutional 
amendment. In the other two states in Group IV income 
taxes have been made possible by way of constitutional 
amendment. In Wisconsin the amendment has been fol-
lowed and "affirmed" by a judicial decision. In Ohio the 
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constitutional provision stands alone, although a decision ad-
verse to the imposition of an inheritance tax had clearly fore-
shadowed an adverse judicial decision as to an income tax in 
the absence of the constitutional amendment. 
In Group V there is one state, Wyoming, which has not 
dealt with the income tax problem. In the remaining three 
states in this group the results to date have been favorable 
to the imposition of an income tax. In Mississippi an early 
leading judicial decision made this possible by characterizing 
the tax as a nonproperty tax. In both Texas and West Vir-
ginia there are favorable constitutional provisions. 
Group VI presents an interesting situation. Nevada has 
not dealt with the income tax problem. However, the other 
five states in this group have dealt with the matter by con-
stitutional provision. In Indiana a judicial decision was con-
temporary with the constitutional amendment, but placed 
no reliance on the amendment in reaching a result favorable 
to the tax. To the contrary, in Kansas the judicial decision 
simply applied the constitutional provision which expressly 
permits the imposition of an income tax. In South Carolina 
and Utah the favorable constitutional provisions stand alone. 
In the fifth state, Florida, we find the single case of a state 
prohibiting by constitutional amendment the levying of any 
form of income tax. It is interesting to note that each state, 
except one, has adopted a special constitutional provision to 
deal with the general problem. Compare the similar course 
of action taken by this Group of states concerning the prop-
erty tax uniformity limitation. As the previous sections of 
this Chapter revealed, in all of the states in this Group, ex-
cept Indiana, the strict effective uniformity limitation has 
been modified by the use of constitutional amendments 
which permit the special treatment of certain classes of prop-
erty. The strict basic uniformity clause has been left un-
changed. Thus, as to the two most difficult of the uniformity 
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in taxation problems the states in Group VI have tended to 
deal with the matter by introducing special constitutional 
provisions which bypass the strict basic clause. 
Group VII has the largest number of states, thirteen, and 
represents a considerable diversity in experience. In one 
state, New Mexico, there is neither judicial decision nor con-
stitutional provision dealing with the problems concerning 
an income tax. In another state, Pennsylvania, there is a 
judicial decision adverse to the levying of an income tax. 
The Pennsylvania court has ruled that, at least as to income 
derived from property, an income tax is a property tax. As 
a result the tax is subjected to a more strict uniformity re-
quirement. The remaining eleven states in Group VII are to 
be counted among those favorable to the imposition of an in-
come tax. In four states (Colorado, Louisiana, Oklahoma, 
and Virginia) constitutional provisions expressly permit the 
imposition of an income tax. In the remaining seven states 
(Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, 
and Oregon) there is some of the strongest judicial precedent 
favorable to the imposition of an income tax without hin-
drance from the uniformity limitation. Although most of 
those seven states have a liberal property tax uniformity 
limitation, that limitation is usually somewhat stricter than 
that which limits nonproperty taxes and, in a good many 
cases, would probably stand in the way of a graduated in-
come tax. Thus, in Georgia, Idaho, Missouri, and Montana 
it was of considerable importance that the income tax was 
characterized as a nonproperty tax. To the contrary, in Min-
nesota, Oregon, and even Delaware the characterization of 
the tax was said to make little difference because the prop-
erty tax uniformity in those states is said to be the same as 
the uniformity required of nonproperty taxes. 
Two states in Group VIII, Arizona and South Dakota, 
have not dealt with the problem. In only one of the seven 
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states in this Group has the result been adverse to the impo-
sition of an income tax. The Washington court characterized 
the tax as a property tax, subject to a stricter uniformity lim-
itation. In the remaining four states the courts have ruled 
favorably on the income tax. In Kentucky and Maryland ju-
dicial decisions characterized the income tax as a non property 
tax and thereby avoided certain uniformity limitations. In 
North Carolina the judicial decision was preceded by a con-
stitutional provision which permitted an income tax. How-
ever, the decision was made at a time when North Carolina 
had a strict uniformity clause, and the decision was necessary 
in order to avoid the ad valorem method requirement. In 
North Dakota the court found it unnecessary to rule on the 
nature of an income tax because there was said to be no sub-
stantial difference in the uniformity rules applicable to prop-
erty and nonproperty taxes. 
The income tax problem as it relates to uniformity of tax-
ation has not been dealt with either by judicial decision or 
constitutional provision in four of the five states in Groups 
IX and X (Rhode Island, Vermont, Connecticut, and New 
York). Only in Iowa has there been any development. A 
judicial decision in that state ruled that the income tax was 
not a property tax and thereby avoided a minor uniformity 
limitation applicable only to property taxes. From this re-
view, no significant pattern relating to the basic types of uni-
formity clauses seems to have developed. The unfavorable 
judicial decisions are scattered throughout all the groups: 
Alabama and Illinois in Group II, Massachusetts in Group 
III, Pennsylvania in Group VII, and Washington in Group 
VIII. In Group VI there has been no judicial opposition, but 
a constitutional provision in Florida prohibits the tax. 
Recall that there are twelve states which have neither judi-
cial opinion nor constitutional provision settling the issue. It 
does seem significant that the following division may be made 
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among those states on the basis of whether they have income 
taxes actually in force. The six states which have some form 
of an income tax are all states which either have basic uniform-
ity clauses of Types VII, VIII, or IX, or have no clause of any 
kind. They are New Mexico, Arizona, Rhode Island, Ver-
mont, Connecticut, and New York. With one exception, 
South Dakota, the remaining six states are states having 
basic uniformity clauses which have in most all cases been in-
terpreted to require a strict effective uniformity limitation as 
applied to property taxes. They are: Nebraska from Group II, 
Michigan and New Jersey from Group IV, Wyoming from 
Group V, and Nevada from Group VI. It is a fair implication 
that in those six states having an income tax of some form 
there simply has not been sufficient doubt as to the validity 
of the tax under the uniformity limitation to challenge it. 
It is also fair to suggest that if the question as to the nature 
and validity of an income tax remains open in a state, that the 
most vigorous controversy concerning the problem would 
in all likelihood arise in states having the strict uniformity 
clauses, namely Types I through VI. And note that five of 
the six states which have no such tax of any kind are found 
to have a strict uniformity clause. However, caution should 
be used in making any generalization concerning the Michi-
gan problem because of the unique constitutional develop-
ment in that state which makes it possible for the income tax 
to be characterized as a property tax and still avoid a strict 
uniformity limitation. That is, in Michigan such a tax could 
be characterized as a specific property tax, as opposed to an 
ad valorem property tax. 
d. Conclusions 
As stated at the beginning of the present section, the rea-
son for making the special study of the income tax was to 
use the history of a single tax to illustrate not only the im-
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p0rtance of the property-nonproperty tax dichotomy in rela-
tion to the uniformity in taxation limitation, but also to reveal 
the pitfalls of this division. It is a fact that this dichotomy has 
been accepted and used by the state courts in their interpreta-
tion and application of the state constitutional limitation of 
uniformity in taxation. It is also a fact that in those states hav-
ing a strict effective uniformity limitation applicable to prop-
erty taxes, this dichotomy is of controlling importance because 
in most cases the characterization of a tax as either a property 
or nonproperty tax will be the most important factor in de-
termining its validity. It is also a fact that the income tax 
controversy represents the quintessence of this conceptual 
battle. 
What conclusions, then, may be drawn from the income 
tax experience-just what is the "test" which distinguishes a 
property tax from a nonproperty tax? This writer, after 
puzzling over the relevant material, tends to feel that none 
of the several tests and, oftentimes, bare conclusions offered 
by the courts are really convincing as absolutes. He found no 
revelation of some "true" test. There was much discussion of 
the nature of an income tax. But in the final analysis the 
really decisive questions were as follows. First, how did the 
justices look upon the income tax from a fiscal policy view-
point? Second, how much discretion was the legislature to be 
allowed, even though the tax in question might be distaste-
ful to the justices? How much flexibility should the law-
makers be allowed in their efforts to meet the new and ex-
pensive demands for service from the government? Having 
assumed the fiscal wisdom or unwisdom of the tax, or having 
assumed that the legislature should have the leeway to make 
that decision, there was not too much difficulty in deciding 
that the tax was a property tax or nonproperty tax as the re-
sult might demand. Characterize the tax as a property tax 
and it was doomed. Actually, even those writers severely 
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criticizing the mere use of a property-nonproperty tax test as 
being "sacerdotal conceptualism" and "unrealistic" have done 
so because its use prevented in some instances the imposition 
of an income tax, whereas the critic viewed such a tax as a 
sound, desirable and "modern" fiscal measure.163 
However, it is suggested that this inconclusive state of 
affairs is not so much a reflection of the injection of "policy" 
factors into issues of "legality," as it is of the obsoleteness of 
the dichotomy, and its consequent inadequacy as an interpre-
tive aid. The interpretation and application of the "uniform-
ity clauses," so-called, is an outstanding example of the 
problem with which courts are faced when interpreting con-
stitutions. This is an area of constitutional law in which the 
courts have a minimum of objective guideposts to channel 
their "interstitial" lawmaking. 
[ C] onstitutional interpretation is no . . . simple matter. 
The judge faces the task of giving meaning to words very 
often in the context of broad phrases that admit of a great 
variety of interpretations. Whether he takes into account the 
historical circumstances that gave birth to the words, whether 
he draws upon judicial tradition and precedent, whether he 
resorts to a process of didactic interpretation that gives logi-
cal meaning to words apart from their setting in time and 
place, whether he measures the results of his interpretation 
by the interests at stake and his conception of the kind of po-
litico-socio-economic order that should function within the 
structure of the constitutional system, he is in any event de-
termining the meaning of words in a situation where mean-
ing is not automatically decipherable. A host of considera-
tions may converge upon and condition his thinking but in 
the end 'choose and decide he must.164 
163 See, for example, Matthews, supra note 1, at 51 5. Also see pp. 3 3-34, 
506, 520-526. 
164 Kauper, "The First Ten Amendments," 37 A.B.A.]. 718, 780 
(1951). 
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Certainly if there was ever a case of words not being "auto-
matically decipherable" it is that of the uniformity clauses. 
The courts could not refuse to decide, for the purpose of courts 
is to settle disputes. There are no gaps in the law. Thus, 
the courts were saddled with interpreting and applying 
clauses conceived at a time when the nation's economy, 
and consequently its revenue structure, was relatively sim-
ple. Property was essentially tangible property. Intangible 
wealth had not yet become so important. The general prop-
erty tax was easily distinguished from other revenue pro-
ducers of the times. However, as the economy grew more 
complex, as demands for state services increased, attempts 
to reach all the wealth of society in order to spread fairly 
the tax burden taxed the ingenuity of the tax-makers, and 
taxes no longer in fact fell into the simple property-non-
property division. Yet, in determining the validity of new 
experiments in taxes, the courts had to continue to apply the 
constitutional limitations conceived for a different economy. 
It is not really too surprising that the property-nonproperty 
test was retained, although it should be evident that the test 
was inadequate and became in point of fact a legal facade for 
a rehash of fiscal policy arguments. At this point the writer 
is reminded of an aphorism made in another context, but 
apropos to the present discussion. 
There is an old Chinese proverb which runs something like 
this: "One should always have in the background of one's 
mind a multiplicity of definitions covering the subject at 
hand, in order to prevent oneself from accepting the most 
obvious." And Cardozo said: "If the result of a definition is 
to make . • . [facts] seem to be illusions, so much the 
worse for the definition; we must enlarge it till it is broad 
enough to answer the realities.m65 
1811 Jessup, "The Reality of International Law," 18 Foreign Affairs 244, 
245 (Jan. 1940). 
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But, appealing as a project of redefinition might be/68 this 
writer is convinced that a "new" formulation of a "test" or 
even of the "function" of these uniformity clauses would 
truly be to "plow in the sea." 
Consequently, one must work with the property-nonprop-
erty tax dichotomy. And, in point of fact, one is not com-
pletely at a loss for a test which will give a modicum of 
service. It is suggested that the "weight of authoritym67 sup-
ports a test related to the standard used throughout the 
present monograph. Herein a tax has been characterized by 
the object of the tax, that is, the thing taxed. A majority of 
the courts considering the validity of an income tax under 
the uniformity limitation (and this majority has been estab-
lished by the more recent decisions) have characterized the 
income tax as a nonproperty tax. Whatever its precise nature 
might be in relation to all those various kinds of taxes which 
are not property taxes, it was held not to be a tax upon prop-
erty. It would seem that all of these courts can find support 
in the following proposed test. Society organizes itself in the 
form of a government in order to promote the common good 
and to contribute benefits and protection to the citizens. 
166 Such a "new" approach, with a "fresh" outlook was the purpose of 
Matthews, supra note 1. See pp. 520-526 for his conclusions. However, 
persuasive as it might be, the problem remains, will such a "different" ap-
proach be accepted and used? 
167 Cf. Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law 308 (1953): 
[T)he "weight of authority", a favorite device of textwriters and law 
teachers, is some indication that in states having no decision of the ques-
tion the "majority rule" will be adopted, more likely than not. This in-
ference is based on the belief that the other courts will consider the need 
for uniformity or that they will respect the opinions of able and learned 
men charged with official responsibility to determine the law. Yet the 
"weight-of-authority" inference has a low degree of probability unless 
supported by qualitative factors, such as the oldness or recency of the 
cases, the prestige of the courts that rendered them, and the like. The 
inference from weight of authority is not of the statistical type. 
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However, this organization costs money. Civilization is ex-
pensive. Therefore, those who are privileged to receive the 
benefits and protections of the organized arm of society 
should have to support that arm. The privilege of receiving 
the benefits and protections of government is then a rational 
"thing" to be taxed, the object of a tax to produce the 
needed revenue. Net income is selected as the base of that 
tax simply because net income is pragmatically related to the 
object of the tax, which is the privilege of receiving the bene-
fits and protections of organized society. Not all, if any, of the 
court decisions characterizing an income tax as a nonproperty 
tax have spelled out the test in the above manner. However, 
it is suggested that all may be conveniently fitted within it. 
Unfortunately, however, the suggested test is no panacea 
because there is a question-begging aspect to it. Just how is 
one to determine whether the object of the tax is "really'' 
the privilege, income itself, or even the property from which 
income is derived? Some of the minority courts have refused 
to accept a legislative recital that the purpose of the tax was 
to reach a privilege, with income simply being the base. For 
example, recall the history of the ill-fated Washington 
income taxes. There seems to be no way around this impasse; 
that is, no way insofar as the constitutional legal issue is 
concerned, because the controversy over the nature of the 
income tax, it must be remembered, simply reflects the eco-
nomic arguments. Thus, in the final analysis, the best solu-
tion for dealing with the income tax problem is by spelling 
out in the constitution itself the extent to which an income 
tax will be permissible. In this way the pros and cons on the 
fiscal wisdom of the income tax as a revenue measure will be 
the determinants, and those arguments can be pressed and 
met openly, not under a facade of a legal issue. Thus, if it 
is thought that no income tax of any form is desirable, then 
do as Florida did and spell out in the constitution the gen-
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eral prohibition. On the other hand, if an income tax is 
thought desirable, then the legislative power to impose such 
a tax should be expressly granted in the constitution, in gen-
eral terms, of course. However, the Massachusetts experi-
ence indicates that the issue of graduated rates should also be 
dealt with expressly. If policywise the income tax should be 
limited to proportional rates, then it should be so stated.168 
On the other hand, if graduated rates are considered desira-
ble, then the income tax provision should indicate that the 
tax, if imposed, may have progressively graduated rates.169 
The experience of the substantial number of states which 
have dealt with the problem by constitutional provision indi-
cates that this is the most desirable course of action. How-
ever, the writer recognizes the difficulty in many states in 
getting any sort of constitutional revision because of amend-
ment requirements which are too rigid.170 Thus, it may be 
that the express constitutional provision, while the desirable 
solution, is not a practical one at the present time. If that is 
the case, and the problem has not already been solved by ju-
dicial precedent, then one simply must work with the prop-
erty-nonproperty tax dichotomy. In such a case there is the 
suggested test to fall back upon. 
168 See, for example, the Illinois proposed amendment, discussed in Cush-
man, "The Proposed Revision of Art. IX of the Illinois Constitution," 19 52 
Univ. of Ill. L.F. 226, at 243. The proposal was defeated in the 1952 
elections. However, the amendment will be submitted again in the fall of 
19 56. Ill. Regular Session, Senate Joint Resolution No. 16, Adopted June 
24, 1955. 
169 On the difficult problems concerning the progressively graduated rate, 
see Blum and Kalven, "The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation," 19 
Chi. L. Rev. 417 ( 19 52). 
170 See, for example, the experience in Tennessee, described by Trew-





EVERAL general conclusions may be drawn from the 
preceding study of the state constitutional limitation 
of uniformity and equality in taxation. First, there 
should be unanimous agreement that the so-called uniform-
ity clauses and their supplementary provisions dealing with 
particular rules of uniformity have produced, more than 
anything else, confusion and litigation. This has been ac-
complished without achieving to any substantial degree the 
ideal of "absolute uniformity" in the distribution of the 
property tax burden when such was the ideal. The Illinois 
experience illustrates as well as any, how if legal classifica-
tion is outlawed a de facto classification tends to come to 
life, but without the safeguards of a system of classification 
based on law. However fair-minded tax officials may be, their 
own private views and administration of a classification sys-
tem is hardly a substitute for a legal classification carrying 
with it procedural safeguards. The Illinois experience also 
illustrates how a de facto classification system can eventually 
have a semblance of de jure characterization bestowed upon 
it. Furthermore, this study has concerned itself only with 
the problem of classification for effective rates and exemp-
tions. There is no consideration of the very acute problem of 
actually achieving equal assessment under some method of 
valuation.1 
Second, it should also be clear that no policy, whether it 
favors a strict or liberal limitation, has profited by the overlap-
ping and redundant uniformity structures which were so often 
1 See Jensen, Property Taxation in the United States ( 19 3 1 ) , especially 
Chapters12and 18. 
767 
768 UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
found. Too often there has been a tendency to clutter up the 
constitution with a prolix and complicated uniformity struc-
ture which still left many of the really hard problems un-
solved. Whatever policy one adheres to, it would profit by a 
clarification of the uniformity structures in many of the 
states. Of course, to the other extreme, some uniformity 
structures consist primarily of nothing more than one of the 
several types of basic clauses. In those instances problems 
and controversies are bound to arise as to the particular rules 
by which the general policy might be implemented since 
there is an insufficient guide to or delineation of the policy 
underlying the provision. 
Third, a definite trend to "return" to a policy permitting 
some degree of classification in the taxation of property was 
revealed. The situation is now in a near balance, but with a 
slant ·toward the liberalization trend. There remains con-
siderable room for future development. 
Fourth, and perhaps most important, it should be clear 
that whatever one's policy might be, the concept of uniform-
ity and equality in taxation as a desirable goal should be 
fully understood before an attempt is made to formulate 
that policy in the form of a constitutional limitation. Prob-
ably a good part of the confusion has stemmed from a fail-
ure to adhere to that fundamental principle. This is so be-
cause "uniformity and equality in taxation" as a policy goal 
is subject to much controversy. If the fundamental tenet is 
to ensure a "fair distribution" of the tax burden, that alone 
is not a sufficient guide because opposite viewpoints claim 
that their way-classification or absolute uniformity, as the 
case might be--is the means to fulfillment of such a policy. 
Thus, a more definite policy must be formulated-precisely 
what is necessary to achieve the policy goal which underlies 
the constitutional limitation of uniformity in taxation? 
In the absence of a sufficiently formulated policy-even 
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when such a policy is clearly had, in the absence of sufficient 
guides in the constitutional limitation to implement that 
goal-, the problem of interpreting and applying the uni-
formity limitation will remain unsettled and subject to 
considerable controversy. It is suggested that the wise solu-
tion to the problem is to spell out, in a general way, in the 
constitution the degree of uniformity desired of all taxes. 
The writer emphasizes "in a general way" because this is 
quite a different thing from putting the details of a tax struc-
ture into the constitution, such as is done in Louisiana. 
Rather, the suggestion is to be more precise in formulating 
the general limitation of uniformity. This requires a real 
understanding of the many ramifications of the limitation 
which have developed over a period of years, and the de-
grees of uniformity which may be possible. Consequently, 
for property taxes it is suggested that the uniformity limi-
tation be spelled out in terms of the three basic particular 
rules of uniformity used throughout this monograph: uni-
versality, effective rates, and method of taxation. The many 
words, the different phrases of the numerous court opinions 
can be fitted into these rules and make sense wholly apart 
from apparent clashes in language used. The actions of the 
courts in fact have followed this division of uniformity, and 
future action can well be planned on the basis of the three 
particular rules of uniformity with a result which should 
leave little room for controversy in the application and inter-
pretation of the limitation. Thus, if property may be ex-
empted, say so. If not, spell that out. Again, this limitation 
should be in general terms, it is not necessary to clutter up 
the constitution with innumerable classes of property enum-
erated as exemptible. Certainly, if property may be ex-
empted a limitation of reasonable classifications should suf-
fice. Again, the policy desired as to the degree of uniformity 
in effective rates should be spelled out in general terms. 
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Finally, the method by which property may be taxed should 
be specified. In the same vein, the controversial taxes such 
as the income tax can be dealt with by the same method. 
Of course, there can be no specific recommendations of 
particular phraseology because much depends on local pol-
icy factors. There is no reason for uniformity among the 
states in dealing with this matter. Different areas will very 
properly differ as to a desirable fiscal policy. Consequently, 
once that policy is agreed upon in terms of the content of the 
uniformity limitation which will effectively implement that 
policy, then the problem of drafting the individual clauses 
can be accomplished without substantial difficulties. 
Appendix 
COMPILATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
ALABAMA 
Art. XI §211. 
Const. 190 1. 
All taxes levied on property in this state shall be assessed in exact propor-
tion to the value of such property, but no tax shall be assessed upon any debt 
for rent or hire of real or personal property, while owned by the landlord 
or hirer during the current year of such rental or hire, if such real or per-
sonal property be assessed at its full value. 
Art.XI§217. 
The property of private corporations, associations, and individuals of this 
state shall forever be taxed at the same rate; provided, this section shall not 
apply to institutions devoted exclusively to religious, educational, or chari-
table purposes. 
Art. IV §91. 
The Legislature shall not tax the property, real or personal, of the state, 
counties, or other municipal corporations or cemeteries; nor lots in incor-
porated cities and towns, or within one mile of any city or town to the 
extent of one acre, nor lots one mile or more distant from such cities or 
towns to the extent of five acres, with the buildings thereon, when same are 
used exclusively for religious worship, for schools, or for purposes purely 
charitable. 
Arndt. XXIII [Art. XXI) 
Section 219 of the present constitution is hereby annulled and set aside 
and hereafter the legislature of Alabama may provide for the assessment, 
levy and collection of a tax upon inheritances and for the levying of estate 
taxes not to exceed in the aggregate the amounts which may by any law 
of the United States be allowed to be credited against or deducted from any 
similar tax upon inheritances or taxes on estates assessed or levied by the 
United States on the same subject. 
Art. XXII. 
The legislature shall have the power to levy and collect taxes for state 
purposes on net incomes from whatever source derived within this state, 
including the incomes derived from salaries, fees and compensation paid 
from the state, county, municipality, and any agency or creature thereof, for 
the calendar year, 1933, and thereafter and to designate and define the 
incomes to be taxed and to fix the rates of taxes provided that the rate shall 
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not exceed 5 per cent nor 3 per cent on corporations. Income, shall not be 
deemed property for purposes of ad valorem taxes. From net income an 
exemption of not less than fifteen hundred dollars ($1500.00} shall be 
allowed to unmarried persons and an exemption of not less than three thou-
sand dollars ($3000.00} shall be allowed to unmarried persons and an 
exemption of not less than three thousand dollars ($3000.00} shall be al-
lowed to the head of a family, provided that only one exemption shall be 
allowed to husband and wife where they are living together and make sep-
arate returns for income tax. An exemption of not less than three hundred 
dollars {$300.00} shall be allowed for each dependent member of the 
family of an income tax payer under the age of 18 years. * * * In the 
event the legislature levies an income tax, such tax must be levied upon the 
salaries, incomes, fees, or other compensation of state, county and municipal 
officers and employees, on the same basis as such income taxes are levied 
upon other persons. 
ARIZONA 
Art. IX §1. 
Const. 1912. 
The power of taxation shall never be surrendered, suspended, or con-
tracted away. All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property 
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be 
levied and collected for public purposes only. 
Art. IX §2. 
There shall be exempt from taxation all federal, state, county and mu-
nicipal property. Property of educational, charitable and religious associa-
tions or institutions not used or held for profit may be exempt from taxation 
by law. Public debts, as evidenced by the bonds of Arizona, its counties, mu-
nicipalities, or other subdivisions, shall also be exempt from taxation. There 
shall be further exempt from taxation the property of widows, honorably 
discharged soldiers, sailors, United States marines, members of revenue 
marine service, nurse corps, or of the components of auxiliari~s of any 
thereof, residents of this state, not exceeding the amount of two thousand 
dollars [ $2,000.00], where the total assessment of such widow and such 
other persons named herein does not exceed $5,000.00; provided, that no 
such exemption shall be made for such persons other than widows unless 
they shall have served at least sixty [ 60] days in the military or naval service 
of the United States during time of war, and shall have been residents of 
this state prior to September 1, 194 5. All property in the state not exempt 
under the laws of the United States or under this constitution, or exempt 
by law under the provisions of this section shall be subject to taxation to be 
ascertained as provided by law. This section shall be self-executing. 
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Art. IX §11 U2 • 
• • • Beginning January 1, 1941, a license tax is hereby imposed on 
vehicles registered for operation upon the highways in Arizona, which li-
cense tax shall be in lieu of all ad valorem property taxes on any vehicle 
subject to such license tax. Such license tax • • • shall be (a) at a rate equal 
to the average ad valorem rate for all purposes in the several taxing districts 
of the state for the preceding year, but in no event to exceed a rate of four 
dollars on each one hundred dollars in value, and (b) during the first calen-
dar year of the life of the vehicle upon a value equal to sixty per cent of the 
manufacturer's list price of such vehicle, and during each succeeding calendar 
year upon a value twenty-five per cent less than the value for the preceding 
calendar year. * * * 
Art. IX §12. 
The law-making power shall have authority to provide for the levy and 
collection of license, franchise, gross revenue, excise, income, collateral 
and direct inheritance, legacy, and succession taxes, also graduated income 
taxes, graduated collateral and direct inheritance taxes, graduated legacy 
and succession taxes, stamp, registration, production, or other specific taxes. 
ARKANSAS 
Art. XVI §5. 
Const. 1874-. 
All property subject to taxation shall be taxed according to its value, that 
value to be ascertained in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, 
making the same equal and uniform throughout the State. No one species 
of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than 
another species of property of equal value, provided the General Assembly 
shall have power from time to time to tax hawkers, peddlers, ferries, exhi-
bitions and privileges, in such manner as may be deemed proper. Provided, 
further, that the following property shall be exempt from taxation: Public 
property used exclusively for public purposes; churches used as such; ceme-
teries used exclusively as such; school buildings and apparatus; libraries and 
grounds used exclusively for school purposes; and buildings and grounds 
and materials used exclusively for public charity. 
Art. XVI §6. 
All laws exempting property from taxation other than as provided in this 
Constitution shall be void. 
Arndt. No. 12. 
All capital invested in a textile mill in this State for manufacturing of 
cotton and fiber goods in any manner shall be and is hereby declared to be 
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exempt from taxation for a period of seven years from the date of the loca-
tion of said textile mill. 
Arndt. No. 22. 
The homestead of each and every resident of the State, whether or not 
such resident be married or unmarried, male or female, shall be wholly 
exempt from all state taxes authorized or referred to in Section 8 of Article 
XVI ohhe Constitution of Arkansas * * * 
Arndt. No. 27. 
* * * (Provision may be made by contract] for the exemption from State 
property taxation of any such· new manufacturing or processing establish-
ment, or any addition or additions to any such existing manufacturing or 
processing establishment, upon such terms and conditions as the Governor 
and the said Commission may deem to the best interests of the State; pro-
vided, that no exemption from taxes shall be granted under this amendment 
for a longer period than ten ( 1 0) calendar years succeeding the date of any 
such contract. * * * 
CALIFORNIA 
I. The Pro'Oisions. 
Art. XIII § 1. 
Const. 1879. 
All property in the State except as otherwise in this Constitution pro-
vided, not exempt under the laws of the United States, shall be taxed in 
proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law, or as hereinafter 
provided. The word 'property', as used in this article and section, is hereby 
declared to include moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, dues, franchises, and all 
other matters and things, real, personal, and mixed, capable of private own-
ership; pro'Oided, that a mortgage, deed of trust, contract, or other obligation 
by which a debt is secured when land is pledged as security for the payment 
thereof, together with the money represented by such debt, shall not be 
considered property subject to taxation; and further pro'Oided, that property 
used for free public libraries and free museums, growing crops, property 
used exclusively for public schools, and such as may belong to this State, or to 
any county, city and county, or municipal corporation within this State 
shall be exempt from taxation, [with a certain exception]. * * * The Legis-
lature may provide, except in the. case· of credits secured by mortgage or 
trust deed, for a deduction from credits of debts due to bona fide residents 
of this State. 
Art. XIII §14 Ws 4-7, 
[U4] The Legislatuie shall have Ule power to provide for the assessment, 
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levy and collection of taxes upon all forms of tangible personal property, all 
notes, debentures, shares of capital stock, bonds, solvent credits, deeds of 
trust, mortgages, and any legal or equitable interest therein, not exempt 
from taxation under the provisions of this Constitution, in such manner, and 
at such rates, as may be provided by law, and in pursuance of the exercise of 
such power the Legislature, two-thirds of all of the members elected to each 
of the two houses voting in favor thereof, may classify any and all kinds of 
personal property for the purposes of assessment and taxation in a manner and 
at a rate or rates in proportion to value different from any other property in 
this State subject to taxation and may exempt entirely from taxation any or 
all forms, types or classes of personal property. 
[~5] The total tax imposed on notes, debentures, shares of capital stock, 
bonds, solvent credits, deeds of trust, mortgages and any legal or equitable 
interest therein in pursuance of the provisions of this section shall not be at a 
rate in excess of four-tenths of I percent of the actual value of such property 
and no tax burden shall be imposed upon any personal property either tangi-
ble or intangible which shall exceed the tax burden on real property in the 
same taxing jurisdiction in proportion to the actual value of such property. 
* * * * * 
[~7] Nothing herein contained shall be construed to subject to assess-
ment and taxation property which is exempt from taxation under other 
provisions of this Constitution. 
Art. XIII § 14 ~s 1-3. 
m1] [All property, other than franchises, owned or used by enumerated 
utilities] shall be assessed annually by the State Board of Equalization, at 
the actual value of such property. 
[~2] All property so assessed by said board shall be subject to taxation 
to the same extent and in the same manner as other property. 
m 3] All companies herein mentioned and their franchises, other than 
insurance companies and their franchises, shall be taxed in the same manner 
and at the same rates as mercantile, manufacturing and business corporations 
and their franchises are taxed pursuant to Section 16 of this article; pro-
vided, that nothing herein shall be construed to release any company men-
tioned in this section from the payment of any amount agreed to be paid or 
required by law to be paid for any special privilege or franchise granted 
by any political subdivision or municipality of this State; provided further, 
that no excise, or income tax or any other form of tax or license charge 
shall be levied or assessed upon or collected from the companies, or any of 
them, mentioned in the first paragraph of this section, in any manner or 
form, different from, or at a higher rate than that imposed upon or col-
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lected from mercantile, manufacturing and business corporations doing 
business within this state. 
Art. XIII §II. 
Income taxes may be assessed to and collected from persons, corporations, 
joint-stock associations, or companies resident or doing business in this 
State, or any one or more of them, in such cases and amounts, and in such 
manner, as shall be prescribed by law. 
Art. XIII § 14- 4/4-. 
[A lengthy section provides that "An annual tax is hereby imposed on 
each insurer doing business in this State on the bases, at the rates, and sub-
ject to the deductions from the tax hereinafter specified." The remainder of 
the Section is, in effect, a "statute" which includes definitions, determines 
the base-gross premiums-, and provides for detailed instructions as to 
deductions. The rate is set forth, and the tax is to be "in lieu of all other 
taxes and licenses, State, county, and municipal, upon such insurers and 
their property, except .•.• " Among other exceptions to the in lieu provi-
sion are taxes upon real estate. A special tax is provided for insurers trans-
acting the business of ocean marine insurance business.] 
Art. XIII § 16. I. (a) Banks, including national banking associations, lo-
cated within the limits of this State, shall annually pay to the State a tax, at 
the rate to be provided by law according to or measured by their net income, 
which shall be in lieu of all other taxes and licenses, state, county and munici-
pal, upon such banks, or the shares thereof, except taxes upon their real 
property and, when permitted by the Congress of the United States with 
respect to national banking a~sociations, motor vehicle and other vehicle 
registration license fees and any other tax or license fee imposed by the 
State upon vehicles, motor vehicles or the operation thereof. 
(b) The Legislature may provide by law for any other form of taxation 
now or hereafter permitted by the Congress of the United States respecting 
national banking associations; provided, That such form of taxation shall 
apply to all banks located within the limits of this State. 
2. The Legislature may provide by law for the taxation of corporations, 
their franchises, or any other franchises, by any method not prohibited by 
this Constitution or the Constitution or laws of the United States. 
3. Any tax imposed pursuant to this section must be under an act passed 
by not less than two-thirds vote of all the members elected to each of the 
two houses of the Legislature. 
Exemptions are provided for in: 
Art. XII §Ia (college property, etc., generally); Art. IX §§10-13, 15 
(named colleges, exemptions); XIII §Ib (cemetery exemption); XIII §lc 
(religious, hospital, charitable purposes, generally); XIII §I 1/4- (Vet's 
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exemption); XIII §1 1/2 (church exemption); XIII- §t l/2a (orphan-
age); XIII §t 3/4 (public bonds); XIII §4 (vessels, except state taxes); 
XIII §to I/2 (household goods). 
COLORADO 
Art. X §3. 
Const. 1876. 
All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the 
territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and 
collected under general laws, which shall prescribe such regulations as shall 
secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, real and personal; Pro-
vided, that the personal property of every person being the head of a family 
to the value of $200 shall be exempt from taxation. Ditches, canals and 
flumes owned and used by individuals or corporations, for irrigating land 
owned by such individuals or corporations, or the individual members 
thereof, shall not be separately taxed so long as they shall be owned and 
used exclusively for such purposes. 
Art. X §4. 
The property, real and personal, of the state, counties, cities, towns and 
other municipal corporations and public libraries, shall be exempt from 
taxation. 
Art. X §5. 
Property, real and personal, that is used solely and exclusively for reli-
gious worship, for schools or for strictly charitable purposes, also cemeteries 
not used or held for private or corporate profit, shall be exempt from taxa-
tion, unless otherwise provided by general law. 
Art. X §6. 
All laws exempting from taxation, property other than that hereinbefore 
mentioned, shall be void; provided, however, that the general assembly shall 
enact laws classifying motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers and requiring 
the payment of a graduated annual specific ownership tax thereon, which 
said tax shall be in addition to, and payable to the proper county officer at 
the same time as state registration or license fees. 
Said graduated annual specific ownership tax shall be in lieu of all ad 
valorem taxes upon such property, and shall be distributed, apportioned, 
credited and paid over to the State and its political subdivisions as provided 
by law with reference to ad valorem taxes; provided, further, that such laws 
shall not exempt from ad valorem taxation motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers in process of manufacture, or held in storage, or which constitute 
the stock of manufacturers, or distributors thereof or of dealers therein. 
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Art. X §17. 
The general assembly may levy income taxes, either graduated or pro-
portional, or both graduated and proportional, for the support of the state, 
or any political subdivision thereof, or for public schools, and may, in the 
administration of an income tax law, provide for special classified or limited 
taxation or the exemption of tangible and intangible personal property. 
CONNECTICUT 
Art. I §I. 
Const. 1818. 
. . . [A] 11 men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; 
and •.• no man, or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emolu-
ments or privileges from the community. 
DELAWARE 
Art. VIII § 1. 
Const. 1897. 
All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the ter-
ritorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and 
collected under general laws, but the General Assembly may by general 
laws exempt from taxation such property as in the opinion of the General 
Assembly will best promote the public welfare. 
Art. IX §6. 
Shares of the capital stock of corporations created under the laws of this 
State, when owned by persons or corporations without this State, shall not be 
subject to taxation by any law now existing or hereafter to be made. 
Art. X §4. 
• . . provided, that all real or personal property used for school purposes, 
where the tuition is free, shall be exempt from taxation and assessment for 
public purposes. 
FLORIDA 
Art. IX §I. 
Const. 1885. 
The Legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of taxation, 
except that it may provide for special rate or rates on intangible property, 
but such special rate or rates shall not exceed two mills on the dollar of the 
assessed valuation of such intangible property; provided, that as to any 
obligations secured by mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien, the Legislature 
may prescribe an intangible tax of not more than two (2) mills on the dol-
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lar, which shall be payable at the time such mortgage, deed of trust, or other 
lien is presented for recordation, said tax to be in lieu of all other intangible 
assessments on such obligations. The special rate or rates, or the taxes col-
lected therefrom, may be apportioned by the Legislature, and shall be ex-
clusive of all other State, County, District and Municipal taxes; and shall 
prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation of all property, both 
real and personal, excepting such property as may be exempted by law for 
municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes. 
Art. IX §I I. 
No taxes upon inheritances or upon the income of residents or citizens 
of this State shall be levied by the State of Florida, or under its authority, 
and there shall be exempt from taxation to the head of the family residing 
in this State, household goods and personal effect to the value of Five Hun-
dred ($500.00) Dollars, provided, however, that the Legislature may pro-
vide for the assessment, levying and collection of a tax upon Inheritances, or 
for the levying of Estate taxes, not exceeding in the aggregate the amounts 
which may by any law of the United States be allowed to be credited 
against or deducted from any similar tax upon Inheritances, or taxes on 
estates assessed or levied by the United States on the same subject. 
Art.IX§I3. 
Motor vehicles, as property, shall be subject to only one form of taxation 
which shall be a license tax for the operation of such motor vehicles, which 
license shall be in such amount and levied for such purpose as the Legislature 
may, by law, provide, and shall be in lieu of all ad valorem taxes assessable 
against motor vehicles as personal property. 
Art. IX §2 • 
• • • after December 31st, A.D. 1940, no levy of ad valorem taxes upon 
real or personal property except intangible property, shall be made for any 
State purpose whatsoever. 
Art. XVI § 16. 
The property of all corporations, except the property of a corporation 
which shall construct a ship or barge canal across the peninsula of Florida, if 
the Legislature should so enact, whether heretofore or hereafter included, 
shall be subject to taxation unless such property be held and used exclusively 
for religious, scientific, municipal, educational, literary or charitable pur-
poses. 
Art. X §7. 
[Homestead exemption of $5,000.] 
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Art. IX §9. 
There shall be exempt from taxation property to the value of five hundred 
dollars to every widow and to every person who is a bona fide resident of 
the State and has lost a limb or been disabled in war or by misfortune. 
GEORGIA 
Art. VII §1. U3. 
Const. 1 94-5. 
All taxes shall be levied and collected under general laws and for public 
purposes only. All taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects 
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. Classes of sub-
jects for taxation of property shall consist of tangible property and one or 
more classes of intangible personal property including money. The General 
Assembly shall have the power to classify property including money for 
taxation, and to adopt different rates and different methods for different 
classes of such property. 
Art. VII §2. U4. 
The General Assembly may provide for a different method and time of 
returns, assessments, payment and collection of ad valorem taxes, of public 
utilities, but not at a greater basis of value or at a higher rate of taxation 
than other properties. 
Art. I §3. U3. 
All exemptions from taxation heretofore granted in corporate charters 
are declared to be henceforth null and void. 
Art. VII § 1. U 4. 
The General Assembly may, by law, exempt from taxation all public prop-
erty; places of religious worship or burial; all institutions of purely public 
charity; all intangible personal property owned by or irrevocably held in 
trust for the exclusive benefit of, religious, educational and charitable insti-
tutions, no part of the net profit from the operation of which can inure to 
the benefit of any private person; All buildings erected for and used as a 
college, incorporated academy or other seminary of learning, and also all 
funds or property held or used as endowment by such colleges, incorporated 
academies or seminaries of learning, providing the same is not invested in 
real estate; and provided, further, that said exemptions shall only apply to 
such colleges, incorporated academies or other seminaries of learning as are 
open to the general public; provided further, that all endowments to institu-
tions established for white people, shall be limited to white people, and all 
endowments to institutions established for colored people, shall be limited 
to colored people; the real and personal estate of any public library, and 
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that of any other literary association, used by or connected with such li-
brary; all books and philosophical apparatus and all paintings and statuary 
of any company or association, kept in a public hall and not held as merchan-
dise or for purposes of sale or gain; provided the property so exempted be 
not used for the purpose of private or corporate profit and income, dis-
tributable to shareholders in corporations owning such property or to other 
owners of such property, and any income from such property is used ex-
clusively for religious, educational and charitable purposes, or for either one 
or more of such purposes and for the purpose of maintaining and operating 
such institution; this exemption shall not apply to real estate or buildings 
other than those used for the operation of such institution and which is 
rented, leased or otherwise used for the primary purpose of securing an 
income thereon; and also provided that such donations of property shall 
not be predicated upon an agreement, contract or otherwise that the donor 
or donors shall receive or retain any part of the net or gross income of the 
property. The General Assembly shall further have power to exempt from 
taxation, farm products, including baled cotton grown in this State and 
remaining in the hands of the producer, but not longer than for the year 
next after their production. 
All personal clothing, household and kitchen furniture, personal property 
used and included within the house, domestic animals and tools, and imple-
ments of trade of manual laborers, but not including motor vehicles, are 
exempted from all State, County, Municipal and School District ad valorem 
taxes, in an amount not to exceed $300.00 in actual value. 
The Homestead of each resident of Georgia actually occupied by the 
owner as a residence and homestead, and only so long as actually occupied 
by the owner primarily as such, but not to exceed $200.00 of its value, is 
hereby exempted from all ad valorem taxation for State, county and school 
purposes, except taxes levied by municipalities for school purposes and 
except to pay interest on and retire bonded indebtedness, provided, how-
ever, should the owner of a dwelling house on a farm, who is already 
entitled to homestead exemption, participate in the program of rural housing 
and obtain a new house under contract with the local housing authority, he 
shall be entitled to receive the same homestead exemption as allowed before 
making such contract. The General Assembly may from time to time lower 
said exemption to not less than $1250.00. The value of all property in 
excess of the foregoing exemptions shall remain subject to taxation. Said 
exemptions shall be returned and claimed in such manner as prescribed by 
the General Assembly. The exemption herein provided for shall not apply 
to taxes levied by municipalities. 
All cooperative, non-profit, membership corporations organized under 
the laws of this State for the purpose of engaging in rural electrification, as 
defined in subsection I of Section 3 of the Act approved March 30, 1937, 
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providing for their incorporation, and all of the real and personal property 
owned or held by such corporations for such purpose, are hereby exempted 
from all taxation, state, county, municipal, school district and political or 
territorial subdivisions of the State having the authority to levy taxes. The 
exemption herein provided for shall expire December 31, 1961. 
There shall be exempt from all ad valorem intangible taxes in this State, 
the common voting stock of a subsidiary corporation not doing business in 
this State, if at least ninety per cent of such common voting stock is owned 
by a Georgia corporation with its principal place of business located in this 
State and was acquired or is held for the purpose of enabling the parent 
company to carry on some part of its established line of business through 
such subsidiary. 
All laws exempting property from taxation, other than the property 
herein enumerated, shall be void. 
IDAHO 
Art. VII §2. 
Const. 1890. 
The legislature shall provide such revenue as may be needful, by levying 
a tax by valuation, so that every person or corporation shall pay a tax in 
proportion to the value of his, her, or its property, except as in this article 
hereinafter otherwise provided. The legislature may also impose a license 
tax both upon natural persons and upon corporations, other than municipal, 
doing business in this state; also a per capita tax: provided, the legislature 
may exempt a limited amount of improvements upon land from taxation. 
Art. VII §5. 
All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the 
territorial limits, of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and 
collected under general laws, which shall prescribe such regulations as shall 
secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, real and personal: pro-
vided, that the legislature may allow such exemptions from taxation from 
time to time as shall seem necessary and just, and all existing exemptions 
provided by the laws of the territory, shall continue until changed by the 
legislature of the state: provided, further, That duplicate taxation of prop-
erty for the same purpose during the same year, is hereby prohibited. 
Art. VII §3. 
The word "property" as herein used shall be defined and classified by law. 
Art. VII §4-. 
The property of the . United. States, except when taxation thereof is 
authorized by the United States, the state, counties, towns, cities, villages, 
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school districts, and other municipal corporations and public libraries shall 
be exempt from taxation. 
ILLINOIS 
Art. IX §1. 
Const. 1870. 
The general assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needful by 
levying a tax, by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a 
tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its property-such value to be 
ascertained by some person or persons, to be elected or appointed in such 
manner as the general assembly shall direct, and not otherwise; but the 
general assembly shall have power to tax peddlers, auctioneers, brokers, 
hawkers, merchants, commission merchants, showmen, jugglers, innkeepers, 
grocery keepers, liquor dealers, toll bridges, ferries, insurance, telegraph and 
express interests or business, vendors of patents, and persons or corporations 
owning or using franchises and privileges, in such manner as it shall from 
time to time direct by general law, uniform as to the class upon which it 
operates. 
Art. IX §2. 
The specification of the objects and subjects of taxation shall not deprive 
the general assembly of the power to require other subjects or objects to be 
taxed in such manner as may be consistent with the principles of taxation 
fixed in this constitution. 
Art. IX §3. 
The property of the state, counties, and other municipal corporations, 
both real and personal, and such other property as may be used exclusively 
for agricultural and horticultural societies, for school, religious, cemetery and 
charitable purposes, may be exempted from taxation; but such exemption 
shall be only by general law. 
Art. IX §9. 
For all other corporate purposes, all municipal corporations may be vested 
with authority tq assess and collect taxes; but such taxes shall be uniform in 
respect to persons and property, within the j.urisdiction of the body imposing 
the same. 
Art. IX §tO. 
The general assembly shall require that all the taxable property within 
the limits of municipal corporations shall be taxed for the payment of debts 
contracted under authority of law, such taxes to be uniform in respect to 




Art. X §1. 
UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY 
Const. 18 51. 
The General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a uniform and equal 
rate of assessment and taxation; and shall prescribe such regulations as shall 
secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, both real and personal, 
excepting such only for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious, 
or charitable purposes, as may be specially exempted by law. 
Art. X §8. 
The General Assembly may levy and collect a tax upon income, from 
whatever source derived, at such rates, in such manner, and with such ex-
emptions as may be prescribed by law. 
IOWA 
Art. I §6. 
Const. 1857. 
All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the General 
Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or 
immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all 
citizens. 
Art. VIII §2. 
The property of all corporations for pecuniary profit, shall be subject to 
taxation, the same as that of individuals. 
KANSAS 
Art. XI §1. 
Const. 1859. 
The legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of assessment 
and taxation, except that mineral products, money, mortgages, notes and 
other evidence of debt may be classified and taxed uniformly as to class as 
the legislature shall provide. All property used exclusively for state, county, 
municipal, literary, educational, scientific, religious, benevolent and charita-
ble purposes, and personal property to the amount of at least two hundred 
dollars for each family, shall be exempted from taxation. 
Art. XI §2. 
The state shall have power to levy and collect taxes on incomes from 
whatever source derived, which taxes may be graduated and progressive. 
Art. XI §10. 
The state shall have power to levy special taxes, for road and highway 





Taxes shall be levied and collected for public purposes only and 
shall be uniform upon all property of the same class subject to taxation within 
the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax; and all taxes shall be 
levied and collected by general laws. 
The General Assembly shall have power to divide property into classes 
and to determine what class or classes of property shall be subject to local 
taxation. Bonds of the state and of counties, municipalities, taxing and 
school districts shall not be subject to taxation. 
§174. 
All property, whether owned by natural persons or corporations, shall be 
taxed in proportion to its value, unless exempted by this Constitution; and 
all corporate property shall pay the same rate of taxation paid by individual 
property. Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to prevent the 
General Assembly from providing for taxation based on income, licenses or 
franchises. 
§181. 
The General Assembly may, by general laws only, provide for the 
payment of license fees on franchises, stock used for breeding purposes, the 
various trades, occupations and professions, or a special or excise tax; and 
may, by general laws, delegate the power to counties, towns, cities, and 
other municipal corporation, to impose and collect license fees on stock 
used for breeding purposes, on franchises, trades, occupations and pro-
fessions. And the General Assembly may, by general laws only, authorize 
cities or towns of any class to provide for taxation for municipal purposes on 
personal property, tangible and intangible, based on income, licenses or 
franchises, in lieu of an ad valorem tax thereon: Provided, Cities of the 
first class shall not be authorized to omit the imposition of an ad valorem 
tax on such property of any steam railroad, street railway, ferry, bridge, gas, 
water, heating, telephone, telegraph, electric light or electric power 
company. 
§3. 
• • but no property shall be exempt from taxation except as provided 
in this Constitution, and every grant of a franchise, privilege or exemption, 
shall remain subject to revocation, alteration or amendment. 
§170. 
There shall be exempt from taxation public property used for public 
purposes; places actually used for religious worship, with the grounds at-
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tached thereto and used and appurtenant to the house of worship, not ex-
ceeding one-half acre in cities or towns, and not exceeding two acres in the 
country; places of burial not held for private or corporate profit, institutions 
of purely public charity, and institutions of education not used or employed 
for gain by any person or corporation, and the income of which is devoted 
solely to the cause of education; public libraries, their endowments, and the 
income of such property as is used exclusively for their maintenance; all 
parsonages or residences owned by any religious society, and occupied as a 
home, and for no other purpose, by the minister of any religion, with not 
exceeding one-half acre of ground in towns and cities and two acres of 
ground in the country appurtenant thereto; household goods and other 
personal property of a person with a family, not exceeding two hundred and 
fifty dollars in value; crops grown in the year in which the assessment is 
made, and in the hands of the producer; and all laws exempting or com-
muting property from taxation other than the property above mentioned 
shall be ,void. The General Assembly may authorize any incorporated city or 
town to exempt manufacturing establishments from municipal taxation, for 
a period not exceeding five years, as an inducement to their location. 
§172. 
All property, not exempted from taxation by this Constitution, shall be 
assessed for taxation at its fair cash value, established at the price lt would 
bring at a fair voluntary sale; • • • 
LOUISIANA 
Art. X §1. 
Const. 19 21. 
The power of taxation shall be vested in the Legislature; shall never be 
surrendered, suspended or contracted away; and all taxes shall be uniform 
upon the same class of subjects throughout the territorial limits of the 
authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected for public pur-
poses only. No property shall be assessed for more than its actual cash value, 
ascertained as director by law •••• The valuation and classification fixed 
for State purposes shall be the valuation and classification for local purposes; 
but the taxing authorities of the local subdivision may adopt a different 
percentage of su~h valuation for purposes of local taxation. 
Equal and uniform taxes may be levied upon net incomes, and such taxes 
may be graduated according to the amount of the net income. Public 
officials shall not be exempted. Reasonable exemptions may be allowed. 
For the purpose of encouraging the reforestation of denuded lands, con-
tracts fixing the assessed valuation of the specific lands for the duration of 
the agreements, and fixing a total severance tax based on. the value of 
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forest products when severed, three-fourths of which shall go to the parish 
where they are severed, and which severance tax, for a period not to 
exceed fifty years from the date of such contract, shall be in lieu of all other 
taxes on said forest products, are hereby authorized under such regulations, 
terms and conditions as may be prescribed by law; and the regulations, term 
and conditions of such contracts as authorized may be made retroactive by 
the consent of the parties as respects the limit of taxation, on contracts 
theretofore entered into. 
Art. X §7. 
Taxes upon inheritances, legacies and donations, or gifts made in con-
templation of death, may be graduate, classified or progressive; provided, 
such taxes shall not exceed three per cent as to ascendants, descendants or 
surviving spouse; ten per cent as to collateral heirs; or fifteen per cent as to 
others; and exemptions to a reasonable amount may be allowed. Donations 
and legacies to charitable, religious or educational institutions located within 
the State shall be exempt from such tax. 
Art. X §8. 
License taxes may be levied on such classes of persons, associations of 
persons and corporations pursuing any trade, business, occupation, vocation 
or profession, as the Legislature may deem proper, except clerks, laborers, 
ministers of religion, school teachers, graduated trained nurses, those engaged 
in mechanical, agricultural or horticultural pursuits or in operating saw 
mills. Such license taxes may be classified, graduated or progressive. • • . 
Those who pay municipal license taxes equal in amount to such taxes levied 
by the parochial authorities shall be exempt from such parochial license taxes. 
Art. X §9. 
[All foreign banks engaging in business in Louisiana shall pay annually a 
$500 license fee, and 5% on the gross amount of interest earned. To be 
in lieu of all other taxes, except on such bank's real estate.) 
Art. X §21. 
[ 1 ] Taxes may be levied on natural resources severed from the soil or 
water, to be paid proportionately by the owners thereof at the time of 
severance. • . . Such natural resources may be classified for the purpose 
of taxation and such taxes may be predicated upon either the quantity or 
value of the product at the time and place of severance. No severance tax 
shall be levied by any parish or other local subdivision of the State. 
No further or additional tax or license shall be levied or imposed upon 
oil, gas or sulphur leases or right, nor shall any additional value be added to 
the assessment of land, by reason of the presence of oil, gas or sulphur 
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therein or their production therefrom. • • • Provided, that sulphur in 
place shall be assessed for ad valorem taxation to the person, firm or corpora-
tion having the right to mine or produce the same in the parish where 
located, at no more than twice the total assessed value of the physical prop-
erty subject to taxation excluding the assessed value of sulphur above ground, 
in such parish as is used in sulphur operations. 
Art. VI §22. 
[Self-executing legislative provisions imposing motor vehicle and motor 
fuel taxes.] 
Art. X §4. 
[After stating that "The following property, and no other, shall be 
exempt from taxation . • .", section 4 includes more than fourteen para-
graphs of exemptions. There are other provisions dealing with special 
exemptions.] 
MAINE 
Art. IX §8. 
Const. 1819. 
All taxes upon real and personal estate, assessed by authority of this state, 
shall be apportioned and assessed equally, according to the just value thereof; 
but the legislature shall have power to levy a tax upon intangible personal 
property at such rate as it deems wise and equitable without regard to the 
rate applied to other classes of property. 
MARYLAND Const. 1867. 
Decl. Rts. Art. 15. 
That the levying of taxes by the poll is grievous and oppressive and 
ought to be prohibited; that paupers ought not to be assessed for the 
support of the Government; that the General Assembly shall, by uniform 
rules, provide for separate assessment of land and classification and sub-
classifications of improvements on land and personal property as it may 
deem proper; and all taxes thereafter provided to be levied by the State 
for the support of the general State Government, and by the counties and 
by the City of Baltimore for their respective purposes, shall be uniform as 
to land within the taxing district, and uniform within the class or sub-class 
of improvem'ents on land and personal property which the respective taxing 
powers may have directed to be subjected to the tax levy; yet fines, duties 
or taxes may properly and justly be imposed, or laid with a political view 
for the good government and benefit of the community. 
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MASSACHUSETTS Const. 1780. 
Pt. Two, Ch. I, § 1, Sub§ IV 
And further, full power and authority are hereby given and granted to 
the said general court, • • • to impose and levy proportional and reasonable 
assessments, rates and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and persons resident, 
and estates lying, within the said commonwealth; and also to impose and 
levy, reasonable duties and excises, upon any produce, goods, wares, mer-
chandise, and commodities, whatsoever, brought into, produced, manu-
factured, or being within the same; 
Amdts: Art. XLIV. 
Full power and authority are hereby given and granted to the general 
court to impose and levy a tax on income in the manner hereinafter pro-
vided. Such tax may be at different rates upon income derived from dif-
ferent classes of property, but shall be levied at a uniform rate throughout 
the commonwealth upon incomes derived from the same class of property. 
The general court may tax income not derived from property at a lower 
rate than income derived from property, and may grant reasonable ex-
emptions and abatements. Any class of property the income from which is 
taxed under the provisions of this article may be exempted from the 
imposition and levying of proportional and reasonable assessments, rates and 
taxes as at present authorized by the constitution. This article shall not be 
construed to limit the power of the general court to impose and levy reasona-
ble duties and excises. 
Amdts: Art. XLI. 
Full power and authority are hereby given and granted to the general 
court to prescribe for wild or forest lands such methods of taxation as will 
develop and conserve the forest resources of the commonwealth. 
Pt. I, Art. X. 
Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by 1t m the 
enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according to standing law. He 
is obliged, consequently, to contribute his share to the expense of this 
protection. 
MICHIGAN 
Art. X §3. 
Const. 1908. 
The legislature shall provide by law a uniform rule of taxation, except 
on property paying specific taxes, and taxes shall be levied on such property 
as shall be prescribed by law: Prooided, That the legislature shall provide 
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by law a uniform rule of taxation for such property as shall' be assessed by 
the state board of assessors, and the rate of taxation on such property shall be 
the rate which the state board of assessors shall ascertain and determine is 
the average rate levied upon other property upon which ad valorem taxes 
are assessed for state, county, township, school and municipal purposes. 
Art. X §4. 
The legislature may by law impose specific taxes, which shall be uniform 
upon the classes upon which they operate. 
Art. X §5. 
The legislature may provide by law for the assessment at its true cash 
value by a state board of assessors, of which the governor shall be ex-officio 
a member, of the property of corporations and the property, by whomsoever 
owned, operated or conducted, engaged in the business of transporting pas-
sengers and freight, transporting property by express, operating any union 
station or depot, transmitting messages by telephone or telegraph, loaning 
cars, operating refrigerator cars, fast freight lines or other car lines and 
running or operating cars in any manner upon railroads, or engaged in any 
other public service business; and for the levy and collection of taxes 
thereon. 
Art. X §7. 
All assessments hereafter authorized shall be on property at its cash value. 
MINNESOTA 
Art. IX §I. 
Const. 1857. 
The power of taxation shall never be surrendered, suspended or con-
tracted away. Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects, and 
shall be levied and collected for public purposes, but public burying grounds, 
public school houses, public hospitals, . academies, colleges, universities, and 
all seminaries of learning, all churches, church property and houses of wor-
ship, institutions of purely public charity, public property used exclusively 
for any public purpose, shall be exempt from taxation, and there may be 
exempted from taxation personal property not exceeding in value $200, for 
each household, individual or head of a family, and household goods and 
farm machinery, as the legislature may determine. Pro'{)ided, that the legis-
lature may authorize municipal corporations to levy and collect assessments 
for local improvements upon property benefited thereby without regard to 
a cash valuation, and pro'{)ided further, that nothing herein contained shall 
be construed to affect, modify or repeal any existing law providing for the 
taxation of the gross earnings of railroads. 
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t\rt. IX§lA. 
Every person, co-partnership, company, joint stock company, corporation, 
or association however or for whatever purpose organized, engaged in the 
business of mining or producing iron ore or other ores in this State, shall 
pay to the State of Minnesota an occupation tax on the valuation of all ores 
mined or produced, which tax shall be in addition to all other taxes pro-
vided by law, said tax to be due and payable from such person, co-partner-
ship, company, joint stock company, corporation, or association however or 
for whatever purpose organized, on May first of the calendar year next 
following the mining or producing thereof. The valuation of ore for the 
purpose of determining the amount of tax to be paid shall be ascertained in 
the manner and method provided by law. 
Art. XVI §3. 
The legislature is hereby authorized to provide, by law, for the taxation 
of motor vehicles, using the public streets and highways of this state, on a 
more onerous basis than other personal property; provided, howwer, that 
any such tax on motor vehicles shall be in lieu of all other taxes thereon, 
except wheelage taxes, so-called, which may be imposed by any borough, city 
or village, and except that the legislature may impose such tax upon motor 
vehicles of companies paying taxes under- gross earnings system of taxation 
and upon the right to use such vehicles upon the public highways notwith-
standing the fact that earnings from such vehicles may be included in the 
earnings of such companies upon which such gross earnings taxes are com-
puted. Any such law may, in the discretion of the legislature, provide for 
the exemption from taxation of any motor vehicle owned by a nonresident of 
the state ••. 
Art. XIX §4. 
The legislature is hereby authorized to provide, by law, for the taxation 
of aircraft using the air space overlying the State of Minnesota and the 
airports thereof, including any contrivance, now known or hereafter in-
vented, used or designed for navigation of or flight in the air, on a more 
onerous basis than other personal property; provided, however, that any 
such tax on aircraft shall be in lieu of all other taxation thereon, and except 
that the legislature may impose such tax upon aircraft of companies paying 
taxes under any gross earnings system of taxation, and upon the right to use 
such aircraft in the air space overlying the State of Minnesota and upon 
the airports thereof, notwithstanding the fact that earnings from such air-
craft may be included in the earnings of such companies upon which such 
gross earnings taxes are computed. Any such law may, in the discretion of 
the legislature, provide for the exemption from taxation of any aircraft 
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owned by a nonresident of the state and transiently or temporarily using 
the air space overlying the State of Minnesota or the airports thereof. 
Art. XVlll § l. 
Laws may be enacted for the purpose of encouraging and promoting 
forestation and reforestation of lands in this state, whether owned by 
private persons or the public, including the fixing in advance of a definite 
and limited annual tax on such lands for a term of years and yield tax at or 
after the end of such term upon the timber and other forest products so 
grown, but the taxation of mineral deposits shall not be affected by this 
amendment. 
MISSISSIPPI 
Art. IV §112. 
Const. 1890. 
Taxation shall be uniform and equal throughout the state. Property shall 
be taxed in proportion to its value. The legislature may, however, impose 
a tax per capita upon such domestic animals as from their nature and habits 
are destructive of other property. Property shall be assessed for taxes under 
general laws, and by uniform rules, according to its true value. But the 
legislature may provide for a special mode of valuation and assessment for 
railroads, and railroad and other corporate property, or for particular species 
of property belonging to persons, corporations, or associations not situated 
wholly in one county. 
Art. VII § 1 8 1. 
The property of all private corporations for pecuniary gain shall be taxed 
in the same way and to the same extent as the property of individuals, but 
the legislature may provide for the taxation of banks and banking capital, 
by taxing the shares according to the value thereof {augmented by the 
accumulations, surplus, and unpaid dividends), exclusive of real estate, 
which shall be taxed as other real estate. Exemptions from taxation to which 
corporations are legally entitled at the adoption of this Constitution, shall 
remain in full force and effect for the time of such exemption as expressed 
in their respective charters, or by general laws, unless sooner repealed by the 
legislature. And domestic insurance companies shall not be required to pay 
a greater tax in the aggregate than is required to be paid by foreign in-
surance companies doing business in this state, except to the extent of the 
excess of their ad valorem tax over the privilege tax imposed upon such 
foreign companies; and the legislature may impose privilege taxes on 
building and loan associations in lieu of all other taxes except on their real 
estate. 
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Art. VII § 182. 
The power to tax corporations and their property shall never be sur-
rendered or abridged by any contract or grant to which the state or any 
political subdivison thereof may be a party, except what the legislature may 
grant exemption from taxation in the encouragement of manufactures and 
other new enterprises of public utility extending for a period of not ex-
ceeding five years, the time of such exemptions to commence from date of 
charter, if to a corporation; and if to an individual enterprise, then from 
the commencement of work; but when the legislature grants such exemptions 
for a period of five years or less, it shall be done by general laws, which 
shall distinctly enumerate the classes of manufactures and other new enter-
prises of public utility entitled to such exemptions, and shall prescribe the 
mode and manner in which the right to such exemptions shall be deter-
mined. 
Art. VII § 192. 
Provision shall be made by general laws whereby cities and towns may 
be authorized to aid and encourage the establishment of manufactories, 
gasworks, waterworks, and other enterprises of public utility other than rail-
roads, within the limits of said cities or towns, by exempting all property 
used for such purposes from municipal taxation for a period not longer than 
ten years. 
Art. XI §236. 
The legislature shall impose for levee purposes, in addition to the levee 
taxes heretofore levied or authorized by law, a uniform tax of not less 
than two nor more than five cents an acre per annum upon every acre of 
land now or hereafter embraced within the limits of either or both of said 
levee districts ••• and all reductions in such taxation shall be uniform in 
each of said districts; but the rate of taxation need not be the same in both 
ofthem .•• , 
MISSOURI 
Art. X §3. 
Const. 1945. 
Taxes may be levied and collected for public purposes only, and shall be 
uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the 
authority levying the tax. . . • Except as otherwise provided in this con-
stitution, the methods of determining the value of property for taxation 
shall be fixed by law. 
Art. X §4. 
(a) All taxable property shall be classified for tax purposes as follows: 
class 1, real property; class 2, tangible personal property; class 3, intangible 
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personal property. The general assembly, by general law, may provide for 
further classification within classes 2 and 3, based solely on the nature and 
characteristics of the property, and not on the nature, residence or business 
of the owner, or the amount owned. Nothing in this section shall prevent 
the taxing of franchises, privileges or incomes, or the levying of excise or 
motor vehicle license taxes, or any other taxes of the same or different types. 
(b) Property in classes 1 and 2 and subclasses of class 2, shall be assessed 
for tax purposes at its value or such percentage of its value as may be fixed 
by law for each class and for each subclass of class 2. Property in class 3 and 
its subclasses shall be taxed only to the extent authorized and at the rate 
fixed by law for each class and subclass, and the tax shall be based on the 
annual yield and shall not exceed eight per cent thereof. 
(c) All taxes on property in class 3 and its subclasses, and the tax under 
any other form of taxation substituted by the general assembly for the tax 
on bank shares, shall be assessed, levied and collected by the state and re-
turned as provided by law, less two per cent for collection, to the counties 
and other political subdivisions of their origin, in proportion to the respec-
tive local rates of levy. 
Art. X §7. 
For the purpose of encouraging forestry when lands are devoted ex-
clusively to such purpose, and the reconstruction, redevelopment and re-
habilitation of obsolete, decadent or blighted areas, the general assembly by 
general law, may provide for such partial relief from taxation of the lands 
devoted to any such purpose, and of the improvements thereon, by such 
method or methods, for such period or periods of time, not exceeding 
twenty-five years in any instance, and upon such terms, conditions, and 
restrictions as it may prescribe. 
Art. X §6. 
All property, real and personal, of the state, counties a~ other political 
subdivisions, and non-profit cemeteries, shall be exempt from taxation; and 
all property, real and personal, not held for private or corporate profit and 
used exclusively for religious worship, for schools and colleges, for purposes 
purely charitable, or for agricultural and horticultural societies may be 
exempted from taxation by general law. All laws exempting from taxation 
property other than the property enumerated in this article, shall be void. 
Art. X §S. 
All railroad corporations in this state, or doing business therein, shall be 
subject to taxation for state, county, school, municipal and other purposes, 
on the real and personal property owned or used by them, and on their 
gross earnings, their net earnings, their franchises and their capital stock. 
MONTANA 
Art. XII §I. 
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Const. 1889. 
The necessary revenue for the support and maintenance of the state shall 
be provided by the legislative assembly, which shall levy a uniform rate of 
assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a 
just valuation for taxation of all property, except that specially provided for 
in this article. The legislative assembly may also impose a license tax, both 
upon persons and upon corporations doing business in the state. 
Art. XII §I I. 
Taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws and for public pur-
poses only. They shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within 
the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. 
Art. XII § Ia. 
The legislative assembly may levy and collect taxes upon incomes of 
persons, firms and corporations for the purpose of replacing property taxes. 
These income taxes may be graduated and progressive and shall be dis-
tributed to the public schools and to the state government. 
Art. XII §17. 
The word property as used in this article is hereby declared to include 
moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, franchises and all matters and things (real, 
personal and mixed) capable of private ownership, but this shall not be 
construed so as to authorize the tax of the stocks of any company or corpora-
tion when the property of such company or corporation represented by such 
stocks is within the state and has been taxed. 
Art. XII §2. 
The property of the United States, the state, counties, cities, towns, school 
districts, munidpal corporations and public libraries shall be exempt from 
taxation; and such other property as may be used exclusively for the 
agricultural and horticultural societies, for educational purposes, places for 
actual religious worship, hospitals and places of burial not used or held for 
private or corporate profit, institutions of purely public charity and evidences 
of debt secured by mortgages of record upon real or personal property m 
the state of Montana, may be exempt from taxation. 
Art. XII §3. 
All mines and mining claims, both placer and rock in place, contammg 
or bearing gold, silver, copper, lead, coal or other valuable mineral deposits, 
after purchase thereof from the United States, shall be taxed at the price 
paid the United States. therefor, unless the surface ground, or some part 
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thereof, of such mine or claim, is used for other than mining purposes, and 
has a separate and independent value for such other purposes, in which case 
said surface ground, or any part thereof, so used for other than mining 
purposes, shall be taxed at its value for such other purposes, as provided by 
law; and all machinery used in mining, and all property and surface im· 
provements upon or appurtenant to mines and mining claims which have a 
value separate and independent of such mines or mining claims, and the 
annual net proceeds of all mines and mining claims shall be taxed as pro-
vided by law. 
NEBRASKA 
Art. VIIl § 1. 
Const. 187 5. 
The necessary revenue of the state and its governmental subdivisions 
shall be raised by taxation in such manner as the Legislature may direct. 
Taxes shall be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately upon all 
tangible property and franchises, except that the Legislature may provide 
for a different method of taxing motor vehicles .••• Taxes uniform as to 
class may be levied by valuation upon all other property. Taxes, other than 
property taxes, may be authorized by law. 
Art. VIIl §2. 
The property of the state and its governmental subdivisions shall be 
exempt from taxation. The Legislature by general law may exempt property 
owned by and used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, 
and property owned and used exclusively for educational, religious, charita· 
ble or cemetery purposes, when such property is not owned or used for 
financial gain or profit to either the owner or user. Household goods of the 
value of two hundred ($200.00) dollars to each family shall be exempt from 
taxation. The Legislature by general law may provide that the increased 
value of land by reason of shade and ornamental trees planted along the 
highway shall not be taken into account in the assessment of such land. No 
property shall be exempt from taxation except as provided in this section. 
Art. VIIl §6 • 
• • • such (municipal] taxes shall be uniform in respect to persons and 
property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same. 
Art. VIIl § lA. 
When a general sales tax, or an income tax, or a combination of a general 
sales tax or income tax, is adopted by the Legislature as a method of raising 
revenue for the State of Nebraska for state purposes, the state shall be pro-
hibited from levying a property tax for state purposes. 
NEVADA 
Art. X §I. 
APPENDIX 797 
Const. 1864. 
The legislature shall provide by law for a uniform and equal rate of as-
sessment and taxation, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a 
just valuation for taxation of all property, real, personal and possessory, ex-
cept mines and mining claims, when not patented, the proceeds alone of 
which shall be assessed and taxed, and when patented, each patented mine 
shall be assessed at not less than five hundred dollars, except where one 
hundred dollars in labor has been actually performed on such patented mine 
during the year, in addition to the tax upon the net proceeds; shares of 
stock (except shares of stock in banking corporations), bonds, mortgages, 
notes, bank deposits, book accounts and credits, and securities and choses 
in action of like character are deemed to represent interest in property 
already assessed and taxed, either in Nevada or elsewhere, and shall be 
exempt. No inheritance or estate tax shall ever be levied, and there shall 
also be excepted such property as may be exempted by law for municipal, 
educational, literary, scientific or other charitable purposes. 
Art. VIII §2. 
All real property and possessory rights to the same, as well as personal 
property in this state, belonging to corporations now existing or hereafter 
created, shall be subject to taxation the same as property of individuals; 
provided, that the property of corporations formed for municipal, charitable, 
religious, or educational purposes may be exempted by law. 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
Pt. II Art. 5. 
Const. 1784. 
[The Legislature may] impose and levy proportional and reasonable 
assessments, rates, and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and residents 
within, the said state; and upon all estates within the same • • • ; for the 
purpose of encouraging conservation of the forest resources of the state, the 
general court may provide for special assessments, rates and taxes on growing 
woods and timbers. 
Pt. II Art. 6. 
The public charges of government, or any part thereof, may be raised 
by taxation upon polls, estates, and other classes of property, including 
franchises and property when passing by will or inheritance; and there 
shall be a valuation of the estates within the state taken anew once in every 
five years, at least, and as much oftener as the general court shall order. 
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Pt. I Art. 12. 
Every member of the community has a right to be protected by it, in 
the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property; he is therefore bound to 
contribute his share in the expense of such protection. 
NEW JERSEY 
Art. VIII§ t.1f1. 
Const. 1947. 
Property shall be assessed for taxation under general laws and by uniform 
rules. All real property assessed and taxed locally or by the State for allotment 
and payment to taxing districts shall be assessed according to the same 
standard of value; and such real property shall be taxed at the general tax 
rate of the taxing district in which the property is situated, for the use of 
such taxing district. 
Art. VIII § 1. 1f2. 
Exemption from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Until 
otherwise provided by law all exemptions from taxation validly granted and 
now in existence shall be continued. Exemptions from taxation may be 
altered or repealed, except those exempting real and personal property used 
exclusively for religious, educational, charitable or cemetery purposes as 
defined by law, and owned by any corporation or association organized and 
conducted exclusively for one or more of such purposes and not operating 
for profit. 
Art. VIII § 1. 1f 3 • 
• • • [veterans, citizens and residents of New Jersey,] shall be exempt 
from taxation on real and personal property to an aggregate assessed valuation 
not exceeding five hundred dollars, which exemption shall not be altered or 
repealed. • • • [disabled veterans] shall be entitled to such further ex-
emption from taxation as from time to time maybe provided by law. The 
widow of any citizen and resident of this State who has met or shall meet 
his death on active duty in time of war in any such service shall be entitled, 
during her widowhood, to the exemption in this paragraph provided for 
honorably discharged veterans and to such further exemption as from time 
to time may be provided by law. 
NEW MEXICO 
Art. VIII § 1. 
Const. 1911. 
Taxes levied upon tangible property shall be in proportion to the value 
thereof, and taxes shall be equal and uniform upon subjects of taxation of 
the same class. 
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Art. VIII §3. 
The property of the United States, the state and all counties, towns, cities 
and school districts, and other municipal corporations, public libraries, com-
munity ditches and all laterals thereof, all church property, all property used 
for educational or charitable purposes, all cemeteries not used or held for 
private or corporate profit, and all bonds of the state of New Mexico, and 
of the counties, municipalities and districts thereof shall be exempt from 
taxation •••• 
Art. VIII §5. 
The legislature may exempt from taxation property of each head of the 
family to the amount of two hundred dollars ( $200), and the property, in-
cluding the community or joint property of husband and wife, of every 
honorably discharged member of the armed forces of the United States who 
served in the armed forces of the United States at any time during which 
the United States was regularly and officially engaged in any war, in the sum 
of two thousand dollars ($2,000). 
Art. VIII §6. 
Lands held in large tracts shall not be assessed for taxation at any lower 
value per acre than lands of the same character or quality and similarly 
situated, held in smaller tracts. The plowing of land shall not be considered 
as adding value thereto for the purpose of taxation. 
NEW YORK 
Art. I § 11. 
Const. 1938. 
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state 
or any subdivision thereof. 
Art. XVI §1 • 
• • • Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws. 
Exemptions may be altered or repealed except those exempting real or 
personal property used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable 
purposes as defined by law and owned by any corporation or association 
organized or conducted exclusively for one or more of such purposes and 
not operating for profit. 
Art. XVI §3. 
• • • Intangible personal property shall not be taxed ad valorem nor 
shall any excise tax be levied solely because of the ownership or possession 
thereof, except that the income therefrom may be taken into consideration 
in computing any excise tax measured by income generally. Undistributed 
profits shall not be taxed. 
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Art. XVI §4. 
Where the state has power to tax corporations included under the laws of 
the United States there shall be no discrimination in the rates and methods 
of taxation between such corporations and other corporations exercising 
substantially similar functions and en~aged in substantially similar business 
within the state. 
NORTH CAROLINA 
Art. V §3. 
Const. 1876. 
• • • Taxes on property shall be uniform as to each class of property 
taxed. • • • The General Assembly may also tax trades, professions, fran-
chises, and incomes: Provided, the rate of tax on income shall not in any 
case exceed ten per cent (I 0%), and there shall be allowed the following 
exemptions, to be deducted from the amount of annual incomes, to-wit: for 
married man with a wife living with him, or to a widow or widower having 
minor child or children, natural or adopted, not less than $2,000; to all 
other persons not less than $1,000, and there may be allowed other de-
ductions (not including living expenses) so that only net incomes are taxed. 
Art. V §5. 
Property belonging to the State, or to municipal corporations, shall be 
exempt from taxation. The General Assembly may exempt cemeteries and 
property held for educational, scientific, literary, charitable, or religious 
purposes; also wearing apparel, arms for muster, household and kitchen 
furniture, the mechanical and agricultural implements of mechanics and 
farmers; libraries and scientific instruments, or any other personal property, 
to a value not exceeding three hundred dollars. The General Assembly may 
exempt from taxation not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) in 
value of property held and used as the place of residence of the owner. 
NORTH DAKOTA 
Art. XI § 176. 
Const. 1889. 
Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property including fran-
chises within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. The 
legislature may by law exempt any or all classes of personal property from 
taxation and within the meaning of this section, fixtures, buildings and 
improvements of every character, whatsoever, upon land shall be deemed 
personal property. The property of the United States and of the state, 
county and municipal corporations and property used exclusively for schools, 
religious, cemetery, charitable or other public purposes shall be exempt from 
taxation. Except as restricted by this article, the legislature may provide 
for raising revenue and fixing the situs of all property for the purpose of 
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taxation. Provided that all taxes and exemptions in force when this amend-
ment is adopted shall remain in force until otherwise provided by statute. 
Art. XI §177. 
The legislature may by law provide for the levy and collection of an 
acreage tax on lands within the state in addition to the limitations specified 
in Section 174 in Article II of the constitution. The proceeds of such tax 
shall be used to indemnify the owners of growing crops against damages by 
hail, provided that lands used exclusively for public roads, rights of way of 
common carriers, mining, manufacturing or pasturage may be exempt from 
such tax. 
OHIO Const. 1851. 
Art. XII §2. 
Land and improvements thereon shall be taxed by uniform rule according 
to value • • • (certain bonds exempt] • • • and without limiting the 
general power, subject to the provisions of article I of this constitution, to 
determine the subjects and methods of taxation or exemptions therefrom, 
general laws may be passed to exempt burying grounds, public school houses, 
houses used exclusively for public worship, institutions used exclusively for 
charitable purposes, and public property used exclusively for any public 
purpose, but all such laws shall be subject to alteration or repeal; and the 
value of all property so exempted shall, from time to time, be ascertained 
and published as may be directed by law. 
Art. XII §7. 
Laws may be passed providing for the taxation of the right to receive, or 
to succeed to, estates, and such taxation may be uniform or it may be so 
graduated as to tax at a higher rate the right to receive, or to succeed to, 
estates of larger value than to estates of smaller value. Such tax may also be 
levied at different rates upon collateral and direct inheritances, and a portion 
of each estate not exceeding twenty thousand dollars may be exempt from 
such taxation. 
Art. XII §8. 
Laws may be passed providing for the taxation of incomes, and such 
taxation may be either uniform or graduated, and may be applied to such 
incomes as may be designated by law; but a part of each annual income not 
exceeding three thousand dollars may be exempt from such taxation. 
Art. XII §I 0. 
Laws may be passed providing for excise and franchise taxes and for the 
imposition of taxes upon the production of coal, oil, gas and other minerals. 
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Art. XIII §4. 
The property of corporations, now existing or hereafter created, shall 
forever be subject to taxation, the same as the property of individuals. 
Art. II §36. 
Laws may be passed to encourage forestry, and to that end areas devoted 
exclusively to forestry may be exempted, in whole or in part from tax-
ation •••• 
Art. II §l(e). 
The powers defined herein as the "initiative" and "referendum" shall 
not be used to pass a law authorizing any classification of property for the 
purpose of levying different rates of taxation thereon or of authorizing the 
levy of any single tax on land or land values or land sites at a higher rate or 
by a different rule than is or may be applied to improvements thereon or to 
personal property. 
OKLAHOMA 
Art. X §5. 
Const. 1907~ 
The power of taxation shall never be surrendered, suspended, or con-
tracted away. Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects. 
Art. X §12. 
The Legislature shall have power to provide for the levy and collection of 
license, franchise, gross revenue, excise, income, collateral and direct in-
heritance, legacy, and succession taxes; also graduated income taxes, gradu-
ated collateral and direct inheritance taxes, graduated legacy and succession 
taxes; also stamp, registration, production or other specific taxes. 
Art. X §22. 
Nothing in this Constitution shall be held, or construed, to prevent the 
classification of property for purposes of taxation; and the valuation of dif-
ferent classes by different means or methods. 
Art. v §so. 
The Legislature shall pass no law exempting any property within this 
State from taxation, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution. 
Art. X §6. 
All property used for free public libraries, free museums, public ceme-
teries, property used exclusively for religious and charitable purposes, and 
all property of the United States, and of this State; household goods of the 
heads of families, tools, implements, and live stock employed in the support 
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of the family, not exceeding one hundred dollars in value, and all growing 
crops, shall be exempt from taxation ...• 
The Legislature may authorize any incorporated city or town, by a 
majority vote of its electors voting thereon, to exempt manufacturing es-
tablishments and public utilities from municipal taxation, for a period not 
exceeding five years, as an inducement to their location. 
Art. XII-A. 
[Homestead exemption.] 
Art. X §8. 
All property which may be taxed ad valorem shall be assessed for taxation 
at its fair cash value, estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary 
sale •••• 
OREGON 
Art. IX §1. 
Const. 1859. 
The Legislative Assembly shall, and the people through the initiative 
may, provide by law uniform rules of assessment and taxation. All taxes 
shall be levied and collected under general laws operating uniformly 
throughout the state. 
Art. I §32. 
No tax or duty shall be imposed without the consent of the people or 
their representatives in the Legislative Assembly; and all taxation shall be 
uniform on the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the 
authority levying the tax. 
PENNSYLVANIA 
Art. IX §1. 
Const. 1874. 
All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the 
territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and 
collected under general laws, but the General Assembly may, by general 
laws, exempt from taxation public property used for public purposes, actual 
places of religious worship, places of burial not used or held for private or 
corporate profit, institutions of purely public charity, and real and personal 
property owned, occupied, and . used by any branch, post, or camp of 
honorably discharged soldiers, sailors and marines. 
Art. IX §2. 
All laws exempting property from taxation, other than the property above 
enumerated shall be void. 
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RHODE ISLAND 
Art. I §2. 
Const. 1843. 
All free governments are instituted for the protection, safety and happi-
ness of the people. All laws, therefore, should be made for the good of the 
whole; and the burdens of the state ought to be fairly distributed among its 
citizens. 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
Art. X §1. 
Const. 1895. 
The General Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform and equal rate 
of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe regulations to secure a just 
valuation for taxation of all property, real, personal and possessory, except 
mines and mining claims, the products of which alone shall be taxed; and 
also excepting such property as may be exempted by law for municipal, 
educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes: Provided, 
however, That the General Assembly may impose a capitation tax upon 
such domestic animals as from their nature and habits are destructive of 
other property: And proflided, further, That the General Assembly may 
provide for a graduated tax on incomes, and for a graduated license on oc-
cupations and business. Prortided, further That the General Assembly may 
provide by law for the assessment of all intangible personal property, in-
cluding moneys, credits, bank deposits, corporate stocks, and bonds, at its 
true value for taxation for State, County and municipal purposes or either 
thereof; ProCJided, that the total rate of taxation imposed thereon shall never 
exceed one-half of one per centum of the actual value of such intangible 
property; Proflided, further, That such intangible personal property shall 
not be subject to the three mill levy provided by §10, Art. II, of this 
instrument or to any other general or special tax levy, except such as is es-
pecially provided by the General Assembly by the authority and within the 
limitation of this provision; nor shall such intangible personal property be 
considered a part of "taxable property," as such term is used in this in-
strument, of the State or any subdivision thereof. 
Art. I §6. 
All property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value. 
Art. III §29. 
All taxes upon property, real and personal, shall be laid upon the actual 
value of the property taxed, as the same shall be ascertained by an assessment 
made for the purpose of laying such tax. 
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Art. X §13. 
The General Assembly shall provide for the assessment of all property for 
taxation; and State, county, township, school, municipal and all other taxes 
shall be levied on the same assessment which shall be that made for State 
taxes •••• 
Art. X §4. 
There shall be exempted from taxation all County, township and mu-
nicipal property used exclusively for public purposes and not for revenue, 
and the property of all schools, colleges and institutions of learning, all 
charitable institutions in the nature of asylums for the infirm, deaf and 
dumb, blind, idiotic and indigent persons, except where the profits of such 
institutions are applied to private uses; all public libraries, churches, par-
sonages and burying grounds; but property of associations and societies, al-
though connected with charitable objects, shall not be exempt from State, 
County or municipal taxation: Prwided, That as to real estate this exemption 
shall not extend beyond the buildings and premises actually occupied by such 
schools, colleges, institutions of learning, asylums, libraries, churches, par-
sonages and burial grounds, although connected with charitable objects. 
Art. VIII §8. 
Cities and towns may exempt from taxation, by general or special ordi-
nance, except for school purposes, manufactories established within their 
limits for five successive years from the time of the establishment of such 
manufactories. 
Art. VIII §6. 
The corporate authorities of cities and towns in this State shall be vested 
with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes said taxes to be 
uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the 
body composing the same; and all the property, except such as is exempt by 
law, within the limits of cities and towns shall be taxed for the payment of 
debts contracted under authority of law. License or privileged taxes imposed 
shall be graduated so as to secure a just imposition of such tax upon the 
classes subject thereto. 
SOUTH DAKOTA 
Art. VI §17. 
Const. 1889. 
No tax or duty shall be imposed without the consent of the people or 
their representatives in the legislature, and all taxation shall be equal and 
uniform. 
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Art. XI §2. 
To the end that the burden of taxation may be equitable upon all prop-
erty, and in order that no property which is made subject to taxation shall 
escape, the legislature is empowered to divide all property including moneys 
and credits as well as physical property into classes and to determine what 
class or classes of property shall be subject to taxation and what property, if 
any, shall not be subject to taxation. Taxes shall be uniform on all property 
of the same class, and shall be levied and collected for public purposes only. 
Taxes may be imposed upon any and all property including privileges, 
franchises and licenses to do business in the state. Gross earnings and net 
incomes may be considered in taxing any and all property and the valuation 
of property for taxation purposes shall never exceed the actual value thereof. 
The legislature is empowered to impose taxes upon incomes and occupations, 
and taxes upon incomes may be graduated and progressive and reasonable 
exemptions may be provided. 
Art. XI §4-. 
The legislature shall provide for taxing all moneys, credits, investments 
in bonds, stocks, joint stock companies, or otherwise; and also for taxing 
the notes and bills discounted or purchased, moneys loaned and all other 
property, effects or dues of every description, of all banks and of all bankers, 
so that all property employed in banking shall always be subject to a taxation 
equal to that imposed on the property of individuals. 
Art,XI §5. 
The property of the United States and of the state, county and municipal 
corporations, both real and personal, shall be exempt from taxation. • . • 
Art. XI §6. 
The legislature shall, by general law, exempt from taxation, property 
used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, for school, reli-
gious, cemetery and charitable purposes, and personal property to any 
amount not exceeding in value two hundred dollars for each individual 
liable to taxation. 
Art. XI §7. 
All laws exempting property from taxation other than that enumerated in 
sections 5 and 6 of this article, shall be void. 
Art. XI §10 • 
• • • such [local] tax shall be uniform in respect to persons and property 
within the jurisdiction of the body levying the same. 
Art. VIII § 15. 
The legislature shall make such provision by general taxation and by au• 
thorizing the school corporations to levy such additional taxes as with the 
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income from the permanent school fund shall secure a thorough and efficient 
system of common schools throughout the state. The legislature is empow-
ered to classify properties within school districts for purposes of school taxa-
tion, and may constitute agricultural lands a separate class. Taxes shall be 
uniform on all property in the same class. · 
TENNESSEE 
Art. II §28. 
Const. 1870. 
All property, real, personal or mixed, shall be taxed but the Legislature 
may except such as may be held by the State, by counties, cities or towns, and 
used exclusively for public or corporation purposes, and such as may be held 
and used for purposes purely religious, charitable, scientific, literary or edu-
cational, and shall except one thousand dollars' worth of personal property 
in the hands of each taxpayer, and the direct product of the soil in the hands 
of the producer, and his immediate vendee. All property shall be taxed 
according to its value, that value to be ascertained in such manner as the 
Legislature shall direct, so that taxes shall be equal and uniform throughout 
the State. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected, 
shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of the same value. 
But the Legislature shall have power to tax Merchants, Peddlers and priv-
ileges, in such manner as they may from time to time direct. The portion of 
a Merchant's Capital used in the purchase of Merchandise sold by him to 
nonresidents and sent beyond the State, shall not be taxed at a rate higher 
than the ad 'l!alorem tax on property. The Legislature shall have power to 
levy a tax upon incomes derived from stocks and bonds that are not taxed 
ad 'llalorem . • 
Art. II §30. 
No article manufactured of the produce of this State shall be taxed other-
wise than to pay inspection fees. 
Art. II §29. 
The General Assembly shall have power to authorize the several counties 
and incorporated towns of this State, to impose taxes for county and cor-
poration purposes respectively, in such manner as shall be prescribed by 
law; and all property shall be taxed according to its value, upon the princi-
ples established in regard to State taxation. 
TEXAS Const. 1876. 
Art. VIII § 1. 
Taxation shall be equal and uniform. All property in this State, whether 
owned by natural persons or corporations, other than municipal, shall be 
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taxed in proportion to its value, which shall be ascertained as may be pro-
vided by law. The Legislature may impose a poll tax. It may also impose 
occupation taxes, both upon natural persons and upon corporations, other 
than municipal, doing any business in this State. It may also tax incomes of 
both natural persons and corporations other than municipal, except that 
persons engaged in mechanical and agricultural pursuits shall never be re-
quired to pay an occupation tax; Provided, that two hundred and fifty 
dollars worth of household and kitchen furniture, belonging to each family 
in this state shall be exempt from taxation. 
Art. VIII §2. 
All occupation taxes shall be equal and uniform upon the same class of 
subjects within the limits of the authority levying the tax; but the Legisla-
ture may, by general laws, exempt from taxation public property used for 
public purposes; actual places of religious worship; also any property owned 
by a church or by a strictly religious society for the exclusive use as a dwell-
ing place for the ministry of such church or religious society; provided that 
such exemption shall not extend to more property than is reasonably neces-
sary for a dwelling place and in no event more than one acre of land; places 
of burial not held for private or corporate profit; all buildings used ex-
clusively and owned by persons or associations of persons for school purposes 
and the necessary furniture of all schools and property used exclusively and 
reasonably necessary in conducting any association engaged in promoting 
the religious, educational and physical development of boys, girls, young 
men or young women operating under a State or national organization of 
like. character; also the endowment funds of such institutions of learning 
and religion not used with a view to profit; and when the same are invested 
in bonds or mortgages, or in land or other property which has been and 
shall hereafter be bought in by such institutions under foreclosure sales made 
to satisfy or protect such bonds or mortgages, that such exemption of such 
land and property shall continue only for two years after the purchase of 
the same at such sale by such institutions and no longer, and institutions of 
purely public charity; and all laws exempting property from taxation other 
than the property above mentioned shall be null and void. 
Art. VIII § I 7. 
The specification of the objects and subjects of taxation shall not deprive 
the Legislature of the power to require other subjects or objects to be taxed 
in such manner as may be consistent with the principles of taxation fixed 
in this Constitution. 
Art. XI §9. 
[Municipal property used for public purposes, all property used for 
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extinguishing fires, and] all other property devoted exclusively to the use 
and benefit of the public shall be exempt • • • from taxation. • . • 
Art. VIII § 1 b. 
[Homesteads of assessed taxable value of $3,000] shall be exempt from 
all taxation for all State purposes. 
UTAH Const. 1896. 
Art. XIII §2. 
All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the 
United States, or under this constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to its 
value, to be ascertained as provided by law. The property of the state, coun-
ties, cities, towns, school districts, municipal corporations and public li-
braries, lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively for either religious 
worship or charitable purposes, and places of burial not held or used for 
private or corporate benefit, shall be exempt from taxation. Water rights, 
ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants, transmission lines, 
pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or corporations for irrigating 
lands within the state owned by such individuals or corporations, or the 
individual members thereof, shall not be separately taxed as long as they shall 
be owned and used exclusively for such purposes. Power plants, power 
transmission lines and other property used for generating and delivering 
electrical power, a portion of which is used for furnishing power for pump-
ing water for irrigation purposes on lands in the state of Utah, may be 
exempted from taxation to the extent that such property is used for such 
purposes. These exemptions shall accrue to the benefit of the users of water 
so pumped under such regulations as the legislature may prescribe. The taxes 
of the indigent poor may be remitted or abated at such times and in such 
manner as may be provided by law. The legislature may provide for the 
exemption from taxation of homes, homesteads, and personal property, not 
to exceed $2,000 in value for homes and homesteads, and $300 for personal 
property. Property not to exceed $3,000 in value, owned by disabled per-
sons who served in any war in the military service of the United States or 
of the state of Utah and by the unmarried widows and minor orphans of 
such persons may be exempted as the legislature may provide. 
Art. XIII §3. 
The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assess-
ment and taxation on all tangible property in the State, according to its value 
in money, and shall prescribe by law such regulations as shall secure a just 
valuation for taxation of such property, so that every person or corporation 
shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property, 
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provided that the Legislature may determine the manner and extent of tax-
ing transient live stock and live stock being fed for slaughter to be used for 
human consumption. Intangible property may be exempted from taxation 
as property or it may be taxed in such manner and to such extent as the 
Legislature may provide. Provided that if intangible property be taxed as 
property the rate thereof shall not exceed five mills ·on each dollar of valua-
tion. When exempted from taxation as property, the taxable income there-
from shall be taxed under any tax based on incomes, but when taxed by the 
State of Utah as property, the income therefrom shall be taxed under any 
tax based on incomes, but when taxed by the State of Utah as property, the 
income therefrom shall not also be taxed. The Legislature may provide for 
deductions, exemptions, and/or offsets on any tax based upon income. The 
personal income tax rates shall be graduated but the maximum rate shall not 
exceed six per cent of net income. No excise tax rate based upon income 
shall exceed four per cent of net income. 
Art. XIII §4. 
All metalliferous mines or mining claims, both ·placer and rock in place, 
shall be assessed as the Legislature shall provide. • • • All other mines or 
mining claims and other valuable mineral deposits, including lands contain-
ing coal or hydrocarbons and all machinery used in mining and all property 
or surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims, and 
the value of any surface use made of mining claims, or mining property for 
other than mining purposes, shall be assessed as other tangible property. 
Art. XIII §12. 
Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to prevent the Legislature 
from providing a stamp tax, or a tax based on income, occupation, licenses 
or franchises. 
VERMONT 
Ch. I Art. 9. 
Canst. 1793. 
That every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoy-
ment ()f life, liberty, and property, and therefore is bound to contribute his 
proportion toward the expense of that protection. 
VIRGINIA 
Art. XIII § 168. 
Const. 1902. 
All property, except as hereinafter provided, shall be taxed; all taxes, 
whether State, local or municipal, shall be uniform upon the same class of 
subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and 
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shall be levied and collected under general law. The General Assembly may 
define and classify taxable subjects, and, except as to classes of property 
herein expressly segregated for either State or local taxation, the General 
Assembly may segregate the several classes of property so as to specify and 
determine upon what subjects State taxes, and upon what subjects local 
taxes may be levied. 
Art. XIII § 170. 
The General Assembly may levy a tax on incomes in excess of six hun-
dred dollars per annum; may levy a license tax upon any business which 
cannot be reached by the ad valorem system; and may impose State franchise 
taxes, and in imposing a franchise tax, may in its discretion, make the same 
in lieu of taxes upon other property, in whole or in part, of a transportation, 
industrial, or commercial corporation. Whenever a franchise tax shall be 
imposed upon a corporation doing business, in this State, or whenever all 
the capital, however invested, of a corporation chartered under the laws of 
the State, shall be taxed, the shares of stock issued by any such corporation 
shall not be further taxed. 
Art. XIII §I 7 I. 
No State property tax for State purposes shall be levied on real estate or 
tangible personal property, except the rolling stock of public service cor-
porations. Real estate and tangible personal property, except the rolling 
stock of public service corporations, are hereby segregated for, and made 
subject to, local taxation, only, and shall be assessed or reassessed for local 
taxation in such manner and at such times as the General Assembly has 
heretofore prescribed, or may hereafter prescribe, by general laws. 
Art. XIII § 169. 
Except as hereafter provided, all assessments of real estate and tangible 
personal property shall be at their fair market value, to be ascertained as 
prescribed by law. So long as the State shall levy upon any public service 
corporation, other than a railway or a canal corporation, a State franchise, 
license, or other tax, based upon or measured by its gross receipts, or gross 
earnings, or any part thereof, its real estate and tangible personal property 
shall be assessed by the State Corporation Commission, or other central State 
agency, in the manner prescribed by law. The General Assembly may allow 
a lower rate of taxation to be imposed for a period of years by a city or town 
upon land added to its corporate limits, than is imposed on similar property 
within its limits at the time such land is added. 
Art. XIII § 183. 
Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, the following property and 
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no other shall be exempt from taxation, State and local, including inherit-
ance taxes: 
(a) Property owned directly or indirectly by the Commonwealth or any 
political subdivision thereof, and obligations of the Commonwealth issued 
since February fourteenth, eighteen hundred and eighty-two, or hereafter 
exempted by law. 
(b) Buildings with land they actually occupy, and the furniture and fur-
nishings therein and endowment funds lawfully owned and held by churches 
or religious bodies, and wholly and exclusively used for religious worship, or 
for the residence of the minister of any such church or religious body, to-
gether with the additional adjacent land reasonably necessary for the con-
venient use of any such building. 
(c) Private or public burying grounds or cemeteries and endowment 
funds, lawfully held, for their care, provided the same are not operated for 
profit. 
(d) Property owned by public libraries, incorporated colleges or other 
incorporated institutions of learning, not conducted for profit, together with 
the endowment funds thereof not invested in real estate. But this provision 
shall apply only to property primarily used for literary, scientific or educa-
tional purpose or purposes incidental thereto. It shall not apply to industrial 
schools which sell their product to others than their own employees or 
students. 
(e) Real estate belonging to, actually and exclusively occupied and used 
by, and personal property, including endowment funds, belonging to Young 
Men's Christian Associations, and other similar religious associations, or-
phan or other asylums, reformatories, hospitals and nunneries, conducted not 
for profit, but exclusively as charities, also parks or playgrounds held by 
trustees for the perpetual use of the general public. 
(f) Buildings with the land they actually occupy, and the furniture and 
furnishings therein, belonging to any benevolent or charitable association, 
together with such additional adjacent land as may be necessary for the 
convenient use of the buildings for such purposes; and 
(g) Property of the Association for the Preservation of Virginia Antiqui-
ties, the Confederate Memorial Literary Society, the Mount Vernon Ladies' 
Association of the Union, the Virginia Historical Society, the Thomas 
Jefferson Memorial Foundation, Incorporated, the posts of the American 
Legion and such other similar organizations or societies as may be prescribed 
by law. 
Except as to class (a) above, general laws may be enacted restricting but 
not extending the above exemptions. 
Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to exempt from 
taxation the property of any person, firm, association, or corporation, who 
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shall, expressly or impliedly, directly or indirectly, contract or promise to 
pay a sum of money or other benefit, on account of death, sickness, or acci-
dent to any of its members or other person. 
Whenever any building or land, or part thereof, mentioned in this sec-
tion, and not belonging to the State, shall be leased or shall otherwise be a 
source of revenue or profit, all of such buildings and land shall be liable to 
taxation as other land and buildings in the same county, city or town. But 
the General Assembly may provide for the partial taxation of property not 
exclusively used for the purposes herein named. 
Nothing herein contained shall be construed as authorizing or requiring 
any county, city, or town to tax for county, city, or town purposes, in viola-
tion of the rights of lessees thereof, existing under any lawful contract here-
tofore made, any real estate owned by such county, city or town, as hereto-
fore leased by it. 
Obligations issued by counties, cities or towns may be exempted by the 
authorities of such localities from local taxation. 
Art. XIII § 189. 
The General Assembly may, by general law, authorize the governing 
bodies of cities, towns and counties to exempt manufacturing establishments 
and works of internal improvement from local taxation for a period not 
exceeding five years, as an inducement to their location. 
WASHINGTON 
Art. VII §I. 
Canst. 1889. 
The power of taxation shall ~ever be suspended, surrendered or con-
tracted away. All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property 
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax and shall be 
levied and collected for public purposes only. The word "property" as used 
herein shall mean and include everything, whether tangible or intangible, 
subject to ownership. All real estate shall constitute one class: Provided, That 
the legislature may tax mines and mineral resources and lands devoted to 
reforestation by either a yield tax or an ad valorem tax at such rate as it may 
fix, or by both. Such property as the legislature may by general laws provide 
shall be exempt from taxation. Property of the United States and of the 
state, counties, school districts and other municipal corporations, and credits 
secured by property actually taxed in this state, not exceeding in value the 
value of such property, shall be exempt from taxation. The legislature shall 
have power, by appropriate legislation, to exempt personal property to the 
amount of three hundred ($300.00) dollars for each head of a family liable 
to .assessment and taxation under the provisions of the laws of this state of 
which the individual is the actual bona fide owner. 
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Art. VII §9. 
The legislature may vest the corporate authorities of cities, towns, and 
villages with power to make local improvements by special assessment, or by 
special taxation of property benefited. For all corporate purposes, all mu-
nicipal corporations may be vested with authority to assess and collect taxes, 
and such taxes shall be uniform in respect to persons and property within 
the jurisdiction of the body levying the same. 
WEST VIRGINIA 
Art. X §I. 
Const. 1872. 
Subject to the exceptions in this section contained, taxation shall be equal 
and uniform throughout the State, and all property, both real and personal, 
shall be taxed in proportion to its value to be ascertained as directed by law. 
No one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed 
higher than any other species of property of equal value; except that the 
aggregate of taxes assessed in any one year upon personal property employed 
exclusively in agriculture, including horticulture and grazing, products of 
agriculture as above defined, including live stock, while owned by the pro-
ducer, and money, notes, bonds, bills and accounts receivable, stocks and 
other similar intangible personal property shall not exceed fifty cents on 
each one hundred dollars of value thereon and upon all property owned, 
used and occupied by the owner thereof exclusively for residential purposes 
and upon farms occupied and cultivated by their owners or bona-fide tenants 
one dollar; and upon all other property situated outside of municipalities, 
one dollar and fifty cents; and upon all other such property situated within 
municipalities, two dollars; ••• but property used for educational, liter-
ary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes, all cemeteries, public prop-
erty, the personal property, including live stock, employed exclusively in 
agriculture as above defined and the products of agriculture as so defined 
while owned by the producers may by law be exempted from taxation; 
household goods to the value of two hundred dollars shall be exempted from 
taxation. The legislature shall have authority to tax privileges, franchises, and 
incomes of persons and corporations and to classify and graduate the tax on 
all incomes according to the amount thereof and to exempt from taxation, 
incomes below a minimum to be fixed from time to time. 
Art. VI §53. 
The legislature may by general law define and classify forest lands. 
Forest lands embraced in any such contract may be exempted from all taxa-
tion or be taxed in such manner, including the imposition of a severance 
tax or charge as trees are harvested, as the legislature may from time to time 
provide •••• 
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Art. X §9 • 
• , , but such [local] taxes shall be uniform, with respect to persons and 
property within the jurisdiction of the authority imposing the same. 
WISCONSIN 
Art. VIII § 1. 
Const. 1848. 
The rule of taxation shall be uniform but the legislature may empower 
cities, villages or towns to collect and return taxes on real estate located 
therein by optional methods. Taxes shall be levied upon such property with 
such classifications as to forests and minerals including or separate or sev-
ered from the land, as the legislature shall prescribe. Taxes may also be im-
posed on incomes, privileges and occupations, which taxes may be graduated 
and progressive, and reasonable exemptions may be provided. 
WYOMING 
Art. I §28. 
Const. 1890. 
No tax shall be imposed without the consent of the people or their 
authorized representatives. All taxation shall be equal and uniform. 
Art. XV §11. 
All property, except as in this constitution otherwise provided, shall be 
uniformly assessed for taxation, and the legislature shall prescribe such regu-
lations as shall secure a just valuation for tax of all property, real and 
personal. 
Art. XV §3. 
All mines and mining claims from which gold, silver and other precious 
metals, soda, saline, coal, mineral oil or other valuable deposit, is or may be 
produced shall be taxed in addition to the surface improvements, and in 
lieu of taxes on the lands, on the gross product thereof, as may be prescribed 
by law; provided, that the product of all mines shall be taxed in proportion 
to the value thereof. 
Art. XV §12. 
The property of the United States, the state, counties, cities, towns, school 
districts, municipal corporations and public libraries, lots with the buildings 
thereon used exclusively for religious worship, church parsonages, public 
cemeteries, shall be exempt from taxation, and such other property as the 
legislature may by general law provide. 
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